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
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The Political Psychology of Democratic Citizenship

Edited by

Eugene Borgida
Christopher M. Federico
John L. Sullivan

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EB: In memory of my parents, Tibor and Anne Borgida.

CMF: In memory of my father, Kenneth Fabian Federico.

JLS: To the loves of my life, Judith, Brandon, and Melissa (rip).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Introduction: Normative Conceptions of Democratic Citizenship and Evolving Empirical Research

Eugene Borgida, Christopher M. Federico, and John L. Sullivan

Democratic theories and theorists have often, as with Gaul, been divided into three parts, partitioned largely by the degree to which they trust political elites more–or less–than they trust the mass of ordinary citizens (Dahl, 1956; Mayo, 1960; Pateman, 1970; Weissberg & Nadel, 1972). In this context, "trust" has a dual meaning–as in the ability to govern well and wisely and as in the capacity to exercise restraint in pursuing self-interest at the expense of the greater good. The most elitist of the democratic theorists, who adhered in broadest terms to the ideals of self-governance and free and open procedures, evolved the position largely in response to the excesses of mass movements such as fascism and communism in the first part of the twentieth century. Because they were fearful of the emotional proclivities, intolerance, and excesses of nonelites, they preferred political systems constructed around institutional checks and balances designed to constrain ruling elites. These theorists also preferred systems fashioned by free and open elections amongst competing elites who can be replaced periodically through the electoral process if–or rather when–they lose touch with and become unresponsive to the broader interests of the citizenry. Their preference was for significant latitude accorded to political decision makers, largely because they had a dim view of the abilities and potential of citizens and because they had greater faith that political leaders will possess–and utilize–greater abilities and more sophisticated judgments to promote the common good (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Bachrach, 1967; Kornhauser, 1959; Mosca, 1939; Schumpeter, 1950).

At the other extreme have been proponents of varying degrees of more direct participatory democracy. Far from mistrusting ordinary citizens, some theorists harbored a more abiding distrust of political elites, preferring that citizens engage in sufficient micromanagement to constrain and restrain political elites through well-informed exercises of vigilance, electoral power, and mechanisms of direct democracy, such as the referendum and recall. Continuous vigilance and active involvement by citizens are portrayed as

reliable and viable mechanisms to curb elite abuses of power, while also driving public policies in directions preferred by the mass of citizens. The most optimistic of these theorists expressed their views during the heady populist days of the civil rights and antiwar movements of the 1960s and 1970s (Pateman, 1970; Thompson, 1970) but the quest for a strong participatory democracy is enduring (Barber, 1984). To varying degrees, these democratic theorists adopted J. S. Mill's belief that the practice of democracy can develop, even in ordinary citizens, astute skill and judgment. In more recent times, the theoretical and empirical work on the concept of deliberative democracy engenders optimism that, to the extent that ordinary citizens lack the requisite qualities for true self-governance, these qualities can become widespread under the right set of institutional circumstances. Even if citizens do not have a deep or profound knowledge of, or even interest in, political processes and policies, they do have the capacity for it, however latent (Crosby, 1975, 2003; Crosby & Nethercut, 2005; Delli Carpini, Cook, & Jacobs, 2004; Fishkin, 1991, 1997; Gastil & Levine, 2005).

The final partition roughly includes democratic theorists whose views fall between elitist and populist democracy. These theorists suggest that elitist democratic theorists may have trusted "the ruling classes" too extensively, while theorists of a more direct democracy may harbor too much optimism about the potential and motivations of citizens. Theorists of pluralist democracy seemed to hold greater stock in the axiom that power corrupts, preferring to trust neither elites nor masses but rather envisioning a democratic system whereby elites operate within a system of institutional checks and balances and the interests and preferences of citizens are voiced and enacted through a pluralist system of electoral and lobbying checks and balances (Dahl, 1956, 1963, 1971; Truman, 1951; Weissberg & Nadel, 1972). Elites counterbalance one another, as do groups of citizens organized by like-minded interests. Elite training and judgment can counterbalance excesses of citizens, and citizens can check elite abuses of power from time to time.

Most often, then, when social scientists rely on their empirical work to address the concerns of democratic theorists, the core question of citizen competence arises. Ideal characteristics of ideal citizens are posited with regard to qualities such as political knowledge and expertise, understanding and internalization of democratic norms and values, political interest and involvement, rational deliberation and emotional passions, and so on. Accordingly, social scientists have concluded, based on several decades of empirical research, that American citizens, despite participating in a long-standing and reasonably robust democracy, fall far short on almost every

normative criterion. However, this way of thinking tends to distort *both* the enormous variation in how democratic theories have been formulated and articulated *and* the nuances of a set of competency requirements that are not, and cannot be, characterized as either/or conditions. Most democratic theories do not specify very exactly the degree to which any of these ideal qualities ought to be manifested by individual citizens—or even by the aggregate electorate, for that matter.

Although it may be possible—even likely—that these ideal qualities, if present in every citizen in a mass democracy, would result in less than ideal processes and outcomes, no one knows for sure and few speculate with any precision about the ideal breadth and depth for such qualities to be distributed throughout society to maximize democratic functioning. We do, however, tend to forget that there has not always been agreement that high levels of civic competence are ideal. Although many of the "first wave" of empirical researchers who addressed these issues expressed some disappointment and even a degree of incredulousness regarding their findings about citizens' competence and tolerance (e.g., Converse, 1964; Prothro & Grigg, 1960), this first wave also included quite a number of scholars who were quite explicit in their view that the rather low level of mass participation was a blessing in disguise (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954; Lipset, 1960). We need to recall that this first wave of empirical research was conducted during and shortly after the rise of fascist power and other authoritarian mass movements.[1] The findings that ordinary citizens were often uninformed and were also quite responsive to emotional and dangerous appeals were not all that surprising. The normative interpretation of these findings, however, was not entirely uniform.

Compounding the ambiguities created by competing democratic theories has been the equally uncertain status of the aforementioned body of empirical research on the topic of citizen competence. Although the earliest research on electoral competence and behavior seemed to suggest a rather clear characterization—that is, citizens were on average subpar with respect to what is required by classical democratic theory on almost every dimension—new data and subsequent reframings created an empirical ambiguity to mirror the theoretical one.

At first, it seemed quite clear that the majority of American citizens possessed too little political information, insufficiently crystallized political

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[1] Of course, the argument has often been made that these movements were promulgated from the top—the masses merely went along with corrupt or evil political elites, but many of the empirically oriented social scientists of the time seemed to accept the prevailing view that authoritarian pressures emanated predominantly from mass movements.

attitudes, too-strong partisan attachments, too much political attention deficit disorder, and an impoverished level of overall political sophistication to function as good citizens in a liberal representative democracy. Then various revisionisms set in. As an example, consider research on ideological constraint. Converse (1964) and his colleagues (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) presented strong evidence that most citizens lacked stable political attitudes, coherent attitude structures, and ideological understandings. Subsequent research, however, presented the case that these findings were significantly overstated due to short-term fluctuations in the political context (Nie, Verba & Petrocik, 1979), attenuations caused by significant levels of measurement error (Achen, 1975; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1978), and an overly narrow conceptualization and measurement of ideology and attitude structuring (Marcus, Tabb, & Sullivan, 1974). Sometime later, beginning in the mid-to-late 1970s, research and theory on information processing addressed the widespread use of "heuristic" shortcuts and "on-line" processing, suggesting that the use of simple decision rules (e.g., partisanship and elite endorsements) might satisfy citizenship requirements of some varieties of democratic theory even in the absence of high levels of information and motivation (Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Popkin, 1991). Still, the informational impoverishment of the American electorate had not improved fundamentally over time despite rising levels of education (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Meanwhile, Zaller (1992) reinstantiated earlier views of the mass electorate by emphasizing a "top of the head" conceptualization of citizen competence, relying on some of the work in social cognition to challenge the more soothing normative conclusions supported by the heuristic and on-line processing model, which had served to reconcile the deliberative citizen model with the cognitive miser/shortcut model (Fiske & Taylor, 2008). There were, apparently, both reasonable and unreasonable shortcuts, and the debate, as in psychology and behavioral decision making, shifted to rational versus irrational heuristics.

    In the years since the "revisionist" research has been conducted, the waters have continued to be relatively more muddied than clarified. For example, empirical work suggests that "unsophisticated" citizens who are low in political knowledge and interest are also less likely to effectively use the heuristics that have been proposed as their very civic salvation (Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, & Rich, 2001; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). On a different front, Goren's work (2004) makes it clear that abstract values and beliefs are "structured coherently and equivalently in the minds of citizens at different levels of sophistication" and that political sophistication fails to enhance the impact of these principles on policy preferences. His empirical findings are compelling and demonstrate that earlier debates about mass–elite

differences in attitude structuring and coherence remain unsettled. Our (re)consideration of the political psychology of citizenship in this volume, then, reflects a continuing uncertainty and disagreement about both theoretical and empirical work on the relationship between citizens' competencies of various sorts and their role as citizens in a liberal democracy.[2]

MOVING BEYOND MALAISE: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AGENDA

Thus, even a cursory review of empirical assessments of the conditions which obtain in contemporary mass democracies suggests a number of critical challenges to the more demanding normative conceptions of democratic citizenship. In a continuing effort to gain theoretical and empirical traction on these problems, researchers are attempting to reexamine various factors relevant to effective citizenship. Although responses to the aforementioned challenges have come from a variety of disciplines in the social and behavioral sciences, researchers in three fields have been notably prominent in work on the complexity of contemporary citizenship: *political science, social psychology*, and *mass communications*. Indeed, most of the contributors to this volume hail from one of these three disciplines with respect to approach, interests, and training.

Nevertheless, in assembling the group of contributors for this volume, we were not simply aiming for "representativeness" or a rehash of each discipline's respective findings about the prospects and problems of democratic citizenship. Rather, our goal is to present a specifically *interdisciplinary* dialogue—what we like to think of as "cross-talk"—about the nature of contemporary challenges to effective democratic citizenship and the ways in which social and behavioral scientists can suggest practical steps toward meeting these challenges. But why should we be interested in an approach like this? As we note below, there are a number of reasons why an interdisciplinary approach grounded in political psychology may offer a uniquely valuable perspective on democratic citizenship. However, one justification

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[2] A second area of concern, political tolerance, can be similarly described. Initial findings of mass intolerance (Prothro & Grigg, 1960; Stouffer, 1955) coupled with relatively greater levels of elite tolerance (McClosky, 1964) are followed by findings of apparent increases in mass political tolerance in the 1970s (Davis, 1975; Nunn, Crockett & Williams, 1978). These in turn are subjected to conceptual and methodological critiques that question the tidy story (Sullivan, Piereson & Marcus, 1982) and attempt to provide a more nuanced discussion of how these findings relate to different variants of democratic theory.

for an interdisciplinary approach stands out in particular—namely, the fragmentary nature of the analyses offered by researchers working largely in isolation in their respective fields of political science, social psychology, and mass communications. We contend that some of the major missteps and contradictions identified in the literature reviewed above could have been avoided and clarified more sharply and quickly had the approach been more interdisciplinary and integrated. For example, the measurement issues that posed significant revisionist challenges to the mainstream findings identified in the political science literatures on ideological constraint and political tolerance were largely derived from psychometrics and psychological theory. If one accepted the validity of the revisionist critiques, one generally concluded that the initial "errors" reflected a narrow, and perhaps even obsessively disciplinary, approach taken within political science. A more clearly interdisciplinary dialogue and research agenda may well have moved the field much farther along and much faster than we have seen. In this volume, we hope to nudge citizenship scholarship even further in the direction of interdisciplinary cross talk and theorizing, in the hope that our knowledge will progress even more rapidly during the next couple of decades, perhaps leading to resolution of some of the theoretical and empirical controversies mentioned above.

A brief review of the key themes explored by citizenship researchers in each discipline reveals the aforementioned pattern of fragmentation. For example, scholars working in political science have provided us with a particularly strong analysis of macro-level issues in contemporary citizenship. Perhaps most fundamentally, a long tradition of democratic theory inherited by the field continues to provide insight into normative questions about the role of citizens in democratic societies and the aptitudes and virtues they should ideally possess (de Tocqueville, 1850/1969; Mill, 1861; Rousseau, 1762/1968), the role of civic education in the development of citizenship (Dewey, 1916/1966; see also Easton, 1965; Easton & Dennis, 1969), and how citizens are represented in government (Dahl, 1961; Pitkin, 1967; Schattschneider, 1960). In turn, philosophical inquiries of this sort have inspired a variety of empirical investigations of just how well citizens live up to the expectations of democratic theory. Among other things, research of this sort—as we have seen—has examined the extent of citizens' political knowledge, often finding it to be lacking (see Bennett, 1989; Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964, 1975, 2000; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1987, 1990); the degree to which they hold beliefs that are internally consistent and ideologically structured, typically finding that most do not (see Converse, 1964, 2006; Erikson & Tedin, 2003; Kinder, 1983; McClosky, 1964; Zaller, 1992); their learning of critical

democratic political norms, often noting that their learning is incomplete (see McClosky, 1964; McClosky & Zaller, 1984; Nie, Junn, & Stehlik-Barry, 1996; Sullivan, Pierson, & Marcus, 1982); and finally the extent to which they actually participate in political activity, finding that it varies considerably as a function of several variables related to ability and mobilization effort (see Campbell et al., 1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980).

Despite these macro-level advantages, political science has had much less to say about lower-level phenomena relevant to citizenship. In particular, the field appears to be less equipped to examine the micro-level psychological processes that effectively mediate between the citizen and his or her broader political environment. For example, political science has often been left with "black box" models of voting and other activities central to citizenship— that is, models that posit some kind of psychological process that intercedes between predispositions and information, on one hand, and decisions, on the other (for reviews, see Krosnick, 2002; Lau, 1990; Lavine, 2002; Lodge, 1995; Lodge, Stroh, & Wahlke, 1990). This is particularly evident in some of the earliest models of voting, such the "Columbia" model (e.g., Berelson et al., 1954), but is even apparent in the more psychological "Michigan" model of voting (e.g., Campbell et al., 1960), which emphasizes the role of a psychological orientation—partisanship—without going into great detail about the psychology behind that orientation (e.g., by understanding it as a group identification; see Green, Palmquist, & Schickler, 2002). Similarly, although political scientists have repeatedly emphasized the importance of political information for effective citizenship, the discipline has often had to look outside its own borders for adequate micro-level models of how information is represented and processed amid limited human cognitive capacity (Lau, 1990, 2003; Lau & Sears, 1986; Lodge & Hamill, 1986).[3]

In social psychology, research on citizenship raises a set of concerns that are almost diametrically opposed to those in political science. Notably, research on the bases of effective citizenship in social psychology is strongest with respect to precisely what political science has dealt with most poorly: namely, attention to micro-level processes. In general, social psychologists have made strong contributions to understanding the basic psychological processes behind a number of traits and behaviors central to effective

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[3] Despite being ill-equipped to identify and test micro-level processes, political behavioralists have more often than not posited or drawn conclusions about these processes, and (from our perspective) their assumptions and conclusions have unwittingly influenced the kinds of macro- and democratic theories endorsed by political scientists.

democratic citizenship, often with the inferential benefits associated with rigorous experimental methods. For example, in recent years, social psychologists have provided detailed accounts of attitude formation and change (for reviews, see Albarracin, Johnson, Zanna, & Kumkale, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 2005), the bases of political attitude structure (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Fabrigar, MacDonald, & Wegener, 2005; Federico, 2004; Federico & Schneider, 2007), the nature of identification with social groups (e.g., Brewer & Brown, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and the bases of political affinity and political conviction (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Duckitt, 2001; Jarvis & Petty, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; McGregor, 2004; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991). Moreover, basic research in social psychology has contributed models of information processing and judgment under cognitive limitations that have helped fill the "black box" at the heart of many classical models of political behavior (for a review, see Lodge, 1995). In particular, a sizable literature on biases, heuristics, and the schematic organization of information has made invaluable contributions to our understanding of how citizens might deal with the "blooming, buzzing confusion" of political life despite low levels of information and motivation (for reviews of the basic literature, see Fiske & Taylor, 2008; Kunda, 1999; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lavine, 2002; Moskowitz, 2005).

However, just as political science has often been at a disadvantage in making sense of micro-level issues, social psychology has been less successful in engaging macro-level aspects of citizenship and the exercise of citizenship. Befitting the field's focus on the impact of the immediate social situation (Fiske, 2004; Jones, 1998), social-psychological research on citizenship has not attended very much to the broader cultural and institutional contexts in which citizenship is practiced and which constrain citizens' thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Kuklinski, Luskin, & Bolland, 1991; Luskin, 2002; see also Rahn, Sullivan, & Rudolph, 2002). For example, recent psychological research has shed a great deal of light on epistemic motivation as an antecedent of citizens' ideological affinities, finding that a closed orientation toward the acquisition and use of information tends to be associated with political conservatism (see Jost et al., 2003, 2007). However, this line of work has devoted little attention to the role of elite political discourse in defining the ideological "menu" from which motivated political choices are made (see Federico & Goren, in press; see also Sniderman & Bullock, 2004).

Finally, research on citizenship in the third discipline represented in this volume—mass communications—offers a pattern of contributions quite different from those offered by political science and social psychology. In

general, mass communications research in this area has not focused as strongly or directly on the macro-level normative, institutional, and cultural concerns examined by political scientists or the micro-level cognitive and motivational foundations of citizenship dealt with by social psychologists. Nevertheless, work in mass communications has attended closely to a feature of contemporary political environments that is dealt with only indirectly by political scientists and psychologists: namely, the technology, organization, and content of political communications themselves. As noted previously, the nature of communication in advanced democracies has evolved considerably over the present era. Recent years have seen a shift toward new means of mass communication—particularly the Internet—and toward a proliferation of competing sources of political information (see Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). In addition, citizens not only have a greater number of communication media and sources of political information to choose from but also have more alternatives to seeking political information when attending to any given medium (Baum & Kernell, 1999, 2006). Naturally, then, many have asked what consequences the evolving structure of mass communications may have for democratic citizenship.

Accordingly, a key focus of mass communications research on citizenship issues has been the "uses and gratifications" citizens derive from particular media and content (Katz et al., 1974; Rubin, 1994). Moreover, other lines of work have looked at the impact of the means and organization of political communications on a number of outcomes relevant to the effective exercise of citizenship, including the acquisition of political information (e.g., Eveland, Hayes, Shah, & Kwak, 2005; Liu & Eveland, 2005; Price & Zaller, 1993; Ridout, Shah, Goldstein, & Franz, 2004; Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000) and civic engagement (e.g., Cho et al., 2003; Shah, 1998; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Shah, Watts, Domke, & Fan, 2002). Other studies in mass communications have examined the impact of mass communications on the nature of political debate and citizen decision making, a focus exemplified by work on patterns of news coverage and their effects on agenda setting and priming (e.g., Althaus & Kim, 2006; Althaus & Tewksbury, 2002; Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; McCombs, 2005; Shah, Watts, Domke, Fan, & Fibison, 1999) and by studies of the impact of media frames on civic discourse (e.g., Boyle et al., 2006; Keum et al., 2005; Scheufele, 1999; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). Finally, communications scholars have been particularly attentive to how changes in the means, organization, and content of political communications have influenced and shaped citizenship, with a special focus on changes in the nature of news coverage amid the rise of "new media"

(e.g., Baum, 2003) and the unique consequences of the rise of the Internet for citizenship (e.g., Eveland, Cortese, Park, & Dunwoody, 2004; Eveland & Dylko, 2007).

Thus, in contemporary social-scientific work on citizenship and current challenges to the effective practice of citizenship, fragmentation in analysis and focus would seem to be the rule. Although scholars in political science, social psychology, and mass communications have all made notable contributions to our understanding of present-day citizenship, they concentrate on very different aspects of the overall problem. In light of this fragmentary pattern of inquiry, we submit that an explicitly *interdisciplinary* approach to the analysis of citizenship holds great potential for insight and integration across topic areas— and for the development of informed interventions aimed at meeting current challenges faced by democratic citizens.

OVERVIEW OF *THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP*

The present volume is organized around five carefully selected themes related to democratic citizenship: civic knowledge; persuasion processes and intervention processes in contemporary democracies; group identity; hate crimes and tolerance; technology and mass media. We specifically chose these topic areas for several reasons. First, these topics, more than some others, address the key challenges to existing perspectives on citizenship discussed earlier in this chapter. They represent themes that are clearly central to the health of democratic societies. At the same time, they represent ongoing lines of research that offer important contributions to an interdisciplinary political psychology perspective on citizenship. These five themes also represent topics with unrealized potential for interdisciplinary exploration and analysis. From our perspective, these are themes where scholars may not be aware of work in other disciplines on the same topic or where scholars are insufficiently aware of such work and might well benefit from greater intellectual commerce. In other words, these are themes that provide excellent opportunities for the interdisciplinary cross talk that we have encouraged in this chapter and that is included in various contributions to this volume.

In Part I, two chapters take up the civic knowledge theme—one by political scientist Michael Delli Carpini and the other by cognitive scientist Paul Johnson—and engage in cross talk about the multifaceted nature of political knowledge and the importance of assessing different types of citizen knowledge about politics. Part II takes up different

aspects of persuasion processes in contemporary democratic societies with a focus on the implications for electoral politics and civic engagement and participation. Social psychologists Crystal Hall, Amir Goren, and Shelly Chaiken, along with social-neuroscientist Alexander Todorov, focus on the ways in which rapid automatic processes, based on brief exposure to candidates' facial appearance, inform our macro-level understanding of democratic citizenship, more generally, as well as electoral decision making in U.S. congressional and gubernatorial elections. Political scientists Jennifer Jerit, James Kuklinski, and Paul Quirk also illustrate the nuances of citizen decision making and policy preferences and draw on different types of evidence to highlight the ways in which politicians engage in strategic persuasion using political rhetoric. The third chapter on persuasion processes, by social psychologists Mark Snyder, Allen Omoto, and Dylan Smith, offers a research-based conceptual model of voluntary civic behavior that generates significant insights into the ways in which voluntary citizen participation is initiated, sustained, and linked to voting behavior and social movement participation.

Part III, on group identity, examines the inevitable categorization of the social world into ingroups and outgroups and the implications for how people perceive individual citizens and social groups. Social psychologist Marilynn Brewer examines the interrelationships among multiple group memberships and the consequences of these identity dynamics for our understanding of citizenship in pluralistic democratic states. Political scientist Pamela Conover focuses on the interplay between democracy and difference, and what she calls the "politics of recognition." Conover's chapter draws heavily on theory and research on social identity and examines the implications of these psychological dynamics associated with recognition for democratic citizenship.

Interdisciplinary research on the corrosive threat to democratic citizenship stemming from hate crimes and intolerance suggests that they pose a real threat to democratic societies. This theme raises questions about what is known and what still needs to be learned about the sources of tolerance that a diverse and dynamic democratic society requires. Social psychologists Charles Judd and Bernadette Park draw on social cognition research on category differentiation and examine the implications of this work for designing interventions that reduce prejudice and also preserve a multicultural perspective. Political scientists Donald Green and Janelle Wong present new findings from a randomized field experiment based on intergroup contact theory from social psychology and speculate on the extent to which interracial contact represents a positive force for promoting democratic citizenship through increased tolerance. In the third chapter in this part,

political scientists Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz argue for more cross talk between social psychologists and political scientists interested in stereotyping processes. Micro- and macro-level understandings of social stereotypes need to be better aligned to maximize an understanding of the political consequences of prejudice and stereotyping.

Rapid changes in the technology and content of mass media raise questions about the effects of these changes on mobilizing information that brings citizens into contact with politics and with each other. In Part V of this volume, sociologist William Gamson and political scientist Lance Bennett confront some of these technology-driven challenges for democratic citizenship. Gamson discusses the ways in which media practices encourage or discourage the development of collective identities that foster civic engagement on the part of those who hold them. Bennett examines personalization and the injection of negative emotional images in news content over the past 20 years and, with Gamson's arguments in mind, considers the ways in which this dynamic facilitates and inhibits civic engagement and mobilization.

In the final part, Chapters 14–16, three sets of distinguished commentators focus on different aspects of the scholarly agenda put forth in this volume. The commentators were invited to address the five topic areas that constitute the volume's organizational backbone, and also, importantly, to take stock and comment on what this body of work suggests about the state of political psychology's contributions to our understanding of these issues. As we suggested earlier, political psychology either has already contributed to our understanding of these issues *or* has enormous potential to contribute to our understanding through increased cross talk. For example, our commentators ask whether these contributions, independently or taken together, provide an integrative, interdisciplinary approach to issues in democratic citizenship, grounded in political psychology. More generally, we also asked commentators to consider the extent to which contributions included in the volume speak to the nature of interdisciplinary social science more generally and the extent to which these contributions are illustrative of the conceptual and operational issues faced by a variety of interdisciplinary researchers.

Thus, in presenting this set of contributions, including the commentaries, our aim is to provide a multifaceted, interdisciplinary look at the *political psychology of democratic citizenship*. As a growing body of work suggests, political psychology is furnishing social scientists with some of the most exciting and important insights about how citizens relate to one another and to politically consequential institutions, structures, and cultural formations (Jost & Sidanius, 2004; Kuklinski, 2001, 2002; Sears, Huddy, & Jervis, 2003). Among

other things, political psychology's historically interdisciplinary approach offers a particularly compelling analysis of how social interaction in the context of politics and political activity shapes citizens—and how the characteristics of citizens may feed back on to interactions and institutions themselves. In particular, we think that political psychology provides an opportunity and a context for scholars working in different fields to engage in edifying cross talk with one another about the nature of democratic citizenship and to transcend the fragmentation discussed earlier. In short, the interdisciplinary bent of contemporary work in political psychology may uniquely equip it to provide us with a more nuanced understanding of citizenship issues—and perhaps even of competing democratic theories—in democratic societies.

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Civic Knowledge

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The Psychology of Civic Learning

Michael X. Delli Carpini

Citizen knowledge is important to the democratic polity, being related to, among other things, political tolerance and efficacy, political participation, and the ability to consistently connect policy views to meaningful political evaluations. However, a large body of research concludes that citizens possess low levels of factual knowledge about government and politics. Moreover, while traditional models—grounded in the normative logic of democratic theory—suggest that political learning is an active and rational process, recent research on heuristics and affect complicates these assumptions. This chapter argues that in order to advance our understanding of political knowledge, it is necessary to integrate five principal areas of research: the traditional model, heuristic models, impression-driven models, affect-based models, and models of operative knowledge.

"A popular government," wrote James Madison (1832), "without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both." There is little disagreement among political scientists that the quality of public opinion and civic participation, and thus of the democratic process, is affected by the extent to which citizens are informed about politics. At the same time, however, "The most familiar fact to arise from sample surveys is that popular levels of information about public affairs are, from the point of view of the informed observer, astonishingly low" (Converse, 1975, p. 79). This "paradox" of democracy (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954) has generated a lively debate in political science. At the heart of this debate is disagreement over the ways in which citizens learn about and use politically relevant information, as well as over what kind of information matters to effective citizenship.

In this essay, I provide an overview and assessment of the major fault lines defining this debate. The first two sections review extant research on what Americans know about politics, as well as the evidence connecting factual knowledge with political opinions and behavior. The following two sections provide an explication of the "traditional" psychological model presumed to explain this connection, and of refinements to this model introduced by a consideration of heuristic decision making. In the next two

sections, I discuss further refinements (and complications) to our under-standing of how citizens acquire, process, and use politically relevant infor-mation resulting from recent research on the role of affect or emotions. The next section directly addresses the question of "what knowledge is of most worth," raised by Paul Johnson in his essay in Chapter 3. Finally, I conclude by raising several questions that must be answered if the theories and find-ings discussed in this essay are to be combined into a more integrated model of civic learning.

WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS

There remains a healthy debate on the meaning of "political knowledge" and its relationship to democratic practice (see, for example, the 2006 spe-cial issue of *Critical Review*, edited by Jeffrey Friedman, which is devoted to "democratic competence"). Nonetheless, over 60 years of survey research on Americans' knowledge of politics leads to several consistent conclusions (Converse, 2000). First, factual knowledge about political institutions and processes, substantive policies and socio-economic conditions, and politi-cal actors such as elected officials and political parties is generally low, with most multiple-item "quizzes" producing mean scores of 50 percent or less (Bennett, 1989; Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986; Pew Research Center, 2007).

Second, while mean levels of political knowledge are relatively low, there is a great deal of variance in what Americans know. In multiple-item quizzes administered to random samples of adult Americans, 30 percent of respon-dents were able to correctly answer over 70 percent of the questions, while another 30 percent were able to correctly answer only about 25 percent (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 151–154; but see Converse, 2000, on the difficulty of determining the "actual" distribution of political knowledge). There is also substantial variance across demographic groups, with men, whites, older citizens, and wealthier citizens significantly more informed than women, nonwhites, younger citizens, and poorer citizens (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 154–177; but see Mondak, 2000, 2001, and Mondak & Davis, 2001, on the possibility that group differences in knowledge, especially across gender, are inflated by differential tendencies to guess). And there are sig-nificant and not always easily explained differences in the particular facts that are commonly known by most Americans as opposed to those that are obscure to all but a small percentage of citizens (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 62–104).

Third, despite some evidence of specialization, knowledge about different areas of national politics appears to be highly intercorrelated. Citizens who are more informed about one area of politics (e.g., foreign affairs) are generally more likely to be informed about other areas of politics (e.g., domestic politics, institutions and processes, and/or political actors) (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993; Zaller, 1986). And fourth, Americans appear no more informed about politics today than they were 50 years ago, despite rising levels of overall educational attainment and greater availability of information (Bennett, 1989; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 105–134; Neuman, 1986, pp. 14–17; Pew Research Center, 2007; Smith, 1989, pp. 159–222).

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN FACTUAL POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIORS

In addition to providing a consistent portrait of what Americans (and increasingly citizens in other nations) know and don't know about politics, research also demonstrates a consistent correlation between factual knowledge and many political attitudes and behaviors. Informed citizens are more accepting of democratic norms such as political tolerance (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995), more efficacious about politics (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996), and more likely to participate in politics in a variety of ways (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Junn, 1991; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). They are also more likely to hold political opinions (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Krosnick & Milburn, 1990), to hold more intense opinions (Bizer, Viser, Berent, & Krosnick, 2004), to hold more stable opinions over time (Billiet, Swyngedouw, &Waege, 2004; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Erikson & Knight, 1993; Kriesi, 2004; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004), and to hold opinions that are more ideologically consistent with each other (Converse, 1964; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 235–238; McClosky & Zaller, 1984, pp. 250–251; Neuman, 1986, pp. 64–67; Sniderman & Bullock, 2004; Zaller, 1986, pp. 10–11). Moreover, they are less likely to change their opinions in the face of new but tangential or misleading information (Kinder & Sanders, 1990; Lanoue, 1992), but more likely to change in the face of new relevant or compelling information (Zaller, 1992, but also see Zaller, 2004, for evidence that under certain circumstances "politically sophisticated" citizens can be less likely to change opinions in the face of changing objective circumstances).

Political knowledge also affects the opinions held by different socioeconomic groups (e.g., groups based on race, class, gender, and age differences). More-informed citizens within these groups hold opinions that

are both significantly different from less-informed citizens with similar demographic characteristics and arguably more consistent with their values and/or material circumstances (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 238–251). These group differences are large enough to suggest that aggregate opinion on a number of political issues would be significantly different were citizens more fully and equitably informed about politics (Althaus, 1998, 2003). It is important to note, however, that the increased consistency between values, beliefs, and specific policy opinions associated with greater knowledge does not necessarily lead to more "enlightened" preferences in a normative sense. For example, both Federico and Sidanius (2002) and Goren (2003) find that political sophistication can increase the likelihood that whites will draw on implicit and explicit racial stereotypes in their assessments of affirmative action and social welfare policies.

Finally, political knowledge seems to increase citizens' ability to consistently connect their policy views to evaluations of public officials and political parties and to their political behavior. For example, informed citizens are more likely to identify with a political party, approve of the performance of office holders, and vote for candidates whose policy stands are most consistent with their own views (Alvarez, 1997; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 251–258). Again, however, this relationship need not lead to more socially conscious behavior. For example, Gomez and Wilson (2001) find that more sophisticated voters engage in "pocketbook voting" (i.e., voting based upon changes in their personal economic circumstances), while less sophisticated voters engage in "sociotropic voting" (i.e., voting based on broader trends in the economy).

HOW FACTUAL KNOWLEDGE AFFECTS POLITICAL BELIEFS, OPINIONS, AND BEHAVIORS: THE TRADITIONAL MODEL

While there is a good deal of research documenting the connection between political knowledge and political attitudes and behaviors, less is known about the psychological processes through which this connection is made. Implicit in the survey and correlational studies discussed above is the assumption that factual knowledge serves as a lynchpin to the development of political beliefs.

"Cognition" (from Latin, "to know") refers to the ways individuals process and use information. The study of cognition has traditionally focused on issues of "attention, perception, learning, and memory" (Eysenck, 1994, p. 64), as well as thought, language, reasoning, and problem solving (Wade

& Tavris, 1993, pp. 275–309). Individual cognitions produce the *beliefs* one holds about any external stimulus, including "things, people, places, ideas, or situations" (Oskamp, 1977, p. 8). A belief, according to Fishbein and Ajzen, is "a person's subjective probability that an object has a particular characteristic" (in Oskamp, 1977, p. 11) or "what a person holds to be true about the world" (Wade & Tavris, 1993). In turn, beliefs form the bases of more specific opinions and behaviors.

Factual information is of obvious importance in the formation of beliefs and their expression through specific opinions and behaviors. For example, if I (incorrectly) believe that blacks have lower unemployment rates or greater incomes than whites, then, all else being equal, I am likely to oppose programs that are designed to provide special assistance to blacks in these areas. If I believe (correctly), however, that black unemployment rates are over twice that of whites' or that blacks earn significantly less than whites, then (again all else being equal) I should be more likely to support such assistance programs.

Of course, the process of attitude formation is more complex than this simple example suggests—all other things are seldom equal. For example, work by Federico (2004, 2007) and Federico and Schneider (2007) suggest that "political expertise" leads to more ideologically consistent attitudes only when they are motivated by a strong "need to evaluate." In addition, people hold numerous, often conflicting values (Bennett, 1980). Preexisting beliefs create webs of knowledge, or cognitive schema (Fiske & Taylor, 1984), through which new information is processed (Cohen, 1994; Kuklinski, Quirk, Schwieder, & Rich, 1997). These schemas can affect what information is attended to, how it is perceived or interpreted, how (and if) it is stored in long-term memory, and when it is recalled for later consideration (Haste & Torney-Purta, 1992). And prior behaviors can lead to cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and a desire to achieve cognitive consistency or balance (Heider, 1946), which can affect the use of old information and the processing of new information. The notion that prior beliefs, structured as schema, play a role in the processing of *new* information further explains why some researchers argue that factual tests or quizzes are useful measures of political knowledge. The assumption is that these tests tap factual knowledge that is stored in long-term memory and that is readily accessible to the individual. These facts are presumed to be the building blocks of prior beliefs, which in turn are the building blocks of cognitive schema. Thus, prior knowledge not only affects the attitudes and opinions one already holds, it also provides the context in which new information is processed (Popkin & Dimock, 2000; Price & Zaller, 1993; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 1991), and so provides a way for explaining how beliefs and attitudes develop and change.

This model of political learning assumes that attitude formation and expression are *active, rational* processes. While some attitudes and even schema may be relatively fixed and easily retrieved, for the most part, they are constructed and reconstructed through the process of remembering, thinking, reasoning, and communicating (Delli Carpini & Williams, 1994; Fishkin, 1995; Gamson, 1992; Neuman, Just, & Crigler, 1992; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). It is through these processes that factual information, as stored in beliefs, is presumed to produce the levels of opinion holding, opinion stability and constraint, opinion change, enlightened preferences, and instrumentally rational attitudes and behaviors summarized earlier. In short, factual knowledge is the anchor that tethers attitudes to each other, to behavioral intentions, and to the empirical world.

SIMPLIFYING THE INFORMATIONAL REQUISITES OF CITIZENSHIP: THE USE OF HEURISTICS

One of the major criticisms of the traditional model outlined above is that it expects citizens "to yield an unlimited quantity of public spirit, interest, curiosity, and effort" (Lippmann, 1925, p. 2), thus setting the standards of citizenship so high as to make democracy impossible (Schattschneider, 1960, pp. 134–136). An arguably more realistic view is that citizens can make reasonably effective decisions even if they are only moderately informed. Much like the traditional model, this approach assumes that beliefs are the mainspring of attitude formation, that they can be based on more or less accurate information, and that attitude formation and expression is an active, rational process. However, citizens are further seen as "cognitive misers" (Hewstone & Macrae, 1994) who attempt to make efficient decisions under circumstances of limited ability to process information, limited incentives to become politically engaged, and limited information (Downs, 1957; Popkin, 1991). Citizens achieve this low-information rationality through the use of information shortcuts or heuristics:

> Citizens frequently can compensate for their limited information about politics by taking advantage of judgmental heuristics. Heuristics are judgmental shortcuts, efficient ways to organize and simplify political choices, efficient in the double sense of requiring relatively little information to execute, yet yielding dependable answers even to complex problems of choice . . . . Insofar as they can be brought into play, people can be knowledgeable in their reasoning about political choices without possessing a large body of knowledge about politics. (Sniderman et al., 1991, p. 19)

Building on the work of psychologists Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (1982), a growing body of research has emerged demonstrating the use of informational shortcuts in political decision making and identifying the specific heuristics used in this process (for an excellent review, see Mondak, 1994). This research goes a long way toward reconciling evidence of low levels of information with the assumption that citizens can make reasoned decisions that reflect their true preferences. Three related issues make it unclear whether the heuristic model offers a satisfying solution to the paradox of a democracy based on poorly informed citizens, however.

First, the use of shortcuts describes a human condition rather than a particular form of decision making. Research suggests that even elites such as foreign-policy makers make decisions under conditions of imperfect information and use heuristics in making decisions (Jervis, 1976; Larson, 1985). Thus, the issue for both the traditional and the heuristic models is not whether or not citizens use partial information to make decisions, but the reliability, validity, and relevance of the information provided (Lupia, McCubbins, & Popkin, 2000, Part I) and used (Lupia et al., 2000, Part II; Riggle, Ottati, Wyer, Kuklinski, & Schwartz, 1992; Sniderman et al., 1991). This is an especially important consideration, given the systematic group differences in political knowledge discussed earlier in this essay.

Second, heuristic models are based on *low* information rationality, not *no* information rationality. These models assume that citizens are able to use shortcuts precisely because they can draw on relevant information stored in long-term memory. The heuristic model suggests that many of the "textbook" facts tapped in quizzes of the public may be unnecessary for making reasoned judgments (Graber, 1994). However, much of the information that *is* necessary for heuristic decision making—for example, the party affiliations, ideological leanings, past issue stands, and personal characteristics of public figures—is precisely the kind of information that many citizens lack (Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, & Rich, 2001; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006).

And third, while most of the political science literature focuses on the *value* of heuristics in reaching decisions that accurately reflect one's true preferences, much of the psychological literature in this area emphasizes the tendency for such simplified processes to lead to *decision errors*. At some point, the amount or quality of information used for making decisions can become so limited as to be useless or misleading (Kuklinski & Quirk, 2000; Kuklinski et al., 1997, 2001; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001, 2006; Tetlock, 2000). For example, a large percentage of those who voted for George Bush in 1988 did so because they wrongly related specific policies to the prior Reagan–Bush

administration (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 263–264). Similarly, heuristic decision making is often at the heart of many of the negative (and inaccurate) stereotypes that drive problematic ethnic and racial attitudes and behaviors (Peffley & Shields, 1996; Smith, 1996).

THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN INFORMATION PROCESSING

While the "traditional" and "heuristic" models described above differ in their views about how much and what kinds of factual information are necessary for citizens to make political decisions, both see beliefs—or cognitive assumptions about what is true—as the driving force of attitude formation and expression. Alternative approaches place a more central emphasis on the role of affect, though research increasingly demonstrates that many emotions operate in conjunction with rather than in opposition to reason and cognition.

Research from both psychology and neuroscience provides a strong basis for the importance of emotions in attitude formation (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000, pp. 12–64). This research reminds us that "information" is much broader than facts, that "cognitions" are not limited to conscious thought, and that there are many "information-processing" systems in the human body. Drawing on this literature, Marcus, Neuman, MacKuen, and Sullivan (1996) distinguish three interrelated information processing systems: reflexive action; emotional responses; and deliberative thought. Deliberative thought comes closest to the processes emphasized thus far in this essay. But Marcus et al. argue that emotional information processing has important and under- or poorly studied implications for political decision making as well.

Two keys to the relationship between emotional and deliberative information processing in the formation of political attitudes are the speed with which different kinds of information are processed and the extent to which they involve conscious thought. For example, reflexive responses to information (moving one's hand away from a hot stove) can take place before one has either a conscious awareness or a sensation of pain. Certain emotional responses to information, while not as quick as reflexive responses, are processed more quickly and less consciously than is rational thought (Lodge & Taber, 1996). For example, when I watch a campaign ad, listen to a presidential address, or read a newspaper article, I may be reacting to that information both emotionally and deliberatively, but my emotional reactions are happening more quickly and, initially at least, less consciously. Thus, at a minimum, emotional responses are likely to affect the extent to which factual

information is attended to and the way it is perceived, stored, and recalled. And it is possible that emotional responses alone are enough for citizens to develop political attitudes, even in the absence of the conscious use of factual information.

The temporal ordering of emotional versus more deliberative or rational responses to new information, combined with how conscious we are about these emotions, has influenced a number of theories of how political attitudes and opinions are constructed. One such theory is the "impression driven" or "online" model of information processing developed by Milton Lodge and his colleagues (Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Lodge & Taber, 2000). According to this theory, individuals make political evaluations at the moment information is presented, storing their affective impressions in memory and then " 'forgetting' the actual pieces of evidence that contributed to the evaluation" (Lodge et al., 1989, p. 401). Affective judgments—rather than factual information—about particular individuals, groups, or issues are mentally stored in a running tally that is updated when new information is encountered. It is these emotional tallies that are retrieved into short-term memory when citizens encounter new information and/or make decisions about the person, group, or issue in question.

The "online model" differs from both the traditional and heuristic models in two important respects. First, it suggests that findings of generally low recognition and recall of political facts tell us little about people's exposure to or use of political information. Citizens may have little memory of such facts, yet have used them to develop their attitudes. For example, I may be able to tell you I disapprove of the job the president is doing, and have based that opinion on a wealth of factual information, but be unable to recall what those specific facts are. Second, it suggests that people's political decisions are driven by affective rather than purely cognitive schema—citizens come to political judgment about many issues through visceral emotions rather than deliberation and thought. In this model, political sophistication is defined as the speed and efficiency with which citizens can process factual information into affective tallies. At best, tests of factual knowledge are indicators of one's cognitive processing ability, rather than of substantively important pieces of information that are called up for active use in forming and expressing political opinions.

Other affect-driven theories involve the use of heuristics. As with all heuristic theories, they assume that citizens use shortcuts in making political decisions. However, affective heuristics are driven by how one *feels* about the issue, person, or group in question. Consider, for example, the "likability heuristic." In the version of this model, developed by Brady and Sniderman (1985) and Sniderman et al. (1991), citizens relate stands

to individuals and groups by attributing their own views to individuals and groups they like and by attributing opposing views to those they dislike. For example, if I am pro–gun control, and I like Bill Clinton, then I assume he is pro–gun control as well. Carmines and Kuklinski (1990) also assume that affect (likability) drives decision making, but argue that one's feelings toward the individual or group, coupled with beliefs about where they stand, cue them as to where they themselves stand on the issue in question. For example, if I like Bill Clinton, and I believe he supports gun control, then I decide that I, too, must support gun control. While the direction of causality is important, the point is that both models see affect, rather than beliefs or knowledge, as the mainspring of attitude formation and change.

More recently, Lodge and his colleagues (Lodge & Taber, 2000, 2001, 2005; Morris, Squires, Taber, & Lodge, 2003; Taber & Lodge, 2006) have combined the notions of affective heuristics with online information processing and the concept of *hot cognitions* to develop a theory of motivated political reasoning. According to this theory, *all* social information is affectively charged at the moment the information is encountered, and this "affective tag" is stored directly with the concept in long-term memory. These hot cognitions (Abelson, 1963) are then updated and revised in the face of new information through the online process discussed earlier. Finally, when asked (implicitly or explicitly) to evaluate a political object, people will use the "how-do-I-feel" heuristic (Clore & Isbell, 1996) by moving the affective tally into working memory and by using the resulting feelings to guide their response, with negative net tallies producing a negative judgment and positive net tallies producing a positive judgment.

While research such as that discussed above has focused on the role of emotions *writ large* on political decision making, work by George Marcus and colleagues (Marcus, 2002; Marcus et al., 1996, 2000; Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, & MacKuen, 2007) and others (Brader, 2005, 2006; Huddy, Feldman, Taber, Lahav, 2005; Miller & Krosnick, 2004) has attempted to parse the effects of *specific* emotions. Underpinning this research is the theory of "affective intelligence," or the ability of individuals to use emotions to determine both when to rely on habitual dispositions (e.g., partisanship) and already established attitudes and opinions and when to use new information to reassess existing attitudes, opinions, and behaviors. Simplifying somewhat, emotions can be arrayed across two dimensions, one ranging from feelings of enthusiasm and elation (e.g., happiness, excitement, and delight) to feelings of depression and lethargy (e.g., sluggishness, boredom, and sadness), and the other ranging from feelings of relaxation and calm (e.g., enthusiasm, hopefulness, and satisfaction) to those of anxiety and unease

(e.g., frustration, anger, and worry). The former dimension is most central to the activation of habitual dispositions, with feelings of enthusiasm increasing the motivations necessary to do so, and feelings of depression and lethargy suppressing such motivations. The latter dimension is most central to the active surveillance of the political environment, with feelings of anxiety and unease increasing the likelihood of learning, the interrogation of existing beliefs, and the central (i.e., more elaborate and deliberative) processing of new information, and feelings of relaxation and calm inhibiting learning and increasing the likelihood of the "peripheral" (i.e., simplistic and nondeliberative) processing of new information.

Of course, like other forms of "intelligence," citizens can be better or worse at "correctly" reading the political environment. Thus, there is no guarantee that the emotions felt are appropriate to objective conditions. Further, the ability to connect emotions to subsequent political decisions and actions can also vary. These variations are determined in part by the information environment, including such things as the nature of elite discourse and the quality and tone of media coverage of politics. Significantly, given the purposes of this essay, they are also determined by levels of political sophistication, with more knowledgeable citizens better able to translate feelings of anxiety and/or enthusiasm into context-appropriate learning and action.

Despite their important differences, the various strands of research on emotions and politics summarized above clearly show that emotions play important roles in political information processing. They can interact with knowledge and beliefs, affecting the way information is perceived, stored, and used. They can create moods that affect one's motivation to attend to or avoid politics, thus affecting the likelihood of learning political facts. And they can substitute for factual information in the formation and expression of political attitudes. What is also clear is that the specific role played by emotions (both independently and in conjunction with factual knowledge) is context dependent. For example, Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) found that when experimental conditions encouraged forming *immediate* impressions (e.g., when subjects are told, before being given information about candidates, that they will be asked to evaluate them), political sophisticates (significantly, defined as those scoring highest on a test of factual knowledge) are most likely to process new information "online." But when the experimental conditions are altered (e.g., when subjects are not told they will be asked to make an evaluation until after information is presented) or when the topic being evaluated is relatively complex (e.g., a policy issue rather than a candidate), political sophisticates are the most likely to draw on information that is stored in memory. And Lodge and

Taber (1996) suggest that the "how-do-I-feel" heuristic is most likely to be employed under certain conditions, including those where affective judgment is called for, where the consequences of being wrong are minor, where objective information is not readily available, where disconfirming evidence is not highlighted, and where one is distracted or under time pressure (p. 3).

The context-dependent nature of emotions and their interaction with more rational processing reminds us that the former can also be treated as a form of information in its own right. That is, while emotional responses to new information may precede more deliberative or rational ones, *awareness* of one's emotional response can affect how these emotions are used. This point is demonstrated in research by, among others, Albarracin and Kumkale (2003), who find that affective responses to persuasive messages are most influential under conditions of moderate thinking about the issue in question, but have little influence on opinion formation or change under conditions where very little or a great deal of thought is present.

POLITICAL LEARNING: THE ROLE OF MOTIVATION

One area where the psychological study of affect could inform more traditional, reason-based models of political learning is in understanding what leads people to attend to politics. While the political science literature provides evidence of the importance of political interest to political learning (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990; Neuman et al., 1992), there is surprisingly little research on what *motivates* people to become interested in politics.

Motivation, according to Wade and Tavris (1993), "refers to an inferred process within a person (or animal) that causes that organism to move toward a goal" (p. 340). People can be motivated to follow (and thus learn about) politics for three reasons: because they *need* to; because they *want* to; or because they believe they *should*. A central source of motives is biological (or primary) needs (e.g., the need for food and water), which "push" people to act. Much of the political science literature implicitly assumes that most people are pushed to politics by individual, tangible, primary needs (e.g., food, shelter, safety, and so forth) or the means to secure these things (e.g., jobs, money, or education). In this view, citizens participate because they need to in order to improve their material conditions or protect what they already have. However, given the relative distance between most government action and one's personal conditions, as well as the relative inefficacy of one's individual participation in most forms of mass politics, it is also

assumed that most people, most of the time, will have little incentive to become politically engaged, and thus little incentive to become politically informed. As a result, increased political learning is likely to occur only when primary needs are threatened and then only when these threats become serious enough to overcome the substantial disincentives presented by the likely ineffectiveness of individual participation. In short, if political engagement is motivated by the desire to tangibly improve one's immediate environment, and if the likely responsiveness of the political system to any individual's participation is negligible, it is *individually irrational* for people to devote personal resources to becoming more politically informed and engaged, even if such individual decisions result in negative individual and/or collective outcomes (Downs, 1957):

> Public choices differ from private choices because the incentives to gather information are different in each instance. The resources expended to gather and process information before making personal consumption decisions have a direct effect on the quality of the outcome for the consumer, whereas time and money spent gathering information about candidates lead to a better vote, not necessarily a better outcome. The wrong economic policy or the wrong approach to arms control may in fact have a bigger effect on a voter's life than the wrong choice of home or college, but the expected gains from being an informed consumer remain higher than the gains from being an informed voter. (Popkin, 1991, p. 10)

To the extent that (1) individuals are motivated to learn about politics by primary needs; (2) individual political action is unlikely to significantly increase the probability of satisfying these needs; and (3) people are individually rational, it seems unlikely that aggregate levels of political knowledge could be increased except in periods of crisis. The evidence that aggregate levels of knowledge have not increased over the past 50 years, despite increases in mean levels of education, the political, economic, and social integration of African Americans and women, and the greater availability of information through the mass media, supports this conclusion and implies that there may be "natural" limits to how informed the public is willing to be.

At the same time, however, aggregate levels of political knowledge (and political participation more broadly), while low, are high enough to suggest that *something* is motivating people to become politically engaged, calling the "rational ignorance" argument into question (Fiorina, 1990). And evidence of group differences in political knowledge, coupled with the fact that the *least-*informed groups are arguably those whose primary needs are least satisfied, further challenges this perspective.

A partial answer to these inconsistencies may lie in a more expanded notion of motivation. Again the psychological literature provides guidance. The research on emotions already discussed in this essay points to ways in which politics can generate moods, which in turn motivate people toward or away from politics. This literature, along with other related research, suggests that motivations can be either "negative"—for example, a sense of threat, fear, or disgust—or "positive"—for example, a sense of enthusiasm or enjoyment (Brader, 2005, 2006; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, pp. 184–185; Huddy, et al., 2005; Marcus, 1988, 2002; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 1996, 2000; Masters & Sullivan, 1989; Miller & Krosnick, 2004; Neuman et al., 2007; Rahn, 2000; Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1990). While these motivations are often tied to "objective" conditions, and thus are related to the primary needs discussed above, such emotions can also be generated by the way in which information is presented and perceived, regardless of the *actual* material threats or opportunities.

In addition, many motives and their resulting behavior—curiosity, the desire to understand, the need for novelty, exploration, and manipulation, and even play—appear to be as deeply ingrained as the primary motives described above (Harlow & Harlow, 1966; Harlow, Harlow, & Meyer, 1950; Vandenberg, 1985; Zuckerman, 1990). While these motives and behaviors often serve to help people better satisfy primary needs like food and shelter, they also seem to be ends in and of themselves, even to the point of taking precedence over basic needs (Harris, 1984). These motivations are learned through social experiences, acting as "pulls" or incentives to act (Wade & Tavris, 1993, pp. 340–341). Such socially determined motivations can be quite basic—humans naturally seek out the contact, company, and approval of others and need the cooperation of others to satisfy many biological and emotional needs (Bowlby, 1969, 1973a, 1973b; Thomas, 1983). The particular *ways* these needs are satisfied are socially constructed, however (Doi, 1973; Levine & Padilla, 1979; Pascale & Athos, 1981). For example, while there is evidence that people are motivated by the need for competence (Bandura, 1990; Sternberg & Kolligian, 1990), achievement (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; McClelland, 1961), and power (McClelland, 1975; Winter, 1988), the specific ways in which people behave to satisfy these needs depend on social and cultural definitions of competence, achievement, and power.

In addition to motivations driven by primary needs and socially constructed wants, citizens can also follow politics out of obligation. A sense of civic duty is a significant predictor of political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 183), but measures of civic duty are poorly developed (as are

most measures of motivation) and generally limited to issues of voting. What is clear from political theory is that the notion of political obligation in liberal democracies is complex and inconsistent (Pateman, 1979). There is little empirical research, however, that attempts to uncover how normative theories of obligation translate into individual values, opinions, or behaviors or that tries to explain why people differ in their sense of civic duty.

Promising avenues of research that are relevant to political motivation are recent works on *social capital* (Brehm & Rahn, 1997; Putnam, 2000) and *deliberative democracy* (Delli Carpini, Cook & Jacobs, 2004; Fishkin, 1995), which posit that engagement in politics is tied to the face-to-face exchanges that come from involvement in community organizations and that engender a sense of trust in and connection to fellow citizens. It is possible that such interactions generate social incentives for wanting to become politically engaged and/or a sense of civic obligation to do so. Theory and evidence on the importance of "solidary" benefits (Wilson, 1973) and "group consciousness" (Rinehart, 1992; Shingles, 1981) for collective action and on the noneconomic motivations for engaging in altruistic behavior (Monroe, 1996) are also suggestive. And in a 1991 survey of Virginia residents, 47 percent of respondents who said they followed politics "most of the time" said they did so because they *should*, and 46 percent said they did so because they *enjoyed* it (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996, p. 185). Tellingly, those who regularly followed politics because they enjoyed it were about as likely to be informed about politics as were those who did so because they felt they should, and both these groups were significantly more informed than citizens who said they did not follow politics most of the time.

Since the "payoffs" for behavior driven by this more expanded set of motivations are at least partially psychological, emotional, and social, the decision to act should be less dependent on calculations regarding the likely satisfaction of primary, material needs such as those discussed earlier. This is not to say that material outcomes—who gets what from politics—don't matter. Clearly such motivations are an important part of the decision to become politically engaged. Nor is it to say that nonmaterial motives are less rational. Individuals are still behaving in a goal-directed manner when they seek out competence, achievement, social recognition, understanding, and so forth or when they act out of a sense of obligation or duty. Indeed, given the general agreement that a more-informed citizenry would produce decisions that better reflect their preferred outcomes, it may well be that behavior driven by social motives would lead, indirectly, to the greater satisfaction of primary needs.

Focusing on a more varied array of motivations may lead to a deeper understanding of why some citizens learn about politics while others don't and point to ways in which levels of knowledge can be increased and made more equitable. At the same time, however, it suggests that understanding and affecting this process will be complicated. A major reason for this is that motives can conflict with each other. For example, Kurt Lewin (1948) categorizes motivational conflicts into: (1) approach–approach conflicts (two mutually exclusive motivations); (2) avoidance–avoidance conflicts (choosing between the lesser of two evils); (3) approach–avoidance conflicts (a single behavior that contains both positive and negative aspects); and multiple approach–avoidance conflicts (situations in which one is faced with multiple choices, each of which has positive and/or negative aspects). Deciding to become politically engaged clearly creates such motivational conflicts, even for citizens predisposed to do so—watching the news versus an entertainment program (approach–approach); following a campaign when neither candidate is particularly appealing (avoidance–avoidance); going to a political meeting that might produce solidarity benefits but that is unlikely to produce significant change (approach–avoidance); trying to decide where you stand on a set of policy options, each of which has attractive and unattractive elements (multiple approach–avoidance). Categorizations such as Lewin's may prove useful in uncovering how psychological motives, coupled with beliefs and attitudes about politics, can lead people toward or away from politics, and thus make them become more or less informed about politics. Clearly, more detailed research on the motivations underlying citizens' engagement in politics is critical to understanding current levels of political knowledge, variations in knowledge across individuals and groups, and the potential for creating a more informed and a more equitably informed public.

WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION AND LEARNING MATTERS?

Underlying the various strands of theory and research discussed thus far are two questions: How do people acquire and use political information, and what kind of information is politically relevant? In his essay in Chapter 3, Paul Johnson adds significantly to both these themes. Johnson argues that while factual information about the substance of politics is important, equally or more important is "operative knowledge." Johnson defines operative knowledge as having three components: the intention to achieve a particular civic goal, the ability to determine a process for achieving this goal, and the identification of heuristics for selecting appropriate actions.

Further, he argues that political learning is most likely to occur through actual civic experience rather than through the acquisition of facts provided by, for example, formal education or the media.

Johnson's approach has important implications for the way we assess how informed or uninformed citizens are. Rather than starting a priori with a set of "facts" presumed to be central to effective political action, the operative knowledge model suggests that we should start with the intended goal (e.g., reducing crime in one's neighborhood), consider the civic activities one might engage in to help accomplish this goal (e.g., attending a neighborhood meeting), and identify the specific skills or resources one might need to perform these activities (e.g., formulating and articulating an argument). From this perspective, a knowledgeable citizen would be one who has the skills and resources necessary to translate civic goals into action. Johnson points to the work of Verba et al. (1995) and Alinsky (1972) as providing suggestions for the kinds of civic skills one might test for, but also suggests that future research in this area should begin by studying individuals who are already politically and civically active, working backwards to identify the specific, context-dependent knowledge they used to take action.

In addition to shifting the kinds of knowledge one might test for, Johnson's model also has implications for how one might try to increase what Americans know about politics. If, as he suggests, learning is most likely to occur through experience, then traditional approaches to increasing citizens' civic knowledge (e.g., through classroom instruction or public affairs media) are likely to fail. At a minimum, his approach suggests that classroom instruction must be tied to real-world examples and issues of relevance to students. The growing service learning movement in education, if properly designed and effectively tied to both public issues and political/civic processes, offers one intriguing model worthy of serious academic research (Battistoni & Hudson, 1997). Johnson's approach also suggests that the media could be more effective in increasing operative knowledge if it addressed issues of greater relevance to citizens and did so in a way that tied these issues to specific actions that interested citizens could take. Here, the "civic" or "public" journalism movement provides a potentially useful model (Rosen, 2001). Finally, it suggests that political and civic organizations can play a major role in helping to produce citizens who are more effective and knowledgeable (Putnam, 2000; Verba et al., 1995).

Having said this, several words of caution seem in order, all of which are, I believe, consistent with Johnson's view. First, operative knowledge, while important, should not be viewed as a substitute for substantive knowledge of the sort tapped in the surveys described earlier in this essay. The relative

merits of classroom versus experiential learning, and of factual learning versus skill development, have been debated within the educational community since at least the Progressive Era. In the end, it seems clear that there is no "correct" resolution to these debates—to be an effective citizen one must both know something about the substance of an issue (e.g., where does my representative stand on gun control) and have the skills and knowledge to act (e.g., writing an effective letter to my representative). Similarly, while experience can be a powerful teacher, it is unrealistic and inefficient to expect citizens to learn exclusively through trial and error. This is especially so given the increasingly complex nature of politics and the resulting confusion over who is and is not accountable. Partial support for the importance of both substantive and operative knowledge can be found in the fact that indicators of both are highly correlated with each other (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Verba et al., 1995). While it is important to better understand how these two kinds of knowledge interact, both appear necessary for citizens to engage in effective, goal-oriented civic action.

Second, while a focus on operative learning might provide a somewhat different portrait of what Americans know about politics, and lead to a different, more finely tuned set of indicators of politically relevant knowledge, my own reading of the data and research suggests that levels and distributions of operative knowledge would look similar to those for more substantive political facts. Indeed, as with the heuristic model discussed earlier, many of the facts tapped in surveys address processes and skills of the sort that would be relevant to operative knowledge— for example, how and where to register and vote, or who in local, state, or national government is responsible for (and so should be contacted about) a particular issue. And Verba et al. (1995) find significant differences in civic skills and resources across income, race, and gender that parallel those discussed earlier regarding substantive knowledge of politics. In short, the same issues regarding the "civic readiness" of the American public are raised regardless of whether our focus is on substantive or operative knowledge.

Finally, much like more traditional models of substantive knowledge and learning, operative learning models must address both the advantages and the limitations to political reasoning introduced by the literatures on heuristic and affective learning discussed above. Both are clearly relevant to the "means–ends analysis" outlined by Johnson and would come into play as citizens identify goals, match goals to one's current state, determine what if any action to take, assess the impact of that action, and refine (or opted out of) future actions. As with learning about substantive politics, however, the specific circumstances and contexts in which information

shortcuts and emotions might facilitate or deter effective civic action is less clear.

TOWARD AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF CIVIC LEARNING

While developing a comprehensive model of civic or political learning is beyond the scope of this essay, the review presented above, coupled with the insights in Paul Johnson's essay, points to several conclusions that should inform the construction of such a model. First, factual knowledge matters to the quality of political decision making, and thus to the quality of citizenship. Second, citizens have numerous strategies available to them in how information is used in political decision making. Third, effectively applying these strategies also requires "knowledge," albeit of a different kind (i.e., operative knowledge). Fourth, affect plays a central and complex role, often in conjunction with factual information and beliefs, in the development and expression of political attitudes. And fifth, the particular way in which information is processed, stored, and used in political decision making is context dependent, varying by issue, motivation, ability, prior knowledge, and opportunity.

Understandably, most existing models of political learning focus on some of these elements of information processing, ignoring others or treating them as given. The traditional model is well grounded in the normative logic of democracy but is often deficient in its understanding of how people actually make political judgments and unrealistic in its expectations regarding civic involvement. Heuristic models are in some ways more realistic, but in showing that citizens can make decisions based on limited information, they often ignore evidence that many citizens lack the information necessary for using shortcuts effectively, and downplay the possible individual and collective risks associated with these low-information decisions. Impression-driven models, while demonstrating the importance of emotional information to political decision making, also fail to fully explore the possibility that such information can lead to poor decisions and could go further in assessing the complex, iterative relationship between affective and cognitive information and between emotional and deliberative information-processing systems. Affect-based models of the sort developed by Marcus and others are more sophisticated in parsing the effects of different types of emotions, and in specifying the various relationships between emotional and deliberative information-processing systems, but tend to downplay the ways in which the larger information environment can manipulate emotional responses and thus the ways in which citizens learn about and engage

in political life (the work of Brader being something of an exception to this). The operative knowledge model makes clear that relevant political information should include the skills and resources necessary to act and that learning is a process that is best tied to experience, but downplays the role played by affect and the importance of substantive knowledge in tying action to meaningful outcomes. And all five approaches are often deficient in considering the structural variables that shape the context in which political learning occurs and how these contexts vary across time, situations, and groups.

The tendency to emphasize particular aspects of information processing while downplaying others comes at a cost, especially when research is used (implicitly or explicitly) to draw conclusions about the limits and potential of democratic politics. What is needed is a model of civic and political learning that can integrate these various approaches and findings, as well as point to new directions for research. To develop such a model, a number of questions must be answered. Do the traditional, heuristic, impression-driven, affective, and operative models represent distinct pathways to information processing and attitude formation, or are they different parts of a more integrated system? If they are distinct, under what conditions are citizens likely to use one approach over another? Is it possible to identify the kinds of information (substantive, affective, and operative) that are most useful to making political decisions? What specific abilities and motivations are most likely to lead to political learning? How do social values shape the motivation to learn? Do different abilities and motivations lead to different forms of information processing? What are the individual and collective costs and benefits associated with each approach? How do specific institutions and processes affect the motivation, ability, and opportunity to learn? How do systemic, interpersonal/social, and intrapersonal/psychological processes interact to affect values, motivations, and ability, and thus the acquisition and use of political knowledge?

Three general approaches to answering these questions strike me as promising. The first is comparative research. There is strong evidence that levels of political knowledge differ significantly across groups of citizens. And yet levels of knowledge also vary significantly within these groups. These inter- and intra-group differences provide the opportunity to explore the relative impact of affect and reason, how ability and motivation affects political learning, and so forth, while also allowing for consideration of structural factors on these individual-level processes. Cross-state and cross-national differences in political knowledge provide similar opportunities to explore how values, motivations, and ability interact with each other and with structural factors to affect political learning.

A second general suggestion for future research is the increased use of experiments (both natural and controlled), especially experiments that test ways in which structural differences in education, the workplace, the media, and the public sphere affect the motivation, ability, and opportunity to learn. Most current experimental research is strongest in demonstrating how citizens make political decisions within existing environmental constraints. More research such as that on deliberative democracy (Fishkin, 1995), public journalism (Rosen, 2001), the structure of the workplace (Sigel, 1989, Part II), and civic education curricula (Milner, 2001; Torney-Purta, Lehmann, Oswald, & Schulz, 2001) would go a long way toward increasing our knowledge of what is possible in the area of political learning.

A third suggestion—and the one most relevant to the purpose of this volume—is the development of a more consciously interdisciplinary approach to the study of civic and political learning. What I hope is clear from this essay is that the content, context, and uses of "politically relevant information" depend upon a combination of psychological, sociological, and political processes. What I also hope is clear is that a great deal of valuable and exciting interdisciplinary "cross-pollination" is already occurring, most notably in the area of emotions. But more can be done, especially by moving beyond the importing of theories and concepts through published research to more active collaborations on new research. Psychologists have much to offer political scientists, sociologists, and communication scholars interested in the physiological and psychological underpinnings of political and civic learning, and much to learn from the latter's knowledge of the cultural, social, economic, media, and political contexts in which such learning does or does not occur.

In the end, what is needed, and what such a collaborative research agenda may provide, is an explicitly *civic* model of information processing. Much of the theory and research on information processing builds from psychological and/or economic models of individual behavior. But individual motivation, as well as definitions of "rationality," vary by the roles we play. What I want to do, what I need to do, and what I feel I should do depend in part upon whether I am acting as an individual consumer, a family member, a friend, a neighbor, a member of a profession or a group, and so forth. Each of these roles has culturally determined rules that shape my incentives to behave in certain ways. Each provides different costs, expectations, opportunities, and rewards. "Citizen" is a distinct role that carries with it its own set of motives, its own definition of rationality, and its own set of requirements. It also has its own set of institutional structures and processes that shape its meaning and that provide the resources necessary for filling this role.

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What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?

Paul E. Johnson

OVERVIEW

In this essay, I describe a kind of knowledge that I believe is missing from typical assessments of civic behavior. I argue that this knowledge (which I characterize as operative knowledge for civic action) is comprised of: (1) the intention to achieve one or more goals that define a civic task, (2) a process for arriving at these goals, and (3) heuristics for selecting specific actions down a goal path. I suggest that operative knowledge for civic action lies at the heart of many political activities and should be assessed whenever we attempt to infer the knowledge individuals have of the process for participating in the political life of their society.

   In order to better understand the idea of operative knowledge, I develop an argument for how such knowledge is acquired, the contexts in which it is deployed, and the mental models that initiate and support its use. I then describe features of this knowledge that lead to what I call civic behaviors. Next, I propose the concept of civic intelligence as a general rubric under which to consider the kind of factual knowledge characterized in typical studies of political and social cognition, as well as the more action-oriented knowledge proposed here. Finally, I address the issue of expertise and how it relates to the kinds of knowledge that have been proposed to explain the behavior of individuals in a civic society.

OPERATIVE KNOWLEDGE FOR CIVIC ACTION

In what follows, I am interested in the knowledge that accomplishes specific goals for the individual or agent who possesses it. This knowledge is most typically acquired in the context of the tasks to which it is applied, rather than being transferred to them after acquisition in another setting (Lave, 1988). Unfortunately, when we assess knowledge, we often use tasks drawn from the technology of particular assessment devices (e.g., multiple choice and survey instruments) rather than ones sampled from the context in which the knowledge is used (Scribner, 1986). The choice of assessment tasks

has important implications for the conclusion of whether the knowledge in question is present or not.

The reasons for the choice of assessment tasks are complex, but include assumptions about how we believe the knowledge in question was acquired. In the case of politics, for example, much of what we attempt to assess that might be predictive of behavior in civic tasks seems to be based on assumptions about what individuals learn in a system of formal education. These assumptions are characterized by what I will call the experience of symbol learning.

In symbol learning, students are exposed (in books, in classrooms, and in the media) to generalizations (e.g., concepts), together with examples and instances designed to relate these generalizations to personal experience. It seems clear that a great deal of learning and schooling in our society takes place in this fashion. The good news is that by adopting a framework of symbol learning, one can readily identify what is to be taught (and therefore, learned). The bad news, as noted by Bowen (1977) and numerous teachers (and students), is that what is learned is often rapidly forgotten (e.g., Mentkowski, 2000).

By contrast, consider a setting in which the learner initially generates behavior out of curiosity or in response to a context in which the behavior that would lead to the achievement of goals is ambiguous or uncertain. This behavior is followed by feedback, from which the learner makes generalizations based on the value of that behavior in achieving specific goals. I shall call this kind of acquisition, experiential learning.

From the point of view of some formal systems of education, the problem with experiential learning is to determine what to teach, as is readily attested to by those whose task it is to impart skills to others (e.g., in the context of professional education). The good news is that in experiential learning, generalizations are constructed by learners, not teachers, and retention is typically much better (e.g., Bransford, Brown, & Cocking, 1999; Keeton, 1976).

I suggest that much of the knowledge underlying the performance of people in civic tasks is acquired through experiential learning. Such learning begins with the goals that individuals seek to achieve in both daily and professional life. Consider, for example, individuals who organize to convince their local government body (e.g., city council) not to build a four-lane road through their community. The goals in this setting require knowledge that is different from that used to organize voting for candidates in a national or local election. What individuals who participate in these kinds of activities learn is how to set goals and what actions to take to achieve these goals, given specific contexts and constraints of time and resources.

What I shall term "civic behavior" relies on knowledge that is organized in terms of goals and the actions that are used to achieve them. While an individual's choice of goals and actions is affected by beliefs and values, the behaviors of civic action cannot be accomplished without the mediation of operative (process) knowledge. An important aspect of such knowledge is that it is also frequently tacit (e.g., Reber, 1989; Wagner & Sternberg, 1986). What this means is that some of the properties that define operative knowledge in specific contexts of application may be largely unavailable to introspection or conscious awareness (Jones, 1999). We learn about operative knowledge not by asking about it, but by studying the behavior of individuals in tasks that elicit it (Sternberg & Horvath, 1999).

To determine the operative knowledge underlying civic behavior, we need assessments that are different from those that are based on the usual (non-veridical) tasks employed to collect data on facts, beliefs, and values (e.g., interviews, survey instruments, and questionnaires). To assess operative knowledge, the tasks must be ones that we would expect citizens to engage in as they participate in some political or civic process. These tasks are what I call veridical. They are samples from contexts in which the knowledge of interest is applied (Johnson, Grazioli, & Jamal, 1992a). This means that if we wish to assess the knowledge that guides what individuals do when they engage in civic behaviors, we must use tasks that elicit these behaviors.

The distinction between veridical and non-veridical tasks is important if we wish to understand the nature of citizen participation in the political and civic life of their society. When we seek to understand physician behavior, for example, we conduct observations in clinics, in hospitals, and in the context of managed care and independent practice (Johnson et al., 2002). We may also construct simulations that prompt these behaviors under various experimental conditions (e.g., Johnson, Kochevar, & Zualkernan, 1992c; Scribner, 1986). Similarly, if we wish to understand the knowledge that generates civic behaviors, we must base our inferences on examination of data from individuals performing tasks such as running for political office, organizing a neighborhood action group, and speaking at a local town meeting (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006).

Tasks in general as well as those that serve as the occasion for civic behaviors reflect a structure of goals, events (information), and constraints. A number of investigators (e.g., Newell, 1990; Rosenbloom, Laird, Newell, & McCarl, 2002) have characterized this structure as a problem space (e.g., a conceptual space comprised of an initial state, a goal state, and a number of intermediate states). Such structures can be general or they can be tuned to the requirements of specific tasks (Clancey, 1985). In either case, the

knowledge that accomplishes performance is comprised of actions that are designed to achieve goals under conditions in which such actions can be expected to be successful.

To understand how individuals organize actions to achieve goals, we need a framework that reflects the procedural aspects of knowledge (Rescher, 1996). One example of such a framework that incorporates features of human information processing is means–ends analysis. The structure of means–ends processing has been used as a model for behavior in a wide variety of problem-solving and decision-making tasks. Anderson (1993) argues that means–ends thinking is the basis for most human learning. In a typical analysis, the elements of a means–ends framework consist of (1) choosing goals that define relevant problem states (as above), (2) finding differences between a given problem state and some end state (e.g., goal), and (3) choosing operators (means) for reducing these differences (see Figure 3.1).

It is important to recognize that the processing activities shown in Figure 3.1 represent an abstraction (idealization) of the kind of thinking that


Figure 3.1 Means–Ends Analysis (MEA)

takes place when humans are faced with a variety of problematic situations. In any specific instance, the behavior of a given agent will reflect shortcuts and modifications based on individual learning and experience. Investigations of means–ends thinking have been conducted using tasks taken from the world at large as well as from typical laboratory situations (Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett, & Thagaard, 1986; Holyoak & Thagard, 2002).

One role of experience is to provide knowledge that can be used to select goals and choose operators for performance in a given task. A second use of experience is to define relevant tasks in the first place. Research from a variety of perspectives has shown that task situations are frequently identified and interpreted using dynamic structures called mental models (Freyd, 1987).

Mental models are representations that give meaning to a given situation or context and form the basis for action (Hutchins, 1983). Mental models identify relevant information, provide interpretations of ambiguous events, and suggest actions by enabling users to see a given situation as an instance one dealt with in the past. Mental models are a means of defining what the problem is. Mental models have properties similar to those of the knowledge structures that Rummelhart (1984) and others (e.g., Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985) have termed a schema. In the work described here, mental models are a source of expectations that serve as the basis by which goals are identified and operators are interpreted and judged to be relevant to the task at hand (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Rasmussen, 1986).

Using a framework of means–ends thinking and mental models, we can represent the knowledge for a given task, or domain of tasks, as a problem-solving method (Anderson, 1990; Johnson et al, 1992c; Newell, 1973). Such methods reflect principles for selecting operators that vary from blind search, to algorithms, to heuristics that achieve goal states when the relevant algorithms are unknown or do not seem to apply (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999).

As individuals gain experience, early methods are often reorganized into a simpler form. Rather than reasoning from an initial state to a goal state, individuals deploy powerful mental models that interpret tasks as instances of ones for which solution methods are known or have been developed in the past (e.g., Johnson, Grazoli, Jamal, & Zualkernan, 1992b; Johnson, Jamal, & Berryman, 1991; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). Indeed, Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) argue that the characteristic most distinguishing experienced (e.g., expert) individuals is that there is no problem to solve (i.e., problem solving is what you do when you don't know what to do). Experienced individuals simply apply their (operative) knowledge. No search or reasoning is required.

HEURISTIC RULES FOR CIVIC BEHAVIOR

I have developed a framework for describing a kind of knowledge that underlies behavior in civic tasks, as well as a model for a process that deploys this knowledge. I now consider examples of civic knowledge and some of the behaviors that one might expect to find in the repertoire of individual citizens. There are two issues here. First, we need to consider in more detail the operative knowledge that gives rise to civic behaviors. Second, we need to decide under what conditions such knowledge might be expected to appear.

One strategy for assessing the basis of a given behavior is to study the responses of individuals who perform the task of interest. An alternative strategy is to study the behavior of individuals who are particularly active or accomplished in deploying such behaviors. Using such strategies, we might decide to study individuals who run for local political office, or those who organize a neighborhood group in support of (or against) a local ordinance, or those who are thought to have especially good political skill or judgment (Tetlock, 2006). In each case, what we wish to discover is the knowledge that underlies the behavior of specific individuals in some context or task of civic consequence.

Following Gigerenzer and his collaborators (e.g., Engel & Gigerenzer, 2006; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999), I shall describe this kind of knowledge using the term "heuristic." Heuristics are cognitive shortcuts and rules of thumb that represent actions as well as the inferences individuals make about which goals to seek, as well as the consequences of actions taken in everyday, real-world situations (see also, Simon, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).

Whether we choose to study behavior using typical or atypical individuals, past efforts to understand the knowledge that guides behavior in everyday tasks have revealed that assumptions about the nature of such knowledge can be dramatically wrong. Much of the work that has emerged in the past several years in what is called situated cognition (e.g., Clancey, 1997; Greeno, 1998) suggests that individuals often do not use the knowledge they acquire in the context of formal education, even when the tasks they perform would seem to require it (e.g., the use of arithmetic in shopping behavior in the supermarket (Lave, 1986, 1988)).

It is also clear that individuals who have not been exposed to systems of knowledge of the sort that comprise the experience of schooling can nevertheless develop heuristic forms of operative knowledge that are quite successful in accomplishing school-related tasks (Scribner, 1984, 1986). What this means is that our intuitions regarding whom to study, what data to collect, or even what to use as a dependent variable can be seriously in error.

In the case of political and civic knowledge, the tendency to use decisions as a dependent variable may be a mistake. Rather, what we should examine are the civic and political goals of individuals and how they act to achieve them. In some cases, the focus of interest may be how a decision is made. Other times, decisions are simply part of a process that is organized to achieve goals in specific situations (Brehmer, 1990, 1992).

In the case of civic tasks, what needs to be understood is how individuals and groups of individuals carry out particular activities. Decisions are part of this process, but it is the shape of these decisions and their role as heuristics in the context of the larger effort to adapt and be successful that must be understood (Clark, 1998). For an example of what the knowledge that supports civic behavior might be like, we can turn to the book *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*, written by Sidney Verba, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady (1995). In a chapter titled "Resources for Politics," the authors list the following civic skills: (1) organize an event, (2) plan a meeting, (3) run a meeting, (4) write a letter, (5) assume responsibility, (6) take part in making decisions, (7) give a presentation, (8) formulate and articulate an argument, and (9) use time and money effectively.

A description of the operative knowledge underlying the behaviors in this list (using, for example, a means–ends framework and heuristic rules) would be different from descriptions of knowledge found in much of the literature on political and social cognition (e.g., Delli Carpini, Chapter 2). It is not that the knowledge examined in this literature is wrong. Rather, there is an important sense in which it is incomplete. What is missing is an analysis of the knowledge that explains what people do when they engage in the real performance of real civic tasks.

Another example of what I shall term "the heuristics of civic behavior" can be found in a book written a number of years ago by Saul Alinsky (1972). This book, *Rules for Radicals*, lays out the thinking to be employed in accomplishing goals of political change. For example, in Chapter 8, which is titled "Tactics," Alinsky lists the following: (1) power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have, (2) never go outside the experience of your people, (3) wherever possible go outside the experience of the enemy, (4) make the enemy live up to their own book of rules, (5) ridicule is man's most potent weapon, (6) a good tactic is one that your people enjoy, (7) a tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag, (8) keep the pressure on, (9) the threat is unusually more terrifying than the thing, (10) the major premise for tactics is the development of operations that will maintain a constant pressure upon the opposition, (11) the price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative, (12) pick the target, freeze it, personalize it, and polarize it.

Alinsky goes on to develop problem-solving methods (means–ends structures) for deploying tactics in a variety of settings. For example, later in the same chapter, Alinsky writes:

> This is the kind of tactic that can be used by the middle class too. Organized shopping, wholesale buying plus charging and returning everything on delivery, would add accounting costs to their attack on the retailer with the ominous threat of continued repetition. This is far more effective than canceling a charge account. Let's look at the score: (1) sales for one day are completely shot; (2) delivery service is tied up for two days or more; and (3) the accounting department is screwed up. The total cost is a nightmare for any retailer, and the sword remains hanging over his head. The middle class, too, must learn the nature of the enemy and be able to practice what I have described as mass jujitsu, utilizing the power of one part of the part structure against another part . . . . (1972, p. 148)

Using a narrative rich in examples, Alinsky describes goals, problem-solving methods, and conditions for action (heuristics) that comprise the operative knowledge for those who would become political change agents. To be sure, facts regarding the political process, as well as attitudes, beliefs, and values, can be part of the knowledge that Alinsky has in mind. But without some means of organizing goals and the actions that achieve them, there is nothing for the individual to do.

While the framework of means–ends analysis and heuristics is useful for characterizing operative knowledge in terms of an individual's goals and actions, we need to introduce another construct to account for the more compelling characteristics of civic action. This concept is often termed "intentionality" (e.g., Dennett, 1989). In what is described here, I propose to consider intentionality as a constraint on behavior. Historically, the idea for constraints on human cognitive agents is often traced to the work of Herbert Simon. In a variety of investigations and writings, Simon has argued that the human mind is subjected to the constraint of bounded rationality (1979). The apparent serial nature of much human information processing, the limited capacity of short-term memory, and the fallibility of long-term memory are among those features of mind that provide important cognitive limits on what humans can do in complex problem-solving and decision-making tasks; such features also define what Laville (2000) has called the procedural rationality of human decision behavior.

While the constraint described by Simon represents a limitation on behavior, some types of constraints can also be thought of as enablers of performance (Medin et al., 1990). Constraints in this latter sense have been used in constructing explanations of human language capability, the recognition of objects, and numerous human developmental capabilities (Pinker, 1994;

Smith, 1995), as well as dynamic features of human cognition more generally (Juarrero, 1999). Intentionality, in the sense in which I propose to use it here, is an enabling constraint; it is an operator that selects goals, seeks anticipatory goal-relevant information, initiates action, and sustains this action to completion down a goal path (Kugler, Shaw, Vicente & Kinsella-Shaw, 1991). Intentionality is that which is maintained in order for behavior in a task to be successful.

A particularly important property of the intentionality constraint for purposes of our analysis is that it affords thinking about the behavior of others (Dennett, 1996; Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001; Searle, 1983). Civic action invariably requires interaction with other individuals, often with the objective of convincing them to act in ways they might not otherwise do. Successful civic action requires being able to anticipate and thereby alter the behavior of those with whom one interacts.

An example of the intentionality constraint as it applies to civic behaviors is provided by Dennett (1989), using what he calls the intentional strategy. According to Dennett, an intentional strategy consists of: (1) treating the object whose behavior is to be predicted as a rational agent, (2) deciding what beliefs that agent ought to have given its place in the world and its context, and (3) assuming that being rational, the agent will act to further its goals in light of its beliefs.

The intentional strategy develops early and is essential for adaptive behavior in the social settings of everyday life, as well as in many professional problem-solving and decision-making tasks (e.g., Johnson, Grazoli, Jamal, & Berryman, 2001). The ability to anticipate and manipulate the behavior of others may also be one of the major factors in the evolution of intelligence (Whiten & Byrne, 1997). In certain cases, its absence can also lead to tragic pathologies of mind (e.g., the phenomenon of autism: Baron-Cohen, 1995; Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993; Grandin, 2000; Sacks, 1996).

Using the idea of intentionality as a constraint in our framework of means–ends thinking, we can now identify major ingredients of the operative knowledge underlying civic behavior. These include identification of goals and subgoals (what we can refer to as a goal structure), selection of operators (specific actions) and heuristics that enable actions in the achievement of one or more goals (including, for example, the tactics described by Verba et al. and by Alinsky), plus an ability to anticipate the thinking (and actions) of others. In the next section, I take up some of the distinguishing characteristics of this knowledge, as well as its relationship to other kinds of knowledge found in discussions of civic behaviors.

CIVIC INTELLIGENCE

I shall use the term "civic intelligence" to refer to the capacity to act so as to solve problems and fashion products and activities in a broad range of civic tasks. What I have called the operative knowledge for civic action as well as the heuristics of civic behavior are part of civic intelligence as are, I believe, the beliefs, attitudes, and values described by Professor Delli Carpini (Chapter 2). Civic tasks range from those that give rise to the skills described by Verba et al., and the tactics promoted by Alinsky, to ones we find in reports of local and national political activities, and in other formal and informal organizations in which citizens participate, as well as those that are often used to characterize the behavior and judgments of political leaders (Tetlock, 2006).

Some of the operative knowledge comprising civic intelligence also functions across domains and contexts. This knowledge is used when other, more specific knowledge is not available or does not seem to apply. One example of such knowledge is the intentional strategy proposed by Dennett. Another is the more generalized kind of heuristic identified by Tversky and Kahneman (1990). Among the interesting properties of these heuristics is their widespread nature. They have since been found in virtually all societies, across all walks of life, and in most contexts of work and daily activity. Heuristics such as representativeness and availability (and others) serve as resources for behavior in a wide variety of situations, including those that are found in civic and political life (see, for example, Quattrone & Tversky, 2004).

In addition to the more general type of heuristics described by Tversky and Kahneman, there are those that reflect the specific contexts of what Fukuyama (1995) has called civil society. Such a society comprises "a complex welter of intermediate institutions, including businesses, voluntary associations, educational institutions, clubs, unions, media, charities, and churches . . ." (Fukuyama, 1995, p. 4), as well as transformations of these institutions due to the pressure and stress of modern life (e.g., Putnam, 2000). Living and acting within a framework of institutions and communities provides the context in which additional heuristics of civic behavior are learned and developed.

Heuristics (both general and specific) and the intentional strategy proposed by Dennett are important features of what I have termed civic intelligence. But we must go further if we are to fully understand the nature of civic knowledge. Once we consider that individuals in a society deploy their knowledge to achieve goals in the context of social groups, we must also consider how the dynamic forces within such groups shape their

behavior. An important feature of social interactions is what Boehm (1997) has called political intelligence. Political intelligence enables individuals to further their self-interest in situations that involve rivalry and questions of power and leadership. Political intelligence and its frequent companion political ideology are also at the heart of the behaviors and rhetoric found in many civic and political debates (Friedman, 2000). Strategies for cooperation, for achieving dominance, and for organizing coalitions to monitor the behavior of others provide a basis for achieving goals in all human societies (Whiten & Byrne, 1997). They also provide a context in which emotions become a powerful influence on the means–ends thinking that guides individual decision-making behavior (Weston, 2007).

Wilson and Sober (1994) point out that all humans (and some animals) live in intentional communities. Such communities nurture individual autonomy and equality, which in turn provide an environment in which the skills and heuristics of community behavior and action are developed (Dunbar & Shultz, 2007). In many cases, neither formal institutions of schooling nor direct experience in civic tasks is required for the development of features of what I have called civic intelligence. Such features are present by virtue of being human and living in social groups.

An example of a task in which the social knowledge underlying civic intelligence appears is social exchange. In social exchange, two or more individuals cooperate for mutual benefit (Cosmides, 1989). Social exchange is pervasive in humans across societies and cultures (Sugiyama, Tooby & Cosmides, 2002). A specific form of social exchange is the social contract. In social contracts, individuals receive a benefit, for which they must pay a cost.

Work using the framework of game theory (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981) has suggested that for the knowledge of social exchange to develop, it is necessary that participants be able to detect cheaters (i.e., those who seek to receive a benefit without paying a cost). In a series of studies, Cosmides and Tooby (1992, 1994) and others have demonstrated that promoting knowledge to look for those who cheat can dramatically improve performance in a broad range of social tasks (see, e.g., Cummins, 1999; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001). Numerous studies have described occasions in which individuals act so as to cheat and deceive others in civic as well as professional life (e.g., Johnson et al., 2001; Rue, 1994). Indeed, use of the operative knowledge that enables the manipulation and deception of others may lie at the heart of activities and problem-solving strategies that are employed in virtually all civic and political environments (Thagard, 1992).

Some aspects of civic intelligence are the result of experience in specific civic and political tasks. Other aspects are present by virtue of being human

and by living in social groups (Cheney & Seyfarth, 2007). Still other features flow from experience as an adaptive problem solver when faced with tasks for which available knowledge is incomplete or does not seem to apply. In this circumstance, individuals often modify the tasks they encounter and improvise solution behaviors from available heuristics. Individuals with civic intelligence are practical problem solvers. Their knowledge is based on acting in the world. In the final analysis, individuals with civic intelligence derive meaning from the events they encounter and the actions they take using the (cognitive) tools at hand (Berry & Irvine, 1986; Levi-Strauss, 1962).

Civic intelligence draws on attitudes and beliefs acquired from experience with civic objects and circumstances; it also incorporates factual knowledge and understanding of various social/political systems. But it is through intentionality, mental models, and the means–ends (heuristic) capacity to act so as to achieve civic and political goals that civic intelligence is set apart from other forms of knowledge and cognitive experience.

ROLE OF EXPERTISE

Any characterization of operative knowledge for tasks such as those found in civic society would be incomplete without consideration of one of the more distinguishing features of this kind of knowledge, namely the properties it develops in the course of repeated experience with specific instances and circumstances. Over time, and with feedback, the operative knowledge that individuals develop in the context of specific tasks takes on characteristics of language and performance often associated with the concept of expertise (Ericsson, 1996; Feltovich, Prietula, & Ericsson, 2006).

While many of the individuals in a given society have the kind of operative knowledge I have described, we may not be willing to think of the average citizen as having much expertise in addressing civic and political problems. There are, however, individuals whose thinking and problem-solving ability might indicate that the term "expertise" should apply. Campaign managers, legislative assistants, and indeed, some elected officials often develop heuristics and other forms of operative knowledge that leads to recognized performance in a variety of civic and political problem-solving and decision-making tasks. Think, for example, of the knowledge and skills required to work with various constituents, as well as other elected officials, in order to achieve legislative goals in some political body. Or, consider the skills and knowledge required to conduct a campaign for political office (e.g., Mieg, 2006).

With experience in the tasks that comprise a given civic or political process, some individuals will acquire the ability to perform these tasks better than others. In addition to the kind of knowledge described by Verba et al. (1995) and Alinsky (1972), there are heuristics that result from learning how to follow the rules for making arguments and for constructing convincing narratives that balance the goals of individuals with those of society (Hammond, 1996; Johnson, Zualkernan, & Tukey, 1993). Such skills lie at the heart of the dialogue and action found in many contexts of civic and political engagement.

In an earlier work (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993) as well as in the current volume, Professor Delli Carpini takes up the important problem of how best to measure political knowledge. The focus in these efforts is upon measuring the presence (and amount) of factual political knowledge that citizens have of their government and how the use of this kind of knowledge (established through survey instruments) may be an indicator of "sophistication and its related concepts of 'expertise,' 'awareness,' 'political engagement' and even 'media exposure' . . . " (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993, p. 1180).

Many citizens have factual knowledge of the political systems in which they find themselves. And, some individuals with operative knowledge for civic and political action have more of this kind of knowledge than others. But regardless of the amount of factual knowledge an individual possess, such knowledge is not the same as the operative knowledge that comprises expertise.

So it is here, perhaps, that the kinds of knowledge that Professor Delli Carpini and I have described converge. While some citizens who possess the operative knowledge (expertise) for civic and political action may lack the kind of factual political knowledge described by Delli Carpini and his collaborators, others with such expertise may also possess it. A prospect for future research would be to better understand the relationship between the factual political knowledge citizens have of their society and how it works and the operative knowledge that enables individuals to participate in its civic and political tasks.

It is important to recognize that individuals with operative as well as factual knowledge can also fail in dramatic and sometimes perplexing ways (Tarvis & Aronson, 2007). In many cases, this failure seems not to be due to the presence or absence of the right kind of knowledge but rather due to the way the human mind deals with (and fails to deal with) the feedback and time-dependent properties of the kind of dynamic environments that comprise political and civic tasks (Dorner, 1996; Tuchman, 1984). Better understanding of how the knowledge possessed by individuals interacts with the environments of modern political and civic life is, also much needed.

CONCLUSION

Individuals have many kinds of knowledge. Included in the knowledge citizens have of their society and how it works is knowledge about how to get involved in organizations and the political process and how to achieve civic and political goals when that seems like the right thing to do. I have called all of this "operative knowledge for civic action." More generally, I have proposed the concept of civic intelligence (and later also expertise) to embrace both the action-oriented knowledge that is used to accomplish civic tasks and the more factual, and value-oriented knowledge discussed by Professor Delli Carpini (Chapter 2).

It remains to address the question posed in the title of the essay, namely, what knowledge is of most worth? The answer, I believe, depends on the nature of the tasks to which such knowledge is applied. In most cases, the kind of knowledge of interest has been that which is applied to tasks that are performed by individuals at a variety of levels in some civic or political process. To be able to engage political issues, to organize and convince others, and to work to achieve civic goals, these are the kinds of activities that lie at the heart of the knowledge we expect of informed citizens.

To be sure, we may also expect citizens to have knowledge of how the process of leadership is organized in their society, the nature of their government, its structures, and how they function. But it is to operative knowledge for civic action that we must look for the capacity to participate in any civic or political process. We have only begun to understand how such knowledge is developed and distributed among individuals and organizations in modern societies.

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Persuasion Processes and Interventions in Contemporary Democracies

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Shallow Cues With Deep Effects: Trait Judgments From Faces and Voting Decisions

Crystal C. Hall, Amir Goren, Shelly Chaiken, and Alexander Todorov

This chapter examines the impact of rapid automatic processes in political decision making. Specifically, using a dual-process framework, the authors argue that individuals assess candidate competence on the basis of facial appearance and that this can predict the outcomes of both U.S. congressional and gubernatorial elections. These judgments occur quickly and are largely independent of controlled processes. These findings illustrate the complexity of electoral decision making in complicated information environments and suggest that even though individuals may not realize it, they often have little control over their initial impressions. The chapter concludes by examining how these findings inform our understanding of electoral politics, political persuasion, and democratic citizenship more generally.

In surveys about the greatness of American presidents, historians consistently rate Warren Harding as the worst American president (Maranell, 1970; Murray & Blessing, 1983), although, in all fairness, this is an open-ended competition. In the Republican primary in 1920, the two main candidates, Leonard Wood and Frank O. Lowden, were deadlocked. Harding was the third compromise candidate, and he won the primary. Although Harding was not particularly smart, Harry Daugherty promoted him because Harding "looked like a President." In 1920, the Democratic Party was suffering from unpopular wartime measures, and Harding won the election with 60 percent of the popular vote. Apparently, he did look presidential. His administration became best known for scandals involving bribery and incompetence.

Every democratic election is a chance for citizens to express their preference for a suitable candidate. In theory, this candidate represents the interests and values of the constituents and leads the nation (or state, province, or town) in a direction that yields beneficial outcomes for the majority of the voters. One would expect that the choice of a candidate would reflect a rational decision based on criteria such as the candidate's demonstrated ability and experience in making sound policy decisions or the compatibility between the candidate's and the voters' values and goals. These criteria

could be evaluated on the basis of several sources, including newspaper editorials, verbal exchanges in televised debates, the written text in candidate advertising brochures, and newspaper articles detailing actions undertaken by the candidates (e.g., pardoning an inmate on death row, voting to reduce taxes, or making a visit to Sudan). Other criteria that may affect the choice of a candidate in more dubiously rational ways include the candidates' facial appearance, their tone of voice, their mannerisms, their gender or ethnicity, or any number of heuristic cues such as style of dress, hair color, and so on, as well as situational factors such as the current state of the economy or perceived threat from other countries.

As the Harding anecdote and research on judgment and decision making make clear, how people make decisions is different from how they *should* make decisions (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988). In this chapter, we focus on the effects of rapid, unreflective, automatic processes on voting decisions. In particular, we describe a series of studies showing that trait judgments of competence based solely on the facial appearance of candidates predict the outcomes of both congressional and gubernatorial elections.

Impressions about individuals are spontaneously formed from minimal information (Todorov & Uleman, 2002, 2003; Uleman, Blader, & Todorov, 2005), and facial appearance is one source of such information. It is well documented within the psychological literature that facial appearance can affect various social outcomes (e.g., Blair, Judd, & Chapleau, 2004; Eberhardt, Davies, Purdie-Vaughns, & Johnson, 2006; Hamermesh & Biddle, 1994; Hassin & Trope, 2000; Langlois et al., 2000; Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998; Mueller & Mazur, 1996; Zebrowitz, 1999). For example, in the domain of military achievement, facial dominance of West Point graduates predicted their rank at the end of their careers (Mazur, Mazur, & Keating, 1984).

In this chapter, we outline a dual-process framework for understanding the effects of superficial cues on voting decisions, describe a series of findings showing that rapid, unreflective judgments of competence from facial appearance predict the outcome of important political elections, and discuss the implications for political persuasion and democratic citizenship. The research presented here suggests that if a candidate wants to win an election, he or she should focus not only on substantive matters such as passing legislation and making progress in implementing policies but also on superficial features that will affect voters' "gut" reactions. The research also suggests that unless one can change the way voters weight their use of heuristic (quick, simplified decision strategies) versus systematic (more deliberative) processing, policy makers should focus on the

heuristic features that have the strongest impact on voters and change those, either by standardizing the presentation of candidates such that superficial information is unavailable or by being sensitive to social context, perhaps encouraging systematic processing in voters themselves. And of course, more marketing-oriented approaches could focus on the presentation of candidates, making sure to capitalize on features that implicitly "matter" to voters—even if these are not the features that matter on a more explicit and deliberative level.

AUTOMATIC AND DELIBERATIVE PROCESSES IN PERSON PERCEPTION

A broad categorization scheme that has been recently developed distinguishes between automatic, fast, unreflective processes (System I) and conscious, slow, deliberative processes (System II) in the way that people integrate information and subsequently make judgments and choices (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 1998). The rapid choice of a candy bar over an apple, based on nothing more than the insatiable drive of a sweet tooth, represents a System I process, whereas the reluctant choice of the apple, based upon consideration of the ingredients of the candy bar and the healthiness of the apple, represents a System II process.

Faces are a rich source of social information and despite the maxim "don't judge a book by its cover," many people believe that they can judge the character of others from their faces (Hassin & Trope, 2000). One source of these beliefs might be the fluency with which trait judgments are made from faces (Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006; Todorov, Pakrashi, Loehr, & Oosterhof, 2007; Willis & Todorov, 2006). As described by Kahneman (2003), intuitive, System I, processes feel like perceptual processes, that is, veridical and compelling. In fact, trait impressions are formed with a single glance at a face (Bar et al., 2006; Willis & Todorov, 2006). For example, Willis and Todorov (2006) showed that a 100-ms exposure to a face is sufficient for people to form a variety of trait judgments. In their studies, participants judged the attractiveness, likeability, competence, trustworthiness, and aggressiveness of faces after exposure time of 100 ms, 500 ms, and 1,000 ms. For all of these trait judgments, additional exposure time did not increase correlations with judgments made under no time pressure. Even though correlations didn't increase with additional exposure time, the response times for judgments *decreased* and the confidence in trait judgments *increased*. In

other words, although judgments did not change, participants became more confident.

At the same time as the Willis and Todorov findings were reported, Bar et al. (2006) reported that people start discriminating between faces that appear threatening and nonthreatening after a 38-ms exposure to these faces. In subsequent research, we have systematically mapped how trait judgments from faces change as a function of time exposure (Todorov et al., 2007). People start discriminating between different categories of faces (e.g., trustworthy vs. untrustworthy looking) after a 33-ms exposure, an exposure at the subjective threshold between subliminal and supraliminal perception of faces (Pessoa, Japee, & Ungerleider, 2005). Judgments improved substantially—as measured with the increase in correlation with judgments made in the absence of time constraints—with the increase in exposure time from 33 to 100 ms. There was little improvement with increase in exposure time from 100 to 167 ms, and no improvement with exposures longer than 167 ms. These findings are consistent with the idea that trait judgments from faces can be characterized as rapid, unreflective, intuitive, System I judgments.

The major implication of this perspective is that quick initial impressions of individuals may skew more deliberative judgments based on substantive information about these individuals. More importantly, because of the properties of these intuitive impressions, their influence on voting decisions can be unrecognized by voters (Todorov, Mandisodza, Goren, & Hall, 2005). Recognition of bias is a precondition for judgmental correction, and therefore voters may not attempt to avoid or correct for such impression biases (cf., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Wilson & Brekke, 1994).

A System I/System II distinction relates qualitatively to dual-process models of persuasion such as the heuristic systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980, 1987; Todorov, Chaiken, & Henderson, 2002) and the elaboration likelihood model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). In these models, people can form their voting preferences either by relying on and processing superficially heuristic cues such as the facial appearance of the candidates or by processing systematically valid cues about the candidates' abilities and agenda such as their voting record on particular policies. Taken together, the System I/System II model and the well-established persuasion models provide a framework within which to examine voting decisions. Normatively speaking, voting is a domain in which individuals should clearly seek out deliberative decisions based on the integration of multiple sources of information. However, as the following research demonstrates, these decisions may often be clouded by quick judgments that occur without conscious processing or intention.

INFERENCES FROM FACES PREDICT ELECTION OUTCOMES

The Harding anecdote aside, do trait judgments based solely on the facial appearance of candidates predict the outcomes of political elections? In a series of studies involving more than 900 participants, participants were presented with the pictures of the winner and the runner-up in congressional races and asked to make a variety of trait judgments (Todorov et al., 2005). We excluded races with famous politicians (e.g., Hillary Clinton) and did not use judgments for races with politicians familiar to the participant. For example, if a participant recognized any of the candidates for, say, 3 out of 32 races, her judgments for only the 29 unrecognized races were used. We never mentioned elections, and participants were asked to make "gut" feeling first impressions. Inferences of competence from the faces of the candidates predicted the outcomes of both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives elections. That is, participants' simple choice of the winning candidate versus the closest contender as being the more competent, based simply on standardized photos of each, was predictive of the actual winning candidate in the election. For the Senate races from 2000, 2002, and 2004, the competence judgments predicted 71.6 percent of the races. For the House races from 2002 and 2004, the judgments predicted 66.8 percent of the races.

Recently, we extended these findings to gubernatorial elections (Ballew & Todorov, 2007), elections that are presumably more important than Senate elections. State governors are among the most powerful elected officials in the United States. For example, Texas is larger than France, and California has a larger population than Canada (*U.S. Census*, 2006). States are significant economic powers, too. If California was a nation, it would rank fifth on the list of largest economies in the world (Barone & Cohen, 2004). Governors are also likely to ascend to the presidency. Seventeen of 43 presidents have been state governors, including four out of five in the last 30 years (Carter, GA; Reagan, CA; Clinton, AR; and G.W. Bush, TX). Not surprisingly, gubernatorial campaigns are expensive. In 1998, the 36 gubernatorial races averaged $14.1 million in expenses (Moore, 2003). By comparison, the Senate races in 1996 averaged $3.3 million (Cantor, 2001).

Nevertheless, judgments of competence from the faces of the winner and the runner-up predicted 68.5 percent of the outcomes of gubernatorial races for the period from 1996 to 2006. These judgments predicted the outcome even when they were made after a 100-ms exposure to the faces of the candidates (Ballew & Todorov, 2007), as described below. Competence judgments predicted the election outcomes not only retrospectively

but also prospectively. In 2004, we collected competence judgments before the actual Senate elections (Todorov et al., 2005). These judgments predicted 68.8 percent of the races. In 2006, we collected judgments before the Senate and gubernatorial elections (Ballew & Todorov, 2007). These judgments predicted 72.4 percent of the Senate races and 68.6 percent of the gubernatorial races.

As shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we also observed a linear relationship between the margin of victory and the difference in competence between the candidates. The more competent the Democratic candidate was perceived to be relative to the Republican candidate, the bigger was the Democratic vote share in the election. For the 120 studied Senate races (from 2000 to 2006), the linear correlation was .40 (Figure 4.1). For the 124 studied gubernatorial races (from 1996 to 2006), the linear correlation was .25 (Figure 4.2). Thus, "gut" feeling first impressions of competence based on facial appearance accounted for 16 percent of the variance in the party vote share in the Senate races and 6 percent of the variance in the party vote share in the gubernatorial races.


Figure 4.1 Scatter plot of the two-party vote share for the Democratic candidates and their perceived competence relative to the Republican candidates. Each point represents a Senate race ($n = 120$). The line represents the best-fitting line

Figure 4.2 Scatter plot of the two-party vote share for the Democratic candidates and their perceived competence relative to the Republican candidates. Each point represents a gubernatorial race ($n = 124$). The line represents the best-fitting line

THE SPECIFICITY OF COMPETENCE JUDGMENTS

People believe that competence is one of the most important attributes for a politician (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Todorov et al., 2005) and the findings were specific to competence. Interestingly, Mondak and colleagues (McCurley & Mondak, 1995; Mondak, 1995) showed that measures of competence and integrity predicted a number of important variables for members of the House of Representatives. These measures were derived from content analysis of the members' descriptions in the *Almanac of American Politics*. Although the source of these descriptions could bias their content, competence predicted how long members of the House stayed in office, the likelihood that the members were challenged in upcoming elections, and the number of votes received by the incumbents. In contrast to competence, integrity contributed little to these predictions.

These findings parallel our findings that inferences of competence from facial appearance were the proximal predictor of election outcomes (Todorov et al., 2005). For example, in one of the studies, participants judged the faces

of the winner and the runner-up on seven different dimensions: competence, intelligence, leadership, likeability, charisma, honesty, and trustworthiness. Factor analysis showed that these judgments clustered in three independent factors: competence (competence, intelligence, and leadership), trust (honesty and trustworthiness), and likeability (likeability and charisma). More importantly, only the competence judgments predicted the election outcomes. In subsequent studies, participants judged the faces on attractiveness, age, and familiarity. Regression analysis with these judgments showed that once again competence judgments were the only significant predictor of the election outcomes. In a preview of our work, Zebrowitz and Montepare (2005) suggested that competence judgments reflected "babyfaced" appearance. Specifically, politicians who are presumably more babyfaced are judged as less competent. In fact, this hypothesis was widely popular in media accounts of our findings. However, subsequent findings did not provide any support for this hypothesis (unpublished data). Whereas judgments of babyfaced appearance predicted 54 percent of the Senate races for 2000 and 2002, judgments of competence predicted 73 percent of these races. Although these judgments were correlated, as suggested by Zebrowitz and Montepare (2005), regression analysis showed that only competence was a significant predictor of election outcomes. Thus, neither global face characteristics such as attractiveness and babyfaced appearance nor specific trait inferences such as trustworthiness accounted for the finding that competence judgments predicted election outcomes.

Interestingly, as shown in Figure 4.3, the predictive utility of trait judgments was related to the perceived importance of trait attributes for politicians. Specifically, we asked a large group of participants to rate the


Figure 4.3 Mean importance of trait attributes for a politician and percentage of Senate races correctly predicted by judgments on these trait attributes. The height of each bar represents the importance of the trait. Error bars show standard error of the mean. The percentage of correctly predicted races is presented above each bar. "Anxious" and "conventional" were reverse scored for the analyses

importance of 13 trait attributes for a politician. These included the three attributes identified in the factor analysis described above—competence, likeability, and trust—and 10 attributes that mapped onto the big five factors of personality—openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). The more important the trait was, the more races the trait judgment predicted. For example, competence was judged as the most important attribute, and this judgment predicted 66 percent of the races studied in this study. In contrast, "reserved" was judged as the least important trait attribute and this trait judgment predicted 49 percent of the races, clearly a chance prediction. The linear correlation between the importance of trait attributes and the percentage of correctly predicted races by the trait judgments was .76, $p < .002$. The predictive utility of trait judgments from faces covaried with the importance assigned to these traits.

We also showed that judgments of competence were highly correlated with hypothetical votes (Todorov et al., 2005). Specifically, one group of participants was asked to cast hypothetical votes and another to make competence judgments. The correlation between hypothetical votes and competence judgments was 0.83 for the Senate races and 0.79 for the House races. The candidates for the Senate races were also rated on 12 other traits, described in the above paragraph. As shown in Figure 4.4, regression analysis showed that the only significant predictor of simulated voting


Figure 4.4 Trait judgments from facial appearance of candidates as predictors of simulated voting decisions. The *Y*-axis plots the unstandardized regression coefficients of trait judgments. Errors show standard errors of regression coefficients

decisions was judgments of competence. These findings are consistent with the idea that rapid trait judgments of competence from facial appearance affect voting decisions.

COMPETENCE JUDGMENTS FROM FACES AND INCUMBENCY

Despite the findings that the effects of judgments of competence are highly specific, it is possible that such judgments do not have causal impact on actual voting decisions. In U.S. elections, it is well known that incumbents have a strong advantage (Cover, 1977; Gelman & King, 1990). For example, in the congressional races we studied (Todorov et al., 2005), incumbents won in 89 percent of the House races and in 74 percent of the Senate races. If incumbents in elections appear to be more competent and participants choose the incumbent more often, this might explain the competence effect. According to this explanation, competence judgments should predict better than chance only races in which incumbents win. Although we showed that the effect of competence judgments was independent of incumbency status for the Senate races, this was not the case for the House races. For the House races, competence judgments predicted the winner only in races in which the incumbents won. However, there are a number of differences between House and Senate races and it is not clear how to interpret the latter finding. There is far less media exposure to House candidates than to Senate candidates, and it is likely that many voters are unfamiliar with the faces of their House candidates. It was also impossible to obtain pictures of both candidates for all House races. For the 2002 and 2004 races, we were able to obtain the pictures of both candidates for 600 out of 870 races. This undersampling may have introduced unknown biases into the sample of these races.

The gubernatorial races are particularly interesting for the test of the incumbency hypothesis because many states have term limits for governors and, correspondingly, there are many races without incumbents. As in the case of the Senate races, incumbency status did not account for the finding that competence judgments predicted election outcomes (Ballew & Todorov, 2007). For the 124 gubernatorial races that we studied, the candidate who was perceived as more competent won in 67.7 percent of the races in which the incumbent won ($n = 62$) and in 62.9 percent of the races in which the incumbent lost or there was no incumbent ($n = 62$), $\chi^2(1) < 1$, $p = .57$, for the test for dependence. Incumbency status and perceived competence were independent predictors of the election outcomes.

To summarize, our research shows that: (a) trait inferences of competence from facial appearance predict important election outcomes; (b) there is a linear relationship between the margin of victory and differences in

competence between the winner and the runner-up; (c) the effect is highly specific (people believe that competence is the most important attribute for a politician, and trait inferences of competence from faces—but not other trait inferences—predict the election outcomes); (d) simulated voting decisions in the absence of any other information but faces are predicted by competence judgments from the faces, but not by a number of other trait judgments; and (e) incumbency status cannot account for the effects of competence, suggesting that these inferences of competence can have a causal impact on voting decisions.

CONVERGING EVIDENCE

There is a growing body of research demonstrating the power of first impressions in the domain of election outcomes (Benjamin & Shapiro, 2006; Lawson & Lenz, 2007; Little, Burriss, Jones, & Roberts, 2007). Lawson and Lenz (2007) replicated our findings in the context of Mexican elections, using judgments of American participants. Judgments of competence from the faces of the candidates predicted the election outcomes and accounted for 18 percent of the variance in vote share. In contrast, as in our findings, judgments of honesty did not predict the election outcomes.

Benjamin and Shapiro (2006) showed that judgments made from silent 10-second clips of debates from gubernatorial elections predicted election results. These judgments accounted for about 20 percent of the variance in vote share and predicted the outcomes better than many important political and economic indicators such as incumbency, historical vote share, and campaign spending. As in our findings, this effect was independent of incumbency status. Furthermore, the effect did not hold when the debate clip was viewed with full sound, corroborating our explanation that these findings result from quick, unreflective impressions. In the full-sound condition, individuals were able to infer information such as the candidate's political party and policy preferences, but this information did not allow them to predict the election outcomes better than chance. Consistent with a large body of evidence in social psychology that "thin slices" of nonverbal behaviors provide sufficient information for accurate social judgments (e.g., Albright, Kenny, & Malloy, 1988; Ambady, Hallahan, & Rosenthal, 1995; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1992; Borkenau & Liebler, 1992; Kenny, Horner, Kashy, & Chu, 1992; Park & Judd, 1989; Watson, 1989), these findings suggest that the most useful information, in terms of predicting the election outcomes, was nonverbal.

Is it possible to predict presidential elections by judgments from the faces of the presidential candidates? Naturally, one of the difficulties in such a

study would be to find participants who are not familiar with the candidates. Little et al. (2007, Study 1) used a clever morphing technique to overcome this difficulty. They created faces based on the shape differences between the candidates for the highest posts in the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. These novel pairs of faces, although derived from the politicians' faces, were not recognizable by participants (Figure 4.6a). Participants were presented with the faces of the winner and the runner-up and asked to cast a hypothetical vote. Consistent with our findings, participants were more likely to choose the winner than the runner-up. As described above, simulated voting decisions are highly correlated with judgments of competence, suggesting that the same mechanisms are operating when people are asked to make competence judgments and cast hypothetical votes for faces. Most likely, when faced with a voting choice between two faces, participants make a rapid judgment of competence and base their voting decision on this judgment.

Overall, these results suggest that complex social judgments can be influenced by quick inferences made from faces. They provide a challenge to the assumed rationality of policy and voting preferences, as they suggest that these choices may be more superficial than individuals would like to believe (cf., Converse, 1964; Quattrone & Tversky, 1988; Zaller, 1992).

THE AUTOMATICITY OF TRAIT INFERENCES AND VOTING DECISIONS

Although in all of our previous experiments, participants were instructed to rely on their "gut" feelings when forming impressions, we did not manipulate the time of exposure to faces or introduced procedures forcing participants to rely on quick judgments. In our research on congressional elections (Todorov et al., 2005), the minimum exposure time used for the faces was a second. Clearly, much less time should be needed if these judgments are automatic (e.g., Todorov et al., 2007).

Ballew and Todorov (2007, Experiment 1) presented the faces of the winner and the runner-up in gubernatorial races for 100 ms, 250 ms, or unlimited time. Competence judgments made after a 100 ms exposure to the faces predicted the election outcomes. In fact, the predictions did not improve with additional exposure time, although the response times for the judgments substantially increased in the unlimited time condition. Whereas the mean response time in the 100 ms exposure condition was about 1.5 s, the mean response time in the unlimited time condition was close to 3.5 s. In Experiment 2, Ballew and Todorov used a 250-ms exposure condition and a response deadline condition. In the response deadline condition,

participants had to respond within 2 s. This time was selected because it was substantially shorter than the time used by participants in the self-pace unlimited time condition, thus forcing participants to rely on quick, unreflective judgments. Once again, competence judgments predicted the election outcomes.

Finally, this experiment also included a deliberation condition in which participants were asked to deliberate and make a good judgment. The underlying logic behind this condition was that to the extent that trait judgments from faces are unreflective, instructions to deliberate should make these judgments worse. In fact, they did. Deliberation judgments were significantly worse in predicting the election outcomes than unreflective judgments—made after a 250 ms exposure or within a response deadline of 2 s. This finding is consistent with prior research showing that introspecting about reasons for making a decision, either freely or by explicitly rating preferences on various choice attributes, can result in inferior decisions in comparison with decisions made more intuitively (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006; Wilson & Schooler, 1991). For example, in a classic study, Wilson and Schooler (1991) showed that judgments of the quality of jams were worse after people were asked to reflect on the jams. Evaluating the quality of jams and making trait judgments from faces are quite different but both rely on mechanisms that are most likely inaccessible to awareness (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). In a more apt analogy, verbally describing a face can interfere with face recognition (Dodson, Johnson, & Schooler, 1997; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990) and thinking about the reasons for liking faces can reduce the consistency of liking judgments (Levine, Halberstadt, & Goldstone, 1996).

Most likely, when individuals are asked to deliberate on judgments from faces that are typically done rapidly and intuitively, they focus on irrelevant facial features and use idiosyncratic personal theories to make the judgments. This can only introduce noise in these judgments (Levine et al., 1996). This possibility is consistent with the Ballew and Todorov data. Both deliberation and unreflective competence judgments correlated with the margin of victory, although the correlation was higher for unreflective judgments. However, these judgments also shared variance consistent with the hypothesis that deliberation judgments were anchored on rapid, unreflective judgments (cf., Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). In fact, as shown in Figure 4.5, removing the shared variance did not affect the correlation between vote share and unreflective judgments (Figure 4.5a). However, it completely eradicated the positive linear relation between deliberation judgments and vote share (Figure 4.5b).

Our findings show that trait judgments from faces occur remarkably quickly and, possibly, operate with minimal input from controlled, System II

Figure 4.5 Scatter plots of the two-party vote share for the Democratic candidates and (a) non-shared variance of unreflective judgments of competence of Democratic candidates (the *X*-axis plots the regression residuals of unreflective judgments regressed on deliberation judgments) and (b) non-shared variance of deliberation judgments of competence of Democratic candidates (the *X*-axis plots the regression residuals of deliberation judgments regressed on unreflective judgments). Each point represents a gubernatorial race. The line represents the best-fitting line

processes. What predicts the outcomes of elections seems to be the automatic component of trait judgments. Deliberation instructions add noise to automatic trait judgments and, consequently, reduce the accuracy of prediction. These findings suggest that the effects of trait judgments from faces on voting decisions can be subtle and not easily recognized by voters.

HOW DO THESE EFFECTS OPERATE IN THE REAL WORLD?

The research reviewed in this chapter seems to paint a simplistic, unidirectional picture of the automatic effects on voting preferences. It is important to bear in mind that automatic inferences from facial appearance are but one example of multiple automatic and controlled influences on election outcomes. One noteworthy influence that we would not want to downplay is party affiliation (Bartels, 2000; Stokes & Miller, 1962). In actual elections, candidates' party affiliation is no doubt very salient to most voters, and staunch partisans are sure to weight this factor heavily in their voting decisions. The affiliation can be thought of as an automatic, heuristic process in its own

right, and for partisans especially, it may overwhelm other influences such as facial appearance.

Partisanship, ideology, and image can each affect evaluations of candidates and voting decisions (Asher, 1983; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Niemi & Weisberg, 1984). A study by Riggle (1992) suggests that party affiliation is a heuristic that voters are more likely to use when directly comparing two candidates (as we have in our studies), rather than evaluating each one individually. Riggle suggests that the greater complexity introduced by having people compare two candidates makes them more likely to rely on heuristics than to evaluate more substantive characteristics such as candidates' issue statements (see also Lau & Redlawsk, 2001).

In fact, one can imagine that partisans will consider party affiliation almost exclusively, disregarding all other factors, whereas undecided voters will be the ones who utilize facial appearance most strongly and ignore factors such as the party affiliation of the candidates. However, in many cases, the undecided are precisely the voters who can swing an election. Political knowledge may be another factor that may moderate the effect of appearance on voting decisions. In fact, Lau and Redlawsk (2001) have shown that less knowledgeable voters are more likely to base their voting decisions on appearance of the candidates than more knowledgeable voters. While research has yet to tease these factors apart, the work that has been completed thus far provides compelling evidence that inferences from facial appearance are an independent, significant factor at play when examining large-scale patterns of judgments among voters.

Certainly, having a competent face is not sufficient for electoral success. If a politician does not have the backing of one of the two major parties in the United States, their face will not make much of a difference. In almost all of the races that we have studied, the candidates represented these parties. Having the support of a major party, a politician with competent appearance can have higher chances of electoral success. However, competence as assessed in our studies is always relative. Participants were presented with pairs of faces and asked to make a choice. Thus, in some races a politician may appear more competent relative to the challenger and in others he or she may appear less competent.

Finally, there are multiple routes through which competent appearance can affect electoral outcomes. For example, party leaders can promote competent-appearing candidates for key positions although these candidates may not be that competent after all. Appearance can also affect decisions to vote. For example, competent-looking incumbents may deter undecided voters, who have a mild preference for the challengers, from voting for the challenger. Studies on actual voting-decision processes will be critical to

delineate the causal influences of appearance on electoral success. It is note-worthy that some countries—Ireland, Greece, and Belgium—use pictures of the candidates in their ballots, and empirical studies in these contexts can be particularly informative.

BEYOND COMPETENCE JUDGMENTS: THE ROLE OF CONTEXT

Clearly, competence judgments from faces are highly predictive of election outcomes. Moreover, these effects are specific to competence judgments. But is it only competence? What if the context of elections changes and makes some other trait attribute more important than competence? The findings shown in Figure 4.3 suggest that such changes in context can lead to changes in voters' preferences. As we described above, the predictive utility of vari-ous trait judgments was tightly linked to the perceived importance of trait attributes. Thus, it is possible that changes in the relative importance of trait attributes can lead to corresponding changes in the predictive utility of trait judgments.

In a particularly striking demonstration, Little et al. (2007, Study 2) showed that shifting context from wartime to peacetime could change vot-ers' preferences. Using the morphing procedures described above, Little and colleagues created morphs of George W. Bush and John Kerry. As shown in Figure 4.6a, these faces were distinct from one another, but difficult to link to the original faces. Participants were asked to indicate which face they would "vote for to run your country" in three different contexts: a time of peace, a time of war, and no specified context. In this study, a preference reversal was found between the Bush and Kerry morphed faces, such that in a time of peace, approximately 61 percent chose the Kerry-shaped face, whereas in a time of war, 74 percent chose the Bush-shaped face. With no context priming, there was a nonsignificant trend toward the choice of the Bush face.

Little et al. used a within-subjects design in which participants made repeated voting choices as a function of context (no context, war, peace). This design introduces potential demand characteristics that might encour-age participants to change their responses. We replicated their findings using a sample of Princeton University students in a between-subjects design. First, very few participants reported that the faces reminded them of the faces of Bush and Kerry. More importantly, as shown in Figure 4.6b, we observed a perfect preference reversal as a function of context, replicating Little et al.'s study. Whereas 64.3 percent of participants preferred the Bush face in a war context, 60.0 percent preferred the Kerry face in a peace context, $\chi^2(1) = 8.98$,

(a)   (b)

Figure 4.6 Preference reversal in voters' preferences as a function of context. (a) Faces of George W. Bush ("C") and John Kerry ("D") morphed with an average face to create "A" and "B," respectively, for use in the experiment. (b) Proportion of respondents choosing the morphed faces of George W. Bush and John Kerry as a function voting in a time of peace versus in a time of war

$p < .003$. This pattern was the same for both self-identified Republicans and Democrats.

What drives these effects? Little et al. found that the Bush face was judged to be more masculine and dominant, traits deemed to be important in a time of conflict, but less intelligent and forgiving, traits deemed to be important in a time of peace. Little et al. (2007) replicated the preference reversal using morphs of masculine and feminine male faces, consistent with the trait importance hypothesis. Participants chose the masculine face significantly more frequently during a time of war and chose the feminine face during peacetime. The results suggest that individuals place differing values on personality traits inferred from faces, and a shifting social context will prime judges to choose based upon the relevant dimensions. In addition, neither the masculine nor feminine face was favored in a general voting scenario, perhaps indicating that voters may implicitly search for information to assist them in making these choices.

This line of work suggests that quick inferences from faces impact judgments in a systematic manner. Not only do individuals make quick unreflective judgments from faces, but they do so in a manner relevant to the corresponding social context. At a broader level, these results suggest flexibility in judgments that reflect nuanced preferences of political leaders dependent on the political context.

IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSUASION

The review of the recent work in the area of person perception and election outcomes shows that individual judgments of candidates are influenced by rapid, unreflective trait judgments from facial appearance. The dual-process perspective on these judgments has practical implications. First, this perspective is relevant in considering persuasion processes, especially because people are often unaware of the influence of these trait inferences. In addition, these findings have implications for understanding individual policy preferences and corresponding behavior.

In light of the previously discussed research findings, there are powerful implications for the campaign management of candidates at all levels of government. In today's age of highly publicized elections, candidates would be well advised to consider the type of image their physical appearance conveys. For example, if homeland security emerges as a hot issue during an election, a candidate with a stern and decisive visage should publicly stress his or her commitment to that cause. Because the research has shown that individuals are drawn to faces with the traits they deem appropriate for the situation, candidates should be sure to take this into account while campaigning. In the process of attempting to convert undecided voters, candidates with faces that "fit" hot-button issues should make their faces highly visible, not just their names and campaign slogans.

From an alternative perspective, the reviewed research would also suggest that the examination of election results might help candidates understand which issues have been salient for voters. It has been shown that polling location often predicts how people vote. In an Arizona election, voters who had a local school as their polling location were more likely to vote for a sales tax to support education, as opposed to other locations (Berger, Meredith, & Wheeler, 2006). This type of effect could be exacerbated if a voter is primed with an issue when voting and then views a candidate's face that seems to fit that issue. Retrospectively, unsuccessful candidates might consider how these types of situational factors influenced their campaign, allowing for even more nuanced future operations.

It should be noted that these suggestions do not imply that candidates for office can use these techniques to convince voters who, for whatever reason, are more likely to rely on superficial cues when making these judgments. As it has been shown, these processes operate extremely quickly, with minimal deliberative input. These persuasion techniques might simply help a candidate to sway swing voters by playing to the strengths offered by their appearance. Clearly, factors such as incumbency status and party affiliation have a strong influence on the choices made by many voters. We suggest that

attention to the role of facial appearance is another method of predicting the behavior of voters, on an aggregate scale.

A major aspect of dual-process models of persuasion is that various factors can enhance people's likelihood of elaborating on the stimuli to which they're exposed and processing them systematically. According to this vast literature (see Petty & Wegener, 1998, for a review), characteristics of the message itself, the source of the message, the recipient of the message, and other assorted context variables have been shown to have an influence on the persuasive power of a message. The current research does not speak to the benefits of encouraging voters to process information about their candidates more deeply, and it is entirely possible that if one were somehow to convince a large proportion of voters to base their decisions on substantive matters, election results would look little like they do now, and they would correlate minimally with appearance-based trait ratings (assuming that there is no kernel of truth in these ratings, a point that has yet to be empirically explored in enough detail)—or for that matter, incumbency status (e.g., Kam, 2006) and political affiliation as well.

However, given that information about the candidates is often ambiguous and that voters rarely have the opportunity to interact with these candidates, systematic processing of this information may do little to overcome biases originating in trait inferences from facial appearance. As work in person perception has shown, biases that are not subjectively recognized can disambiguate ambiguous information and people may end up believing that their perceptions are a veridical representation of reality (Trope, 1986; Trope & Gaunt, 1999). As the bias hypothesis in the HSM states, an ambiguous persuasion message can be interpreted in line with a preceding heuristic cue even if people are highly motivated to seek accuracy. Thus, the same ambiguous message can be interpreted differently if the candidate is perceived to be competent than if he or she is perceived to be incompetent. For example, Chaiken and Maheswaran (1994) showed that ambiguous descriptions of consumer products were interpreted differently in the context of a reliable source of the information (*Consumer Reports*) than in the context of an unreliable source (a promotional pamphlet from Kmart). This effect was independent of participants' motivation.

What the current research does suggest is to focus more on heuristic cues and how they operate in determining people's decisions. Research on attitudes, persuasion, marketing, and health has demonstrated various heuristic ways to influence everything from the usage of condoms (Stone, Aronson, Crain, Winslow, & Fried, 1994) to the quality of conversations with and behavior toward a person believed to be attractive versus unattractive (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977) to convincing people to help out a

stranger. Participants in a good mood—induced by the discovery of a dime in a phone booth or by receiving cookies—were more likely to engage in helping behavior such as helping out a stranger or mailing a sealed and addressed letter ostensibly left by someone at a phone booth (Isen & Levin, 1972; Levin & Isen, 1975). Simple heuristic cues or manipulations have an effect in these cases, where one would assume that overall motivations and intentions should be uniform and not malleable enough to be influenced by these slight changes in context. The research reviewed within this chapter adds to what has been studied in this regard, in the context of voting decisions (see also, for the influence of nonverbal information, Masters & Sullivan, 1993; Patterson, Churchill, Burger, & Powell, 1992). Inferences drawn from faces can be added to the list of cues that might influence an uncertain voter.

From a theoretical perspective, the research reviewed in this chapter describes a set of cognitive processes that demonstrate possible conflicts between System I and System II processes. People would like to believe that complicated judgments are a result of the careful consideration of relevant information. However, the vast literature on dual-process models suggests that this is often not the case (Chaiken & Trope, 1999). Even though they may often not realize it, people have little, if any, access to or control over their quick first impressions, emotions, and attitudes. It is difficult for individuals to debias themselves from what has been labeled "mental contamination" (Wilson & Brekke, 1994; Wilson, Centerbar & Brekke, 2002). There are distinct difficulties in recognizing sources of contamination, and subsequently knowing the best way to correct for them. The findings discussed within this chapter provide examples of this problem at play in real-world judgments with large stakes. We argue that, in the case of potential contamination resulting from rapid inferences drawn from faces, it is nearly impossible to avoid these influences, but that the societal costs of not addressing these issues are too great. Continued research in this area should provide new suggestions of how to understand the complicated constellation of social and cognitive factors that interact to produce voting decisions.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

There are many parallels between the model of the rational actor in economics and the model of the voter in democratic theory. The rational actor is driven by self-interest and has stable, comprehensive, and coherent preferences. Yet, none of these assumptions seem to hold under close scrutiny (e.g., Henrich et al., 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000; Miller, 1999). The

voter in democratic theory not only has the properties of the rational actor but also is well informed about policy, follows political developments, and actively participates in politics (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997). Yet, the majority of voters have very little political knowledge (e.g., Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992), misunderstand economic principles (e.g., Bartels, 2005; Caplan, 2007), construe basic ideological distinctions in an idiosyncratic fashion (Conover & Feldman, 1981), have inconsistent preferences (Quattrone & Tversky, 1988), and base their evaluations of candidates and issues on emotions (Lodge & Taber, 2005). The research reviewed here adds to this work that consistently finds violations of the assumptions of democratic theory. As we noted in the introduction, how people behave is different from how they should behave. Similarly, in the realm of politics, the reality of individual choice may be systematically deviating from the ideals put forth by democratic theory.

As we showed, judgments of competence based solely on facial appearance predict election results from the level of congressional to higher-stakes gubernatorial elections. These trait inferences occur quickly, with minimal input from controlled processes and consistent with online models of candidate evaluation (Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989). At the same time, our findings suggest that the influence processes are not entirely irrational. People have the right ideas about the importance of trait attributes for politicians and, apparently, they look for evidence of such attributes. Where the process goes awry is that they look for this information in the wrong place.

In an age of increasingly competitive elections, both politicians and voters should concern themselves with the influence that appearance has on the perceptions of voters. Due to the influence of an ever-growing media presence, citizens are constantly faced with the images of their potential leaders. It is interesting to consider an example from the 1960 U.S. presidential election campaign, when television ownership and coverage were not as widespread as they are today. At that time, John F. Kennedy faced Richard Nixon in the first-ever televised debates. Kennedy was judged to be the likely winner based on television appearance, yet Nixon was judged more likely based on radio alone (Kraus, 1988).

In the previous example, impressions made from visual appearance clearly had a substantive impact on recipients' judgments. Aspiring politicians would do well to be aware of this and to understand how it may affect their efforts. Voters should be aware of how quickly these judgments occur and how unavoidable this influence might be. A conscientious voter would perhaps choose to avoid media images of candidates to make objective decisions, but it is unclear whether inevitable exposure to the countenance of these high profile individuals can be avoided in the current day and age. On the other hand, voters might increase their deliberation and reliance on

more substantive information when making voting decisions. The knowledge of a potential influence by superficial information might motivate voters to engage in educated political decision making that is the result of the integration of relevant information.

Voters rely on multiple heuristics (Lau & Redlawsk, 2001), and in real-life voting, additional relevant information may decrease the effect of simple first impressions. This suggests that one effective way to facilitate rational deliberation on voting choices might be to encourage (and make accessible) the use of substantive information. A winning face might be easier for a voter to digest than a set of well-thought-out policy plans. However, providing individuals with knowledge of the effects of first impressions could facilitate their willingness to consider the information that truly matters. Voters may not have the capacity to ignore the influence of irrelevant cues, but they do have the power to increase their exposure to other sources of information.

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Strategic Politicians, Emotional Citizens, and the Rhetoric of Prediction

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This chapter considers how politicians use rhetoric to promote their policies, how citizens respond to that rhetoric, and the consequences of their responses for the competence of public opinion. We focus on a particular type of rhetorical appeal–those based on emotionally charged predictions about policy consequences. We argue that such appeals are often central to policy debate and that they are extremely difficult for citizens to deal with intelligently. We suggest that the processes by which citizens respond to prediction-based rhetoric are crucial to the direction and character of collective opinion, and we sketch a preliminary theory of those processes.

To understand these interactions between politicians and citizens, we adopt the unconventional practice of applying two distinct analytic approaches to the two categories of actor. For politicians, we emphasize maximizing and strategic behavior, reflecting their full-time employment in politics and large personal stakes in political outcomes. For ordinary citizens, we stress affect- and emotion-driven mental processes, reflecting their fleeting attention to politics and their lack of incentives to calculate carefully. Our argument, stated briefly, is as follows: Political leaders want to win policy debates and they employ rhetoric in an effort to move public opinion to their respective sides. To ensure that their presumptive supporters remain loyal, they mostly proclaim partisan or ideological principles: for example, "Republicans put their faith in state and local governments." To sway those citizens who are generally not aligned with either party or hold no ideological tendencies, however, they mostly make predictions about consequences. These predictions are often negative and dire—"under national health care reform, you'll lose the freedom to choose your doctor"—and designed to elicit negative emotions, especially fear and anger. The result is an emotionally charged politics that undermines at least many citizens' ability to make reasoned policy choices and compromises the intelligence of collective opinion.

Our discussion is divided into three main sections. The first uses Anthony Downs's *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) as a starting

point but amends his framework in several ways. The resulting framework explains how political parties seek to win policy debates by gaining public support for their favored policies, rather than merely competing to offer policies that citizens already prefer. It also makes some important distinctions about the available means of gaining such support. The second section uses these distinctions to identify several varieties of political rhetoric, and singles out one form of it—appealing to extreme and predominantly negative predictive claims—as generally central to politicians' persuasive efforts. It then illustrates the prominence of such claims, using two real-world high-stakes political conflicts that occurred 150 years and thousands of miles apart.

The final, and most speculative, section discusses the psychological processes of citizens' responses to predictive claims. We discuss and largely reject two views in the literature—one emphasizing heuristics, the other emotion-induced learning—that would tend to discount either citizens' need to deal with predictive rhetoric at all or the difficulty for them of doing so competently. We argue, in contrast, that citizens use a variety of casual, mostly unconscious, and minimally reliable methods of assessing and responding to predictive claims.

Our emphasis on initially nonaligned voters warrants a comment. These are the people who either do not readily identify themselves with any political faction, or if they do, identify with one that fails to give clear guidance on a particular issue. Their importance stems from the simple fact that they often determine the citizenry's majority position.

HOW PARTIES COMPETE: THE DOWNSIAN MODEL REVISITED

More than 40 years ago, Anthony Downs (1957) introduced a model of party competition that still structures much thinking about the relationship between politicians and public opinion. The model makes three key assumptions: voters' preferences are fixed, voters' preferences are normally distributed along a single liberal-conservative dimension, and parties are self-interested actors whose primary goal is to win elections. It predicts that in a polity where citizens' ideological preferences are unimodal in distribution, two rational, competing parties will move toward the median voter to maximize electoral support. Importantly, in the present context, the model does not expect that the parties will make efforts to change those preferences.

In recent years, the Downsian median voter model has come under considerable criticism. Most scholars now acknowledge the empirical inaccuracy of the model's principal prediction—that two competing parties will converge on the ideological center. Notoriously, they instead stake out sharply differing positions, closer to the respective ends of the ideological spectrum. Supporters of the Downsian model have offered a straightforward remedy to this discrepancy: introduce party activists who take extreme positions and can compel the parties to respond to their preferences in order to maintain their contributions of money and effort (Aldrich, 1983; Aranson & Ordeshook, 1972; Coleman, 1972; May, 1973; for an alternative perspective, see Adams & Merrill, 1999; Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989). With this addition, these scholars argue, it is possible to retain the model's basic structure while also accommodating the relatively extreme positions that parties adopt on policy.

Other scholars have argued against this simple solution, contending that the main problem with Downs's model is the erroneous assumption that citizens' preferences are fixed (see, e.g., Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). In their view, the very reason for public political debate between parties is to sway those preferences in one or the other direction.

This criticism is headed in a useful direction, but in our view it accepts too much of Downs's conceptual framework to be persuasive. Downs construes public preferences in terms of a broad ideological dimension, essentially a relative preference between two opposing values or sets of values. Here, Downs would seem correct: such values arguably should remain stable over long periods of time. And there is little reason for politicians to invest limited resources in an effort to change them. At most, they might try to change the relative salience of certain values by priming some and not others (e.g., Chong & Druckman, 2007; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987).

Apart from general values, however, Downs's framework overlooks two elements that are important to the parties' efforts to shape opinion. One is citizens' beliefs pertinent to a particular deliberation. Politicians often try to shape citizens' beliefs about current conditions and the likelihood that particular outcomes will occur if a policy is or is not put into law (e.g., Jerit, 2009; Lupia & Menning, 2009). Will a tax cut stimulate investment and economic growth? Will it force cuts in needed programs? Will coercive methods of interrogation protect the country from terrorist attack? By failing to incorporate efforts to shape such beliefs, Downs eliminates the issue-by-issue give-and-take of real politics from his model.

Politicians can attempt to form and change such beliefs, fundamentally, because of the role of uncertainty in policy decisions. There is always considerable and sometimes enormous uncertainty about the impact of

proposed policies (see, e.g., Riker, 1996).[1] Not even experts really know the consequences of a policy in advance. Indeed, even Downs recognizes this uncertainty and its implications for elite persuasion. In a chapter titled "How Uncertainty Affects Government Decision Making," he points out that in the absence of uncertainty, voters' preferences over specific policies are fixed because they are rational deductions from the voters' views of the good society. However, in an uncertain world,

> [r]oads leading toward the good society are hard to distinguish from those leading away from it. Thus, even though voters have fixed goals, their views on how to approach those goals are malleable and can be altered by persuasion. Consequently, leadership can be exercised on most policy questions . . . . (Downs, 1957, p. 87)

Such views are more than merely malleable, however. Citizens often hold no definite beliefs at all about the consequences of a given policy until they encounter debate about it, giving politicians important opportunities to influence their decisions by creating or changing those beliefs.

The other overlooked element is citizens' preferences about specific policies, as opposed to their general values or ideology. Politicians debate policy alternatives, and citizens are asked to choose among them. In fact politicians rarely have occasion to debate broad ideological principles, except in making a case for a particular policy. Moreover, citizens' preferences about specific policies are by no means simply determined by their general values. For example, the public initially gave strong support to the Clinton administration's 1993 national health care proposal; but as a result of powerful criticism, largely in the form of dire predictions, that support faded over a period of a few months and the proposal died without coming to the House or Senate floor (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). There was no evidence of any broad shift in general values during those months.

A perspective that can account for party competition to persuade citizens, therefore, will take into account at least three elements of citizens' thinking. First, general values or ideology apply to a wide range of policies, and are generally quite stable over the short run. Parties cannot change them significantly. They can, however, attempt to prime certain values and thus increase their salience for citizens temporarily. Second, beliefs are largely specific to a particular policy; they concern consequences

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[1] Riker (1990) distinguishes between outcomes and alternatives. Although there is often uncertainty regarding both, most of it is associated with the future impacts of competing policies.

of adopting or failing to adopt that policy. Such beliefs are often far more movable than values, and politicians make frequent efforts to influence them. Finally, there are preferences regarding specific policies, and these, too, are subject to influence. Apart from electioneering, citizens' policy preferences are usually the principal object of politicians' influence efforts.

Two implications of this admittedly simplified account warrant emphasis. First, the main mechanisms for producing change in public preferences about policies are, on one hand, the priming of values and, on the other hand, the formation and modification of relevant beliefs. The parameters of the two mechanisms will vary across citizen groups. Among the highly partisan, who hold relatively extreme positions on the relevant values, the primed political value will generally dominate decisions. If a strong Republican is reminded that a decision is about the value of free enterprise, that cinches her decision. Among the unaligned, on the other hand, beliefs might vary widely and will carry the greater weight.

Second, politicians' rhetoric will play a major role in triggering both mechanisms. Suppose, for example, that members of the two parties in the U.S. Congress are debating whether to provide social services to illegal immigrants. Democratic leaders can appeal to their core supporters on the grounds of humanity, and Republican leaders to their core supporters on the grounds of legality. Leaders of each party can also try to shape beliefs about the consequences of providing or not providing such services: "If we deny services, children will suffer illness and even die"; "If we provide services, more illegal immigrants will swarm into the country, and break the budgets of state governments." In the next section, we consider politicians' rhetoric more fully.

THE FUNCTIONS AND DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL RHETORIC

Despite the now-popular idea that citizens use politicians' cues to help them make decisions (e.g., Carmines & Kuklinski, 1991; Lau & Redlawsk, 2006; Lupia, 1994; Mondak, 1993) and the publication of Zaller's highly influential book showing that elite discourse shapes public opinion (Zaller, 1992; also see Brody, 1991; Johnston, Blais, Brady, & Crete, 1992; Jones, 1994), scholars have been slow to explore what politicians actually say and do when they debate policy.[2] In his posthumously published book,

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[2] For example, Zaller's empirical measurement consists of the number of statements for and against a policy in *The New York Times* and news magazines.

Riker summarizes the state of affairs as it existed nearly 15 years ago (1996, p. 4):

> We have learned quite a bit about voters' preconceptions, habits, and decisions . . . . But we have very little knowledge about the rhetorical content of campaigns [and policy debates], which is, however, their principal feature. Consequently, we do not know much substantively about how policies are presented [and] discussed . . . .

> His words apply equally well today.

Three Forms of Political Rhetoric

Politicians say many things during the course of a policy debate, and so the first task is to identify the forms that political rhetoric and argument can take. From the perspective of politicians seeking to persuade citizens, the three potentially most valuable forms are assertions of core party values and principles, predictions of future states,[3] and descriptions of current circumstances. All three forms of political rhetoric are motivated by party leaders' desires to sway opinion in the preferred direction, although each form has its own purpose.

Competing political parties espouse core values to ensure that their usual followers support the parties' positions, and to demonstrate their loyalty to those values. When Democratic leaders assert that "We must pass this bill because Democrats will not accept working men and women going without good health care," they are both reaffirming a long-held value—the welfare of the working class—and telling their supporters what the correct position on the bill is. Similarly, when Republican leaders argue against a bill by saying that "Republicans cannot support this program because the services should be provided by state and local governments," they are

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[3] Sniderman (2000) argues that the defining feature of political rhetoric is value conflict: elites make opposing claims about the course of action that the country *should* follow. And they do this, Sniderman claims, for purely instrumental reasons: "To attract the support of their partisans in the electorate as a whole, parties have to present themselves not as opportunistic actors but as agents acting under an obligation to devise a principled and coherent approach to public policy" (p. 127). We agree that value-based arguments are an important part of politicians' rhetoric. In fact, we have looked at the dynamics between predictions and value-based assertions elsewhere (Jerit, 2002). Sniderman presumably would also agree that appeals to values cannot fully explain the dynamics of political debate. If politics were solely about values, each side would assert its values early, and citizens would line up on one side or the other. As we will show shortly, empirically that is not the case. Moreover, value-based arguments are not likely to sway those who are not swayed by them at the outset.

simultaneously invoking a traditional value—decentralized government—and conveying their party's position on the specific proposal. Mobilizing and keeping the party faithful in line is an essential task; and the best way to accomplish it is to play on the core values that brought people to the party in the first place.

Not everyone is among the party faithful, however. There is a sizable group of citizens who do not initially favor one party over the other, or who only lean toward one of them. These are the citizens who must be persuaded that one policy position is more compelling than the other. As we noted earlier, these initially unaligned citizens often determine on which side majority public opinion will fall.

So how might the parties convince them? Riker (1996) argues that the most effective appeals take the form of predictions about what will happen if a policy proposal is or is not passed. Playing on uncertainty, especially the possibility of bad consequences, he contends, will sway citizens. At any point in time, of course, this strategy is available to both parties. Writing in 1991, Lau, Smith, and Fiske (p. 645) observe that "the most frequently attempted manipulation—and the one to which advocates devote most of their creative energy and time—is the formulation and presentation of 'interpretations' of various policy proposals," where an interpretation "consists of a set of arguments about the [future] consequences of a policy proposal."

The specific content of these predictions is almost limitless: "Time limited welfare reform will lead to increased hunger and homelessness"; "Time limits will promote work"; "Without welfare reform, the country will soon face a financial disaster"; "If government does not bail out the auto industry, unemployment will rise to levels never before witnessed in the United States"; "Without welfare reform, we will create yet another generation who cannot care for themselves"; "If we pass this health bill, many Americans will lose their freedom to choose their doctors." More often than not, Riker argues, the competing parties will predict negative and wholly different consequences.

If parties assert core values to keep the faithful on board and make dire predictions to sway the initially unaligned, why, when, and how do they use facts? Certainly they do not use them to help citizens make objective, fact-based decisions. The parties' primary goal is to sway citizens, not to educate them, and thus they will use facts accordingly. This implies that, as a matter of timing, parties will use facts about existing conditions when they serve the parties' interests. Democrats will cite a high unemployment rate during a Republican administration but not during a Democratic one. Republicans will do the opposite.

Moreover, parties can and will state the same fact in different ways. Democrats, for example, will note that only 2% of the total national budget goes toward welfare payments. Republicans will cite the actual amount of money spent, since $30 billion sounds much greater than 2%.[4] As Tversky and Kahneman (1981; see also Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) have documented in a variety of settings, different presentations of identical situations produce different choices. But even if competing political parties should cite the same fact in the same form, they will interpret it differently (Gaines, Kuklinski, Quirk, Peyton, & Verkuilen 2008). Especially in politics, "getting the facts right" is neither easy nor a high priority (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).[5]

A Strategy of Political Rhetoric

In Downs's median voter model, the two parties want to win elections. To that end, they move to the middle of the ideological spectrum when making policy. Adding beliefs to the model changes expectations about party behavior. If parties can shape beliefs, and thus preferences, by taking advantage of uncertainty and strategically using rhetoric, then winning elections and winning policy debates through rhetorical persuasion are both possible, if not mutually reinforcing.

Political rhetoric will not evolve in precisely the same way across different policy debates. Nevertheless, we expect the general pattern to resemble the following: The parties use a variety of appeals to form or change people's beliefs, including appeals to values, references to fact, and predictions about the outcomes of policy alternatives. Appeals to values occur early, for purposes of keeping the party faithful in line. Also early, each party decides whether to cite facts, doing so only when "the facts" can be used to advantage. Over the duration of a debate, and especially when they feel a need to compete ever more strenuously for support of nonaligned voters, the parties increasingly rely on dire predictions. Supporters of the status quo argue that current conditions are not so bad and, more crucially, predict that the proposed policy will produce serious adverse consequences. Supporters of change cite currently intolerable conditions that will worsen under the status quo.

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[4] Although not direct quotes, the figures are reasonable representations of the actual figures as of the mid-1990s, when Congress debated and adopted welfare reform.

[5] We have referred to "the two sides" or "the two parties" several times throughout our discussion. That policy debates almost always devolve into two, not three or four, sides is itself an interesting phenomenon, which we will explore in future research.

To maximize the impact of their predictions, politicians predict absolutely rather than probabilistically: "If policy x passes, consequence y will follow," not "if policy x passes, there is a 40 percent likelihood that consequence y will follow." Rarely do parties and politicians include causal explanations with their predictions. Adding an explanation of a prediction may only raise questions about it and soften its impact.

Rhetoric to Evoke Emotions

When politicians predict that "passage of this bill will lead to a dramatic increase in taxes" or that "young kids will die of starvation and we are doing nothing about it" or that "this bill will increase hostility between blacks and whites," they intend to activate emotions in the process of shaping citizens' beliefs about future outcomes. The two emotions that dire predictions most naturally evoke are fear and anger. Many predictions— "this bill will dramatically increase your taxes" and "unless we act, even more high-school graduates will be unable to afford college"— evoke both.

In recent years, psychologists, neurologists, and cognitive scientists have published pathbreaking work on emotions (see, among other works, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 1998; Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Brader, 2005, 2006; Damasio, 1994, 1999; DeSteno, Petty, Rucker, Wegener, & Braverman, 2004; Ekman, 1992; LeDoux, 1996; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). Rather than repeat what these scholars have written, we only note the following. First, not only are fear and anger basic emotions, but they also are short-term reactions to specific targets (Lerner & Keltner, 2000). They should be natural, expected reactions to political rhetoric designed to create beliefs. Second, we have already noted that citizens likely will receive conflicting if not contradictory predictions simultaneously. They might hear that passing the legislation will create this to-be-feared condition and that not passing the legislation will create that to-be-feared condition. How citizens make decisions under such circumstances is a topic to which we return in the final section of this chapter.

TWO CASE STUDIES OF POLITICAL RHETORIC

We have offered several propositions about how politicians should behave when they believe they can shape citizens' beliefs. We have been testing these propositions with a variety of case studies. Despite obvious limitations, case studies afford an opportunity that quantitative studies do not: to explore parties' and politicians' political rhetoric in detail.

Here, we briefly summarize the results of two case studies. In both instances, the stakes were exceptionally high, with citizens and their political leaders facing the possibility of a constitutional crisis. Emphasizing the importance of making the "right" choice, competing politicians on both sides of each issue used rhetoric strategically, for the singular purpose of moving public opinion in the desired direction.

The Lincoln–Douglas Debates

The Lincoln-Douglas debates represent one of the most instructive episodes in American history for considering the character of political rhetoric in major policy debates.[6] From late August through mid-October of 1858, incumbent Illinois Democratic senator Stephan A. Douglas and Republican challenger Abraham Lincoln held a series of seven debates at locations around the state. The debates concerned the Senate election and were not strictly a referendum on a policy question. In fact, senators were indirectly elected, and the contestants were actually seeking to influence voters' choices between the two parties in the state legislative elections. Both candidates, however, focused their remarks entirely on the issue of slavery, by far the most important and controversial policy debate of the 19th century, if not American history. As the centerpiece of a vigorously contested Senate campaign (Lincoln gave 63 other speeches, Douglas 130), the debates received great attention in Illinois newspapers and extensive coverage in the national press. In view of the Lincoln–Douglas contest, the *New York Times* called Illinois "the most interesting political battleground in the Union."

Scholars often cite the Lincoln–Douglas debates as the highpoint of popular debate in American politics, and as setting a standard of excellence that even the best contemporary debates do not approach. And they were indeed remarkable in relation to today's practices. Each debate lasted 3 hours, for a total of 21 hours of debate on a single issue. In what would now be regarded a heroic feat of attentive citizenship, audiences of up to 10,000 listened to the speakers without benefit of seating, amplification, or access to a refrigerator. Reporters skilled in shorthand recorded the speeches, and the state's two leading newspapers published verbatim accounts. With some dissents, commentators have praised the intellectual depth of the exchanges and, in particular, their clarity in revealing the competing principles of American political culture (Jaffa, 1959). In short, they are presumably the limiting case

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[6] Except where otherwise cited, our account of the Lincoln–Douglas debate relies on Donald 1995, Ch. 8.

of an advocacy campaign that, in principle, should have enhanced citizen competence.

What do the Lincoln–Douglas debates reveal about the strategy of political rhetoric? As their admirers have stressed, they did indeed feature notably direct exchanges on general issues of political principle. Douglas, who advocated allowing each state or territory to decide the question of slavery for itself, appealed to the principle of popular sovereignty. He professed indifference to the outcome of the decision on slavery, as long as the decision was made by majority rule. He also faced squarely the issue of the exclusion of blacks from the relevant majority, arguing that Negroes were an inferior race and that the Constitution and Declaration of Independence were written by, and for the benefit of, white people exclusively.

Lincoln, who opposed the expansion of slavery into the territories and insisted that slavery must somehow end, did not exactly advocate full social or political equality for blacks. But he refuted Douglas's historical claim of a for-whites-only Constitution. He stressed that blacks were part of mankind and, regardless of specific constitutional provisions concerning slavery, were in no way excluded from the political community. In contrast to Douglas's appeal to popular sovereignty, Lincoln grounded his argument in the notion of inalienable individual rights, a position that enabled him to conclude that slavery was simply "wrong." Both Lincoln and Douglas appeared to invite citizens to make their decisions on grounds of political principle.

In fact, however, neither candidate relied primarily on the persuasive force of such principles. To do their persuasive heavy lifting, both relied largely on predictions of consequences and attributions of intent that were sufficiently extreme and alarming that, if taken seriously, would render citizens' relative priorities between the opposing principles virtually moot. In his opening statement in the first debate, Douglas set forth the major theme that he would pursue throughout the campaign. He charged that Lincoln had been conspiring since 1854 to create "an Abolition party, under the name and guise of a Republican Party." Lincoln, he alleged, wanted to suppress self-government and abolish slavery in every state, both North and South. Douglas pronounced this policy "revolutionary and destructive of the existence of this Government" (*Founder's Library*, *The Lincoln–Douglas Debates*). He closed with a frightening prediction:

> I believe that this new doctrine preached by Mr. Lincoln and his party will dissolve the Union if it succeeds. They are trying to array all the Northern States in one body against the South, to excite a sectional war between the free States and the slave States, in order that the one or the other may be driven to the wall. (Founder's Library, *The Lincoln–Douglas Debates*)

Lincoln rejected the charge of abolitionism, quoting one of his earlier speeches to demonstrate that he simply did not know what to do about ending slavery. He also leveled a comparably alarming charge against Douglas: that his objective was to extend slavery to the entire nation. "[H]e is eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty" to perpetuate slavery, Lincoln added, and went on to predict that Douglas would try to invade Mexico and Latin America to secure more territory for the expansion of slavery (Donald, 1995).

As the series of debates proceeded, each candidate largely stuck with his initial themes. In fact, instead of the exchanges helping to clarify issues, narrow differences, and discipline rival claims, the opposing predictions and attributions became, if anything, more extreme. In the fourth debate, Lincoln used most of his opening speech to endorse an unsubstantiated charge by another Republican that Douglas had been part of a plot to legalize slavery in Kansas. In his last statement in the final debate, Douglas, whose earlier allegation of Lincoln's abolitionism had some basis in reality, ascended to a new height of alarmism. Lincoln's plan to limit the expansion of slavery, he argued, was genocidal. It would confine slaves to land where they could not support themselves. The extinction of slavery that Lincoln promised would really result in "extinguishing the Negro race."

In the edifying view favored by most scholars, the Lincoln–Douglas debates informed Illinois citizens "that what was at stake was not just the choice between two candidates or political parties; it was a choice between two fundamentally opposed views of the meaning of the American experience . . . . [with] Douglas as the advocate of majority rule and Lincoln as the defender of minority rights" (Donald, 1995, 226–227). But this philosophic formulation overlooks the nature of the candidates' most strenuous efforts to persuade. Their rhetoric defined the voters' choice as a high-stakes bet about the relative credibility of two nightmares: that Lincoln would promote abolition, push the country toward civil war, and promote genocide; or that Douglas would work to impose slavery even in the Northern states. Even if voters could judge which "meaning of the American experience" they preferred, that judgment would not tell them which potential nightmare was more real.

Scotland: The 1997 Devolution Referendum

The election of a Labour government in the United Kingdom in the spring of 1997 ushered in one of the most eventful periods in Scottish political history. As part of his campaign manifesto, Prime Minister Tony Blair pledged that Scotland would have a parliament with law-making powers, including the capacity to raise revenue. He promised to put this matter before the people of Scotland in the form of a binding referendum later that fall. The question

of home rule had been put to the Scottish people once before, in 1979, but the measure had gone down to defeat. This time around, however, the referendum had two parts. The first question asked whether "there should be a Scottish parliament," the second "whether a Scottish parliament should have tax-varying powers."

A simple majority was needed to pass the referendum, although it was possible that the Scots might vote "Yes, No"—that is, they might vote *for* the creation of their own parliament, but *against* giving it the power to vary the income tax. This was in fact a very real concern. Although public support for the first question was strong, supporters of the second question barely constituted a majority. What's more, the percentage of people claiming to be undecided on the second question ranged anywhere from 18 to 24 percent. Incidentally, the percentage of undecided voters was not much lower on the first question, which suggests that passage of the first question was hardly a foregone conclusion. History is particularly instructive in this regard: last-minute shifts in public opinion killed the 1979 referendum.

Given the large number of unaligned voters on both questions, neither side could take anything for granted. Winning the referendum meant winning over these voters. As a result, elites on both sides of the issue attempted to shape beliefs about the consequences of devolved power, especially in relation to the economy and Scotland's ties to the United Kingdom.

In the beginning of the debate, opponents of devolution attempted to persuade citizens that the creation of a Scottish Parliament would lead to conflict with Westminster and the eventual breakup of the United Kingdom. One Tory MP claimed that "a parliament in Edinburgh would be the forerunner to an independent socialist republic" ("The Scotts are on the March," 1997). John Major was only slightly less restrained in his assessment when he warned that the future of the United Kingdom was at stake and that "the best interests of all the nations in the UK—in a dangerous and shifting world—are best served by staying together" (Watson, 1997). That same day, he made a series of stark predictions about the impact of devolution: "Would Scotland be weaker or stronger then? Weaker. Would Scotland attract more or less investment? Less. Would Scotland have a stronger or weaker voice in the European Union? Weaker. And so would the rest of the UK" (Donegan, April 24, 1997).

Officials in the Labour party responded to these attacks by pointing out that a Scottish parliament's powers would be clearly defined and would not include the power to create a separate Scottish state. On several occasions, Tony Blair went so far as to claim that a devolved parliament "could never proceed via referendum to independence." But this

particular line of argument ran the risk of offending the Scots, especially those who favored independence. Labour therefore altered its strategy and began responding with an opposing prediction. Because devolution was the "sensible middle way" (between the status quo and separation), Labour asserted that it would save, rather than destroy, the Union.

From the moment Blair launched his campaign manifesto, arguments regarding the second question—should a Scottish parliament have tax-varying powers—dominated the debate. Opponents charged that it would hurt the business climate and that "companies would move south of the border to avoid higher taxes" ("Business tries to avoid tartan trap," 1997). At first, Labour simply tried to emphasize the difference between having the power to tax and the use of such powers. It quickly resorted to a much stronger formulation. Blair asserted that "Labour has absolutely no plans to raise taxes in Scotland, whatever the powers conferred on a devolved parliament" (Ahmed, 1997). Of course, the crucial piece of information, and one that was noticeably absent from most news reports, was the fact that Blair's guarantee was contingent upon Labour winning a majority of the seats. No one could be certain that this would happen, given that the new parliament would be elected under proportional representation.

In the months to come, elites would continue to debate the effects of tax-raising powers and the future of the union. But the substance of these arguments changed in important ways. Claims became more specific, and at the same time, more extreme. Proponents portrayed the constitutional change as if it was a magic elixir. The following statement by Scotland's Devolution Minister is a characteristic example: "Apart from making government closer to the people, [a Scottish Parliament] would boost the Scottish economy, attract investors, and unleash intellectual energy generated by devolution" (Smith, 1997). Others claimed that a Scottish parliament would reduce "brain drain"—the tendency of young, talented Scots to pursue their careers beyond the country's borders. Opponents, for their part, referred to the referendum as a "leap in the dark" and warned citizens about "the cost of extra power hungry politicians, the impact on jobs, pensions and public services, and the specter of power being taken away from local authorities" (Dinwoodie, 1997). The leader of the Tory party painted a similarly dark picture:

> Devolution will unleash wild expectations, followed by disappointment and years of tension between Westminster and Edinburgh . . . A Scottish Parliament would be a long term let-down, marked not by action but by frustration as another layer of politicians and bureaucrats interfered in the affairs of

the Scots and ran up a bill which the Scottish people would have to foot. (Donegan, June 28, 1997)

Indeed, in the final days of the campaign, opponents made an analogy between the threat posed by a devolved parliament and that posed by Hitler ("Like Churchill before the last war we see the terrible dangers ahead—and we give warning").

The extreme rhetoric was not limited to arguments about the future of the union. The leader of the opposition warned that the creation of a tax-raising parliament would "destroy jobs, drive away investment, make Scotland poorer, and strike at the heart of United Kingdom" (Buxton, 1997). He added, "The tartan tax will institutionalize in one part of the UK a permanent competitive disadvantage. Don't be fooled by the promises; as sure as night follows day, a Scottish parliament will increase taxes" (Macaskill & Donegan, 1997). Proponents of devolution countered with arguments that were at least as strong. The Devolution Minister proclaimed, "There is no way that the Scottish business community will ever be placed at a competitive disadvantage to that in England and Wales as a result of devolution. We have committed ourselves to a level playing field" (Mackenna & Harrington, 1997).

Summary of Case Studies

Elite rhetoric dominated the political environments within which ordinary citizens made decisions on the two preceding policy questions, one arising in the mid-1850s, the other in the late 1990s. A central feature of this rhetoric was heavy reliance on predictions, sometimes implicit, about the effects of competing policies. These predictions, which proliferated over time, emphasized negative outcomes more than positive ones and were typically extreme—often portraying drastic harm. Ironically, most of the rhetorical predictions were presented as certainties, yet almost all suffered from an utter lack of supportive evidence. But that is the point: Uncertainty opens the door to predictions; it also closes the door to concrete evidence.

The case studies, assuming they can be generalized, reveal clearly that politicians make predictions to form and change citizens' beliefs and to provoke fear, anger, and other strong feelings. They also show that neither politicians nor the media seem to provide citizens with reliable, readily identified cues to help distinguish those that are worth taking seriously from those that are just hot air. Under such circumstances, what can we reasonably expect from citizens who are asked to render political judgments?

SPECULATIONS ON CITIZENS' RESPONSES
TO POLITICAL RHETORIC

To address citizens' responses to predictive rhetoric, we first comment on two important perspectives in political psychology that appear to suggest grounds for expecting quite competent performance. We then proceed to an admittedly speculative account of the processes that we would expect citizens to use, and reflect on their reliability.

One optimistic view is that citizens can essentially ignore predictive arguments. The political heuristics school says that citizens use informational crutches, especially simple source and value-framing cues such as party and ideology, and thus avoid the need to evaluate actual arguments about policies (Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, Chapter 4; Lupia & McCubbins, 1998; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman, 2000). Such cue taking represents a workable form of decision making for those who have strong enough partisan loyalties that they are satisfied simply to put all their trust in party leaders.

Cue-taking obviously cannot work, however, for the large group of citizens whom we have called the nonaligned–those not firmly or generally aligned with either side in a policy debate. The heuristics perspective thus fails to explain the choices of many citizens. Moreover, because movement of the nonaligned in one direction or the other often determines majority opinion on major policy debates, this view cannot account for collective decisions—which side wins and which loses—in those debates.

The other optimistic perspective, "affective intelligence," is based on emotion and political learning (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Its advocates argue that when citizens confront something threatening or unexpected in the environment, they become anxious. This anxiety drives them to learn, including by gathering additional information. In the end, heightened anxiety leads to more attentive and informed decision making, thus the term "affective intelligence."

In important respects, however, this analysis does not seem to apply to the situation of citizens facing rhetorical predictions about policy. One can reasonably suppose that extreme and contradictory predictions lead many citizens to become anxious and pay closer attention to a policy debate. But it is not clear that the greater attention can lead to effective learning. The debates will not feature reliable diagnostic information on the validity of the predictions. Citizens may find themselves bombarded with equally frightening, contradictory predictions from the opposing sides, with no useful strategy for deciding which ones to believe.

The outstanding question is this: *how do people form beliefs and respond to predictive rhetoric when partisan or ideological cues do not suffice and when*

diagnostic evidence is not readily available? Our attempt to answer this question is admittedly, at this stage, more a matter of theoretical speculation than of hard evidence.

Outcomes and Causal Linkages

We argued earlier that party leaders use predictions to accomplish two objectives: to lead citizens to believe one thing and not another and to evoke emotional reactions in them. Two aspects of a predictive argument should be crucial in this regard. To simplify our discussion of them, we initially assume the existence of a single party.

The first important aspect of a prediction is its *outcome*, that is, the change (or lack of change) in some important condition that the prediction forecasts. For the prediction to work, the outcome must be sufficiently salient to the unaligned citizen to generate an emotional reaction from him or her (Schwartz & Clore, 1983, 1988). A prediction will shape collective preferences only when a sizeable majority of unaligned citizens react emotionally to the outcome that it concerns.

Most commentary on political rhetoric stops here (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000). In effect, authors assume that the emotionally-salient outcomes operate essentially independently, that the effect of politician's rhetoric depends solely on how strongly citizens feel about the outcome. Logically, another factor must come into play.

The second crucial aspect of a predictive argument is the asserted *causal linkage* between the focal policy (either the status quo or a proposal for change) and the outcome, or, in other words, the belief that the prediction seeks to create. The link is generally that the policy will cause, prevent, avoid, or lead to the outcome: "Reinstating capital punishment will result in the deaths of innocent victims"; "The Clinton health plan will create a huge bureaucracy"; "Without the tax cut, we'll have an economic Dunkirk."[7] A prediction ultimately will not affect people's preferences if they do not in some sense accept the link between the focal policy and the outcome. That acceptance may not amount to a fully conscious, explicit belief that the link is valid. But those who reject or discount the link likely will not react to the prediction, or at least will not do so in a powerful way.

For people with strong ideological orientations, ideology will often determine whether they accept the link that a party's leaders try to make. Strong conservatives expect almost any government action to hurt the economy;

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[7] Even if an argument does not make a prediction, it will still link a policy to a target, for example, by portraying the policy as belonging to a target category: "Affirmative action is a racist policy."

they should be prone to believe almost any alleged link between a specific government action and a specific harm. Strong liberals expect government to promote prosperity and equality and should believe politicians' efforts to link government actions with desirable outcomes.

For the non-ideological or ideologically moderate, however, the plausibility of the asserted link should matter greatly. Here we part company with Riker (1990, pp. 58–63), who flatly dismisses the importance of plausibility, arguing that citizens do not evaluate predictive claims critically and in any event lack the expertise to do so competently. This view overlooks a significant role for citizens' perceptions of the validity of the asserted linkages.

Consider the following fictitious predictions, which we have concocted by scrambling the focal policies and predicted outcomes in some otherwise realistic examples: "Capital punishment will create a huge bureaucracy"; "Without the tax cut, innocent victims will die"; "Unless the government subsidizes the auto industry, the country will remain vulnerable to terrorist attack." These predictive rhetorical appeals fall flat. The outcomes are certainly potent, but because the links are not believable, the reader or listener, instead of being moved, is merely baffled.

In short, contrary to Riker, the claimed links in predictive rhetorical appeals evidently must pass some test of plausibility, if they are to be effective. Put differently, they must have properties that elicit some form of assent to the relevant belief. Determining the nature of this test is crucial to understanding the uses of predictive rhetoric and its consequences for citizen competence. Unfortunately, we are about to navigate largely uncharted waters.

Citizens' Assessments of Asserted Links in Predictive Arguments

Assuming that citizens care about the outcome, they will consciously or unconsciously consider the claimed link between the focal policy and that outcome. Does an important causal linkage exist? To avoid effort, and lacking expertise in the policy area, citizens will limit their answers to a simple categorical question: Is there a genuine, significant link of the sort claimed, or is the claimed link minimal or nonexistent? Unlike experts, ordinary people generally will not bother with refined distinctions, for example, attempting to distinguish between a very important and a somewhat important link. A simplifying, dichotomous judgment fits with the expectation of low-involvement, peripheral processing that most citizens undertake. As Hall, Goren, Chaiken, and Todorov (Chapter 4) suggest, even voting choices may be more superficial and susceptible to low-involvement heuristic processing than scholars tend to believe.

To avoid being manipulated, unaligned citizens will not take politicians at their word, but rather will try to assess the validity of an alleged link independently. In searching for independent corroboration, they will employ simple heuristics, including the following three in particular.

Schema-based evaluation: First, does the proposed link fit an accessible schema, or story, that the citizen has stored in memory? If political leaders claim that increasing the severity of punishment will deter crime, the majority of citizens who have a readily accessible punishment-deters-crime schema will accept the link.[8] Reliance on schemas is a well-established feature of human judgment and is especially important in predominantly "top-down," peripheral processing (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000).

Example-based evaluation: Second, does the alleged link receive support from readily accessed examples? If a politician in the late 1970s claimed that intervening in a domestic conflict in another country would lead to a protracted, unwinnable war, anyone who had lived through the Vietnam War era probably connected with and accepted the link. By the 1990s many no longer remembered the Vietnam example. By 2009, however, the Iraq War would substitute as a convincing illustration. Psychologists have shown that people rely heavily on prominent examples in mental tasks (Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; Read, 1983; also see Gilovich, 1981). Politicians assume and reinforce this tendency, sometimes invoking seemingly instructive events until the generation that experienced them is dead and buried.

Simulation: Can the citizen easily imagine the process by which a claimed link would work? For example, if the link is that cutting tax rates will increase economic growth, those citizens who can come up with some of the intermediate steps—people will see greater reward and thus make a greater effort—will accept the link. People's use of the simulation heuristic has been found in research on attribution (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Significantly, party leaders and other advocates of a policy proposal often will not take time to explain the link, thus leaving citizens to come up with it unassisted.

The availability of any single heuristic supporting the link should normally suffice. People might have a schema for the notion that chemical pesticides cause cancer, even though they do not know a single example of such a chemical and cannot begin to describe the intermediate steps. They might know an example of price controls leading to shortages (say rent

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[8] Some people might have conflicting schemas: Punishment-deters-crime and, for example, punishment-can-get-out-of-hand. If people retrieve conflicting schemas, they might dismiss the link or, alternatively, think more deeply.

control, for New Yorkers), without having a general schema or understanding of the mechanism. And they might be able to simulate the process by which free vaccinations would reduce the cost of medical care without having a schema for that effect or awareness of any example. In each case, people find the corroboration they need.

For the most part, one or both of two sources will provide the information underlying the schemas, examples, and simulations: everyday life and recent, highly salient news stories. People's abilities to make links relevant to international conflict might come, for example, from experiences with obnoxious neighbors. Some citizens might now readily draw examples, for various kinds of claims, from the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the intelligence failures about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, or the contribution of regulatory failures to the 2008 financial crisis. We suggest that the failure of a heuristic search to turn up adequate corroborating considerations for the claimed link, in the fleeing moments in which the citizen is processing the rhetoric, will lead her to dismiss the alleged link and reject the rhetorical appeal based on it.[9]

If this account of citizens' responses to alleged causal linkages is roughly correct, what does it imply about the quality of their collective preferences about policy? There are two major considerations. First, how accurately are citizens' emotional responses to the predicted outcomes tuned to their settled and considered preferences regarding the relevant conditions? If a citizen reacts strongly to the claim, "federal policies are destroying the family farm," is it necessarily so that she has a strong, stable preference for maintaining small farms? This important question lies entirely beyond the scope of this chapter.

Second, how do citizens' assessments of the claimed links compare with informed views about the effects of policies? We expect these assessments to be unreliable and potentially misleading in two respects. To begin with, the division of claimed links into a simple dichotomy of real effects versus unreal or insignificant ones casts aside important differences of probability

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[9] A few caveats, however, are in order: We do not suggest that accepting the belief proposed by a predictive argument necessarily means taking it to be literally true—no matter how inflated or bombastic the claims. Nor does it necessarily mean translating the claim into a measured, operational statement of the likely consequences. Acceptance is likely to mean treating the message, especially its emotional and practical meaning, as essentially valid. Indeed, we do not suggest that the citizen necessarily reaches a conclusion about it consciously. If corroborating information is highly accessible, he may not even be aware of undertaking an evaluation. He will just react to the target as if it is indeed at stake in the manner claimed.

and magnitude. Suppose, for example, that a citizen encounters the prediction that a proposed policy "will risk needless deaths." A dichotomous assessment will make no distinction between, say, a 10 percent chance of 100 deaths and a 1 percent chance of 10 deaths. Despite the 100-fold difference in the two risks, generating considerations to support either sort of risk might seem to corroborate the predicted threat and produce essentially the same response. In short, dichotomous assessments of broadly worded, emotion-laden predictions will result in crude responses to real stakes.

More fundamentally, however, finding corroboration in schemas, examples, and simulations, often in the virtually complete absence of any domain-specific knowledge, gives powerful advantages to certain predictions, and disadvantages to others, for reasons that have little to do with their actual merit. Alleged links that fit widely held schemas—corporations exploit, severe punishment deters crime—should produce a strong response. Causal links that require considerable explanation for ordinary citizens, however valid, will appear suspect and be readily dismissed. The citizen's reactions will be along the lines, "If that will really happen, why don't I know it?"

Partisan Competition, Partisan Loyalists, and the Unaligned

The preceding discussion assumed a single party. Even then, we concluded that rhetorical predictions about the consequences of policies create obstacles for citizens who seek to make reasonable decisions. These obstacles undoubtedly increase exponentially when two parties make opposing predictions, or unrelated predictions with opposing policy implications. The number and severity of predictions may escalate in a rhetorical arms race.

The preceding discussion also focused on the unaligned with respect to party and ideology. But what about those who identify strongly with one party or ideology and simply accept that side's predictive rhetoric as truth? Do they reach better judgments, in some sense, or use a preferable mental process to reach those judgments? Clearly, the process they use leaves them confident of the correctness of their beliefs, resolute in their policy preferences, and relatively eager to promote those preferences through voting and other forms of participation. It also leaves them relatively alienated from politicians and even citizens on the other side of the great partisan-ideological divide. From our perspective, however, the main point about these citizens is that, by accepting partisan claims automatically, they take into account no actual information about the policies at stake in a given debate. Such decision making does nothing to support an expectation of competence or intelligence in collective decisions about policies.

CONCLUSION

In this very exploratory chapter, we have considered the political logic of policy rhetoric; the prominence of appeals that rely on extreme and mostly negative predictions and seek to elicit an emotional response; the processes that citizens use in determining their response; and the consequences of those processes for the competence of individual and collective decisions about policy. To put our findings simply, the information environment in which citizens make decisions about policies presents a constant stream of dramatic, emotionally salient predictive claims, covering a wide range of outcomes, and presented largely without supporting evidence or other diagnostic information. The highly partisan cope with this constant stream by adopting the party line. The unaligned have no such luxury, and thus must try to make sense of the political rhetoric. Sometimes the dire predictions elicit some form of corroborating information—a pertinent schema, an example from daily life, or the like—in the minds of these citizens, thus ringing a bell with them. There is little reason to suppose that the predictive appeals that ring a bell in this way correspond at all closely to the considerations that would prove decisive in an environment that encouraged deliberate judgment on the basis of realistic claims and the best available diagnostic information. But, then, there is no reason to believe that taking party cues does, either.

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The Role of Persuasion Strategies in Motivating Individual and Collective Action

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Voluntary citizen participation is often viewed as a meaningful solution to a wide range of societal problems. However, while volunteerism is widely endorsed by individuals from across the political spectrum, citizens' behaviors often fall short of their civically minded attitudes. Beginning with these premises, this chapter develops a conceptual model to explain voluntary civic behavior and identifies persuasion strategies that can effectively initiate and sustain voluntary citizen participation. Research suggests that there is great practical potential in employing persuasion strategies that focus on both promoting participation and overcoming barriers to involvement. These findings have implications above and beyond volunteerism, informing our understanding of persuasion and voting behavior, as well as social movement participation.

It has often been suggested that one solution to many of the problems confronting society is to promote citizen participation, that is, to encourage people to act in ways that will benefit not only themselves as individuals but also the communities at large and the society of which they are members. Consider the example of protecting the environment: Current rates of global population growth and consumption are fundamentally unsustainable. If environmental catastrophe is to be averted, then there must be significant changes in behavior at the individual and societal, indeed even worldwide, levels (e.g., McKenzie-Mohr, 2000; Oskamp, 2000). Beyond environmental protection, individual-level citizen participation takes many forms. Some participation is explicitly political, such as involving oneself in the political process by voting or working for an election campaign, but many forms of participation are not necessarily political, such as volunteering one's time to help others in need, looking out for neighbors to deter crime, or joining a social movement.

More generally, social commentators have emphasized the importance of "citizenship" behaviors in responding to societal problems (e.g., Boyte & Kari, 1996) and in generating "social capital"—bonds of trust among citizens that are built through participation in the affairs of their larger communities (Putnam, 1993, 1995). In fact, there is a substantial body of research

that examines such citizenship behaviors and the ways in which the coordinated activities of individuals can serve the common good (e.g., Kymlicka & Norman, 1994; Putnam, 1993, 1995; Van Vugt, Snyder, Tyler, & Biel, 2000; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995).

The role of citizen participation in solving societal problems is widely endorsed, regardless of political leaning. Those on the political right in the United States promote civic participation as a means to save government money, to promote local control over important issues, and to avoid what they see as potentially oppressive government-imposed solutions to local community problems. And, those on the political left advocate grassroots organizing and believe in cooperative behavior to effect positive community changes, including community growth and empowerment driven by citizen participation.

However, as surveys have repeatedly shown, in many realms of citizen participation, people's attitudes and values far out-distance their behaviors and habits. Compare, for example, the proportion of people who endorse various forms of citizen participation versus the proportion of people who actually participate. In the United States, many more people identify themselves as environmentalists than actually adopt conservation habits, including such simple actions as participating in neighborhood recycling programs (Kohut & Shriver, 1989; Oskamp, 2000). Similarly, national survey data indicate that, at the same time as Americans overwhelmingly endorse the value of volunteering and assert that nonprofit service organizations play major roles in their communities, far fewer report any actual volunteerism through such organizations (e.g., Independent Sector, 1988, 1999). These examples suggest that there is wide recognition that society faces serious problems and that citizen participation is needed to address these problems. What is lacking, it would seem, is a commensurate response in the form of action. When confronted with a serious issue, most people acknowledge that something must be done, but also seem to fervently hope that someone else will do it.

Perhaps, the lack of correspondence between positive attitudes toward community involvement and citizen participation and actual involvement and participation should not come as any great surprise. Much research in the social sciences has established that there is often a gap between the attitudes that people hold and their actual behaviors in situations that test these attitudes (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1998; Wicker, 1969). As an example of the oft-observed weak association between attitudes and actions, the case of citizen participation is particularly intriguing because of two key features involving levels or rates of endorsement and variability. In many domains of citizen participation, there is, at the level of attitudes, much

agreement about the need for community involvement, but, at the level of action, relatively low rates of participation. Thus, not only is there a lack of congruence between attitudes and action (with generally supportive attitudes paired with inaction rather than action), but there also would seem to be relatively little variability in both attitudes and behaviors (with attitudes being generally and uniformly favorable, and behaviors generally low in occurrence).

Successful attempts to promote citizen participation (e.g., getting people to recycle, to volunteer, and to otherwise participate in their communities) would increase the congruence between attitudes and actions by raising the mean level of behaviors to one more commensurate with widespread positive attitudes. However, this *congruence* between attitudes and action would not necessarily be accompanied by high statistical *correlations* between attitudes and behaviors. For, it seems likely that the attitudes and behaviors involved would still be marked by relatively low variability. In this case, attitudes would continue to be generally and uniformly favorable, whereas low variability in behavior would result from uniformly high rates of participation. In fact, variability in behavior would be particularly small to the extent that attempts to promote citizen participation are highly effective in enhancing rates of actual participation, perhaps even to the point of universal participation. In a sense, then, it appears that the practical goal of increasing citizen participation might not be wholly successfully met in scientific and statistical terms because the correlation between attitudes and actions would still be low. Nevertheless, increasing the correspondence between attitudes and action by raising rates of citizen participation to match the prevalence of favorable attitudes may meet the practically significant goal of fostering a civically engaged society.

In addition, in much social science research on attitudes and behaviors, the emphasis has been on changing attitudes as a precursor to behavior change (e.g., Petty & Wegener, 1998). In the context of citizen participation, however, attitude change is unlikely to be the goal. Rather, the task of increasing citizen participation can be framed as one of promoting the occurrence of behaviors already supported by favorable attitudes. Thus, the question arises: How can people be motivated to bridge the gap between their generally favorable attitudes toward social action and their behaviors, which often fall short of these attitudes? In this chapter, we discuss ways of motivating individuals to increase their participation in community action. The approach taken to this question is two pronged, involving, first, an examination of people who have bridged the gap between positive attitudes and actual community involvement to understand how and why they have translated their attitudes into action. Second, we articulate the implications

of these translation strategies for designing persuasion messages that we believe can successfully encourage individuals to turn their attitudes into action.

The specific context for explicating this approach is provided by our program of research on the psychology of volunteerism. As part of this program, we have conducted a large number of studies, some in laboratory settings and others in the field, with potential and actual volunteers as participants. These studies have identified and implicated a set of personal and social motivations in the processes of volunteerism, as well as examined the effectiveness of persuasive messages that appeal to these motivations in encouraging nonvolunteers to become volunteers. Our experiences in conducting this program of research have led us to the conclusion that the study of volunteerism represents an excellent opportunity for addressing broader questions about what motivates people to take social action, whether as individuals or as collectives, and thereby for understanding diverse forms of citizen participation.

VOLUNTEERISM AS A FORM OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Every year, in countries around the world, millions upon millions of individuals volunteer their time and efforts to help others directly (e.g., Curtis, Grabb, & Baer, 1992; Independent Sector, 1999). They volunteer for such activities as providing one-to-one companionship to the lonely, tutoring to the illiterate, counseling to the troubled, and health care to the sick. Other volunteers invest their time and effort in political campaigns, advocacy efforts, social movements, and other causes the goals of which are not so much the direct delivery of help and assistance to specific individuals, but rather the improvement of the conditions of life of entire groups. Accordingly, volunteerism represents a noteworthy example of citizen participation. Volunteers contribute their time and effort with the purpose of solving problems faced by their communities, to alleviate the suffering of others within their communities, and to generally better the human condition. And indeed, volunteers play critical roles in ameliorating such problems as hunger and poverty, illiteracy, and alcohol and drug abuse, as well as in advancing the agendas of various social movements and political causes such as environmental action and human rights movements (see Wilson, 2000, for a recent review of research on volunteerism).

As with many instances of citizen participation, volunteerism is an area in which attitudes outpace behaviors. National surveys reveal that, by margins of over 3 to 1, people agree that "people should volunteer some of their

time to help other people and thereby make the world a better place" and that "nonprofit organizations generally play a major role in their communities" (Independent Sector, 1988, 1999). With respect to actual volunteering, however, a quite different pattern emerges. Rather than the high rate of participation that would be predicted from attitudes toward volunteerism, the very same surveys have found that barely 1 in 3 respondents report any current sustained volunteer involvement. The questions thus arise: How and why have some people been able to link their attitudes and behaviors and actually become volunteers? And, can an understanding of how attitudes are translated into action in the case of volunteerism be generalized to broader questions related to increasing citizen participation?

THE PROCESSES OF VOLUNTEERISM

We have developed a conceptual model of the processes of volunteerism that considers multiple levels of analysis and different stages in the "life course" of volunteers. This model seeks to characterize volunteerism as a phenomenon that is situated at, and builds connections between, these different levels of analysis and successive stages (for reviews, see Omoto & Snyder, 1990, 2002; Omoto, Snyder, & Berghuis, 1993; Snyder & Omoto, 1992a, 1992b).

In the volunteer process model, we conceptualize volunteerism as a process that unfolds over time. The model specifies psychological and behavioral features associated with each of three broad sequential and interactive stages—antecedents, experiences, and consequences of volunteerism. At the *antecedents* stage, we have identified personality, motivational, and circumstantial characteristics of individuals that predict who becomes involved as volunteers and if they do, who will be the most effective and satisfied in their volunteer service. At the *experiences* stage, we have explored psychological and behavioral aspects of the interpersonal relationships that develop between volunteers and recipients of their services, and between volunteers and the organizations in which they work. We have paid particular attention to the behavior patterns and relationships that facilitate the continued service of volunteers and positive benefits to service recipients. Finally, at the *consequences* stage, we have focused on the impact of volunteer service on the attitudes, knowledge, and behavior of volunteers, the recipients of their services, and the members of their social networks. Taken together, the stages of this model speak to the initiation as well as to the maintenance of volunteer service and to its ultimate effectiveness.

In conceptualizing volunteerism, we have found it useful to view it from the vantage point of multiple levels of analysis. At the level of the *individual*

volunteer, the model calls attention to the activities and psychological processes of individual volunteers and the recipients of volunteer services. At the *interpersonal* level, since much volunteerism (at least in the United States) occurs in the context of individuals providing services to other individuals, the model incorporates the dynamics of the dyadic helping relationships that develop between volunteers and recipients of service. At an *organizational* level, many volunteer efforts take place in the context of community-based organizations and institutions. Thus, the model focuses on organizational goals associated with recruiting, managing, and retaining an unpaid workforce, as well as associated concerns about work performance, compensation, and evaluation. Finally, at a broader *societal* level, the model considers the linkages between individuals and their societies as well as cultural dynamics associated with the emergence and evolution of traditions of volunteer service (e.g., Omoto & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Omoto, 2001).

We stress that the model is not so much a theory of volunteerism as a broad framework for organizing our work and that of others on volunteerism and for helping to identify conceptual issues for empirical investigation. And, we believe that our conceptual model and the issues of interest are applicable to many (if not most) forms of volunteerism. However, much of our empirical research has been on volunteer service programs that have emerged in the United States in response to the epidemic of HIV and AIDS (Omoto & Snyder, 1990, 1993, 1995; Snyder & Omoto, 1992a, 1992b). Therefore, we have used the specific case of AIDS volunteerism to inform a more general understanding of the social and psychological processes of volunteerism. In much of our research, furthermore, we have examined the processes of volunteerism as they occur in the real world, focusing on "real" individuals involved in "real" acts of volunteerism in "real" world settings. Moreover, we have supplemented our field-based data collections with focused laboratory studies to more carefully specify causal mechanisms and processes of volunteerism. Guided by the volunteer process model, our research has emphasized the diversity of motivations involved in the initiation and maintenance of volunteer behavior, the interpersonal challenges that volunteers face, and the effects of both of these factors on volunteers' longevity of service, the functioning of their clients, and the attitudes and behaviors of members of their social networks (for reviews, see Omoto & Snyder, 2002; Snyder & Omoto, 2000, 2001).

PERSUASION STRATEGIES FOR MOTIVATING ACTION

In the context of our present concerns with strategies for persuading people to take individual and collective action in diverse domains of citizen

participation, the obvious question to ask is whether the perspectives provided by the volunteer process model and the understanding gained from studies guided by it can be "leveraged" into the design of persuasion strategies that encourage people to volunteer, or for those who are already active, to sustain their participation. As a context for our discussion of persuasion strategies for encouraging people to volunteer and, by extension, to become active members of their communities and participating citizens in society, we find it useful to start from our volunteer process model. This model, with its distinct levels of analysis, running from the individual to the societal, reminds us that the focus and scope of attempts to motivate citizen participation can range from those focused on individuals to those constructed at larger collective, organizational, and even societal levels. Accordingly, guided by the levels of analysis of the volunteer process model, let us first examine the matter of targets for persuasive strategies. In particular, how have messages been focused on the different levels?

To be sure, attempts to persuade individuals to become involved come from diverse sources situated at different levels of analysis. One can imagine a continuum spanning from the macro societal-level persuasive message campaigns, to those constructed and executed at the community and organizational level, to those operating at the one-on-one, individual-to-individual level. This continuum can be thought of as anchored at one end by large-scale, systematic, media campaigns to promote involvement and on the other end by small-scale, individual-to-individual attempts to persuade, perhaps using idiosyncratic approaches to persuasion. Intermediate along this continuum are the efforts of organizations (such as volunteer service organizations, political parties, and social movements) to reach out and recruit people to participate in them, perhaps using a combination of advertising appeals and direct, face-to-face recruitment efforts.

As an example of a large-scale, systematic, media campaign, consider the "Give Five" campaign, initiated by Independent Sector in 1987, to encourage people to contribute 5 hours per week of their time to volunteering and 5 percent of their income to charitable organizations. This appeal has been disseminated through public service announcements on radio and television, in magazine and newspaper ads, and on billboard displays. One set of media messages constituted variations on the theme that, if everyone would just give five—5 hours a week of their time and 5 percent of their income—to helping others, how much better the world would be. The focus of these media messages would seem to be motivations involving concern for improving the lives of others and the consequent benefits for others of one's involvement in volunteerism and philanthropy. By contrast, other mass media messages have appealed to the benefits to the self (rather than

benefits to others) that may accrue from giving, helping, and participating. Such self-benefits seem to be reflected in a slogan also used in the Give Five campaign: "Give five—What you get back is immeasurable"—which emphasizes the benefits of giving and volunteering for the individual. Regardless of the specific motivations emphasized, however, the Give Five campaign provides an illustration of a large-scale media campaign targeted at the societal level that was mounted to encourage individuals to volunteer and to give.

On a somewhat more circumscribed level of advertising, many volunteer service organizations publish notices in community newspapers or distribute brochures in community gathering places announcing their need for volunteers and informing prospective volunteers of how and where to sign up. In many U.S. cities, service and educational organizations have also used special events such as annual walk-a-thons (often drawing many thousands of walkers and spectators to increase public awareness, as fundraising opportunities, and to draw new volunteers into their organizations). Such efforts represent persuasion and recruitment efforts at the organizational level of analysis in the volunteer process model.

The other end of the continuum of the focus and scope of persuasion attempts is marked by informal, individual-to-individual persuasion efforts whereby friends, family, and other associates encourage each other to volunteer, often through the example that they set with their own volunteer service. Although not nearly so visible as large-scale media campaigns, these persuasion attempts may nevertheless be a prominent route to participation. In fact, in descriptive data from a longitudinal study of AIDS volunteers (Omoto & Snyder, 2002), a majority of new volunteers (57 percent) claimed such routes to volunteering. These individuals reported being asked to volunteer by someone they knew, knowing other individuals who were volunteers, or having participated in community events which brought them into contact with other people who were volunteering. Clearly, then, and at least as reported by volunteers, interpersonal persuasion seems to function as one route to involvement.

Moreover, over time, as these new volunteers became experienced volunteers, they also became sources of individual-to-individual persuasion, with some 28 percent of them reporting, after only 6 months of service as a volunteer, that they had recruited one or more other people to volunteer. In another study (Omoto & Snyder, 2002), newly recruited AIDS volunteers nominated a nonvolunteer friend or associate as a potential research participant. These associates were contacted by the investigators and subsequently completed questionnaire measures about their HIV-related knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs. Results indicated that 6 months after their friends had gone through their training to be volunteers, 49 percent of these associates now claimed

some degree of willingness "to actually become an AIDS volunteer." These findings, encompassing data from volunteers and nonvolunteers, provide indirect evidence that informal persuasion attempts and modeling were likely occurring between individual volunteers and their associates (see also Omoto, Snyder, Chang, & Lee, 2001).

Of course, these descriptive data, although suggestive of the operation and likely success of informal persuasion and recruitment efforts, are still limited in their ability to say precisely how such persuasion and recruitment efforts are carried out and why these efforts may succeed or fail. To address this issue, we now turn our attention to empirical research on persuasive strategies to promote volunteerism and other forms of citizen participation. To do so, we again draw on the volunteer process model and research generated by it to articulate distinctions that provide an organizing framework for our discussion.

Specifically, by identifying successive stages in the life history of volunteers, the volunteer process model alerts us to a potentially important distinction between persuasive efforts directed at the *initiation* of volunteerism and other forms of citizen participation and those directed at *maintaining* involvement once it has begun. Moreover, by identifying the important influences of psychological forces (especially motivations) that dispose people to volunteer and to continue their service, as well as deterrent influences (such as stigmatization) that act as impediments to participation, research on volunteerism alerts us to be mindful of these two opposing tendencies in the design of persuasion strategies.

Based on these considerations, our discussion of persuasion strategies is organized around two distinctions: (1) the persuasion strategy's emphasis on the initiation of volunteerism on the part of nonvolunteers or on the maintenance of volunteering by those who already are volunteers, and (2) the strategy's focus on factors that facilitate involvement or on overcoming barriers that deter involvement. Relevant to these distinctions, we examine descriptive research as well as experimental studies designed to systematically construct persuasion strategies that build on and incorporate each of these distinctions.

INITIATION OF PARTICIPATION VERSUS MAINTENANCE OF INVOLVEMENT

The first distinction that we discuss concerns whether the goal of the persuasion strategy is to persuade nonvolunteers to become volunteers (a focus on initiation) or whether it is to persuade volunteers to continue their active

involvement (a focus on maintenance). In some media-based campaigns, this distinction may be blurred. For example, the Give Five campaign that we have described encourages those who have never done so to "give five," while simultaneously encouraging those who are already involved to continue their efforts or to increase their involvement to reach the 5 hour, 5 percent target. Similarly, in informal persuasion attempts, the focus may be on convincing others to take their first steps toward involvement and participation or may be on encouraging them to maintain their involvement. In fact, support and encouragement for maintaining civic participation from social network members may be especially important when competing obligations make it difficult for individuals to continue to invest time and effort in volunteering and other forms of participation.

The importance of distinguishing initiation and maintenance goals is underscored by several considerations. First, there is the frequent observation by coordinators of volunteer service programs that, as difficult as it is to recruit volunteers, it is often more difficult to retain them, suggesting that explicit attention needs to be paid to both tasks (Miller, Powell, & Seltzer, 1990; Omoto & Snyder, 1993). Second, research on volunteerism (e.g., Omoto & Snyder, 1995) suggests that the motivations most frequently reported for initiating volunteer work (i.e., other-focused motivations such as value-based goals) are not necessarily the motivations that predict longevity of service (i.e., self-focused motivations to learn something or to develop personal skills and abilities). A clear implication here is that persuasive messages aimed at recruiting new volunteers may need to be framed in terms of appeals to one set of motivations (e.g., other-focused concerns), whereas persuasive messages aimed at maintaining currently active volunteers may need to be framed in terms of appeals to different (and self-focused) motivations.

Recruiting Volunteers

For the most part, psychological research on persuasive messages for encouraging volunteerism has focused on matters of recruitment, or encouraging nonvolunteers to become volunteers in the first place. Further, research on persuasive messages for recruiting volunteers has focused on appeals to prospective volunteers' motivations for becoming volunteers. A recurring theme in these investigations is the importance of the *matching* of messages to motivation. That is, building on research indicating a diversity of potential motivations for volunteering (e.g., Clary et al., 1998; Omoto & Snyder, 1995), these studies have demonstrated that the persuasive impact of a message is greater when it directly addresses the recipient's primary motivations than when it does not.

Persuasion messages to recruit volunteers can target specific motivations in their appeals, with the motivational appeals tailored to the particular motivations of individual prospective volunteers. In this way, the messages can help prospective volunteers see the link between their goals and an action (volunteering) that can serve to meet those goals. As well, recruitment messages that target specific motivations are more likely to attract people who hold one or more of the targeted motivations. To the extent that these motivations also fit with subsequent volunteer experiences, service organizations may be likely to recruit volunteers who will be satisfied with and committed to their work and less susceptible to burnout. We now examine representative laboratory and field tests of the hypothesis that messages that target motivations matching those of their recipients will be particularly effective in promoting citizen action.

In one laboratory experiment (Clary, Snyder, Ridge, Miene, & Haugen, 1994), participants (undergraduate students) filled out an inventory of motivations to determine their strongest and weakest motivations to do volunteer work. Next, they watched a videotaped public service announcement (PSA) of the type often aired on television (and thus an analog to the types of messages used in large-scale mass media campaigns such as Give Five). Each of these messages had been designed to appeal to one possible motivation for volunteering. The PSAs all depicted a spokesperson who reflected on how volunteering to work with children had fulfilled her personal goals. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a matching condition, in which the spokesperson emphasized the same motivation as their own strongest motivation; half were assigned to a mismatched condition in which they watched a PSA emphasizing their own weakest motivation. The results showed a clear matching pattern. Participants who had been assigned to the matched condition rated the PSA as more persuasive, and as eliciting more positive emotions, than did participants in the mismatched condition. The same pattern emerged when participants rated the depicted volunteer activity; matched participants rated the volunteer activity as more reflective of their own goals, and, most crucially, indicated greater intent to pursue the volunteer activity. It is important to note that ratings of the PSAs did not differ with respect to the perceived clarity of the message or in the extent to which the volunteer's experience appeared to have met the spokesperson's goals. Instead, it appears that the critical element was the PSA's representation (or not) of participants' own motivations to volunteer.

Another laboratory study examined the effects of matching in recruiting volunteers; this time, the medium for the recruitment message was a brochure explaining why one might volunteer (Clary et al., 1998). In this study, participants (university students) first completed an inventory of their

motivations to volunteer. Next, they reviewed a set of brochures that urged them to consider signing up with a campus-based volunteer program. These brochures, which were modeled on recruitment brochures actually used on many college and university campuses, each targeted one of the specific motivations measured by the inventory. The brochures each targeted a different motivation for volunteer involvement. Again, evidence for matching was obtained. Participants' ratings of the personal importance of the individual motivations were strongly and positively related to the perceived persuasiveness of the corresponding motivationally focused brochures. In addition, the relation between motivation and brochure evaluation was strongest when motivation matched the brochure being evaluated (e.g., values motivation being correlated with the values-oriented advertising brochure). Based on these laboratory findings, then, it appears that recruitment messages that target specific motivations of prospective volunteers are likely to be differentially effective in spurring people to take action.

Moreover, a pair of studies has examined the use of motivation matching in field settings. In an initial study (Omoto, Snyder, & Smith, 1999), volunteers at an AIDS service organization evaluated three newspaper-type advertisements encouraging AIDS volunteerism. One ad contained a self-focused motivational appeal (e.g., "volunteer to feel better about yourself"), one contained an other-focused motivational appeal (e.g., "volunteer to help people in need"), and one ad contained no appeal to any specific motivation. As with the laboratory studies, the results revealed a clear matching pattern. First, the motivational ads were generally preferred to the control ad. Further, preference for the other-focused ad over the control ad was strongly predicted by volunteers' reported other-focused motivation for their own current volunteer work, but not by their reported self-focused motivation. When preference for the self-focused motivation ad over the control ad was examined, the converse pattern was obtained: Volunteer's self-focused motivation predicted this preference, but their other-focused motivation did not.

To see whether these advertisements would be differentially effective in actually recruiting volunteers, a second field study was conducted (Smith, Omoto, & Snyder, 2001). Ads similar to those described above, and specifically recruiting volunteers for AIDS service organizations, were sequentially placed in two campus newspapers at two different universities, in reverse orders. Each ad ran for five consecutive weekdays, followed by a 2-week break during which responses to the ad continued to be collected. Respondents who telephoned in response to an ad were also sent a questionnaire to complete and return that assessed, among other things, their respective levels of self-focused and other-focused motivation. Across advertisement

sites, more people responded to the motivational ads than to the control ad, with the other-focused ad attracting the most respondents. In addition, the other-focused motivational ad was more successful than the control ad in attracting callers who followed through with their intent to pursue the advertised volunteer opportunity. Data from the follow-up questionnaires indicated that significantly more of respondents to the other-focused ad (62 percent) reported that they had followed through on their intent to volunteer than respondents to the control ad (only 15 percent). Of particular relevance to the matching effect, participants who responded to the other-focused ad were higher in other-focused motivation than were participants who responded to the other two ads, although a strong matching pattern was not observed for the self-focused ad (Smith et al., 2001). Taken together, these field-based studies provide additional evidence supporting the use of specific motivationally based appeals for volunteers, with these appeals also especially likely to attract motivationally matched prospective volunteers.

Retaining Volunteers

Although, for the most part, research on persuasion strategies for promoting volunteerism has focused on the initiation of participation, there have also been investigations relevant to the maintenance and persistence of participation. Particularly, in the context of the volunteer process, there have been investigations of the retention of volunteers; that is, of the factors that encourage active volunteers to continue their participation. Here too, the available evidence suggests that the interplay of motivation and experiences may be critical. For example, in a longitudinal field study of AIDS volunteers, commitment to sustained service was greater among volunteers whose experiences were congruent with, or matched, their motivations for volunteering as espoused 6-months earlier (O'Brien, Crain, Omoto, & Snyder, 2000; see also, Crain, Omoto, & Snyder, 1998).

Moreover, in a pair of laboratory experiments in which college students were induced to participate in analogs of volunteer service, attitudes and intentions facilitative of continuing service were increased by interventions designed to encourage them to frame their volunteer service in ways that were congruent with their own motivations. For example, in one study (Williamson, Snyder, & Omoto, 2000), college students engaged in a "reading for the blind" task in which they recorded sections of a psychology textbook for use by blind students (reading for the blind is a not-uncommon volunteer activity on the part of college students). After making this recording, participants were encouraged to think about this activity and how it fit with one of two types of motivation for volunteering—whether in terms of self-focused motivations and benefits or in terms of other-focused motivations and

benefits. And, in fact, each participant's motivational orientation for volunteering had been assessed several weeks earlier and in an unrelated context. Volunteers who reflected on the ways that reading for the blind was consistent with their own motivational orientations toward volunteering reported more favorable attitudes and intentions toward future volunteerism than did those in the mismatched reflection conditions.

In a companion experiment (O'Brien et al., 2000), college students, prior to beginning a laboratory analog of volunteering (in this case, assisting clients of an AIDS service organization by proofreading and editing a reference guide of available support services), were assigned to contemplate the ways in which their upcoming volunteer experiences would fulfill either self-focused or other-focused motivations for volunteering. Once again, participants had previously completed a measure of their motivations for volunteer service. Consistent with the prior studies, after completing the proofreading task, participants in the motivationally matched conditions (e.g., individuals with relatively high levels of self-focused motivation who contemplated self-focused benefits from the volunteer task) reported greater willingness to continue with this or similar volunteer tasks in the future than volunteers in the motivationally mismatched conditions.

Taken together, then, the results from the field and from the laboratory indicate that the degree of matching between the experiences of volunteers and their primary motivations for service influences the maintenance and perpetuation of their volunteer activities (see also Crain et al., 1998). Thus, to the extent that systematic interventions, perhaps involving persuasive messages, successfully direct individuals to attend to instances of motivational matching, or even help people to discover such matching, sustained participation can be expected.

Although we have explicated the matching principle and its facilitating implications for the initiation and maintenance of participation in terms of motivations, similar facilitative effects seem likely for other influences on social and civic participation. For example, some research has examined the meaning of volunteerism, including identifying differences between service-oriented and relationship-oriented interpretations, and has noted that service-oriented construals are more typical among older volunteers and relationship-oriented ones among younger volunteers (Omoto, Snyder, & Martino, 2000; see also Sanderson & Cantor, 1995). Accordingly, persuasive messages designed to encourage and promote volunteer involvement on the part of younger and older people may need to be framed in different terms in order to match the construals of audience members of different ages. Extrapolating from the lessons learned about matching messages to motivations, older volunteers may be more likely to initiate and continue volunteering

when the service-oriented considerations of their work are made salient, whereas younger volunteers may be more likely to get involved and continue in response to messages that appeal to their relationship-oriented motivations and construals.

PROMOTING INVOLVEMENT VERSUS OVERCOMING BARRIERS

The second distinction that we wish to discuss, but for which there is less research to date, discriminates between persuasion attempts that focus on promoting factors that facilitate involvement and those that focus on overcoming barriers that deter involvement. For example, a persuasion strategy that emphasizes, not unlike the Give Five campaign, all of the benefits that would flow from large numbers of people giving their time and money to helping others would be one with a promotion emphasis. Presumably, the more this persuasive message convinces individuals of the benefits of giving and volunteering, the more likely they will be to give and volunteer, and to continue to do so. By contrast, a persuasion strategy that attempts to counteract people's reservations, hesitations, and fears about volunteering would be one that seeks to promote involvement by addressing and overcoming barriers to participation. For example, these strategies might directly address and attempt to counter people's concerns that they do not have enough time to volunteer, or that they do not possess the necessary skills, or they might combat people's fears that volunteering will bring them into contact with individuals who are "different" from them or who might make them feel "uncomfortable." In this regard, one of the effects of the Give Five campaign might have been to persuade people that even a minimal commitment of "giving five" would be meaningful, thus overcoming barriers posed by feelings of not having enough time or resources to contribute meaningfully to society.

The need for persuasion strategies to take account of factors that facilitate civic participation and those that serve as impediments to it is congruent with theories of motivation that distinguish between the forces that promote action and those that deter action (e.g., Snyder & Cantor, 1998). For the most part, the research that we have considered in this chapter has concentrated on the facilitating effects of motivations in promoting volunteering. Let us now examine forces that may inhibit people from becoming involved or from staying involved.

At a descriptive level, research on volunteerism has revealed, in addition to motivations that dispose people to volunteer, barriers or deterrents that

may impede service. For example, many AIDS volunteers report experiences of stigmatization (i.e., having been made to feel embarrassed, uncomfortable, or otherwise stigmatized) as a result of their volunteer work (e.g., Snyder, Omoto, & Crain, 1999). These feelings, the evidence suggests, function as barriers and deterrents to volunteering. When contemplating becoming a volunteer, the expectations that members of one's social network (i.e., friends and family) may disapprove seem to lessen one's willingness to volunteer (Omoto, Snyder, & Crain, 2001a). Moreover, even among those who do become volunteers, feelings of stigmatization seem to function as barriers and deterrents to continuing and effective service. In one longitudinal study of AIDS volunteers, for example, we found that feelings of stigmatization were associated with early termination of volunteer service and, among those who continued to serve, with feelings of stress and demoralization related to one's volunteer work (Omoto, Snyder, & Crain, 2001b).

To the extent that barriers and deterrents weigh heavily in people's decisions to initiate or continue volunteer service, perhaps persuasive messages can be designed to address and even help people to overcome these impediments to participation. For example, research on people's reasons for volunteering and for not volunteering (see Clary, Snyder, Copeland, & French, 1994) has revealed that, in general, people's reasons *for* volunteering are typically rather abstract (e.g., humanitarian values), whereas their reasons for *not* volunteering tend to be relatively concrete (e.g., lack of time). Moreover, when Clary et al. (1994) presented college students with messages designed to refute their reasons for not volunteering that primarily addressed practical and concrete reasons (e.g., "I don't have time to volunteer") or more abstract reasons (e.g., "I won't be able to make a difference by volunteering"), they found greater effectiveness for the abstract than the concrete refutational message.

Clearly, more research remains to be done on refutational messages for the initiation and persistence of civic participation. The research that does exist, from both field and laboratory settings, however, is consistent in suggesting that there may be great practical potential for not only focusing on approaches that promote participation, but also on those that address specific (whether abstract or concrete) barriers to involvement.

THE ROLE OF PERSUASION IN OTHER FORMS OF CIVIC PARTICIPATION

Thus far, we have considered the role of persuasion strategies primarily for the initiation and maintenance of volunteer activity. Although we have

argued that, in many respects, volunteerism is a prototypic example of civic participation, we do wish to make explicit that persuasion strategies can be applied to other forms of participation besides volunteerism. Indeed, the research literature indicates that some of the same principles of persuasion may also be operating in other domains of civic participation.

Voting Behavior

Voting is one of those areas of civic participation with low rates of participation despite a high consensus about its value and importance (at least in the United States). Although it is surely one of the least effortful forms of participation in the political process, the Federal Elections Commission reports that less than half of eligible voters voted in the 1998 Congressional elections, and only 20 percent of eligible voters aged 18–24 cast ballots (Voter Registration and Turnout in the 1998 General Election by Age, Race, and Gender, n.d.). Moreover, electoral campaigns have become increasingly matters of media messages appealing for votes rather than individual-to-individual solicitations of support. What lessons might our considerations of persuasive messages and strategies for promoting social action have for the case of voting behavior?

Lavine and Snyder (1996) examined the effectiveness of persuasive messages targeted at the voting intentions and behaviors of college students, who because of their age, are also likely first-time voters. In two studies, participants' general orientation toward value expressive (a desire that one's actions should reflect deeply held values) or social adjustive (a desire to gain the approval of others) functioning was tapped by an inventory of relevance to these orientations (the Self-Monitoring Scale; Snyder, 1974). Next, participants read one of two appeals designed to encourage voting; one appeal was worded so as to emphasize value expressive motives, whereas the other appeal emphasized social adjustive motives for voting. Participants were randomly assigned to appeals such that half of the participants with the value expressive orientation read material that was consistent with this orientation, and half did not. Likewise, half of the social adjustment participants saw material that appealed to this specific motive, and half saw material emphasizing the other (value expressive) motive. As with the studies of volunteerism, support for a matching effect was obtained. Specifically, the matching of orientation to message predicted perceptions of higher message quality, an outcome that was also linked to both intention to vote and actual voting behavior in upcoming elections.

In other research designed to examine the role of persuasive messages in promoting voting, Burgess, Haney, Snyder, Sullivan, and Transue (2000) conducted a study within the voter turnout campaign sponsored by "Rock

the Vote." This campaign has used PSAs run on television and radio and has coordinated a nationwide voter registration drive to encourage young adults to vote. Specifically, for the 1996 election, Rock the Vote incorporated the use of "pledge cards" into their registration drive. Newly registered voters self-addressed these cards pledging to vote in the upcoming election. These cards were collected by Rock the Vote, and subsequently mailed back to the individuals shortly before the election, to remind them of their commitment to vote. For some participants in this study, the cards contained a standardized pledge to vote, whereas, for other participants, the cards contained the prompt "I will vote because_____" which allowed them to write in their own reasons for voting. Thus, some individuals were encouraged to explicitly state a personalized motivation for voting, whereas others did not have that opportunity. After the election, surveys were sent to a sample of pledge card recipients that asked, among other things, whether or not they had actually voted in the just-completed election. The results of this investigation indicated that the personalized pledge card intervention had a positive influence on voting. Specifically, individuals who received and completed pledge cards on which they had written their own personalized reason to vote were more likely to have actually voted than those who completed and received pledge cards that did not contain the sentence prompt, "I will vote because_____."

The particular effectiveness of the pledge card intervention may stem from three sources. First, having the targets of the intervention serve as the sources of the very messages designed to prod them to action may constitute an effective personalized *self-persuasion* strategy (e.g., Janis & King, 1954; McGuire & McGuire, 1996). Second, having the targets of the intervention generate their own reasons may effectively and functionally place them in a matched message condition in which the pledge card message spoke directly to their own motivations. And, third, the pairing of the Rock the Vote organization with the pledge card may have produced a particularly compelling mix of a large-scale and a personalized persuasion approach. Not only do these explanations represent potentially promising directions for future work on voting, but also, for our purposes, they illustrate the potential utility of making the distinctions we have pointed to and also of designing interventions with these distinctions in mind.

Social Movement Participation

We now turn briefly to a third form of participation, social movement participation, which refers to a class of activities that are designed to promote the collective good of disadvantaged groups. Such activities can include strikes, boycotts, protests, petition drives, civil disobedience, and holding

public discussions. Motivational issues have been a central concern in attempts to understand participation in social movements (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Simon et al., 1998; Simon, Stürmer, & Steffens, 2000). Group members' willingness to engage in collective action can be predicted from their motivation to achieve goals for themselves and their group and by the strength of their identification with their group's movement (e.g., Simon et al., 1998). Moreover, longitudinal studies indicate that this sense of collective identification seems to be causally linked to actual movement participation (Stürmer & Simon, 2004).

Although this research focuses on group identification as a key predictor of social action, it is compatible with our framework for analyzing volunteerism and voting behavior. Specifically, motivation for action that derives from group identification is personalized and especially in that individuals are likely attracted to groups and movements because of the identity benefits they expect to derive from membership in them. In addition, group identification that spurs action (e.g., Simon et al., 1998) would seem to be conceptually related to the desire to help members of one's community observed among volunteers. In fact, there are indications of associations between volunteering and a general psychological desire for connection to a community (e.g., Omoto & Snyder, 2002; see also Wilson, 2000). Thus, working on behalf of the community or in volunteer capacities may be a consequence of a desire to meet specific psychological needs, including those related to identity concerns. Extrapolating from these propositions to the design of persuasion strategies, it may be that persuasive messages tailored to identity considerations will be particularly effective in promoting the initiation and maintenance of volunteerism, social movement involvement, and other forms of civic participation. Another intriguing possibility that awaits research attention is how certain identity concerns or collective identifications may also serve to hinder different types of civic participation and involvement (see, e.g., Snyder et al., 1999).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we have discussed the important roles of citizen participation and civic engagement in society and examined strategies built on psychological science that may be helpful in engaging people in individual and collective actions. At a conceptual level, we have addressed the gap that exists, in many domains of participation, between generally favorable attitudes and actions that fall far short of those attitudes. Empirically, we have examined both descriptive data and the results of experiments

and interventions that illustrate some of the persuasion strategies that can promote civic participation and different types of social action.

In these efforts, we have drawn systematically on a program of basic and applied research on the social and psychological aspects of volunteerism. We have argued that volunteerism is a paradigmatic case of citizen participation, with most people endorsing it but fewer practicing it. Drawing on the volunteer process model, with its emphasis on multiple levels of analysis in the unfolding life course of volunteers, we have reviewed studies of volunteerism, conducted in the field and in the laboratory using experimental and nonexperimental methodologies, to identify psychological and social factors that may inform the design of persuasion strategies for promoting social action. In large measure, these studies focus on individuals who have chosen to become volunteers and who have managed to remain active as volunteers, individuals whose study may be informative about the mechanisms that can and do link attitudes to action. Our strategy of inquiry resembles an often-practiced approach to the study of personality and social behavior, that of identifying groups of individuals who demonstrate the phenomenon of interest, and then using them as targets of investigations of the dynamics of that phenomenon (Snyder & Ickes, 1985). In this case, studies of volunteers have the potential to reveal when and why people, first, take action and, then, sustain that action.

Guided by our conceptual model of the volunteer process, we have examined persuasion strategies for promoting volunteerism as a form of civic participation. First, in accord with the multiple levels of analysis of the model, we examined different "levels" or targets for persuasion attempts promoting volunteerism. Specifically, we identified and delineated characteristic features of: (1) large-scale media campaigns promoting giving and volunteering; (2) the recruitment practices of community-based service organizations that are dependent on volunteer labor; and, (3) the informal, one-on-one influences of individuals on other individuals that, through word and deed, requests and examples, may encourage involvement.

Then, guided by the stages in the temporal course of volunteerism posited in the volunteer process model, we framed a pair of distinctions to be addressed in understanding the role of persuasion strategies in promoting action. We discussed each distinction in conceptual and analytic terms and presented evidence relevant to each distinction derived from descriptive sources and from experimental studies. Specifically, we examined the distinction between initiating and sustaining participation. As well, we discussed the distinction between persuasion strategies that are aimed at promoting forces that encourage action and those that are aimed at overcoming barriers and impediments that deter action.

Although we have considered these distinctions separately, we do recognize the potential utility of considering them in combination. Thus, in further articulations of the distinction between initiation and maintenance of action, there may be benefits to inquiring, for example, whether the forces that promote and those that deter action are different ones for initiation and maintenance. In the case of volunteerism, it may be that the motivations that are particularly salient at the initiation of activity are different than those relevant to later staying actively involved as a volunteer. Similarly, the barriers to be overcome when one initially decides to volunteer (such as concerns about lack of time or skills) may be systematically different than the ones that stand in the way of sustaining participation (e.g., the burnout that may come with engagement on the frontlines of service). Moreover, there may be a temporal course to the relative importance of forces that promote action and of barriers that deter action, with one or other set of factors being more important at initiation and the other for maintenance. If so, then future persuasion strategies and campaigns may need to take account of the joint and interactive influences of stage of activity (initiation vs. maintenance) and type of motivation (forces that promote action vs. barriers that impede action).

Moreover, although we centered our discussion on the paradigmatic case of volunteerism, we also have provided a glimpse of relevant evidence from studies of participation in the political process and of social movement participation. In each case, we showed how the considerations that we articulated in the specific context of volunteerism may have wider generality and applicability to the role of persuasion strategies for promoting and sustaining action in diverse domains of citizen participation. Nevertheless, we deem it important to identify potential delimiting conditions on these generalizations. A defining feature of volunteerism is its sustained involvement over extended periods of time. To be sure, many other forms of citizen participation (such as long-term involvement in social movements) may involve sustained activity. Other forms, such as voting for a specific candidate or on a certain referendum in a particular election, may have more of a one-time-only or short-term quality. Accordingly, interventions designed to promote involvement may need to take account of a distinction between sustained, ongoing versus episodic, time-limited involvement, and of the possibly different social and psychological mechanisms associated with these different kinds and degrees of participation.

What practical conclusions can we draw about the features of effective persuasion strategies for motivating individual and collective participation in society? As we have seen, one need not look very far to see examples of persuasion attempts with roots in psychological science in action. The picture to be painted from the literature on empirical investigations of

persuasion and action is far from complete, to be sure, but several modest recommendations based on our analysis can be offered nonetheless. First, use multiple sources, such that coordinated attempts to promote involvement come from the mass media and from individual sources. Second, systematically attend to matters of both initiation and maintenance, recognizing that the job of promoting action is not over when people are recruited to become active participants in their communities and societies. Rather, the job also requires encouraging people to continue to be involved through sustained and maintained participation. Third, design persuasion strategies that not only appeal to the forces that promote action but also systematically work to address and overcome possible barriers to involvement, whether those promoting forces and impeding barriers operate at the initiation or maintenance stages of action. In all of these efforts, additionally, the matching of messages to the needs, goals, and motives of audience members may prove to be especially effective in promoting citizen participation in its many and varied manifestations.

From the perspective of basic and applied social science, attempts to carry out these recommendations may provide opportunities for theory-guided "action research" relevant to social issues (e.g., Chein, Cook, & Harding, 1948; Lewin, 1946; Sanford, 1970). From a societal perspective, the combined effects of these recommendations may help to reduce the gap between the positive attitudes and (lack of) actions that is evident in so many domains of citizen participation. This increased participation, additionally, should encourage the growth of social capital, thereby also helping to insure more effective and broad-based responses to many current and future societal problems.

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Group Identity

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Social Identity and Citizenship in a Pluralistic Society

Marilynn B. Brewer

A large body of research has demonstrated the centrality of group identification to political behaviors and attitudes. This chapter examines the interrelationships among multiple overlapping group memberships and the consequences of these dynamics for our understanding of citizenship in pluralistic democratic states. Social identity is critical to understanding citizenship and national attachment, with situational and motivational factors functioning to make these identities salient. This implies that national identity can come into conflict with competing subnational identities when role requirements of the two groups are incompatible and when the two groups have distinct and incompatible group prototypes. The chapter explores the dynamics of the cross-cutting group identities in a pluralist democracy and concludes that cross-cutting category structure and multiple social identities with awareness of ingroup diversity provide an effective formula for reducing intergroup prejudice and promoting cultural pluralism.

In a large nation-state, citizens have multiple social group memberships that may acquire political significance. In addition to membership in the nation itself, meaningful subgroup identities include gender, ethnic and cultural groups, political parties and interest groups, and religious organizations. In many pluralistic democratic states, these subgroupings form the basis for political action units—setting political agendas, representing member interests in the political arena, and mobilizing members for collective action and social change. In this chapter, I will draw on social-psychological research and theory on social identity and intergroup relations to consider the interrelationships among multiple overlapping group memberships and their implications for citizenship in pluralistic societies.

CITIZENSHIP AND IDENTIFICATION

The concept of "social identity" has been invoked throughout the behavioral sciences to provide a conceptual bridge between individual and group levels of analysis (Brewer, 2001; Brewer & Silver, 2000). Across a variety of

disciplinary and theoretical contexts, the concept has acquired multiple different meanings (cf., Brewer, 2001; Deaux, 1996; Thoits & Virshup, 1997). In my own work, I make a particular distinction between two types of social identity—*role identities* and *group identities*. Role identities define individuals in relationship to others and their positions within a social network or an organizational structure, and include prescriptive behaviors, obligations, and responsibilities associated with group membership. Although role identities serve to connect the individual to the group as a whole, they are essentially "I" identities (Thoits & Virshup, 1997) in the sense that they function as components of an *individual's* self-concept.

Group identities, by comparison, are "we" identities, entailing "a shift towards the perception of the self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person" (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987, p. 50). That is, group identification[1] involves an expansion of the sense of self beyond that of the individual person to a more inclusive social entity so that the conception of self-interest is expanded to incorporate group interests (Brewer, 1991; Conover, Chapter 8). Boundaries between "me" and "you" are eclipsed by boundaries between "us" and "them." According to the self-categorization theory of social identity (Turner et al., 1987), when group identification is engaged, the attributes and values of the individual self are assimilated to the representation of the group as a whole, enhancing those features that make the group distinctive from other social categories and at the same time enhancing uniformity and cohesion within the group.

Both role identities and group identities provide internalized mechanisms for attachment between individual and group and between self-interest and group-interest. Social identities in both senses are critical resources for the formation and maintenance of groups as collective actors. To the extent that group members adopt group-relevant role identities and identify with the group as a whole, individual behavior will be channeled in directions that serve collective welfare (Brewer & Silver, 2000).

Applying these social identity concepts to the nation-state as a social group, we can make a parallel distinction between citizen identity and national identification as two mechanisms for aligning individuals with the collective at the national level. As applied here, citizenship is a role identity

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[1] I use the terms "group identity" and "group identification" essentially interchangeably throughout this chapter. For most purposes, "identification" is the preferred term because it conveys the idea of incorporation of the self in the group as a process, rather than identity as content.

defined by the rights and obligations associated with civic life and membership in a democratic polity. National identification is the sense of being an integral part of a single political community and in collective solidarity.[2] When the citizen role is understood in essentially the same way by all members of the polity, citizen identity and national identification are mutually reinforcing. Group identification at the national level creates bonds of solidarity among all members, aligns individual interests with national welfare, and provides the motivation for being a good group member at the individual level, that is, for enacting the voluntary, participatory behaviors that constitute the citizen role (see Huddy & Khatib, 2007). When national identity is engaged at the collective level, personal identity (perception of self and other individual group members) should be defined primarily in terms of the citizen role. And when citizen identity is activated at the personal level, national identification should be engaged as the primary (salient) group identity.

Antecedents of National Identification

If national identity serves to activate and motivate participatory citizenship that is essential to democratic polities, then social-psychological theories of ingroup formation and social identity become important to understanding when and why national identity might be engaged. Various theories of social identity emphasize both situational and motivational antecedents of group identification. Situational causes are those factors that make a particular category distinction *salient* within a social context. Categories are salient to the extent that there are shared features (similarities) that differentiate those who are in the category from those who are not in a specific context (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McCarty, 1994). Thus, American social identity is likely to be more salient when two Americans meet in Moscow, Russia (where their shared national membership distinguishes them from most others in the setting) than when they meet in Moscow, Idaho (where their shared Americanness is not likely to be a distinguishing characteristic). The power of category salience has been demonstrated in the classic minimal intergroup situation where mere categorization of individuals into two arbitrary but salient groupings has proved sufficient to create ingroup loyalties, biases, and favoritism (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971).

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[2] In her important article on citizen identities and political philosophies, Conover (1995) makes a similar distinction between two meanings of citizen identity as person-with-rights-and-obligations ("I" identity) and member-of-the-community ("we" identity). She uses the term "citizen identity" to refer to both meanings although they are clearly differentiated both conceptually and empirically.

Apart from mere cognitive salience, a context of threat or common fate can enhance identification with those who share the threat by virtue of their group membership. The basic premise of Realistic Group Conflict theory (Levine & Campbell, 1972: Chapter 3; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961) is the idea that competition with outgroups over scarce resources motivates ingroup cohesion and intergroup conflict. Clearly, one source of shared threat at the national level is a state of international conflict or warfare, but economic competition, competition in sports, and other symbolic conflicts can have similar group identity–enhancing effects. A sense of shared fate does not necessarily depend on the presence of intergroup competition. Natural catastrophes and (on the more positive side) shared achievements (e.g., a successful space mission) can have similar effects. Events that symbolize common values or common history (e.g., the Fourth of July in the United States) are also likely to enhance the situational activation of national identification.

There are also motivational factors that make some group identities relatively important across situations. Groups that contribute to the personal or collective self-esteem of their members by virtue of their recognized value or status engage high identification by satisfying members' needs for positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Group identities also serve needs for cognitive clarity (Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999) and satisfy the needs for belonging and inclusion (Baumeister & Leary, 1995). My own theory of "optimal distinctiveness" (Brewer, 1991) combines motives for belonging and differentiation to account for activation of group identities.

The basic premise of the optimal distinctiveness model is that the two identity needs (inclusion/assimilation and differentiation/distinctiveness) are independent and work in opposition to motivate group identification. Individuals seek social inclusion in order to alleviate or avoid the isolation or stigmatization that may arise from being highly individuated. In a recent review of the literature on social attachment, Baumeister and Leary (1995) conclude that "existing evidence supports the hypothesis that the need to belong is a powerful, fundamental, and extremely pervasive motivation" (p. 497). And researchers studying the effects of tokenism and solo status have generally found that individuals are both uncomfortable and cognitively disadvantaged in situations in which they feel too dissimilar from others. On the other hand, too much similarity or excessive deindividuation provides no basis for comparative appraisal or self-definition, and hence individuals are also uncomfortable in situations in which they lack distinctiveness (Fromkin, 1972). Arousal of either motive will be associated with negative affect and should motivate change in the level of self-identification.

The theory of optimal distinctiveness takes into account the role of the relative distinctiveness/inclusiveness of a social category as a factor in social identification. Within a given social context, or frame of reference, an individual can be categorized (by self or by others) along a dimension of social distinctiveness–inclusiveness that ranges from uniqueness (i.e., features that distinguish the individual from any other persons in the social context) at one extreme to total submersion in the social context at the other. Satisfaction of the drive toward social assimilation is directly related to level of inclusiveness, whereas satisfaction of self-differentiation needs is inversely related to the level of inclusiveness.

Optimal identities are those that satisfy the need for inclusion *within* the ingroup and simultaneously serve the need for differentiation through distinctions *between* the ingroup and outgroups. In effect, optimal social identities involve *shared distinctiveness.* Individuals will resist being identified with social categorizations that are either too inclusive or too differentiating but will define themselves in terms of social identities that are optimally distinctive. To satisfy the needs simultaneously, individuals will select group identities that are inclusive enough that they have a sense of being part of a larger collective but exclusive enough that they provide some basis for distinctiveness from others. Equilibrium is maintained by correcting for deviations from optimality. A situation in which a person is overly individuated will excite the need for assimilation, motivating the person to adopt a more inclusive social identity. Conversely, situations that arouse feelings of deindividuation will activate the need for differentiation, resulting in a search for more exclusive or distinct identities. Thus, the theory holds that individuals will actively seek to achieve and maintain identification with groups that are optimally distinctive within a given social context.

Optimal distinctiveness theory thus provides a motivational explanation for why situational salience (distinctive shared identities) activates group identification. The level of members' social identification with any particular group will be a joint function of the properties of the group (inclusiveness and distinctiveness) and the level of arousal of individuals' motivations to seek inclusion or difference (Brewer & Silver, 2000). Whether national identities will be actively engaged at any particular time will depend on both of these factors.

Group Identity and Ingroup Homogeneity

One implication of optimal distinctiveness theory is that national identity will be highest when inclusion needs are activated *and* national distinctiveness is salient. Optimal distinctiveness is heightened when similarities *within* the ingroup are emphasized at the same time that differences *between* groups

are accentuated. Thus, social identity thrives on intragroup homogeneity and adherence to a single prototypic representation of the group's norms, values, and character (Huddy, 2001). Experimental evidence supports the idea that ingroup identification is enhanced by focusing on commonalities and similarity (e.g., Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003) and, conversely, that threats to ingroup boundaries enhance perceptions of intragroup homogeneity in order to reestablish solidarity and cohesion (Pickett & Brewer, 2001).

If ingroup homogeneity is one (though not the only) important factor for activating and maintaining high levels of group identification, then there is some inevitable tension between maintaining strong national identity on the one hand and the existence of heterogeneity and pluralism within the nation on the other. In the following section, I will explore various ways in which this tension may be manifest, using the framework of social identity theory and optimal distinctiveness.

COMPETITION BETWEEN NATIONAL AND SUBNATIONAL GROUP IDENTITIES

Based on social identity concepts, there are two ways in which an individual's multiple group memberships and associated social identities may come into conflict. One is the presence of competing role requirements. If the role demands of being a good group member in one group are incompatible with meeting the role responsibilities associated with membership in another group, then one or the other role identity has to take precedence within any given situation. A second source of identity conflict occurs when specific distinguishing features that characterize the prototype of one group are inconsistent with features prototypic for the other. This latter is particularly likely in the case of nested (superordinate and subordinate) group identities, such as national identity and intranational subgroup identities. Within the context of a superordinate category, subgroups gain meaning in terms of their difference or distinctiveness from *other* members of the same superordinate group. In many cases, the bases for intergroup differentiation at the subgroup level may be incompatible with assimilating to commonalities at the superordinate level.

Dual Identities

It is not always the case that identity needs at different levels of inclusiveness will be in competition or conflict. In his classic book on the nature of prejudice, Allport (1954) presented a model of concentric circles in which nested group memberships provide a basis for progressively more inclusive social

identities. Individuals are nested within family groups that are nested within neighborhoods and communities that are combined into higher-order polities, and so on. By virtue of his or her membership in the more local and immediate small groups, the individual also acquires membership in the higher-order groupings that include the subgroup. Such a model assumes positive interdependence among units at each level of analysis. Individuals band together in families to meet mutual needs; families band together in communities to meet other needs, and so on. As a consequence, there is an expanding circle of interdependence that includes people who have no direct contact or exchange.

The concentric circle model, then, assumes that identities at different levels of inclusiveness are compatible and even mutually reinforcing. Under such conditions, individuals can maintain dual identities simultaneously without conflict. Thus, I can be both a good Democrat and a good American with strong social identification at both levels if I believe that my role as a member of the Democratic Party is consistent with my role as a citizen of the United States and that the prototypic Democrat represents values and beliefs that are prototypically American. In this case, my subgroup political identity feeds the superordinate identity and vice versa.

Certainly there are many successful social organizations that are based on such a model of nested identities. Indeed, the concept of dual identities has been advocated as an ideal for achieving common superordinate group identification while maintaining distinctive social identities at the subgroup level (e.g., Berry, 1984; Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000; Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). When interests are aligned, identification with one's department or work unit is positively correlated with identification with the organization as a whole, and membership in regional subdivisions of national political activist groups promotes identification with the collective movement. Nonetheless, there are both social-psychological and structural reasons why national and subgroup identities are often mutually antagonistic rather than mutually reinforcing.

Social Identity and Intergroup Comparison

Given that superordinate groups create the context within which subgroup identities take on meaning, most of the time for most individuals subgroup identities will be more salient and more distinctive than the superordinate group identity. Hence, the needs for inclusion and differentiation that motivate social identification are most likely to be satisfied at the subgroup level, and the awareness of intergroup differences between subgroups will usually swamp awareness of commonalities at the superordinate level. Awareness of intergroup differences is further complicated by processes

of social comparison as groups seek to establish their own positive value through comparison with other groups at the same level of inclusiveness within the superordinate groups. According to social identity theory, it is this process of *social competition for positive distinctiveness* that underlies ingroup favoritism and intergroup discrimination (Turner, 1975). Social competition creates a "zero-sum" mentality in which ingroup superiority is achieved at the expense of the outgroup and often also at the expense of collective interests at the superordinate level (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Interdepartmental competition has been observed to undermine organizational welfare even when objective interests should be aligned through positive interdependence. Similarly, "party politics" can supercede pursuit of common goals in the national interest, and the "politics of recognition" may be pursued at the cost of divisiveness and intergroup antagonism (see Conover, Chapter 8).

When membership in the superordinate national group does become salient, subgroups may engage in "ethnocentric projection" of their own values and characteristics onto the superordinate identity (Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003). Such projection serves to bring subgroup identity and superordinate identity into alignment, but it also creates another form of social competition at the subgroup level as each group seeks ownership or control of the meaning of the superordinate national identity. Under these circumstances, differences between the outgroup and the ingroup at the subordinate level are not only exaggerated but represented as failures or as threats to values at the superordinate level. Hence, differences are devalued and seen as sources of conflict rather than diversity.

Influence of Sociostructural Factors: Social Identity of Minorities and Majorities

Thus far, I have been describing intergroup processes in something of a contextual vacuum, assuming essentially symmetric relations between ingroup and outgroup. In most real-world national contexts, however, subgroups are embedded in a system of structural relationships of differential power, status, and economic resources. In a hierarchical system, where some subgroups are relatively advantaged in terms of size, power, and/or status compared to others, the effects of intergroup comparison, social competition, and ethnocentric projection are exacerbated.

Differential advantage influences social identification at both subgroup and superordinate group levels in a number of ways. First, membership in a disadvantaged minority group is more likely to be situationally salient and distinctive than membership in a dominant majority group. Hence, minority

groups are more chronically aware of intergroup differences and are more actively, consciously engaged in the struggle for positive distinctiveness than members of dominant groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; see also Conover and Judd & Park, Chapters 8 and 9). Consistent with this expectation, findings from both laboratory experiments and field studies, indicate that members of minority groups have higher social identification at the subgroup level than do majority group members (e.g., Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992).

Some social identity theorists have argued that minority identification and ingroup favoritism are defensive responses to insecurity and identity threat (e.g., Ellemers, Doosje, van Knippenberg, & Wilke, 1992; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984, 1991; Simon, 1992). Optimal distinctiveness theory offers an alternative explanation for minority ingroup identification that does not rely solely on defensive self-enhancement motives. Because of their relative distinctiveness, minority groups satisfy needs for both inclusion and differentiation—identity needs that are presumed by the theory to be independent of the need for self-enhancement. According to this theory, individuals seek distinctive group identities as much as positive group identities. All other things being equal, individuals will prefer group memberships that are both positive and distinctive, but when the two motives are in competition, it is not at all clear that the enhancement motive dominates. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that group identification is stronger among members of distinctive, stigmatized social groups than among members of larger, higher status groups (Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, & Broadnax, 1994; Simon, Glassner-Bayerl, & Stratenwerth, 1991; Simon, Hastedt, & Aufderheide, 1997).

In one test of the relative impact of enhancement and distinctiveness motives, Brewer, Manzi, and Shaw (1993) placed participants into groups that differed in size and status and in addition, manipulated activation of the need for differentiation. Ingroup identification was assessed by evaluative ratings of the ingroup on dimensions unrelated to the status differential. The results of the experiment produced a three-way interaction between ingroup size, status, and the differentiation manipulation on ingroup valuation. Under conditions when no need for differentiation was aroused, ingroup enhancement was predicted by both size and status, with participants classified in a low-status minority category showing the greatest evidence of enhancement-motivated ingroup positivity. When participants' need for differentiation was aroused, however, ingroup valuation was entirely predicted by group size: Minority members exhibited ingroup favoritism, while majority members did not, regardless of the status of the group. These findings were extended in three later experiments by Leonardelli and Brewer

(2001), demonstrating that minority group size per se engages ingroup identification independent of any need for self-enhancement.

In a hierarchical system, then, the relative strength of subgroup versus superordinate group identification is likely to be different for members of disadvantaged minority subgroups than for members of the advantaged majority. Minority groups are more chronically aware of intergroup differences at the subgroup level and identify with these subgroup distinctions more. Further, the effects of ethnocentric projection are dramatically different for members of dominant versus subordinate subgroups. For advantaged majority group members, projection of their own subgroup values, norms, and characteristics to the superordinate national level contributes to a sense of common group membership at the superordinate group level and reduces awareness of heterogeneity at the subgroup level. As a consequence, for majority group members, identification at the subgroup and superordinate group levels are essentially interchangeable.

For minority group members, by contrast, ethnocentric projection of the national image by the dominant majority contributes to incompatibility and conflict between subgroup identification and identification with the superordinate group on the part of minorities. As a consequence, there is a significant asymmetry between minority and majority groups in their pattern of group identification at the subgroup and superordinate group levels (Brewer, von Hippel, & Gooden, 1999; Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001). For majorities, the two levels of identification are mutually compatible and potentially positively correlated. For minorities, identification with the subgroup is likely to be inversely related to identification with the nation as a whole. Just such an asymmetry has been demonstrated in the relationships between ethnic and national attachment among dominant and minority ethnic groups in the United States. For instance, results from a student survey conducted by Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and Pratto (1997) indicated that European Americans scored higher on measures of both patriotism and nationalism than did members of ethnic minority groups. Further, patriotism was positively correlated with level of identification with their white ethnic ingroup on the part of European Americans, but this correlation was reversed among ethnic minorities. This pattern was replicated by Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin (1998) in a later survey of university freshmen in which ethnic attachment and national attachment were found to be positively related among European American students but uncorrelated or negatively correlated for ethnic minorities.

This asymmetry in the compatibility between national identification and subgroup identification among majorities and minorities provides the social-psychological backdrop for the politics of recognition discussed by Conover

(Chapter 8). Ironically, one consequence of this politicization of subgroup identities is to make majority subgroups more aware of intranational inter-group differences with a consequent unleashing of ethnocentric biases and potential undermining of some bases for national and citizen identity even among the dominant group.

MULTIPLE CATEGORIZATION: A POSSIBLE RESOLUTION?

Growing awareness of the tension between the values of national identifi-cation and solidarity on the one hand and the recognition of group-based differences and political demands on the other have contributed to a polar-ization between assimilationism and multiculturalism/separatism as oppos-ing political philosophies (Fredrickson, 1999; see Judd & Park, Chapter 9). However, there is an alternative to representing assimilationism and multi-culturalism as two extremes along a single bipolar continuum. There may be other forms of pluralism that hold more promise for maintaining distinc-tive social identities within a common superordinate structure. The key is to capitalize more effectively on our capacity for multiple social identities.

Large, complex nations are rarely characterized by a single simple hierar-chical structure of embedded groupings. Instead, societies are differentiated along a number of different dimensions of social differentiation—ethnicity, religion, region, occupation, gender—each of which subdivides the whole into different subgroupings with partially overlapping memberships. In such a system, individuals may belong to, and identify with, multiple politi-cally meaningful ingroups, each of which is a different subset of the national collective. To the extent that these group divisions are only minimally correlated, shared ingroup memberships and ingroup–outgroup differenti-ations on one occasion are realigned on others, when alternative identities are salient. Other individuals who are outgroup members in one category distinction may be fellow ingroup members in another. If different identifi-cations are meaningful and functional for individuals in different times and places, cross-cutting social categories reduce invidious social comparison, dilute social stereotypes, and motivate conflict prevention.

This insight that complex, cross-cutting patterns of social differentiation increases social stability and tolerance has been independently generated by anthropologists (e.g., Gluckman, 1955; Murphy, 1957), sociologists (e.g., Blau, 1977; Coser, 1956; Flap, 1988) and political scientists (e.g., Almond & Verba, 1963; Lipset, 1959). For instance, Coser (1956) hypothesized that:

> In flexible social structures, multiple conflicts crisscross each other and thereby prevent basic cleavages along one axis. The multiple group affiliations

of individuals makes them participate in various group conflicts so that their total personalities are not involved in any single one of them. Thus segmental participation in a multiplicity of conflicts constitutes a balancing mechanism within the structure . . . (pp. 153–154)

Similarly, Lipset (1959) identified role differentiation and cross-cutting ties as essential structural preconditions for the development of stable democracies. More recently, social-psychological research and theory provides a number of reasons why multiple cross-cutting social identities might reduce intergroup comparison and discrimination along any one dimension and, at the same time, increase identification with the superordinate national identity.

First, cross-cutting distinctions make social categorization more complex and reduce the magnitude of ingroup–outgroup distinctions. According to social categorization theory (Vanbeselaere, 1991), processes of intracategory assimilation and intercategory contrast counteract each other when categories are crosscutting. Thus, the effects of intercategory accentuation are reduced or eliminated, and the differences between groups are minimized (or no greater than perceived differences within groups). This undermines the cognitive basis of ingroup bias. Second, partially overlapping group memberships reduce the evaluative significance for the self of intergroup comparisons (Brown & Turner, 1979), thereby undermining one motivational base for intergroup discrimination.

Third, multiple group memberships reduce the importance of any one social identity for satisfying an individual's need for belonging and self-definition (Brewer, 1991), again reducing the motivational base for ingroup bias.

Finally, principles of cognitive balance (Heider, 1958; Newcomb, 1963) are also brought into play when ingroups and outgroups have overlapping membership. When another person is an ingroup member on one category dimension but belongs to an outgroup in another categorization, cognitive inconsistency is introduced if that individual is evaluated positively as an ingroup member but is also associated with others who are evaluated negatively as outgroup members. In an effort to resolve such inconsistencies, interpersonal balance processes should lead to greater positivity toward the outgroup based on overlapping memberships.

Importantly for identification at the national level, these same processes should also reinforce superordinate social identity. One effect of multiple cross-cutting ingroup memberships is to motivate individuals to seek a more inclusive ingroup identity that incorporates or transcends their plural social identities. Thus, one consequence of active participation in different groups at the subgroup level may be a strengthened identification with

the superordinate political entity. Further, there is evidence that the benefits of cross-categorization may be enhanced when category distinctions are embedded in a common superordinate group identity (Crisp & Hewstone, 2000). Thus, crossed categorization and dual levels of identification may work together to produce enhanced inclusiveness and reduced intergroup discrimination without eliminating distinctive subgroup identities.

Experimental Evidence

Social psychologists have only recently begun to recognize the potential importance of cross-cutting group memberships for the reduction of prejudice and discrimination and to subject these predicted effects to experimental test (e.g., Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998; Crisp, Hewstone, & Rubin, 2001; Marcus-Newhall, Miller, Holtz, & Brewer, 1993; Rust, 1996). Experiments are usually conducted by first creating ingroup–outgroup categorizations in the laboratory and then by introducing a cross-cutting distinction into the social context. This was the case, for instance, in a laboratory paradigm designed by Marcus-Newhall et al. (1993). In this experiment, participants were first divided into arbitrary social categories, based (ostensibly) on the results of a dot-estimation judgment task. Each experimental session was run with 8 same-sex participants, four of whom were told that they were "underestimators" and four of whom were assigned to the "overestimators" category, and all were given large colored identification buttons to wear that clearly signify their estimator category membership. Overestimators and underestimators were then segregated for a brief discussion period, which served as an ingroup formation consolidation phase. In the next phase of the experiment, participants were reassigned to four-person teams, each team consisting of two underestimators and two overestimators. The teams then engaged in a cooperative task that provided the opportunity for the introduction of a crossed category manipulation.

The cooperative task that teams undertook was to reach consensus, through team discussion, on a list of the seven most critical traits that should be considered in selection of NASA astronauts. Prior to engaging in the group discussion, each team member was given a set of preliminary materials to read that would establish their "expertise" regarding the stresses and demands faced by astronauts in preparing for and experiencing space travel. Two of the team members were given materials that provided information on the cognitive and skill demands of the astronaut role, and the other two were given information on the emotional and social demands of the job. Thus, two members shared the role of "cognitive expert," and two shared the role of "emotional expert" for the upcoming team task. In the *convergent categorization* experimental condition, both overestimators were assigned to

the same expert role and both underestimators were assigned to the other, so that estimator category and role were redundant differentiations. In the *cross-cutting* condition, on the other hand, two members of the same category were assigned to different roles, so that estimator category and role were orthogonal.

After individually receiving their role assignment and reviewing their information packets, all four team members were brought together and engaged in free discussion until they had agreed upon a list of seven emotional and cognitive requirements for the selection of astronauts. Once the team handed in their consensual list to the experimenter, members were again separated and asked to complete a number of post-discussion measures. The critical measures were evaluations of each of the fellow team members and a point assignment wherein the rater allocated up to 100 "chips" to each of the team members for their contribution to the group product. From these measures, estimator category bias scores were computed by subtracting the average rating/allocation assigned to the outgroup category members on the team from those assigned to the ingroup category member. This made it possible to assess how intercategory discrimination (based on the estimator categorization) had been affected by intergroup cooperation and the assignment of role categories.

As expected, Marcus-Newhall et al. (1993, Experiment 1) found that the convergent role assignment condition produced significant bias based on category membership on the point allocation measure. In the cross-categorization condition, however, this category-based bias was completely eliminated. This same cross-categorization paradigm has also been used with natural (as opposed to artificial) social categories that are asymmetric in terms of size or status. Bettencourt and Dorr (1998) formed 6-person teams composed of Republicans and Democrats, where one group was in the minority (2 members on the team) and the other group in the majority (4 members on the team) and role assignment either converged with or cross cut political group membership. In another context, Rust (1996) created 4-person teams consisting of two university sophomores (higher-status group) and two freshmen (lower-status group), again with cross-cutting or convergent role assignments on the team task. Both of these experiments replicated the Marcus-Newhall et al. findings with respect to the effect of role assignment on ingroup bias in evaluations and point allocation.

Cross-Cutting Identities Outside of the Laboratory

Results from these laboratory experiments are promising with respect to the potential for cross-cutting category membership to reduce intergroup bias and discrimination and to create shared ingroup identity. However,

generalizing directly from such experiments to subgroup relationships in national contexts must be circumscribed. The intergroup situation in the laboratory involves a great deal of interpersonal contact between members of different social categories, and the effectiveness of cross-categorization in reducing bias is diminished when there is less opportunity for personalized interaction (Marcus-Newhall et al., 1993, Experiment 2; Bettencourt & Dorr, 1998, Experiment 2). In the society at large, social categories tend to constrain social contact so that individuals have most interpersonal interactions with others who share one or more ingroup category memberships. Thus, even though individuals may belong to multiple relatively inclusive categories with overlapping memberships, their *cognitive representations* of those ingroup categories (and their feelings of connectedness to others who share that category membership) may be limited by their range of experience with other category members (Blau, 1977).

The first issue to be confronted in real-world contexts is whether two or more social categorizations are equally salient in a given social situation. If a single dimension of social differentiation dominates the definition of social identities in a given context, the presence of cross-cutting group identities will be ignored and cannot be expected to influence intergroup discrimination based on the dominant category. Category dominance may be chronic, as when a single line of social fission (e.g., race or religion) comes to have pervasive social and political significance across all domains of social life. In order for crossed categories to have psychological effects, two or more category distinctions must have *functional significance within the same social context*. That is, individuals must confront the fact that their different ingroup–outgroup categories have overlapping memberships. If one category distinction dominates the social interaction, overall bias will not be reduced just because a crossed categorization is present (Pepels, 1999).

Even when two or more categories are made simultaneously salient and meaningful, the effects of crossed category memberships may not be sufficient to reduce intergroup discrimination. The outcome will depend on how the individual construes his or her multiple group memberships (Brewer, 2000; Roccas & Brewer, 2002). Consider the example of an individual who is both a female and an African American, that is, has social identities that derive from gender categorization on the one hand and from her ethnicity on the other. Objectively, gender and ethnicity are cross-cutting social distinctions. Thus, when the individual considers her gender ingroup, the group includes females of various ethnicity, some black and some nonblack. Conversely, when she considers her ethnic ingroup, it includes male as well as female African Americans. As long as the individual embraces *both* ingroup

identities inclusively, her psychological ingroup includes at least some ethnic outgroupers and some gender outgroupers.

Imagine, however, that when our individual thinks about her female ingroup, she is aware that she represents an ethnic minority within that gender category and hence feels socially differentiated from white females. Similarly, when she thinks about her ethnic ingroup, she is aware of the implications of her gender identity vis-à-vis African American males. Under these circumstances, she may categorize herself as an African American woman and only those who share this combined category membership constitute her psychological ingroup. African Americans who are male and females who are white represent outgroup categories rather than shared social identities. In such a case, potential inclusive multiple subgroup identities converge into a single *exclusive* minority identity. This illustration demonstrates that the relationship between multiple social identities and intergroup discrimination is not a simple straightforward one, even when the categories involved are objectively cross-cutting or overlapping. If multiple category distinctions serve to differentiate a society into a number of highly exclusive subcategories, the consequence may be an increase in ingroup bias and intergroup conflict rather than less. Thus, the issue is to understand when (or under what conditions) multiple identities will be defined inclusively rather than exclusively.

Factors that would be predicted to promote more inclusive multiple identities include high cognitive complexity and tolerance for uncertainty, as well as secure social identity or strong activation of the need for inclusion (relative to the need for differentiation). There are also a number of external conditions or situational factors that might encourage more inclusive cross-category representations. Social mobility and increased contact across group boundaries reduce provincialism (Pettigrew, 1997) and expose the individual to direct experiences with cross-cutting group memberships. Such experience increases awareness that an ingroup category includes others who are diverse with respect to alternative category memberships. Similarly, pluralistic cultural norms and social values that favor tolerance and openness to change should also encourage more inclusive ingroup representations (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997).

Exploring Social Identity Complexity

This conceptual analysis of the cognitive representation of multiple identities focuses on the *phenomenological* rather than the objective categorization structure. In order to understand when cross-cutting categories will be effective in reducing prejudice, we need to know how the individual perceives his or her ingroups. To study the complexity of multiple social identities, some method

for assessing the subjective meaning of crossed category memberships at the individual level is needed.

As an initial attempt to get at an individual's subjective representation of his or her multiple group identities, Roccas and Brewer (2002) developed a methodology to assess social identity complexity. In questionnaire surveys of undergraduate college students, respondents were asked to check various social categories to which they belong (from a lengthy list of ethnic, religious, political, organizational, demographic, and geographical social groups) and to indicate which of these group memberships are particularly important to them. The vast majority of students listed at least 4 or 5 different social identities as important to them, and most of these represent objectively cross-cutting social distinctions (e.g., Catholic religion and Ohio citizen). Thus, the raw material of cross-cutting multiple social identities is prevalent even among this relatively young population.

In a subsequent questionnaire, respondents were reminded of their individual social group identities and then asked a series of questions about the relationships they perceive between different pairs of their ingroups (e.g., Catholics and Ohioans). One question assesses (on a 10-point rating scale) their subjective impression of the extent of overlap in membership between the two ingroups (e.g., Of persons who are Catholic, how many are also Ohioans? Of persons who are Ohioans, how many are also Catholic?) In general, the lower the degree of overlap between different ingroups, the more inclusively the individual is defining each ingroup separately (i.e., if the number of Ohioans who are also Catholic is perceived to be low, then the Ohio ingroup must include many non-Catholics; if the number of Catholics who are Ohioans is low, then the Catholic ingroup must include non-Ohioans, etc.). On the other hand, if the overlap between ingroups is perceived to be high, the categories are subjectively convergent rather than crosscutting (i.e., the ingroup is conceptualized as Catholic *and* Ohioan).

Based on this logic, a rough index of the complexity of multiple category representations can be generated by averaging the overlap ratings across all possible ingroup pairings. Low values on this index signify relatively *high* ingroup inclusiveness, while high values represent low ingroup inclusiveness (exclusiveness). An initial assessment of the psychometric properties of this index (based on pairings of nationality, religion, ethnicity, and university ingroup identities) revealed a reasonable distribution of scores ($M = 3.17$, sd $= 1.03$; $n = 198$). Further, scores on the index were correlated in a predictable manner with respondents' important social values. Using Schwartz's (1992) circumplex model of value classification, Roccas and Brewer (2002) found that the overlap index (where higher scores indicate less complexity, greater exclusiveness) correlated positively with Conservation

and Self-Enhancement (individualism) values ($r = 0.13$ and 0.25 respectively, $n = 151$) and negatively with Openness to Change ($r = -0.18$) and Universalism ($r = -0.25$).

Roccas and Brewer (2002) also hypothesized that social identity complexity should be associated with tolerance toward outgroups, for both cognitive and motivational reasons. They noted that individuals with high levels of social identity complexity are more likely to be cognitively aware that other persons who are outgroup members on some group dimension might be ingroup members when considered on some different dimension. Also, the motivation to favor one's ingroup may be diminished when one recognizes the partially overlapping nature of ingroup memberships, which reduces both the importance of the ingroup in intergroup comparisons and the significance of any particular social identification for an individual's self-definition and collective self-esteem.

Results of initial exploratory research supported the hypothesized relationship between individual differences in social identity complexity and tolerance-related variables. Roccas and Brewer (2002) presented initial data indicating that higher social identity complexity was associated with higher endorsement of openness, lower power orientation, and higher universalism values on the Schwartz Value Inventory (Schwartz, 1992). In a second exploratory study, greater social identity complexity was associated with less social distance to an outgroup (Russian immigrants) among Israeli participants.

More recently, Brewer and Pierce (2005) assessed the relationship between social identity complexity and tolerance in a large-sample mail and phone survey of adults from Ohio. In this study, a mail survey was used to identify potential participants for a phone survey and to obtain a listing of group memberships from each respondent. These group memberships were then used to construct a personalized phone interview for each respondent contacted. Specifically, three of the participant's own identified ingroup memberships across different domains, along with the ingroup "American," were used when asking each respondent about the extent of the overlap between each of these groups. The phone interview also elicited responses to items measuring attitudes toward affirmative action and multiculturalism, as well as emotional distance from outgroups as measured by "feeling thermometer" questions. These variables were then tested for a relationship to the overlap measure of social identity complexity.

The results confirmed that social identity complexity was associated with both tolerance-related policy preferences and affect toward outgroups. Among the white men and women respondents, the mean overlap score across four ingroups was significantly correlated with attitudes toward

affirmative action, multiculturalism, and affect toward outgroups after controlling for age, education, and ideology. Individuals with higher social identity complexity (low perceived overlap among their four ingroups) were more likely to endorse affirmative action and multiculturalism and to show less affective distance to ethnic minorities than were individuals with low social identity complexity (high overlap scores). This finding seems particularly compelling when it is noted that the overlap scores computed in this study did not include the participants' racial and ethnic group memberships, but were based on categories such as religious affiliation, occupational category, and sports fanships. The subjective representation of these nonethnic groups was nonetheless related to tolerance of ethnic outgroups in the manner predicted by Roccas and Brewer (2002).

CONCLUSION

At this point, the development of our measure of ingroup inclusiveness is still rather crude and the data very preliminary. But if these findings are replicated with more refined measures and larger samples, they provide support for our thesis that a cross-cutting category structure and multiple social identities with awareness of ingroup diversity provide an effective formula for reducing intergroup prejudice and for promoting cultural pluralism. From this perspective, what is required is a comprehensive theory involving the dynamic interactions between individual differences, social structure, and social cognition as the foundation of a political psychologically informed approach to social identity and tolerance in a pluralistic society.

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The Politics of Recognition: A Social Psychological Perspective

Pamela Johnston Conover

Political theory has been engaged in an ongoing debate about the role of recognition in liberal democracies. Recognition demands, among other things, respect for all social groups and their fundamental way of life. A failure to fulfill this demand can lead to discrimination and prejudice and ultimately impede effective democratic citizenship. This chapter argues that these claims are ultimately psychological in nature and that psychological science provides evidence to support a politics of recognition. Specifically, psychological research suggests that misrecognition impedes democratic citizenship and that meeting the demands of recognition can actually enhance the dynamics of democratic deliberation.

In recent years, multicultural disputes and divisive identity movements have illustrated the fundamental interplay between democracy and difference. The demands for recognition made by disadvantaged groups force us to consider whether our many differences—based on race, gender, ethnicity, class, religion, nationality, sexual orientation, disability, and age—must necessarily translate into incivility in public life and distrust between citizens. To be successful, must liberal democracies rest on a single, universalizing citizen identity, or can difference, and the identities it engenders, be recognized without jeopardizing civil society?

Political theorists have taken both sides on the issue. In his essay "The Politics of Recognition," Charles Taylor lays out the philosophical nature of such politics and argues that the demand for recognition is a legitimate one that liberal polities can and should honor (Taylor, 1994). Michael Walzer (1994), among others, supports much of Taylor's argument (also see Honneth, 1995). However, some theorists, like Nancy Rosenblum (1998), question the wisdom and necessity of indulging the demands for recognition posed by various social groups. In rejecting Taylor's argument, Chandran Kukathas (1998) has even gone so far as to call for a "politics of *in*difference." I side with Charles Taylor. But I believe that an adequate defense of a "politics of recognition" requires an understanding of its psychological underpinnings. Accordingly, in this chapter, I describe the nature of the "politics of recognition" and the psychological processes at work in such politics.

THE NATURE OF THE "POLITICS OF RECOGNITION"

Justice requires more than an equitable distribution of the material benefits of society. It also requires that we recognize one another's basic human dignity (Fraser, 1997; Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1994). In the modern world, recognition of individual dignity is connected to the recognition of one's true or authentic self. But our authenticity—our sense of self, of who we *really* are—is shaped by our identities, our understanding of those sets of characteristics that uniquely define us (Appiah, 1996; Taylor, 1994). Often these characteristics are social or group identities. Therefore, our claims to individual dignity hinge, in part, on the recognition that our core social identities receive from others. To be denied such recognition diminishes our dignity as human beings. For citizens who belong to powerful and advantaged groups, recognition is typically automatic, and often taken for granted (Jost & Hunyady, 2002, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). But for other citizens, it must be demanded. Unfortunately, such demands for recognition often result in intergroup conflict.

The Demand for Recognition

What is required to meet the demand for recognition? On Charles Taylor's (1994) account, the demand has two fundamental meanings. The first is that our universal dignity as human beings be recognized. This is a demand for equal respect as members of humanity, regardless of the particularities of who we are—our class, race, gender, talent, accomplishments, or moral record (Hill, 1991). The second meaning is that our unique dignity as an individual, our difference, be recognized (Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1994). Thus, the demand for recognition is also a call for respect as *particular* individuals: a request that our uniqueness as human beings be acknowledged and respected by our fellow citizens. And because social identities are so central to how we think of ourselves, this means that our groups, and the way of life they sustain, should likewise be respected. Though Taylor (1994) describes these as two distinct demands, Thomas Hill Jr. (2000, p. 79) argues that respecting people as members of humanity necessarily requires that we also respect them as particular individuals by recognizing the particular identities and projects that give their lives meaning.

Civility in public life is central to meeting both demands for recognition. To treat people with equal respect as members of humanity, we should acknowledge their dignity both directly and indirectly (Buss, 1999). We show respect indirectly by respecting a person's ends and interests, which entails acknowledging them as constraints on our own goals. And we show respect

directly by treating a person politely. As Sarah Buss (1999, p. 802) explains, "When we treat one another politely, we are directly expressing respect for one another in the only way possible. We are, in effect, saying, 'I respect you,' 'I acknowledge your dignity.'" So Buss makes the strong and convincing claim that good manners, in particular being polite, have substantial political significance for they are central to treating people with respect. In effect, "*appearing* respectful is essential to *really* respecting" others (Buss, 1999, p. 805; also see Calhoun, 2000). Thus, satisfying the first demand for recognition requires tolerance and civility (understood both as politeness and as respect for our capacity to set our own ends).

Taylor (1994) offers two interpretations of the demand for recognition as particular persons: groups and cultures actually must be judged to have equal worth; or in the absence of careful comparative study, they must be *presumed* to have equal worth. It is the latter, weaker interpretation that Taylor actually defends and that I focus on here. As Taylor (1994, p. 73) explains, what the presumption of equal worth "requires of us is not peremptory and inauthentic judgments of equal value, but a willingness to be open to comparative cultural study."

This is a demand for open-mindedness, and it is stronger than a demand for tolerance, which allows negative judgments and only obligates us not to act on them in illegal ways. Open-mindedness requires that we confront our biases and replace our inclination to judge with a sincere willingness to listen and learn, thereby allowing group members the opportunity to pursue their way of life and thus live authentically (Hill, 2000; Walzer, 1997). And unlike tolerance, genuine open-mindedness entails showing appropriate concern, both for the social identities of each individual and for the practices and perspectives associated with the identities (Gutmann, 1994; Hill, 2000). Open-mindedness is best expressed through civility—acting respectfully toward one another. As Hill (2000, p. 84) suggests, the goal is "respectful confrontation," which is best achieved when we use self-discipline, "modesty and caution to curb our arrogant bias in judging others whom we hardly understand." Thus, satisfying the second demand for recognition requires open-mindedness and civility, *not* an actual endorsement of a particular way of life.

So public life need not be disrupted by demands for recognition. On the contrary, it is actually improved when marginalized groups are treated in an open-minded and respectful fashion, for civility and open-mindedness toward strangers, particularly those belonging to outgroups, promote the evolution of mutual trust (Macy & Skvoretz, 1998). And mutual trust generates social capital and strengthens civil society.

Negotiating Identities: Authenticity Versus Misrecognition

Given the value of mutual recognition to civil society, why do demands for recognition provoke conflict? Recognition can be problematic because the meaning of categories—and thus the core identities associated with them—is "dialogically constituted" and consequently inherently political. We do not determine our authentic selves or core identities by ourselves; instead, we arrive at them through discussion with other citizens (Minow, 1997; Taylor, 1994). This is true for both dominant and subordinate groups in society. But marginalized citizens are at a distinct disadvantage because they have less input into the dialogic process. When citizens disagree on the meaning of particular identities, recognition is contested rather than automatic, consequently open-mindedness and civility can be hard to sustain. Thus, "negotiations" over meaning can become contentious and rude, ultimately turning into full-blown intergroup conflicts.

Acknowledging the social construction of the self also constrains our understanding of authenticity as an ideal: Though we make many choices about who we will be, society determines the range of available options. So "authenticity" depends heavily upon our *autonomy* to define ourselves within these broad social and cultural constraints (Appiah, 1996; Taylor, 1994). In this context, autonomy is understood as a psychological capability—the right and the opportunity to choose which of our identities define our sense of self and the contribution to the meaning of those identities (Hill, 1991). Thus, authentic selves can only be realized when people have considerable autonomy.

But citizens differ in their autonomy, and consequently the likelihood that they will be able to achieve adequate recognition. People who belong to dominant groups enjoy greater autonomy, while those who are members of subordinate groups find their autonomy more limited (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). And when citizens lack autonomy, the potential for *mis*recognition increases. At its most extreme, misrecognition becomes nonrecognition: Society simply does not acknowledge the existence of a particular group or its traditions, and consequently, its ways of life are rendered invisible by cultural practices (Fraser, 1997). More often, subordinate groups are acknowledged, but the majority misrepresents and misunderstands their difference.

The above outlines the chief justification for taking seriously the demands for recognition: misrecognition results in serious harm (Fraser, 1997; Honneth, 1995; Taylor, 1994). In its milder forms, it produces false or distorted identities thereby undermining authenticity. In its more virulent

forms, misrecognition promulgates demeaning images or nonrecognition, thus adding disrespect and contempt to inaccuracy. Under such circumstances, an individual's dignity is assaulted, for authenticity becomes difficult, and self-respect and esteem are threatened. It is worth quoting Taylor (1994) at length here:

> . . . a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being . . . misrecognition shows not just a lack of due respect. It can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its victims with a crippling self-hatred. (p. 25)

Misrecognition can lead to discrimination, which produces additional harm to the psychological, material, and political well-being of its targets. On normative accounts, then, misrecognition is both intrinsically and instrumentally harmful.

Political Activism and the Demand for Recognition

Too often, the harm becomes real: Disadvantaged groups find that their difference is met with rudeness, dogmatism, and misrecognition rather than civility, open-mindedness, and respect. So they turn to politics. The demand for equal respect as members of humanity produces a "politics of universalism": citizens seek respect by eliminating group-based discrimination, and replacing it with equal rights. Thus, African Americans have sought equal respect through colorblind laws, and women through gender-neutral laws. Ironically, though a "politics of identity" is the vehicle for such political activism, the ultimate goal is to secure for all, *regardless* of their group identities, the universal identity of "equal citizen" (Gutmann, 1994). Group identities are evoked to eliminate the discrimination associated with them, not to protect them.

In contrast, the demand for recognition as particular persons leads to a "politics of difference," which is meant to protect group identities and the practices they engender. Discrimination arises when disadvantaged groups are forced to assimilate to the images and practices of the majority. "Liberal neutrality" cannot ensure adequate recognition for disadvantaged groups, because the law and political institutions are not neutral, but instead reflect the values and practices of the dominant groups in society (Taylor, 1994). Therefore, nondiscrimination requires differential treatment both to enable groups to preserve those self-understandings and practices that are central to living authentically and to guarantee that they will not be disadvantaged because of it (Kukathas, 1998; Taylor, 1994). Thus, the "politics of difference"

calls for political majorities to demonstrate their "open-mindedness," their presumption of the equal worth of subordinate groups, by taking positive steps to ensure that group members can, indeed, live authentically.

Two versions of the "politics of difference" have emerged. In the first, groups focus on the state—political institutions and the law—seeking legislation and court decisions that recognize their "difference" by establishing differential treatment. Like the "politics of universalism" this too is a "politics of identity," but the focus here is on preserving the group identity and way of life. So this "politics of identity" is interest group politics in which the interest at stake is truly the "self." The second version of the "politics of difference" is a "cultural politics" in which groups strive to control the public's understanding by influencing the "flow of information" so that "cultural representations" are more authentic (Abel, 1998). The battleground is culture itself, not the law or political institutions, and the "enemies" are the dominant groups that control the construction of meaning (Abel, 1998; Gamson, 1998). Thus, the two versions of the politics of difference attack the power of dominant groups in different ways: The former addresses the social and political consequences that occur when categorization leads to discrimination, while the latter seeks to control and change the process of categorization itself.

In sum, the "politics of recognition" encompasses several types of identity politics. The "politics of universalism" mobilizes around group identities in order to secure the universal identity of "citizen" for its members; respect is the recognition desired. The "politics of difference" focuses on group identities in order to protect them and the ways of life they engender; esteem is the recognition desired. When demands for recognition are met with tolerance, open-mindedness, and civility, it facilitates mutual respect and positive intergroup relations, thereby strengthening civil society (Huo, 2003; Huo & Molina, 2006). Conversely, when intolerance, dogmatism, and incivility are the response, it undermines recognition and triggers intergroup conflict (Huo, Molina, Sawahata, & Deang, 2005; Huo & Tyler, 2001) Thus, the politics of recognition draws our attention to the group basis of human dignity and its role in promoting civil society.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION

The politics of recognition encompasses a number of different psychological processes. Specifically, Taylor's (1994) argument rests on several fundamental claims about the basic nature of our identities: (1) categories of identity are socially constructed; (2) the process is politicized; (3) group identities constitute part of our sense of self and help construct a way of life

that shapes our understanding of our own authenticity; (4) misrecognition of identities occurs and is harmful, and (5) misrecognition is a source of discrimination. Space does not permit an in-depth consideration of each of these claims, so I will focus primarily on the third and fourth claims, which lie at the core of a politics of recognition.

Social Categorization

By now, it is commonplace to argue that identity categories are socially constructed—created and given meaning through social interaction and dialogue (Appiah, 1996; Minow, 1997). Indeed, postmodernism rests on the claim. In a provocative paper, Ian Hacking (1992) describes the process as one of "making up people": The emergence of new categories of description creates novel possible selves, "thinkable, decipherable somethingnesses" (p. 83). Thus, the boundaries of our individuality—our uniqueness—are defined by the available categories and their meaning, which can be negotiated in a variety of ways. At one extreme, the meaning might be defined entirely by political and social elites and then imposed on those labeled as belonging to the category; at the other extreme, the social practices of a group dictate the meaning.

Social psychological research confirms this view (Fiske, 1998, 2002; Hogg, 2003). The meaning of categories is not arbitrary but rather is shaped by social processes. Similarly, the salience of particular categories is determined socially. The most salient categories are those visible in social interaction or those that have social significance. Race, gender, and age are both visible and socially significant, so it is not surprising that they are salient (Correll et al, 2007; Richeson & Shelton, 2007; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, & Trawalter, 2005; Thompson & Sekaquaptewa, 2002). But even concealable attributes, such as religion and sexual orientation, can become quite salient depending on the social context. Thus, there is ample evidence that the existence, meaning, and salience of categories are created socially.

Politicization

The process of social construction is also political. At the collective level, categorization preserves and accentuates group differences that are clearly politicized (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Hogg, 2003, 2006). Indeed, social psychologists have argued that virtually all naturally occurring categorizations involve unequal groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Pratto, van Laar, & Levin, 2004). Categorization both freezes inequalities between groups and provides mechanisms for perpetuating the inequality by embedding categories into the law and other social institutions. For example, racial inequality

was incorporated into American law and this generated racial inequality in other settings (Minow, 1997). Consequently, maintaining boundaries between groups becomes a political mechanism for maintaining intergroup differences, and labeling individuals as belonging to one group rather than another becomes an exercise in power.

Moreover, it is an exercise in power that we each reinforce daily without much thought. At the individual level, we automatically categorize people according to the ways in which they differ from the dominant groups in society. In the United States, this "cultural default" is young, white, heterosexual males (Fiske, 1998). *Non*default categories have priority, or are "marked," so that those individuals who seem to belong to them are judged more rapidly and marked linguistically (Smith & Zárate, 1992). Thus, on both the collective and individual levels, categorization maintains power and status differentials in society (Fiske, 2002; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004; McCoy & Major, 2006).

Identity, Interests, and Ways of Life

Understanding the politics of recognition requires that we explore how basic interests become bound up with social identities in defining our sense of self and sustaining our ways of life. Implicit in the politics of recognition is the assumption that our social identities and our preferences are linked to one another in a mutually defining fashion. That is, some of our preferences are "constitutive preferences" in the sense that they help to define the meaning of a particular social identity (Conover, 2001). And conversely, our identities are often "expressive identities" in that they not only shape our preferences, but also convey a message about them (Hunter, 2000). For example, the issue of abortion is often linked to the identity of "feminist" such that taking a pro-choice stand partially defines what it means to be a feminist, and identifying oneself as a "feminist" conveys the message that you have a pro-choice preference on the abortion issue. From this perspective, both our preferences and the social identities associated with them are dialogically shaped through social construction and regulated by social norms, two deeply political processes (Benhabib, 1999).

Because our identities and basic preferences are mutually constitutive, when people deliberate about political issues they are debating not just about their preferences, but also about the identities linked to those preferences. Inclusive politics thus becomes essential: group members must have a presence, voice, and authority in articulating their preferences and shaping their own identities, otherwise their interests might be misunderstood and their identities rendered unauthentic. Consequently, as Anne Phillips (1995) argues, a "politics of presence" is necessarily tied to a "politics of ideas."

This is a sharp departure from a traditional liberal understanding of politics that views "difference" in terms of the diversity of ideas and goals. On a liberal account, our ideas and preferences might be shaped by our experiences, but they are, nonetheless, detachable from those experiences and thus from who we are (Phillips, 1995). So even if groups differ in their interests, it is possible to separate the interests from the group. Consequently, it does not matter *who* articulates an idea or represents an interest: Men can represent women's interests, or whites can represent the preferences of African Americans. Implicit in this understanding is the notion that interests are fixed and that the process through which they are formed stands outside politics (Phillips, 1995). Thus, from a liberal perspective, a vigorous and competitive "politics of ideas" is all that is needed to ensure that difference is treated fairly.

The politics of recognition calls this account into question by suggesting that *what* is represented cannot be detached from *who* is represented. So, for example, whites cannot speak adequately for African Americans even if they share the same preferences, because there is something fundamentally different—and politically valuable—about articulating one's *own* interests when they are tied to a basic identity. This raises a number of questions. How does the connection between interests and identity arise? How can we understand this connection psychologically? And what are the political implications of the connection between preferences and identity?

Explaining the connection. A variety of explanations might account for the linkage between particular preferences and social identities. I focus on four. "Essentialism," the idea that attributes or preferences are innately characteristic of a specific group, is an obvious though much aligned candidate for explanation. On this account, the interests of a group are "fixed" by its very nature. But political theorists and social scientists soundly reject the notion that social groups share a basic "essence" that guarantees their preferences on politics or anything else (Fuchs, 2001; Minow, 1997). Moreover, essentialism is inconsistent with the "politics of recognition," which assumes that the meaning of identities is dialogically negotiated rather than predetermined by nature.

A more appealing explanation is the argument that "shared life experiences" shape, though do not fully determine, both preferences and identities (Minow, 1997; Phillips, 1995). There are two distinct ways of formulating this explanation. In the first, experiences are "shared" only in the sense that they are *similar*. The groups in question are "common-identity" groups whose members are categorized similarly but not tied to one another as group members. For example, women have *similar* experiences in child raising that

could lead them to have similar gender identities and preferences. On this account, our preferences and social identities are connected, but the linkage may not be conscious. Indeed, the connection might be spurious: the same experiences could produce both preferences and identities. Or, similarity in experience might lead people to identify with the group and that, in turn, shapes one's preferences (Huddy, 1998). Or vice versa—the similarity of experience produces the shared preferences, which then helps to generate the common identity. None of these variants of the "similarity" argument requires, however, that group members have interpersonal relations with one another.

The second way of formulating the "shared experience" explanation is to argue that events are "shared" in some *interpersonal sense*. In this case, the groups are "common-bond"—groups whose members are connected to one another. Interpersonal sharing might take several forms. One is the discussion of similar experiences. For example, women might discuss their individual experiences of child raising with other women, and this verbal sharing generates a common gender identity and similar preferences. Or interpersonal sharing might take the form of actually experiencing together an event, like attending a political march. Such experiences are "social goods" in the sense that part of their value and meaning is derived from their shared nature (Taylor, 1989).

On this "interpersonal sharing" account, our social identities and preferences are mutually reinforcing. They evolve together in a developmental cycle of reciprocal causation that occurs within a group context; by sharing experiences with one another over time, people come to understand what it means to be a group member. Social influence and comparison processes within the group reinforce the connection between identities and preferences that emerges out of this process of sharing (Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg, & Turner, 1990). Group identities are more likely to function as "we" identities when there is interpersonal sharing, particularly if the events are actually experienced together. The genuine sharing of experiences together pushes individuals to adopt a group level of categorization that promotes viewing the group in "we" terms (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Hogg, 2006; Kim & Bearman, 1997; Taylor, 1989). In contrast, where group identities are based only on having similar experiences, rather than interpersonal sharing, it is easier to treat them as personal or "I" identities.

A third explanation derives from the second one and is future-oriented. Specifically, shared experiences might generate both social identities and a common *perspective* (Phillips, 1995). Though our identities and initial preferences evolve in tandem, there is always the possibility of developing new preferences. This is particularly likely when group members are put

in new circumstances or given new opportunities to explore their preferences. Underlying this explanation is the assumption that people who share social identities also share a common perspective and that our identities indirectly determine our future preferences through their influence on our perspectives.

A final explanation builds on the idea of interpersonal sharing but emphasizes politics: Specifically, the role of political activists in actively constructing preferences and identities. Indeed, a politics of recognition rests on the assumption that interests are fluid, shaped by political discourse, and adaptable to changing conditions that provide individuals greater autonomy to shape their own lives and more opportunities with which to do it. Political group consciousness emerges through a process of transformation in which identities and interests are reshaped in a mutually reinforcing process. As Hyojoung Kim and Peter Bearman (1997) explain, "this symbiosis between identity and interest is the key to the success of any social movement" (p. 85). Thus, the connection between an identity and particular preferences is forged for political reasons and is influenced by the information transmitted from a group's leaders to its members, as well as the interactions among group members (Kinder, 1998).

In sum, there are multiple routes through which preferences and social identities might become related to one another. In some instances, the connection is sociological: Because of similar experiences, group members come to have the same preferences and a common identity. Here, the social identity might not contribute to the creation or maintenance of the preferences nor do group members necessarily consciously connect the two. Alternatively, preferences and identities might be causally interrelated, because they evolve together through shared experiences or are constructed together by political activists in the process of social mobilization. In such cases, there likely is a psychological link between the preferences and identity in the minds of group members.

Stereotypes, prototypes, and political preferences. How can we characterize this psychological connection? Stereotypes and prototypes come into play because they are key cognitive structures connecting particular social identities with bundles of basic preferences and political ideologies (Huddy, 2001, 2003). Public policies often contain group cues, and consequently discussion of such issues evokes group prototypes and stereotypes. Even when an issue is not explicitly framed as a group issue, the debate can embody group cues (Conover, 1988), and thus public debate can quickly become an "us–them" affair. And though they are ostensibly focused on abstract principles and values, such debates also become negotiations over the meaning of the identities that are involved.

Let me be clear about the scope of my argument. I do not mean to suggest that all group members develop a meaningful political identity, nor that all political preferences are linked to some social identity, nor even that all preferences that distinguish a group from other groups become linked to the group identity. Rather, I am arguing that certain key preferences come to be consciously associated with social identities, and this link is reflected in the group prototypes and stereotypes held by members and nonmembers. Consequently, when people categorize themselves as belonging to a group, the related group prototype becomes a referent for assessing issues and developing political preferences, particularly when identities are strong. In general, group prototypes are more likely to be "fuzzy categories" that capture the general nature of a group in terms of ideal types or exemplary members rather than in terms of detailed lists of specific attributes (Hogg, 1996). For politically relevant groups, such prototypes might evoke prominent political activists, and general partisan and ideological leanings (e.g., liberal, pro-welfare, and antigovernment), but they probably do not contain specific preferences on a wide variety of issues. Nonetheless, political group prototypes might include a few core specific issue preferences along with general political leanings. So through their link to social identities, key preferences become part of one's self-image and self-understanding (Conover, Searing, & Crewe, 2002). In this fashion, our group identities situate us in the political landscape and help us to understand the group-based nature of our political reality.

Political consequences. The link between preferences and identities is critical, because it is the psychological key to understanding why people must speak for themselves in political deliberations and public life. When preferences are "constitutive preferences," it transforms them psychologically, thereby making political issues more relevant to the self. When preferences are linked to social identities, attitudes become personally more important (Boninger, Krosnick, & Berent, 1995) and stimulate greater personal involvement (Thomsen, Borgida, & Lavine, 1995). Moreover, it gives the individual a "vested interest" in the issue, which now has personal consequences for the self. Indeed, the preferences become a part of the self, thereby broadening self-interest to incorporate the interests of the group.[1] And finally, it changes one's perspective on the issue. By engendering a self-*in*-other perspective, social identities encourage an "attending together" by the members of a social group to *their* problems, thereby promoting a "for us"–"for them" perspective on the issue (Taylor, 1989). Thus, when our

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[1] Even if group preferences are not in the interest of the individual, they nonetheless are in the interest of the self (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Conover, 1995).

preferences are constitutive preferences, they become more important and personally involving, and the related perspective less individualistic and fundamentally more group-oriented.

Constitutive preferences have other cognitive and emotional consequences. They motivate people to process information differently, leading them to engage in selective exposure to information and to invest more effort in processing the information and thinking about the issue (Boninger et al., 1995; Thomsen et al., 1995). This, in turn, has a ripple effect: attitudes become more extreme and more closely linked to other important attitudes and values. And all this makes the attitudes stronger and more stable, which promotes the development of intense emotional reactions (Abelson, 1995).

Constitutive preferences and expressive identities have significant political implications. When they are strong, political discussion can become more difficult, because citizens are more likely to be emotional and less likely to be open-minded. Consequently, they are less likely to listen to one another, or if they listen, to value the arguments being made, or in the end to be swayed by them. Moreover, even if citizens listen to and respect one another's arguments, deliberation *alone* on contentious issues might not change constitutive preferences, because for people to resist persuasion when changing their preferences means altering their identities as well. Indeed, many citizens simply avoid discussing contentious issues with anyone but their family and close friends for fear of becoming too emotional or revealing too much about who they are (Conover et al., 2002). Finally, the cumulative effect across a number of preferences is also important. For each identity, a group-oriented worldview emerges that is particular to group members and that cannot be assumed by outsiders (Brewer & Gardner, 1996).

Identity politics thus complicates public discourse and deliberation. Meeting demands for inclusiveness makes deliberation more conflictual because bringing more diverse citizens into the debate ushers their identities in with their ideas. This does not mean that change is impossible and deliberations are doomed to fail. On the contrary, a politics of recognition presumes that both identities and preferences are fluid and can be shaped through political discourse. But it does suggest that deliberation might not be the best way for citizens to *initially* communicate "across difference" on contentious issues involving strong constitutive preferences. As Iris Young (2000) and others have suggested, storytelling and narratives may be an essential precursor to successful public debate because they can lead citizens to adopt different understandings of one another's lives and identities, thereby improving the climate for deliberation (Conover, 2001).

In sum, social identities and political preferences are often linked to one another, creating what can be described as "constitutive" preferences and

"expressive" identities. Constitutive preferences become a part of the self, which helps make them stronger and produces a perspective on issues that is group-oriented. Outsiders can strongly hold the same position, but they simply cannot replicate the personal involvement, commitment, and perspective of group members. Therefore, they are unlikely to act on an issue in the same way. Thus, there is a strong psychological basis for the political argument that lies at the core of a politics of recognition: Group members must be allowed to speak for themselves and to represent themselves in political deliberation and public discourse (Phillips, 1995; Williams, 1998).

The Harm of Misrecognition

Misrecognition is at the center of Taylor's argument: the demand for recognition rests on the claims that misrecognition exists and causes serious harm. A substantial amount of social psychological research bears on the validity of these two claims (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Steele, 1997; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). This becomes obvious when the concept of misrecognition is translated into psychological terms. Political theorists (Gutmann, 1994) suggest that misrecognition involves the negative images and feelings that citizens have about one another as a consequence of their social identities. Specifically, it refers to identities that are inauthentic—false, distorted, confining, and reduced—and the negative emotional reactions associated with them—contempt, disrespect, distrust, disgust, and depreciation (Taylor, 1994). Misrecognition is, on this account, essentially the political philosopher's way of describing the cognitive process of stereotyping, the emotions of prejudice, and their consequences (Fiske, 1998; Schneider, 2004).

With this in mind, it is not difficult to establish the validity of the claim that misrecognition exists. An enormous amount of social psychological research makes clear the pervasiveness of both stereotyping and prejudices (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Fiske, 1998). The existence of misrecognition is indisputable. But the harm attributed to it by political theorists is less easily validated, and in the end, more complex than either political theorists or social psychologists might have thought.

As conceptualized by Taylor (1994) and others, misrecognition produces multiple harms. It reduces our authenticity by limiting autonomy in all three of its senses: it is psychologically debilitating, disrespectful of our right to construct our own identities, and it constrains our opportunities. Misrecognition diminishes our self-respect, and it erodes our self-esteem. And finally, the cumulative effect of these harms is to reduce our capacity for citizenship by diminishing our capacity to act democratically in our everyday lives. Social psychological research bears unevenly on these claims: discounting some, supporting others, and remaining silent on a few.

Autonomy and authenticity. Misrecognition does limit autonomy and consequently makes authenticity difficult. It does this by contributing to the development of "inauthentic" identities—and preferences—among disadvantaged group members.[2] Social comparison processes are key psychological forces underpinning this effect. Specifically, disadvantaged group members, especially, tend to restrict their social comparisons to within their group as a means of protecting themselves against the potentially devastating effects of misrecognition (Crocker et al., 1998; Major & O'Brien, 2005; Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). There are three related consequences of misrecognition for disadvantaged groups.

First, the intragroup context of comparison affects the *development* of preferences (Sunstein, 1991). Threats of misrecognition restrict the autonomy of disadvantaged group members: They perceive that their options are limited, and this perception is reinforced by the intragroup context of comparison (Crocker et al., 1998). Consequently, disadvantaged group members develop "adaptive preferences" adjusted to the status quo and their limited opportunities (Sunstein, 1991). Moreover, their preferences are "distorted" because they are formed in the absence of full information and with their options limited by their subordinate status (Nussbaum, 1999). Both adaptive and distorted preferences are "deformed" in the sense that they are inauthentic: They are not the preferences that disadvantaged group members would develop in a different comparative context, one in which they had more information and a wider range of opportunities (Nussbaum, 1999). Thus, social comparison processes encourage disadvantaged group members to develop "deformed" preferences that accommodate their subordinate status and lead them to live inauthentic lives (Jost & Hunyady, 2005; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

Second, the intragroup context of comparison contributes to the *persistence* of "deformed" preferences. Once preferences are developed, disadvantaged group members are unlikely to realize their deformed nature because they continue to rely heavily on intragroup comparisons and on ingroup members for information (Abrams et al., 1990). Intergroup comparisons that would make the disadvantaged aware of their deprivation pose a threat to self-esteem and therefore tend to be avoided (Major, 1994). So, social comparison processes sustain the existence of "deformed" preferences thereby perpetuating acceptance of misrecognition.

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[2] Stereotyping might also undermine authenticity among advantaged group members. Making favorable downward comparisons to disadvantaged groups enhances self-esteem (Major, 1994), potentially creating falsely exaggerated images of self-worth.

Finally, the intragroup context of social comparison prompts people to view their group identity at the personal rather than the collective level (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey, 1995). Therefore, misrecognition threatens them at the personal level as individuals, rather than at the collective level as part of the group. Rather than viewing negative outcomes as injustices resulting from discrimination, disadvantaged group members are more likely to attribute them to personal failings. As a result, group members are often unaware of the ways in which their preferences and outcomes are related to their group identities; consequently, they are less likely to perceive their relative deprivation. Thus, intragroup social comparisons hinder disadvantaged group members from experiencing their group identities as collective identities, making it less likely that they will see discrimination as a group phenomenon. This inhibits collective action.

The implications for political action are significant. If misrecognition is to be remedied, "inauthentic" preferences must be transformed so that they are closer to the "true" preferences that would exist under nondiscriminatory conditions. This requires disrupting routine social comparison processes so that the disadvantaged have fuller information about the range of opportunities available in society, and thus become more likely to perceive their relative deprivation and possibly take collective action. But because the development of preferences is heavily influenced by the group context and linked to our social identities, changing preferences cannot be accomplished without also changing the understanding of group identities. Individuals must be prompted to experience their group identities at the collective level and to reject the misrecognition of the identities in the broader society. And they can recognize the connection between their identities and their preferences by developing a sense of group consciousness.

Self-respect and Self-esteem. Taylor (1994) suggests that misrecognition directly erodes self-respect, but other theorists are skeptical. Nancy Rosenblum (1998), in particular, argues that there is little empirical evidence to demonstrate that public standing determines self-respect—and she is right. Social psychologists have largely ignored the concept of self-respect, focusing virtually all of their attention, instead, on self-esteem (Crocker & Knight, 2005; Crocker & Park, 2004; Crocker & Wolfe, 2001).While both concepts deal with interpersonal regard, they are distinct, and therefore the empirical neglect of self-respect leaves untested a basic tenet in the argument for recognition.[3]

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[3] "Respect" is an acknowledgement of our equal status as human beings; in contrast, "esteem" has to do with the value placed on a person's character or achievements, according to what society deems worthwhile or significant (Honneth, 1995). "Self-respect," then,

While social psychological research tells us very little about the effects of misrecognition on self-respect, it tells us a great deal about the impact of stereotyping on self-esteem. And once again, political theorists have it only partly right. It *is* indeed threatening to personal and collective self-esteem to have a devalued social identity and to confront misrecognition—prejudice and negative stereotypes. But many people are able to deal with this threat in ways that protect their personal and collective self-esteem (for a review of evidence, see Crocker et al., 1998). For example, when membership is voluntary, individuals can protect their self-esteem by opting to exit from the devalued group. When actual exit is impossible, they can psychologically disassociate from the group or change themselves to become less similar to the group. Alternatively, rather than trying to escape the stigma, they can adopt strategies that serve to minimize it. By using a mix of these strategies, most disadvantaged individuals are able to maintain positive views of themselves, their lives, and often their groups (Crocker et al., 1998). Thus, political theorists are wrong to assume that lowered self-esteem is a harm typically produced by stereotyping and prejudice.

But they are correct in thinking that identity politics helps citizens maintain self-esteem in the face of misrecognition, for group identification fosters higher levels of both personal and collective self-esteem (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Kaiser, 2005; Major et al., 2002). Even when a group is devalued by the broader society, the experience of mutual esteem—solidarity—within the group can provide individuals with the recognition essential for them to maintain their self-esteem and thus their dignity. So encouraging civility and open-mindedness is critical, for it protects the ability of disadvantaged groups to maintain their own group life. It is important to note, however, that some people find it difficult to use their groups to maintain self-esteem, and consequently they are more likely to be harmed by misrecognition. People with concealable stigmas (e.g., gays and lesbians) are particularly vulnerable to low self-esteem in part because they find it difficult to locate similar others who might offer support in their daily lives (Frable, Platt, & Hoey, 1998). And within disadvantaged groups, members who deviate from group standards are frequently denigrated and their self-esteem suffers for it (Smith & Tyler, 1997).

Citizenship and everyday life. The final harm of misrecognition lies in the cumulative effect of its other harms; together they are presumed to diminish the capacity of people to practice citizenship in everyday life. Democratic citizenship requires that we treat one another with tolerance.

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is the fundamental appreciation of one's basic moral rights, as a human being and a citizen (Hill, 1991).

The necessity of civility is arguable: Though it is essential for demonstrating recognition, some think it too demanding a standard for everyday democratic life (but see Conover & Searing, 2000; Calhoun, 2000). Nancy Rosenblum (1998, p. 351), a critic of the politics of recognition, maintains that all that is required for the everyday practice of democratic citizenship is that we treat one another identically and with "easy spontaneity"—a rejection of deference and a "habitual disregard" for difference that can be adopted with little conscious effort. Using Rosenblum's minimal standard, does the harm of misrecognition render people less able to act as citizens—to be tolerant and to treat others equally and with "easy spontaneity"? From the psychological research just reviewed, we know that misrecognition reduces autonomy, but that it does not routinely damage self-esteem, even though it seriously threatens it. So the question becomes, do the harm of misrecognition to autonomy and the threat it poses to self-esteem weaken our capacity for democratic citizenship? And the answer must be yes.

The *threat* of misrecognition impinges upon autonomy by instilling an attitude of distrust and suspicion that makes it difficult to treat others identically and with "easy spontaneity," much less with civility or mutual respect. The uncertainty of not knowing when prejudice and stereotyping will be encountered puts stigmatized individuals constantly "on guard," making them cautious of other citizens and mistrustful of their claims that they are not prejudiced (Crocker & Major, 1989; Crocker & Major, 1994; Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-Suson, 1996; Major & Crocker, 1993). In such circumstances, it becomes difficult to assess whether outcomes are due to one's personal qualities or to prejudice, and this "attributional ambiguity" can generate mistrust in social relationships (Major & Crocker, 1993). Thus, the threat of misrecognition psychologically hinders disadvantaged citizens so that they are less able to practice democratic citizenship in their everyday lives. Instead of approaching others as equals and with "easy spontaneity," they are forced to distinguish between those who are likely prejudiced and those who are likely not, and this dictates caution and constant monitoring rather than "easy spontaneity," suspicion, and mistrust rather than civility.

But Rosenblum argues that misrecognition need not be debilitating in this fashion. Instead of meeting the threat of misrecognition with distrust and constant monitoring, disadvantaged individuals should simply be "thick skinned," by granting others allowances and not magnifying the significance of slights to their identity (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 353). In effect, people should exercise the "self-discipline to tolerate being misunderstood" (Rosenblum, 1998, p. 353). Aside from the fact that this unfairly places the onus of dealing with stereotyping entirely onto those who are misrecognized, it is also advice that makes no psychological sense. Exercising the

self-discipline necessary to offer a "thick skin" would require conscious monitoring and therefore would be inconsistent with a posture of "easy spontaneity." And in any case, offering a "thick skin" is precisely what the disadvantaged are already doing when they deal with misrecognition by adopting a guarded posture and an attitude of suspicion to protect the self, rather than internalizing the misrecognition or letting it undermine their self-esteem.

Rosenblum (1998) appears to be more concerned with the burden placed on advantaged citizens by a politics of recognition. Here, she is correct in suggesting that the daily interactions of *advantaged* citizens also suffer from the presence of misrecognition in society, though not necessarily in the ways she imagines (Crocker et al., 1998).[4] Specifically, *even* if they are unprejudiced, it is difficult for advantaged citizens to take Rosenblum's (1998, p. 350) "simple" advice and just ignore difference by adopting with little conscious effort a stance of "easy spontaneity." What we do with "easy spontaneity" is to react to cues that signal difference, *not* disregard them, and what we find simple is categorizing people and behaving toward them accordingly, *not* acting indiscriminately. Indeed, cultural stereotypes are activated automatically and often unconsciously, and subsequently can influence behavior without people being aware of it (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, 2000; Schneider, 2004). Even citizens who are only mildly prejudiced find it hard to treat people identically (Crocker et al., 1998; Kinder, 1998). Their ambivalence colors their social interactions and frequently makes them anxious when they encounter disadvantaged citizens (Devine, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998).[5] And their anxiety leads them to act in ways that signal their underlying ambivalence: for example, avoiding eye contact, increasing their social distance, and hesitating in their speech (Devine et al., 1996). Moreover, the threat of being accused of prejudice can exacerbate their anxiety, particularly when interacting with strangers (Crocker et al., 1998).

And there is reason for anxiety. For despite their good intentions and conscious monitoring of their behavior, the unstructured nature of many public interactions leaves too much room for misunderstanding. Consequently, many advantaged citizens will "eventually misstep and enact behavior (verbal or nonverbal) that is or could be interpreted as prejudiced": so comments

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[4] Anxiety arises from the basic demand for tolerance, not as a consequence of any demand for active shows of esteem for the disadvantaged, as Rosenblum suggests.

[5] Even truly unprejudiced citizens sometimes feel anxious because they are unconfident that they have the experience and know-how to act in a way that conveys their true feelings (Devine et al., 1996).

in public discourse appear prejudiced or looks in social interactions are misinterpreted (Crocker, Major, & Steele, p. 540). This can produce guilt, particularly for those who value egalitarianism and a self-image as an unprejudiced citizen (Devine & Monteith, 1993). Over time, their anxiety and the threat of failing to be tolerant can lead advantaged citizens to avoid contact with the disadvantaged, or where that is not possible, to abandon the goal of treating them without prejudice (Crocker et al., 1998).

In sum, misrecognition causes only some of the harms attributed to it by political philosophers. Social psychologists offer no evidence to support the claim that misrecognition damages self-respect. Moreover, contrary to the assertions of political theorists, misrecognition is seldom internalized and only infrequently diminishes self-esteem. Many citizens who are subjected to some stereotyping are able to maintain their own dignity by using a variety of strategies to protect their self-esteem. But defending one's dignity comes at a high price: it limits autonomy, sometimes substantially, and consequently makes authenticity difficult. So misrecognition is harmful. And the *threat* of misrecognition is also destructive for it undermines civility and the capacity of individuals—both advantaged and disadvantaged—to act *as citizens*. Civility requires a stance of mutual trust and positive regard, and thus is unlikely in an atmosphere poisoned by the possibility of misrecognition. Even the more minimal requirements of democratic living outlined by Rosenblum, treating one another equally and with "easy spontaneity," are difficult to meet when misrecognition is prevalent. Her suggestion that citizens deal with misrecognition by just being "thick-skinned" does nothing to ensure that individuals have sufficient autonomy to pursue those ways of life that they deem valuable. Briefly considering the link between misrecognition and discrimination in everyday life makes this apparent.

Misrecognition and Discrimination

Political theorists argue that misrecognition is also harmful because it contributes to discrimination. Discrimination produces its own serious harms by perpetuating the misrecognition of groups, undermining the fairness of the political decision-making process, and contributing to an unfair distribution of material goods (Koppelman, 1996). And all of these reduce to the same fundamental harm to dignity: people are denied equal respect and concern because of their group membership (Gutmann, 1994; Koppelman, 1996).

I want to focus very briefly on discrimination between citizens in their daily interactions and political discourse—the kind of discrimination where misrecognition has its most insidious impact. At the individual level, the translation of misrecognition into interpersonal discrimination will likely depend on both individual and contextual factors (Devine et al., 1996).

Generally, interpersonal discrimination is more likely in relatively unstructured contexts, such as everyday interactions in the public square, where people may rely more heavily on their stereotypes and prejudice to guide their behavior (Crocker et al., 1998; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, & Ferguson, 2001; Swim, Hyers, Cohen, Fitzgerald, & Bylsma, 2003; Swim & Stangor, 1998).

The exercise of democratic citizenship requires easy access to the public spaces of civil society and a voice in the decisions that affect our public lives (Bowman, 1993; Burrington, 1998). Acts of intolerance make the public landscape a hostile environment for some citizens. These acts range from *violence* and *harassment* to *exclusion* and *silencing.* Acts of intolerance may or may not be illegal depending upon the act and the group (e.g., it's illegal to fire a person because of her race, but in many states, it's legal to do so because he is gay). In addition to causing physical harm, hate crimes and harassment alienate and make fearful those under attack. And citizens who are excluded from public places or silenced in public discussions are likely to become resentful and angry. Moreover, intolerant acts are inherently disrespectful because they violate the rights of the targeted citizen.

Beyond acts of intolerance, everyday discrimination in civil society often entails *social rejection* and *incivility*. Social rejection can be episodic, as when a stranger avoids sitting near a disabled person, or chronic, as when students reject their classmate because of her race. Everyday discrimination also takes the form of *incivility* in both speech and nonverbal acts. Like social rejection, incivility is mixed in its emotional content and automaticity, though many acts of incivility might be automatic and thus not be recognized as uncivil by the person committing them. Both social rejection and incivility are fundamentally disrespectful for they prevent acknowledgment of the targeted individual as a person of equal moral worth.

Moreover, just as the *threat* of misrecognition has deleterious effects, so does the mere *threat* of discrimination produce harm. The fear of intolerance forces the disadvantaged to alter their behavior and thereby forsake their rights as equal citizens: some public spaces are avoided and some public acts are not undertaken. Many women who are wary of street harassment, for example, routinely avoid various public places where men go without thinking (Bowman, 1993). Thus, dominant groups can control public spaces, and therefore public life, through occasional intolerant acts and the ever present *threat* of intolerance that is created and maintained by such acts (Burrington, 1998). The harm produced by the threat of intolerance and incivility undermines autonomy and the practice of citizenship in everyday life.

In sum, misrecognition breeds discrimination and incivility in public life. The harm is material—a loss of resources and opportunities. It is psychological—fear and a sense of isolation, the undermining of one's

autonomy, and attacks on one's self-respect and self-esteem. And it is political—the disrespect and denial of one's rights to act as equal citizens in public life. In the past, most of our attention has focused on the political harm of intolerance, those acts of discrimination that deprive us of our rights and produce serious harm. But misrecognition and the "minor" incivilities that populate our everyday lives have just as devastating an effect on the character of our polity.

CONCLUSIONS

Political theorists argue that the demand for recognition is a compelling one that democracies should honor because the harms of misrecognition and discrimination are substantial: they deprive citizens of the respect and esteem essential for human dignity and the practice of democratic citizenship. Social psychological research provides substantial evidence bearing on this argument. It has amply documented the existence of misrecognition—stereotyping and prejudice in psychologists' terms. And it also confirms that misrecognition produces real harm, though it is often the *threat* of stereotyping and prejudice that generates the harm, and not the internalization of stereotypes. Even without civility, many citizens are able to safeguard their self-esteem using a variety of strategies. But these same psychological strategies limit the autonomy and authenticity that liberal states seek to preserve so that citizens can construct ways of life that they value. Moreover, misrecognition also contributes to discrimination. In particular, the incivility of misrecognition discourages citizens from exercising their rights in public life by making public spaces uninviting, social relations unappealing, and mutual trust unavailable. In this way, incivility weakens social capital and undermines the capacity for democratic citizenship. So, the assumptions of Charles Taylor and others that support a politics of recognition rest on firm empirical—as well as moral—ground.

Political theorists are also correct in their assumption that the pursuit of equal dignity often necessitates a politics of identity when demands for recognition are ignored. The politics of recognition draws our attention to the ways in which our identities are inextricably linked to our preferences. Because of this, a "politics of ideas" cannot be separated from a "politics of presence" (see Phillips, 1995). Social psychological research deepens our understanding of how identities and preferences are woven together so as to create a group-oriented perspective on political issues. Brewer (Chapter 7), for example, discusses different patterns of relationships between minority and majority groups at the subgroup and national identity

(or superordinate) group level, thus providing a social psychological perspective on the dynamics of the intergroup contexts in which the politics of recognition typically plays itself out. When our preferences are consciously linked to our identities, they become constitutive of the self; consequently, they are more important and our perspective becomes less individualistic and more group-oriented. So we must speak for ourselves because others cannot replicate *our* group perspective. This means that disadvantaged group members must have their *own voice* in public discourse and debate. And this demand, too, is readily defensible, for deliberative democracy requires that all citizens have the opportunity for a genuine voice in the debate.

So it is essential to take seriously the demands for recognition. Failure to do so undermines deliberative democracy. But on the other hand, meeting the demands for recognition can actually strengthen civil society and contribute to the vitality of deliberation. Where difference is met with respect and open-mindedness, rather than misrecognition and intolerance, it contributes over time to the evolution of mutual trust, which generates social capital. In this regard, strong norms of democratic civility might be particularly important (Conover & Searing, 2000). The psychological trick is to learn to recognize our differences and still see one another as fellow citizens, as members of a common community. It is the common identification as "citizen" that must motivate us consciously to take care—to be polite and respectful—in how we react to the more particular identities that define our differences. To be sure, such norms of democratic civility might be burdensome; they would require us to attend to difference and consciously work to adjust our behavior. But their cost would be worth enduring if they could improve the character of our public life.

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Hate Crimes and Tolerance

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Diverging Ideological Viewpoints on Pathways to More Harmonious Intergroup Relations

Charles M. Judd and Bernadette Park

Social cognition research on social categorization and stereotyping has traditionally assumed that outgroup prejudice follows from stereotyping and the categorization process. Consequently, prejudice reduction strategies typically involve efforts to reduce the salience of category boundaries. Challenging this perspective, this chapter argues that negative outgroup stereotypes ensue from prejudicial outgroup attitudes. The existence of numerous groups (and group differences) is not problematic unless these differences result in competition over scarce resources. This alternative perspective suggests that efforts at eliminating categorization are somewhat misplaced, especially given that categorization is such a fundamental part of social perception and cognition. In addition, it provides space for legitimate claims of ethnic and cultural uniqueness.

INTRODUCTION: SETTING THE CONTEXT FOR OUR RECENT THINKING ON STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE

As social cognition researchers, we have long been interested in the cognitive underpinnings and consequences of group stereotypes. We can define stereotypes as beliefs about the typical attributes of members of a social category. Accordingly, they may include relatively accurate as well as inaccurate beliefs about the group; they may largely consist of negative appraisals of the group, although they need not be exclusively negative; and they may be consensually shared with others, although they need not be (Judd & Park, 1993).

The process of social categorization (i.e., dividing the social world up into distinct groups based on gender, ethnicity, age, religion, and other demographic characteristics) is known to affect the perception of category members in at least two ways (McGarty, 1999; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Target individuals who are members of different categories will be seen as more different from each other given categorization than they would be in the absence of categorization. Secondly, target individuals who are members

of the same category will be judged more similar to each other given categorization than in the absence of categorization.

As the salience or importance of given social categories increases, the magnitude of these two effects seems to increase, thus giving rise to ways to assess the potency or strength of social stereotypes (Park & Judd, 1990). On the one hand, group perceptions vary in how stereotypic they are. More potent stereotypes are those where group members are judged to possess more extremely stereotypic attributes. They would then be seen as more different from other groups. Secondly, group perceptions vary in their level of perceived dispersion. More potent stereotypes are those where group members are seen as all very similar to one another.

Much of our initial work was focused on ingroup versus outgroup differences in the strength of stereotypes. In general, outgroup perceptions are both more stereotypic and less dispersed than ingroup perceptions. We showed that this was the case both in real groups, such as gender-defined groups (Park & Judd, 1990; Park & Rothbart, 1982), and in laboratory-constituted groups (Judd & Park, 1988), where we control the amount of information individuals have at their disposal about members of both their own and the other group.

We explored a variety of reasons for this difference between the strength of ingroup and outgroup stereotypes, including a familiarity-based explanation that Linville and her colleagues (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989) had put forward, arguing that ingroups are seen as more variable and less extreme simply because we typically know of more ingroup than outgroup members. Our demonstration that the ingroup–outgroup differences persisted even when we artificially controlled the amount of information available about ingroup and outgroup members effectively argued against this explanation. And, as a side note, it is precisely for reasons such as this that social psychologists have explored issues of stereotyping and intergroup relations in laboratory settings. Only in such settings is this kind of experimental control possible, to enable us to discriminate among competing theoretical explanations for an effect of real-world interest.

At the same time, we undertook extensive work with groups of African American and white American respondents to examine ingroup–outgroup differences in stereotypes with more representative samples (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995). Here our goal was not to explore some mechanism responsible for differences in stereotypes, as in the previous laboratory work. Rather our goal was to document ingroup–outgroup differences in stereotype strength in the context of groups with a long history of conflict in the United States. To this end, we used probability samples from the student population here at the University of Colorado, and we also collected

survey data from a diverse sample of African American and white American respondents from the city of Cincinnati.

What we found was surprising, given the earlier laboratory work we had conducted. First, in the student samples, we failed to find any evidence of ingroup–outgroup differences in stereotype strength. Rather, African American participants reported stronger stereotypes for both target groups than did white American participants. Additionally, and surprisingly, white American participants actually reported outgroup stereotypes that were somewhat more positive than the stereotypes they reported about their ingroup. This was not the case for the African American participants, whose ingroup stereotypes were more positively valenced, as expected, than their outgroup stereotypes.

In the broader samples, taken from Cincinnati, we found evidence for a very interesting interaction between respondent's age and ethnicity in the strength of target group stereotypes. Among African Americans, younger respondents reported more stereotypic views of both target groups than did older respondents. Among white American respondents, however, this age difference was reversed, with weaker or less extreme stereotypes reported about both target groups by those who were younger.

An easy explanation for the results from the white American participants is that our younger Cincinnati respondents and our student respondents were simply reporting politically correct beliefs about African Americans and their own group. That is, they were misrepresenting their true sentiments, reporting the absence of strong stereotypes when in fact they harbored very stereotypic views, particularly negative ones of the outgroup. Certainly, to some extent, we think that this explanation makes a great deal of sense, particularly given subsequent research that has documented fairly strong implicit negative stereotypes and prejudice of white American students toward ethnic minorities (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

Nevertheless, the pattern of results we observed, particularly among the diverse sample from Cincinnati, led us to develop a subtly different explanation, one that argues that African American and white American youth in our society are being socialized to adopt rather different ideological beliefs about the role of race and ethnicity in our society and about how more harmonious interethnic relations are best accomplished. On the one hand, we argued that young white Americans in our society have largely adopted a "colorblind" ideology, advocating that issues of race and ethnicity in our society are best dealt with if one attempts to treat everyone as valued individuals, emphasizing that "we are all Americans" and that ethnicity and race should not make any differences in how people are treated. To say that

young white Americans have adopted this ideological point of view is, we think, subtly different from saying that they are masking their true racist sentiments. Although at an implicit level, white Americans may still spontaneously react with prejudice to minorities, our point of view is that many of them are actively trying to implement their ideological point of view. They really do attempt, in their everyday interactions, to minimize the role of race and ethnicity and to treat everyone as individuals, rather than as representatives of their ethnic categories.

On the other hand, we argued that African Americans are going in an ideologically very different direction, one that might be characterized as a "multicultural" ideological point of view. They are being increasingly socialized to say that ethnicity *does* matter; that people in our society are treated differently as a function of their race and ethnic background; that minorities need to take pride in their ethnic cultures and heritages, rather than attempting to hide them; and that our society as a whole is richer because of the diversity of cultures that are represented. From their point of view, harmonious ethnic relations ensue only when the various diverse ethnic backgrounds and cultures are recognized and valued by society as a whole.

It seems to us likely that these pronounced differences in ideologies might constitute a potential new source of interethnic conflict, although those who espouse either the colorblind or multicultural ideological points of view do so under the shared conviction that their ultimate goal is more harmonious interethnic relations. On the one hand, young African Americans are likely to see the colorblind ideological approach as one that attempts to deny African Americans their cultural and ethnic identities. They may believe that this ideological point of view is no different from a rather racist and assimilationist viewpoint—one that demands that minority ethnicities in the country conform to the white dominant culture. On the other hand, young white Americans who espouse a colorblind point of view are likely to view skeptically any effort toward maintaining ethnic identities, believing that such efforts ultimately only divide, rather than unite the society.

THE EVOLUTION OF IDEOLOGICAL THOUGHT ON INTERGROUP RELATIONS WITHIN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Social Psychology as a discipline has long defined the general area of intergroup relations as a core problem area. In spite of the discipline taking great pride in the fact that it adopts an empirical approach that attempts to discover scientific truths, it is a fascinating tour to look back and discover the

twists and turns in the ideological assumptions that have colored social psychological work on intergroup relations over the last 70 years. Our understanding of the very divergent ideological positions adopted by young African American and white American participants in our research increased our sensitivity to the dominant ideological perspective on these issues that has permeated recent social-psychological thinking.

If we go back 30 or more years, social psychology originally treated prejudice and interethnic hostility as the core problems that were motivated either by individual or by social circumstances. On the one hand, one dominant point of view took a pronounced individual-difference perspective, arguing that prejudiced individuals manifested such attitudes because of particular patterns of socialization that led them to satisfy their ego needs through the derogation of outgroup members (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). A related point of view was that individuals whose wishes were frustrated by powerful socializing agents would tend to inhibit their aggressive responses toward those agents and displace them onto weak minority targets (Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). On the other hand, more social and contextual points of view suggested that hostile intergroup attitudes and relations emerged from realistic conflicts over the distribution of scarce resources in society (e.g., Levine & Campbell, 1972).

Although these points of view make rather different motivational assumptions, they share the point of view that prejudice, defined as negative sentiments toward outgroups, is the primary problem in intergroup relations. Prejudice arises from either personal or social circumstances and, if prejudice is to be reduced, then these circumstances need to be changed.

Importantly, from the point of view of this early work in intergroup relations by social psychologists (e.g., Allport, 1954; Campbell, 1967; Krech & Crutchfield, 1948), the existence of different groups or cultures in a single society was not the source of problems in intergroup relations, so long as the society was not structured so that the groups conflicted over scarce resources. It seemed to these theorists that differences among groups certainly existed and that social perceivers were expected to be knowledgeable about and sensitive to differences that exist among different cultural groups. Therefore, from the point of view of these theorists, stereotypes (as we have defined them—beliefs about groups that need not be inaccurate nor negative nor consensual) were not problematic. In fact, a reasonable social perceiver was expected to appreciate the differences among groups that populate the social world.

Beliefs about group differences become problematic from this point of view only when they become stereotypic exaggerations in the service of

prejudice (which derives from conflicts of interest and personal motivations). As both Allport (1954) and Campbell (1967) made very clear, it is possible to see nearly every group characteristic in either a positive light or a negative one and prejudice against outgroups functions by providing the negative valence for the stereotypic belief about group differences that may actually exist. So, individuals who part slowly with their money may be called either "frugal" or "cheap." If they are an outgroup with whom there exists a conflict over scarce resources, the resulting prejudice will color the stereotypic belief so that the "cheap" characterization prevails.

Since negative and exaggerated outgroup stereotypes ensue from prejudice or hostile intergroup attitudes, these early theorists argued that attempts to change stereotypes about groups (or to eliminate them altogether) were unlikely to ever be successful. Allport (1954) explicitly states that the purpose of a stereotype about a category "is to justify (rationalize) our conduct in relation to that category" (p. 191). Stereotypes are difficult to change because they derive from the underlying prejudice: "they have the slippery propensity of accommodating themselves somehow to the negative attitude which is much harder to change" (p. 13). Campbell (1967) is even more explicit on this subject, lamenting the fact that "There has grown up in social and educational psychology a literature and teaching practice which says that all stereotypes of group differences are false, and, implicitly, that all groups are on average identical" (p. 823). He goes on to say that remedial efforts devoted to changing group stereotypes, in the hope that prejudices will thereby be reduced, are not only doomed to failure, but worse, they perpetuate the erroneous belief "that the particular group differences cause the hostility . . . that were the actual group differences to exist, discrimination would be justified" (p. 827).

In sum, early thinking in social psychology clearly argued that prejudice or hostile attitudes derived from personal and social motivations. Differences among social categories in our society were thought to be problematic only to the extent that personal and social situations inclined individuals to dislike groups other than their own. Presumably, if those situations ceased to exist, then culturally distinct social groups could live in harmony. Additionally, for these earlier theorists, negative outgroup stereotypes clearly followed from prejudice, rather than such beliefs being in fact the cause of outgroup disliking. Such negative stereotypes were constructed to justify the hostile outgroup attitudes. Accordingly, prejudice reduction efforts that focused on changing outgroup stereotypes were doomed to failure, as they were attacking a consequence of the problem rather than the cause of the problem.

What is remarkable is how little is left of this early argument in current thinking in social psychology about intergroup relations. In the 1970s, social psychology experienced a fundamental shift in thinking, due in part to the cognitive revolution of the 1970s and 1980s. Rather than focusing on prejudice as the core problem, researchers increasingly focused on basic cognitive processes underlying social categorization and the resulting biases. In large part, this shift was due to a series of studies known as the "minimal group" studies, conducted by Tajfel and others (e.g., Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971; for a review, see Brewer, 1979) in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In these studies, individuals were brought into the laboratory and randomly divided into two different groups, supposedly based on some unimportant characteristic (painting preferences or dot estimation strategies). Although they didn't interact with other participants, they were asked to make a series of decisions about how various rewards ought to be distributed to other members of their own group and to members of the other group. Across these studies, participants showed a small but quite consistent bias in the pattern of their reward distributions, favoring ingroup members at the expense of outgroup members.

Social cognition researchers drew the implication from these studies that intergroup hostility and discrimination was an inevitable consequence of the simple tendency to categorize the social world. Once a categorical distinction was imposed, then between-category differences and within-category similarities were accentuated (Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), and if one was a member of one of the categories, then negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination directed toward the outgroup ensued more or less inevitably. As Wilder put it (1981) in making this argument, "Tajfel (1969) has proposed that intergroup bias may be . . . a direct product of the categorization process. He has argued that the mere existence of different social groups is sufficient to foster biased behavior" (p. 228).

The social cognition perspective has spent much of the last 30 years accumulating evidence about the consequences of categorization for the development of stereotypes, particularly negative ones about outgroup categories. Although we will not extensively review this literature, a few examples of this empirical work are particularly instructive.

Hamilton (1981; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976) argued that negative outgroup stereotypes could result simply from the particular distinctiveness of outgroup members and negative behaviors or attributes. This phenomenon, known as the distinctiveness-based illusory correlation, seemed to provide a ready explanation for why we come to associate negative attributes (which are relatively rare and distinctive) with outgroup members (who are also presumed to be relatively rare and therefore distinctive).

Once formed, negative outgroup stereotypes seem to take on a life of their own. They are used to interpret ambiguous information about a group so that it is evaluatively consistent with the preexisting set of valenced beliefs (Darley & Gross, 1983; Sagar & Schofield, 1980). They guide how behavioral information about group members is attributed, with negative outgroup behaviors attributed dispositionally and negative ingroup behaviors attributed situationally (Pettigrew, 1979). And they become self-fulfilling prophecies (Snyder, Tanke, & Berscheid, 1977), guiding hypothesis testing and information retrieval in a manner that is stereotype confirming (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978).

This emphasis on categorization and the negative outgroup stereotypes that seemed to ensue from mere categorization tended to redefine prejudice as a product of those negative stereotypes, rather than seeing stereotypes as a rationalizing consequence of prejudice. Thus, consistent with other models of attitudes in the social cognition literature (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), prejudice became redefined as the overall valence of the stereotypic content associated with a group (see Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). The tendency was thus to see prejudice as a consequence of valenced stereotypes, rather than as their cause.

Not surprisingly, given this emphasis on categorization and its apparent consequences for intergroup bias, much of the research on prejudice reduction in recent years has concentrated on strategies to overcome or eradicate category distinctions. In other words, the theoretical assumption that categorization was sufficient to lead to intergroup bias caused researchers to focus on decategorization as the primary mechanism for prejudice reduction. Thus, Brewer and Miller (1984; Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1991) argued that contact with individual members of a disliked outgroup reduces prejudice toward that group only if the contact is highly personalized, whereby the outgroup members are treated as individuals, rather than as representatives of their group. Only then, the argument goes, will the categorical distinctions between the perceiver and the outgroup members break down, resulting in a lessening of the categorical distinctions, a decrease in the strength of the stereotypic discrimination between the outgroup and the ingroup, and a breakdown in the resulting prejudice. In a similar vein, the other major process whereby prejudice is thought to be reduced within the social cognition literature relies on the utility of superordinate categories (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993) whereby perceivers recategorize ingroup and outgroup members as all members of some larger, common superordinate category, in essence, reducing the utility of the former categorical distinction by concentrating on the fact that "we are all Americans."

In addition to these two approaches to prejudice reduction that rely on decategorization, there is a very lively literature in the social cognition tradition on stereotype change, exploring the conditions under which exposure to counterstereotypic information about an outgroup will lead to a weakening of the group stereotype (Rothbart & John, 1985; Weber & Crocker, 1983). An implication of this work on stereotype change seems to be the implicit belief in the social cognition literature that beliefs about group differences (i.e., stereotypes) are necessarily erroneous and misleading, that they are a causal factor in the development of hostile intergroup relations, and that getting rid of them will somehow eliminate prejudice. Clearly this point of view is at odds with the earlier arguments of Allport (1954) and Campbell (1967).

From our perspective, recent work in intergroup relations from the social cognition point of view has implicitly adopted the "colorblind" ideological point of view that our earlier work (Judd et al., 1995) documented as the prevailing viewpoint of young white Americans in our society. While we certainly would argue that many interesting consequences of social categorization have been documented by social cognition researchers (e.g., McGarty, 1999), it nevertheless seems to us that sweeping conclusions about the role of categorization as a sufficient cause of prejudice and, accordingly, the belief that decategorization and stereotype change are the best routes to prejudice reduction have been led more by prevailing ideological inclinations than by extensive empirical literature.

In fact, outside of the minimal group studies that we have already mentioned, there is little supporting evidence to suggest that as category distinctions become more potent or salient, there is a necessary increase in outgroup hostility from members of those social categories. And even in the minimal group studies, it appears that outgroup discrimination in the face of minimal group assignments occurs only in some particular circumstances: when making positive discriminations rather than when distributing negative outcomes (Mummendey et al., 1992); only when the experimenter has implied that the members of the different minimal groups share common fates (Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969); and only under conditions where responses are anonymous and future interactions unanticipated (Diehl, 1990). Thus, outgroup discrimination following from mere categorization occurs only in some very special circumstances that are unlikely to be realized in actual intergroup encounters.

Admittedly, there is some correlational literature that has shown a relationship between the strength of prejudice (or hostile outgroup attitudes) and the strength of outgroup stereotypes (e.g., Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997; Walker & Antaki, 1986). But such correlations, of course, are perfectly consistent with the argument that prejudice causes one to create

justifying outgroup stereotypes, as well as with the social cognition assumption that stronger intergroup differentiation leads to intergroup bias. Additionally, there are numerous studies in which no such correlation has been observed (e.g., Biernat & Vescio, 1993; Judd et al., 1995; Taylor & Falcone, 1982).

In sum, we would like to suggest that social psychological work for the past 30 years has been dominated by the "colorblind" ideological point of view that we observed in our survey work (Judd et al., 1995) among white American respondents. And, although this point of view has yielded provocative insights about social categorization and the functioning of social stereotypes, it has rested upon ideological assumptions about the factors that give rise to prejudice that do not seem to be empirically well supported.

TOWARD A MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: PREJUDICE REDUCTION IN THE FACE OF CATEGORY DIFFERENTIATION

There is no doubt that reductions in prejudice and outgroup discrimination can be accomplished through the elimination of social category boundaries. After all, if the ingroup–outgroup distinction ceases to exist, then outgroup discrimination along that dimension is undefined. However, as a general strategy toward the improvement of intergroup relations in a very diverse world, we think that the decategorization approach is both infeasible and undesirable, for a number of reasons. First, as the cognitive literature has made clear, humans are spontaneous categorizers. Categories are useful cognitive tools that enable us as perceivers to simplify, integrate, and organize our perceptual world. This is true about all sorts of categories, including those that are used to categorize people and form the basis of group stereotypes. It is implausible that when it comes to these social categories, perceivers could be taught to avoid their usage. Second, it is important to underline an argument made by Campbell in his classic 1967 paper and repeated in some of our later work (Judd & Park, 1993): Social categories do differ and they are diagnostic. To pretend that they are useless, that members of diverse social groupings are indistinguishable, is to ignore the diversity of cultures and histories that makes our world a fascinating place. From an anthropological point of view, to argue that there are not real and meaningful group differences is simply naïve. Finally, as our African American respondents have made clear, it is ultimately discriminatory to deny minority members of our society the right to assert their identities as distinct and valuable ethnic cultures. To argue that ethnic boundaries are irrelevant, that

ethnic category distinctions should not be discussed, is to suggest that the unique perspectives and cultural histories of different ethnic groups in our society are worthless.

It is for all of these reasons that we undertook a series of studies to examine whether we could design an intervention that would lead to reductions in ethnocentrism and outgroup prejudice even while maintaining the value of ethnic group categorizations and the utility of such categorical distinctions (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Naturally, we labeled this intervention a multicultural one, contrasting it with a colorblind intervention.

In these studies, white participants reported to the laboratory and were told that the study they were about to participate in focused on issues of ethnic relations in the United States. They were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions: the multicultural one, the colorblind one, or a control, no instruction condition. In the first two of these, participants read a short essay about ethnic relations in the United States. This essay was presented to participants as a summary of the consensual wisdom of leading experts in the United States on the issue of race and ethnic relations in the country. These experts were described as including leading sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists, and other experts in public policy domains. Participants were further told that interethnic issues were very important and that steps needed to be taken to resolve interethnic conflicts, both existing ones and ones that might occur in the future.

At this point, the two essays diverged in the content of what was described as the consensual wisdom of the experts concerning how interethnic conflict could be reduced. In the colorblind condition, it was suggested that intergroup harmony could be best achieved if we recognized that we are all individuals who are created equal, regardless of our ethnic background, that at our core we are all the same, and that we should respect each other as individuals and fellow Americans. In the multicultural condition, it was suggested that intergroup harmony could be best achieved if we better appreciate our diversity as a nation and accepted and valued that diversity, accepting each group's positive and negative qualities.

After they had read through these essays twice, participants in the colorblind and multicultural conditions were asked to write a short essay of their own explaining why they felt that either the colorblind or the multicultural point of view was useful and important for society. Perhaps unsurprisingly, all participants were able to do this and in fact a perusal of what participants wrote indicated that the ideological point of view that had been attributed to the experts was readily endorsed by all participants, regardless of which point of view they had been given.

At this point, participants in the first study completed a questionnaire that included two tasks. The first of these asked participants to estimate the percentage of African Americans and white Americans who possessed each of 56 different traits, with the order of the two groups counterbalanced. These traits differed in whether they were positively or negatively valenced and in whether they were generally seen as stereotypic of African Americans or stereotypic of white Americans (as determined by prior research). Presented in Table 9.1 are examples of each of these four kinds of traits. The second task that participants complete consisted of a warmth thermometer task, in which they rated how warmly they felt (on a 100-point scale) toward various groups, including African Americans and white Americans.

The ratings of each group from the percentage estimation task can be examined in two ways. First, one can look at the extent to which a group is given higher percentages on positively valenced traits than on negatively valenced ones, regardless of whether the trait is a stereotypic one (or a counterstereotypic one) for the target group that is being rated. This difference, as a function of trait valence, is an indicator of the extent to which the group is positively regarded, similar to the measure that derives from the thermometer warmth rating task of the group.

Second, one can compute the degree to which the group is seen stereotypically, by computing the differences in percentage estimates given on traits that are stereotypic of the group compared to the percentage estimates given on traits that are counterstereotypic. This measure indicates the degree to which the group is differentiated from another context group, collapsing

Table 9.1 Stereotypic Traits Used in Percentage Estimation Task

POSITIVELY VALENCED	NEGATIVELY VALENCED
Black stereotypic (White counterstereotypic)	
Streetwise	Poor
Playful	Superstitious
Sensitive	Lazy
Humorous	Dishonest
Religious	Threatening
White stereotypic (Black counterstereotypic)	
Organized	Boring
Wealthy	Materialistic
Independent	Conventional
Ambitious	Selfish
Educated	Stuffy

across whether that differentiation is along positively valenced or negatively valenced attribute dimensions.

What we found in this first study, as expected, was that participants in both the colorblind and multicultural conditions reported more favorable evaluations of the outgroup (i.e., African Americans), on both the percentage estimation and thermometer tasks, than participants in the control condition. Thus, both ideological manipulations increased reported positive regard for the outgroup. On the stereotypicality measure, however, computed from the percentage estimates, the multicultural participants evidenced more stereotypic views of the outgroup than participants in both the colorblind and control conditions. In other words, they were more willing than control or colorblind participants to indicate that African Americans as a group differed from white Americans, along both positively and negatively valenced attribute dimensions. This combination of results supports our contention that increasingly positive regard for outgroups is not incompatible with the recognition that outgroups are different from the ingroup, in both positively and negatively valenced ways.

In the second study reported by Wolsko et al. (2000), we omitted the control condition, just comparing the colorblind and multicultural conditions, and examined, in addition to the percentage estimation and thermometer tasks, judgments of African Americans and white Americans on various demographic dimensions for which we knew the actual demographic statistics for these two groups. For instance, we asked participants about the percentage of members of each group that were unemployed. We asked what percentage of households in each group earned more than $50,000 per year. We asked what the average SAT math score was for each group. We asked what percentage of each group smoked cigarettes on a regular basis. We asked what percentage of adults in each group were divorced. We asked what percentage of each group said that they had attended a religious service at least once in the past seven days. These were all attribute dimensions along which we were able to ascertain the actual percentages of each group, based either on U.S. Census data or on survey responses from national probability samples. Because we knew these actual percentages, we were able to examine whether our participants correctly reported the ethnic group differences that actually did exist on these attribute dimensions. In other words, we could assess the accuracy with which they differentiated between the two groups.

The final measure that participants in this second study completed was one in which we asked them to rank order various values that one might espouse in terms of their personal importance to the participant. These values were taken from the list compiled by Rokeach (1973) and his

rank-ordering procedure was utilized. Additionally, after participants had personally ordered these values, they were asked to do it twice more, once as they thought the average white American would do it and once as they thought the average African American would do it.

Results on the demographic questions indicated that all participants differentiated between the two groups on the various dimensions less than in fact the groups actually differed on those dimensions. In other words, all participants underestimated the actual differences between the two ethnic groups in our society on these dimensions. However, those participants who had been given the multicultural ideological orientation showed significantly less of an underestimation of these actual differences than did those given the colorblind ideological orientation. Thus, while the results of the first study suggest that multicultural participants differentiated more between the two groups on both positively and negatively valenced attribute dimensions than colorblind participants, the results from this study suggested that this greater differentiation was in the direction of increased accuracy of judgment of the actual differences between the two groups.

Turning to the value sort task, once again multicultural participants reported greater differences in the rank ordering of values they attributed to the two groups. Interestingly, they also reported greater differences between their own preferred ordering and those they attributed to either white or African Americans. In other words, participants given a colorblind ideological orientation saw greater similarity between their own values, the values of whites in our society, and the values of African Americans, compared to participants given the multicultural point of view.

These two studies thus suggest that participants given either ideological point of view, the colorblind and the multicultural, show less intergroup bias and less outgroup prejudice than do control participants who are given neither ideological point of view. On the other hand, multicultural participants, compared to colorblind ones, actually show stronger group stereotypes (on both positively and negatively valenced attribute dimensions), their views about the group differences are more accurate, and they see the groups (and themselves) as endorsing rather different value orientations.

Our third study examined whether these different ideological points of view would affect not only group perceptions but also perceptions of individual group members. Once again, participants were given one of the two ideological viewpoints, using the same manipulation as in the previous studies. Following this, they completed a behavioral prediction task, modeled after one developed originally by Locksley and colleagues (Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, & Hepburn, 1980; see also Beckett & Park, 1995). Specifically, they were told that we were interested in how well they could predict

the behavior of individuals in a situation, knowing how those individuals had performed in other similar situations. Half of the participants were told that they would have to predict whether an individual would take a job close to home, in line with the wishes of his family, or one further away that offered a higher salary (family-oriented vs. selfish). The other half of the participants were told that they would have to predict whether an individual would decide to attend college as opposed to getting a job immediately after high school (ambitious vs. not ambitious). Half of the target individuals for whom these predictions were to be made were Latino males (described by first name and photograph), the other half were white. Note that for the first decision scenario, the more positively valenced choice (family-oriented) was the choice that might be considered more stereotypic of Latinos, while in the second scenario, the more positively valenced choice (ambitious) might be considered to be counterstereotypic of Latinos.

Each participant made behavioral predictions for 24 target individuals, knowing the decisions that these individuals had made in four other decision scenarios. These four other scenarios were all related to the last one in which the choice had to be predicted, in that they involved choices either between the family and self or between ambituous and unambitious goals (depending on the final scenario). Target individuals varied in the choices they were said to have made in these four other scenarios.

We were interested in the extent to which participants used the diagnostic individuating information about the previous decisions of the target individuals in making their predictions as well as differences in the predicted decisions as a function of target ethnicity. To estimate these effects, we computed within-participant regressions across the 24 target individuals. The criterion in these regressions was the behavioral choice that the participant said each target would make in the fifth scenario. The predictor variables were the targets' decisions in the prior four scenarios and the targets' ethnicities. To the extent that individuating information is used, slopes for the prior decision scenarios should be large, whereas the use of ethnicity

Table 9.2 Mean Regression Weights for Ethnicity and Individuating Information

	ETHNICITY		INDIVIDUATING INFORMATION	
	POSITIVE	*NEGATIVE*	*POSITIVE*	*NEGATIVE*
Colorblind	−.002	.002	.102*	.077*
Multicultural	.025*	.022*	.092*	.092*

*Mean differs significantly from zero, $p < .001$

information should be indicated by the magnitude of its slope. The mean values for these slopes are given in Table 9.2. These are broken down by whether the slopes are for target ethnicity or the individuating information and whether they come from the scenario where the Latino stereotypic decision is the positively valenced one (family oriented) or the negatively valenced one (unambitious).

Interestingly, the slopes for target ethnicity did not differ from zero among participants in the colorblind condition, either in the condition where the Latino stereotypic choice was the more positively valenced one or in the condition where it was the more negatively valenced one. On the other hand, participants who had been given the multicultural ideological perspective used target ethnicity in both sorts of decision scenarios, and the extent to which they used it did not vary as a function of whether the Latino stereotypic decision was the positively or negatively valenced one. Thus, consistent with the conclusions from the group-level judgments of the previous two studies, these results suggest that individuals who endorse a multicultural point of view are willing to use the ethnicity of a target individual in making judgments about that person, both in situations where that cue might lead to more negative judgments and, importantly, when that cue results in more favorable judgments. Individuals who endorse a colorblind point of view, somewhat inappropriately, avoid using the ethnicity cue in either context.

One possible worry about the use of ethnicity cues in these sorts of interpersonal judgment tasks is that participants who endorse the multicultural point of view might inappropriately fail to use the diagnostic individuating information. In fact this was not the case. Participants in both conditions were very sensitive to the prior decisions made by all target individuals in predicting their decisions in the fifth scenario. And this was as true for the multicultural participants as it was for those in the colorblind condition. In other words, while the multicultural participants regarded ethnicity as an appropriately useful cue in making these judgments, it did not mean that they placed less weight on individuating characteristics of the target individuals. They simply used more information in total.

We believe that these studies nicely illustrate the consequences of both the colorblind and the multicultural point of view in dealing with ethnic interrelations. On the one hand, both ideological perspectives are associated with more positive evaluations of outgroup ethnicities, compared with the control condition. But the colorblind point of view does so by negating the value and diagnositicity of ethnicity, leading participants to underutilize it as a cue in making individual judgments and to inaccurately underestimate the actual differences that exist in our society as a function of ethnicity. On

the other hand, while positively valuing outgroups, those with a multicultural point of view more appropriately recognize the differences that exist between the various ethnic groups in our society and also are more willing to use ethnicity as a valid cue, both when it leads to more positive judgments about outgroup individuals and when it leads to more negative ones.

It is important, of course, to recognize that the manipulations we have used in these studies are of a very particular sort, in that they both share the common denominator of encouraging participants to evaluate individuals positively, regardless of their ethnic group memberships. In the multicultural manipulation, we are *not* suggesting that participants simply pay attention to ethnic category membership. Rather, we are suggesting that the existence of diverse ethnic categories in our society produces a positive net benefit for the society as a whole. Thus, while we are making category differences salient, we are doing so in the context of more positive outgroup regard. We are not simply saying "use your stereotypes"; rather we are saying, "there are important ethnic group differences and these need to be positively valued." We would not want our multicultural ideological manipulation confused with one that simply encouraged individuals to stereotype, based on the negative outgroup stereotypes which they certainly already possess. Group differences are important to recognize so long as the value that accrues from diversity is a positive one.

CONCLUSION

The social cognition perspective in social psychology has made great strides in identifying many of the cognitive dynamics that follow from social categorization. A guiding assumption in much of this work has been that stereotypes, defined as beliefs about group differences, are necessarily problematic and that intergroup evaluative bias (i.e., outgroup prejudice) follows from the negative outgroup stereotypes that result from categorization processes. This perspective has largely taken it for granted that outgroup hostility is an inevitable consequence of social categorization. Accordingly, the dominant perspectives on prejudice reduction have emphasized strategies to reduce the salience of category boundaries, either focusing on treating others as individuals rather than as seeing them as category members or focusing on superordinate categories that can serve to break down ethnic category boundaries.

We have argued that this perspective is somewhat at odds both with older work in social psychology on the causes and consequences of prejudice as well as with the ideological predilections of many minority group

members in our society. Consistent with the writing of Allport (1954) and Campbell (1967), we have argued that categorization and stereotypes per se are not the cause of interethnic hostilities. Rather, negative outgroup stereotypes ensue from prejudicial outgroup attitudes. Therefore, efforts to reduce prejudice which focus on changing negative outgroup stereotypes are doomed to failure, since those stereotypes are a consequence rather than a cause of outgroup hostility. Additionally, it seems to us that processes of categorization are fundamental to social perception and that it is somewhat naïve to think that one might be effectively trained not to use ethnic categories when categorization serves such valuable purposes in other domains. Finally and importantly, such a perspective ignores the legitimate claims that minority group members make about the value of their unique ethnic and cultural heritages. To pretend that ethnic category boundaries are not meaningful is, from their point of view, equivalent to an assimilationist perspective that says that only the dominant American culture can exist within our society.

Because of all of these reasons, it seems extremely important that social psychologists begin to think about alternative models for prejudice reduction, models which allow social perceivers to utilize and value the diverse ethnic categories that exist in our society. Our intention in the research that we summarized in the last section of this chapter was to outline a relatively simple intervention that might accomplish these aims. Although we are far from confident that the ideological intervention we evaluated would have long-term, lasting effects, our results suggest that in fact more fully developed programs for prejudice reduction could be designed that accomplish more harmonious intergroup relations while acknowledging and valuing the diverse cultural and historical traditions that exist in our society.

The cultural and ethnic boundaries that exist in our society are not simply going to disappear. What we need to do is to learn how to accomplish more harmonious intergroup relations in their presence, rather than pretending they do not exist. That seems to us to be a worthy agenda for social psychology in the coming years.

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Tolerance and the Contact Hypothesis: A Field Experiment

Donald P. Green and Janelle S. Wong

The contact hypothesis predicts that racial prejudice diminishes when whites and nonwhites interact in a setting that fosters cooperation among people of equal status. This hypothesis has seldom, if ever, been tested using randomized experimentation outside the laboratory. This chapter reports the results of a randomized field experiment, in which non-Hispanic white students were randomly assigned to 2- and 3-week Outward Bound wilderness courses. In the control group, all the students in each course were non-Hispanic whites. In the treatment group, most of the students were non-Hispanic whites, but at least three of the participants were African Americans or Latinos. One month after completing the course, the white participants were interviewed by telephone. Consistent with the contact hypothesis, the group that experienced a racially heterogeneous environment expressed greater levels of tolerance than the control group. Although these findings require replication, the research design provides a template for future field experiments examining the validity of the contact hypothesis.

In his seminal work, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Gordon Allport (1954, p. 255) formulated what was later termed the contact hypothesis: "Contact that brings knowledge and acquaintance is likely to engender sounder beliefs concerning minority groups, and for this reason contribute to the reduction of prejudice." By puncturing false stereotypes and drawing attention to individual characteristics rather than group generalizations, contact was thought to ameliorate hostility. But Allport recognized early on that the lessons learned from intergroup contact hinged on the *quality* of these interactions. "Prejudice," he argued, "may be reduced by equal status contact between majority and minority groups in the pursuit of common goals. The effect is greatly enhanced if this contact is sanctioned by institutional supports (i.e., by law, custom, or local atmosphere)" (p. 267).

Subsequent researchers have devoted a great deal of attention to interracial contact and the conditions under which it affects group attitudes (Brewer & Miller, 1988; Desforges et al., 1991; Jackman & Crane, 1986; Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp,

2006; Powers & Ellison, 1995; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961; Sigelman & Welch, 1993). In response to Allport's hypothesis that prejudice diminishes when groups meet under conditions of equal status, scholars have pointed out that what characterizes an equal-status condition is unclear (Hubbard, 1999; Pettigrew, 1998). Furthermore, the proviso that the targets of prejudice enjoy equal status with those who harbor negative perceptions severely narrows the set of real-world circumstances under which contact might be expected to ameliorate prejudice. If prejudice emanates from a sense of where groups are located in a status hierarchy (Blumer, 1958) and if that sense is reinforced by marked differences in the socio-economic attributes of these groups, equal-status contact rarely, if ever, occurs. On the other hand, as the Allport quotation above suggests, equality has several facets, among them being equal treatment by institutional rules and equal access to an organization or activity. Whether contact under these less stringent conceptions of equality diffuses prejudice is an empirical question.

In addition to testing the original hypothesis and its associated cognitive aspects, researchers have extended the theory by focusing on the central role of affect in intergroup relations (Pettigrew, 1997, 1998). Recent studies, for example, have posited that contact situations are likely to produce more positive results when opportunities for friendship are available (Pettigrew, 1998; van Laar, Levin, Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2005). Contemporary scholarship on contact theory considers the role of close relationships, such as knowledge that an ingroup member is friends with an outgroup member, and emphasizes the link between exposure and "liking" (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000, 2006, p. 767; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997).

Even with these refinements, the effectiveness of intergroup contact remains controversial. For example, Jackman and Crane (1986) contend that contact affects only a limited range of racial attitudes held by whites and that positive effects heavily depend on equal-status conditions that are difficult to obtain in the real world. However, most studies, especially those that examine at least one of the conditions specified in the original theory, have found an inverse relationship between intergroup contact and prejudice (Desforges et al., 1991; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Powers & Ellison, 1995; Sigelman & Welch, 1993; for a more skeptical point of view, see Hurwitz & Peffley, Chapter 11). In their review of over 500 studies of intergroup contact, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) report that contact alone often promotes tolerance between groups and that under Allport's optimal conditions the effects of contact appear even more pronounced. The value of the hypothesis for understanding contemporary group relations is thus the subject of continuing research and debate (Brewer & Miller, 1984, 1988; Dixon, 2001; Jackman & Crane, 1986; Sigelman & Welch, 1993).

Underlying much of this debate is a methodological challenge having to do with the causal direction of the relationship between contact and prejudice reduction (Allport, 1954; Jackman & Crane, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998; Powers & Ellison, 1995; Smith, 1994; Sigelman & Welch, 1993). The correlation between intergroup contact and tolerance may be interpreted in two very different ways. Contact may produce tolerance, as Allport suggests. Alternatively, more tolerant people may seek out intergroup contact. Does intergroup contact lead to less prejudice, or are those who are less prejudiced more likely to seek out situations that bring them into contact with other groups?

Previous research has grappled with the causality problem in a variety of ways. Some research use statistical methods to correct for possible self-selection (Oliver & Wong, 2003; Pettigrew, 1997; Powers & Ellison, 1995). Others track individuals over time (Levin, van Laar, & Sidanius, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998) or examine situations such as military quarters in which individuals have little or no control over their social environment (e.g., Brophy, 1946). The most commonly used methodology is laboratory experimentation, in which intergroup contact is assigned on a random basis (Brewer & Miller, 1988; Cook, 1984). Psychologists such as Charles Judd and Bernadette Park (Chaper 9) utilize laboratory experiments to shed light on nuanced causal questions. Many laboratory studies, however, tend to be rather contrived. For example, the groups into which subjects in the Brewer and Miller (1988) essay were sorted comprised those who either underestimated or overestimated the number of dots on a chart, and the focus of the study is on how different reward systems affect ingroup bias against other dot-estimation groups. In light of these limitations, researchers such as Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley (Chapter 11) encourage those interested in tolerance and stereotypes to adopt methods that allow for greater external validity and generalizability.

This study uses one such method, field experimentation, in which random assignment occurs in a real-world setting. Field experiments conducted outside of the laboratory setting that test the effects of contact on prejudice are rare (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). One notable exception are studies that assess the effects of random roommate assignment among first-year college students on intergroup attitudes (Boisjoly, Duncan, Kremer, Levy, & Eccles, 2006; McClelland & Linnander, 2006; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2006; van Laar et al., 2005). The term "field experimentation," which originates from agricultural research, is especially appropriate in this instance, for subjects in our study were teenage students in 2- and 3-week Outward Bound wilderness programs. Outward Bound programs are physically demanding treks into the rugged terrain. The courses combine hiking and camping with

instruction on how to survive in the wild and on exercises designed to build trust and cooperation among the students. Instructors often push students to the point of exhaustion in an effort to build self-confidence and a sense of achievement. At the same time, the courses encourage participants to engage in self-reflection, keep diaries, and rethink the values by which they live their lives back home.

The essential feature of a field experiment is random assignment to treatment and control groups. In this study, some students were randomly assigned to a control group in which all the participants in each ten-student crew were white. Other students were assigned to integrated crews in which at least three of the participants were non-white. A few weeks after their return, the students in each treatment condition were interviewed by phone.

The dependent variable in our study draws on Fredrickson's (1980) historical discussion of prejudice and intolerance, and the desire to preserve hierarchies that place minorities in a subordinate position.[1] This construct is similar in spirit to Allport's conception of prejudice in that it involves negative orientations toward outgroups. But whereas research on the contact hypothesis often focuses on stereotypes, or beliefs about the attributes of outgroups, our focus here is on the impulse to shun or exclude outgroups. This impulse, which may arise from negative stereotypes, is more directly connected to social and political outcomes such as hate crime (Green, Abelson, & Garnett, 1999), support for extremist candidates (Billiet & DeWitte, 1995), and discrimination (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). Both previous (Reich & Purbhoo, 1975) and more recent studies have tested the effect of intergroup contact on an expanded set of attitudes having to do with tolerance or acceptance of outgroups (cf. Glaser, 1994; Lee, Farrell, & Link, 2004; Sigelman & Welch, 1993) rather than more traditional racial stereotype measures. In some respects, this study puts the contact hypothesis to a harder test than would be the case if the dependent variables were stereotypes. Yet, consistent with the contact hypothesis, the group that experienced a racially heterogeneous environment expressed greater levels of tolerance than the control group.

TESTING THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS WITH A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Subjects. During the summer of 2000, Outward Bound conducted a randomized field study through one of it regional schools, located in North Carolina.

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[1] By contrast, other studies (e.g., Aronson & Gonzalez, 1988; Desforges et al., 1991; Scarberry, Ratcliff, Lord, Lanicek, & Desforges, 1997) have focused on the extent to which subjects form friendship ties with individuals from other social groups.

Students enrolled in wilderness courses that involved a physically rigorous camping expedition through rugged terrain. Extensive research on Outward Bound by other researchers has demonstrated repeatedly that these wilderness courses leave a psychological imprint on their participants. Not only do such courses convey information about survival in the wilderness, they also increase participants' self-esteem and confidence (Hattie, Marsh, Neill, & Richards, 1997). Because the courses place great emphasis on cooperation in a context in which participants were together battling harsh conditions, they seem to provide an excellent opportunity to study the effects of intergroup contact under circumstances where people from different groups pursue collective goals.

The racial composition of each course was varied at random. In some courses, each of the participants (including the instructor) were white, while in the others, seven participants were white but at least three of the ten participants were African Americans or, in a few cases, African Americans and Latinos. Since, under ordinary circumstances, few of the participants in wilderness courses were African Americans or Latinos, these students were recruited for the course by community outreach campaigns, some of which involved 1- and 2-day Outward Bound excursions coordinated through local schools. The white students, who tended to come from middle-class communities, paid tuition of approximately $2,000 to participate in the course.

The class differences between the white students and the minority scholarship students are evident from the neighborhoods from which they are drawn. Using the addresses of the white subjects ($n = 54$), we located their census tracts and examined the median household income (as of 1989) and racial composition within each tract. The median white student came from a census tract that was 93 percent white and had a median household income of $46,000. These figures contrast markedly with comparable numbers for minority scholarship recipients. The median minority student resided in a census tract that was 30 percent white and had a median household income of just $19,000.

Randomization procedure. At the base camp of each wilderness area, students are assigned to different crews of ten students, each of which has its own instructor. Ordinarily, instructors determine the composition of each crew, trying to create a blend of different backgrounds and personalities. For purposes of our experiment, however, the assignment of the first seven students was done prior to randomization, so that instructors would not know whether the remaining three students would be white or non-white

(African American or Latino) students, which was determined by a coin flip.[2]

Block design. One limitation of the present study is that some wilderness sites had only one course. Thus, it was not always possible to compare randomly assigned courses leaving from the same site. We focus here at the sites from which at least two courses departed, one racially integrated and another all-white. By comparing students in the homogeneous and heterogeneous versions of a given course leaving from a given location, we hold constant the tastes of the participants, which might have led them to choose a particular wilderness location or date of departure.

Students in each experimental condition were called between September 5 and 13, which was at least 3 weeks after the end of each course. Interviews were conducted with 144 of 174 white participants, for an 83 percent response rate. Of the completed interviews, only 54 respondents attended courses in sites that had both homogeneous and heterogeneous sessions. These students are the focus of the analysis presented here.

Table 10.1 presents some descriptive statistics on the composition of these students. The treatment and control groups are compared in terms of age, sex, the self-reported frequency with which they watch television each day, what their educational goals are for the years ahead, and the frequency with which they attend religious services. As one would expect based on random assignment, none of these variables bears a significant relationship to the experimental treatment ($p > .10$, two-tailed test). Nevertheless, the treatment group does seem to be somewhat more female and college-oriented. Thus, in the analysis to follow, we examine whether the relationship between the experimental treatment and the outcome variable is altered when we control for these background characteristics.

Although we did not observe the courses directly, we may get a feel for the experience by examining responses to open-ended survey questions.

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[2] In a pilot study conducted in 1997, this experiment went awry at the randomization stage. Instructors first assigned the minority students to one of the crews and then filled the remainder of the crews in order to achieve what they regarded as balance among students' socio-demographic characteristics. Thus, the composition of the crew was to some unknown extent endogenous, rendering the experimental results uninterpretable. For example, if more affluent white students were paired with African Americans, the effects of group heterogeneity would be confounded by selection bias. The survey and scales used here are otherwise identical to the first study.

Table 10.1 Characteristics of Students, by Experimental Group

	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS COURSES (%)	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS COURSES (%)
Age		
14	14	23
15	25	23
16	36	23
17	25	31
Sex		
Female	29	46
Male	71	54
Educational Intentions		
Four year college	68	86
Junior college, trade school	11	0
Work or military	11	0
Other or Don't Know	11	11
Amount of TV Viewing		
Less than 1 hour	43	62
1–2 hours	36	23
3+ hours	14	12
Don't Know	7	4
Frequency of Religious Attendance		
More than once per week	7	15
Once per week	21	35
Two or three times per month	11	8
Once per month	25	12
Several times per year or less	14	15
Never	21	15
Number of observations	28	26

Note: Some totals do not add to 100 percent due to rounding error. None of the relationships in this table are statistically significant at the 5 percent level using a chi-square test.

At the outset of the survey, students were asked what they liked and disliked about their wilderness course. After each reply, they were prompted to think if there was "anything else?" until they had nothing else to add. As Table 10.2 indicates, the courses were evaluated favorably. All of the respondents mentioned something that they liked, and one-fourth claimed there was "nothing" that they disliked.

As befits a program that focuses on teaching students to thrive in the wilderness, cooperate, and forego creature comforts, many of the most commonly mentioned "likes" had to do with personal growth, the acquisition of new skills, and the enjoyment of outdoor activities such as rock climbing.

Table 10.2 Responses to Open-Ended Questions Concerning Likes or Dislikes about Course

	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS COURSES (%)	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY MIXED COURSES (%)
Likes		
Personal growth/new skills/new challenges	32	23
Adventure/outdoor activities/natural beauty	32	15
Making friends/meeting people	43	38
Getting along with different people/developing teamwork	14	19
Supportive people/discussions	7	4
Nonspecific good time, being in a group	0	15
Dislikes		
Nothing	25	27
Getting lost/tired/wet/dirty/cold/homesick	43	38
Activities went too fast/not enough fun activity	7	0
Stress/felt unsafe/worried about getting lost	7	8
Whining/shirking among others	4	4
Food/cleanup chores	11	4
Arguments/conflict within group	4	12
Number of observations	28	26

Note: Totals do not add to 100 percent due to multiple responses to each question.

Another prominent theme had to do with making friends and learning to get along with different people. Typical remarks were, "I learned about myself and gained confidence" or "I made a lot of friends." On the negative side, the most common complaints had to do with the travails of camping: rain, cold, dirt, insects, fatigue, and homesickness. A typical comment frowned on "carrying a 50 pound backpack," "getting lost," or "going without a shower." Less common but nonetheless interesting complaints concerned whining and arguments among members of the group.

None of the 54 respondents mentioned race or ethnicity directly in any open-ended responses. The closest these respondents came to discussing this issue were allusions to getting along with different people and conflicts within the group. Table 10.2 hints that these group concerns may have been more salient to the racially heterogeneous groups, but the differences are not statistically significant. To detect the effects of exposure to minorities, we have to look to those survey questions that asked directly about tolerance.

Outcome measures. The survey contained a series of questions tapping feelings of hostility toward outgroups. As shown in Table 10.3, three of the five questions were asked using a Likert scale ranging from "strongly agree"

Table 10.3 Questions Used to Measure Tolerance

I'm going to read you some more statements, and again, I want you to tell me whether you strongly agree, agree somewhat, or strongly disagree.

1. "If a person of a different race were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from him or her."

Scored 1 if "strongly agree"; 0 otherwise.

2. "I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a person of another race in a public place."

Scored 1 if "strongly disagree"; 0 otherwise.

3. "I would never want to be around a teenager who was gay."

Scored 1 if "strongly disagree"; 0 otherwise.

4. "When you are older, would you prefer to live in a neighborhood where the people are mostly white, mostly nonwhite, or half and half?"

Scored 1 if "half and half"; 0 otherwise.

5. I am going to read a list of words. Tell me for each one whether that word describes you very well, describes you pretty well, describes you a little bit, or doesn't describe you at all . . . "Prejudiced."

Scored 1 if "not at all"; 0 otherwise.

to "strongly disagree." The first question examines whether the respondent bridles at the idea of being subordinate to people of another race. The second item taps feelings of social awkwardness in the presence of other racial groups. The third item measures the desire to ostracize stigmatized groups, in this case, gay teenagers. The fourth item asks respondent to indicate whether they hope to live in a racially integrated or segregated neighborhood. The fifth question asks respondents whether several adjectives describe them, among which is the word "prejudiced." Each of the scale items is scored in the manner described in Table 10.3 and added together to form a 5-item scale. The reliability of this scale is .65, as gauged by Cronbach's alpha.

It should be noted that this scale differs from the dependent variable used in much previous research on intergroup contact. Studies such as Desforges et al. (1991) and Scarberry et al. (1997) examine the extent to which intergroup contact causes people to develop friendships with or positive attitudes toward members of the outgroup. Here the dependent variable is one's general orientation toward minorities, which seems closer to Allport's original hypothesis that contact breaks down group negative stereotypes and intergroup hostility.

Table 10.4 describes the relationship between the attitude scale and the experimental treatment. Higher scores on this scale indicate more tolerant responses. Note that 32 percent of those who attended a racially homogenous

Table 10.4 Tolerance Scores by Experimental Condition

TOLERANCE SCALE	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY HOMOGENEOUS COURSES (%)	STUDENTS IN RACIALLY HETEROGENEOUS COURSES (%)
0 (Low tolerance)	7	0
1	4	0
2	14	4
3	21	23
4	21	15
5 (High tolerance)	32	58
Total	99	100
Number of observations	28	26

course demonstrated the highest levels of tolerance measured by the scale compared to 58 percent of those who attended a racially heterogeneous course. Students who had attended a racially homogeneous course scored an average of 3.4, as opposed to 4.3 among those who had attended a racially heterogeneous course. Ordinarily, this comparison would be subjected to a one-tailed test, but it proves significant with a more conservative two-tailed test. A difference of means test, not assuming equal variances, yields a $t = 2.44$ (46 d.f.), which has a two-tailed $p = .02$. Similarly, a nonparametric test (Mann–Whitney $U = 246.5$) produces a $Z = 2.15$, asymptotic 2-sided $p = .03$. Thus, despite the small sample size, the experimental effect proves to be significant under a range of different tests.

This result holds up when multiple regression is used to control for the background variables described in Table 10.1. As Table 10.5 indicates, the relationship between the experimental treatment and the outcome measure is essentially unaffected by the inclusion of control variables. Without control variables, the regression model indicates that participants in racially heterogeneous courses scored .84 scale points higher than participants in homogeneous courses ($p < .05$, one-tailed). This bivariate analysis, however, does not take into account the fact that random assignment was conducted at the level of the course. With the introduction of control variables that mark which Outward Bound course each student attended, this slope becomes .80 but remains statistically significant ($p < .05$, one-tailed). With the further introduction of controls for individual characteristics such as age, sex, educational aspiration, television viewing, and religious attendance, the estimated treatment effect becomes .85 ($p < .05$, one-tailed). Since none of these controls at the group or individual level significantly predict outgroup hostility, the introduction of additional covariates expends degrees of freedom

Table 10.5 Multiple Regression Results (Standard Errors in Parentheses)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	MODEL 1 ESTIMATE	MODEL 2 ESTIMATE	MODEL 3 ESTIMATE
Racial heterogeneity of the course	.84*(.35)	.80*(.36)	.85*(.41)
Course 1		.09 (.53)	−.15 (.79)
Course 2		.11 (.56)	−.17 (.62)
Course 3		.05 (.61)	.51 (.91)
Course 4		−.57 (.57)	−.62 (.61)
Sex (0 = Female, 1 = Male)			−.44 (.45)
Age (14−17)			.27 (.35)
College orientation (1 = Expects to attend 4 year college, 0 Otherwise)			−.26 (.57)
Amount of TV viewing (1 = Less than 1 hour per day, 0 Otherwise)			.33 (.40)
Frequency of religious attendance (1 = More than once per week, 0 Otherwise)			−1.00 (.71)
Frequency of religious attendance (1 = Once per week, 0 Otherwise)			−.90 (.61)
Frequency of religious attendance (1 = Two or three times per month, 0 Otherwise)			−1.58 (.84)
Frequency of religious attendance (1 = Once per month, 0 Otherwise)			−.34 (.63)
Frequency of religious attendance (1 = Several times per year, 0 Otherwise)			−.72 (.72)
Constant	3.43	3.54	.28
Adjusted R^2	.08	.04	.01
Number of observations	54	54	54

*$p < .05$, one-tailed. No other slope estimates are significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed.

without reducing the disturbance variance. Thus, the standard errors of the experimental treatment increase slightly as covariates are added. Nevertheless, the effects of this experimental intervention appear to be quite robust across a range of different models.

ATTITUDE CHANGE AND INTERGROUP CONTACT

The 2- and 3-week Outward Bound courses create a social environment that seems to present an ideal opportunity to study attitude change. Students struggle together against the elements and are tested to the limits of their

endurance. Without diversions like television or preexisting friendships, students had no alternative but to interact with and rely on a new group of people.

In terms of the volume of intergroup exposure and conditions under which it occurs, Outward Bound presents a limiting case for the contact hypothesis. Although students from different ethnic or racial groups tend to come from different socio-economic positions, the wilderness functions as a leveler, pushing all of the participants to their physical limits. Had no attitude change occurred, we would be forced to conclude that intergroup contact is largely ineffectual, since few social environments produce contact of this intensity and quality. In fact, we find that interracial contact does reduce aversive attitudes toward minorities. The results reported here show a noticeable change in attitudes in the wake of a racially integrated wilderness experience. Our findings converge with those field experiments that focus on contact between interracial roommates (Boisjoly et al., 2006; van Laar et al., 2005) and studies based upon laboratory experiments (for a review of such studies, see Tropp, 2006).

Naturally, these results are subject to a number of caveats. Attitudes were assessed only a few weeks after the course was completed, and we cannot say whether interracial contact has long-lasting effects. The small sample size raises the question of whether the results are statistically robust. Although the findings are statistically significant at conventional levels, it remains to be seen whether they hold up when this study is replicated and extended to other settings. Finally, as Hurwitz and Peffley (Chaper 11) caution, researchers must not assume that changes in attitudes are accompanied by concordant changes in behavior. We do not know from this study whether interracial contact decreases discriminatory behavior. Nevertheless, it seems that the Outward Bound program provides a mechanism for reducing intolerance, which is a rare and valuable achievement.

One interesting feature of the Outward Bound curriculum merits comment. Unlike diversity training courses, the wilderness courses do not explicitly confront racial attitudes as part of their programmed curriculum. Young people engage in a variety of exercises designed to foster a sense of interdependence; they share their experiences but there is no explicit exhortation about tolerance per se. Similar to the random roommate assignment studies discussed earlier, there is no particular instruction or exercise designed to promote tolerance, but simply the creation of opportunities for interracial interaction. The lack of focus on race provides a somewhat different formulation of the conditions under which contact ameliorates racial hostility. The literature on contact suggests that exposure to outgroups reduces prejudice under conditions of equal status (Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Jackman &

Crane, 1986), pursuit of common goals (Aronson & Gonzalez, 1988; Brown & Wade, 1987), cooperation (Aronson & Gonzalez, 1988; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Cook, 1984; Sherif et al., 1961), and institutional support for norms of tolerance (Landis, Hope, & Day, 1984). With respect to the last of these, it may be that normative instruction is a sufficient but unnecessary condition for the promotion of tolerance.

Indeed, it could be argued that the lack of exhortation facilitates the effects of interracial contact. While the present research does not provide direct evidence on this score, students who participated in interracial courses may have come to see each other either as individuals rather than group members or perhaps as members of a common ingroup (i.e., their Outward Bound crew), transformations that might have been inhibited by an attempt at indoctrination. Intergroup differences were a matter of passive learning, judging from the infrequency with which ethnic issues or intergroup frictions surfaced in open-ended comments. Some might argue that the very fact that the course was integrated may have conveyed a strong sense of support for institutional norms of tolerance by the Outward Bound organization. However, even if this were the case, institutional support for tolerance was implicit rather than explicit. Further experimentation is necessary to determine the conditions under which wilderness courses promote tolerance. For example, future studies could test whether more active intervention that highlights and encourages participants to evaluate group differences positively (see Judd & Park, Chapter 9) leads to more tolerant attitudes compared to simple contact. The alternative hypothesis is that this type of intervention works precisely because it is first and foremost a wilderness course and therefore conveys messages about equality in a subtle fashion.

Our findings also have related implications for recent research on prejudice and tolerance. A series of studies by Stuart W. Cook (1978, 1984) suggest that to best reduce prejudice, conditions accompanying contact should encourage stereotype disconfirmation. The Outward Bound courses do not emphasize activities aimed at disconfirming some of the most prevalent stereotypes about African Americans' or Latinos' interest in academics or intellectual aptitude. However, the courses might present opportunities for disconfirmation of stereotypes about minorities' work ethic or willingness to work with others (Johnson, Farrell, & Guinn, 1997). In any case, this study suggests that explicit stereotype disconfirmation is not necessary to induce tolerance in contact situations. In addition, the Outward Bound programs are designed to enhance self-esteem. Because the relationship between self-esteem or self-affirmation and prejudice is quite complicated (Fein & Spencer, 1997; Jordan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2005), it would likely be very useful to design a similar experiment that focuses on the relationship between self-esteem and tolerance in the Outward Bound context.

Finally, blatant, overt expressions of racial prejudice have declined in the past four decades (cf. Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1997). Scholars who study prejudice have turned their attention to more subtle forms of racial prejudice, including symbolic racism (Sears, 1988), intergroup anxiety (Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and aversive racism (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Studies (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999) suggest that strategies to increase tolerance may depend on the type of form prejudice takes:

> Whereas the traditional form of prejudice may be reduced by direct educational and attitude change techniques, contemporary forms may require alternative strategies oriented toward the individual or involving group contact. (p. 101)

This point may have special force when it comes to aversion to outgroups. Even those who reject the notion that outgroups are biologically inferior or inherently less able due to deep-seated cultural tendencies may still prefer to avoid them. These aversive tendencies may be so automatic that they manifest themselves at a preconscious level (Banaji & Dasgupta, 1998), and yet the findings here suggest that they are susceptible to change. Intergroup contact, at least under the conditions studied here, seems to undercut the tendency to exclude, segregate, and ostracize.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

Although the results of this research suggest that intergroup contact may reduce intolerance, we caution against extending the findings too far beyond the study context. The Outward Bound setting, with its intense physcial demands, emphasis on cooperation, and isolation of the participants from "everyday life" in a wilderness environment, is not easy to replicate for large numbers of citizens in the real world. Outside of relatively authoritative institutions, such as military barracks or the penal system, few civic institutions systematically encourage widespread interracial contact in a democratic context. The salutary effects of Outward Bound are impressive and worthy of further study, but wilderness courses per se do not constitute a practical recipe for reducing intolerance in the larger context of a democratic society.

The positive effect of contact on tolerance in the Outward Bound context may occur precisely because baseline levels of interaction between racial groups are fairly low in the present civic environment. As Jonathan Kozol recently observed, the nation's public schools are more racially segregated today than they were 30 years ago (Kozol, 2005). Most places of worship continue to be racially segregated, giving rise to the poignant observation that "Sunday is the most segregated day in America" (Emerson & Smith,

2001). Voluntary organizations—central to life in any vibrant democracy—tend to be racially segregated as well (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995). The net effect of segregated social neighborhoods and social institutions on interracial contact is perhaps much greater than one might suppose. According to the 2000 General Social Survey, 86 percent of white respondents claim to know at least one black person, and 63 percent of white respondents to the 2006 General Social Survey claim to be acquainted with at least two black people.[3] These figures suggest a reasonably high level of white–black interaction, but consider a different measurement approach that starts by asking respondents to enumerate five "good friends" without reference to race and later asks respondents to report their friends' race. Of the 2,241 white respondents to the 1998 General Social Survey, just 1.5 percent named a black person as a good friend. In 2004 General Social Survey, just 1.2 percent of white respondents mentioned a black person among the five people with whom they discuss important matters.[4] Even in the absence of de jure segregation, our democracy is one in which whites and blacks remain distant geographically and socially.

Some, such as Robert Putnam (2007), suggest that demographic trends leading to increased racial diversity at the neighborhood level may present short-term challenges to trust and cooperation in a democratic society. One way to meet those challenges may be to encourage sustained interracial social contact in more local settings, by setting up summer camps, cooking classes, open art studios, and other activities that have the potential to bring diverse groups together. Our research shows that interracial contact represents a potential positive force in terms of promoting democratic citizenship

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[3] The N for the 2000 survey was 1,085, and the question asked, "Do you personally know any . . . blacks?" The N for the 2006 survey was 513, and the question asked, "I'm going to ask you some questions about all the people that you are acquainted with, meaning that you know their name and would stop and talk at least for a moment if you ran into the person on the street or in a shopping mall. Some of these questions may seem unusual but they are an important way to help us understand more about social networks in America. Please answer the questions as best you can. . . . How many are black?"

[4] The 1998 survey asked, "Many people have some good friends they feel close to. Who are your good friends (other than your spouse)? Just tell me their first names . . . Is (NAME) Asian, Black, Hispanic, White or something else?" The 2004 survey ($N = 2,234$) asked, "From time to time, most people discuss important matters with other people. Looking back over the last six months who are the people with whom you discussed matters important to you? Just tell me their first names or initials . . . Is (NAME) Asian, Black, Hispanic, White or something else?"

through increased tolerance, but the conditions necessary to create attitude change remain both rare and difficult to sustain.

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Racial Stereotyping and Political Attitudes: The View From Political Science

Mark Peffley and Jon Hurwitz

While political science has made effective use of research on the psychology of stereotyping, psychology has not benefited from political science in the same way. This chapter argues that the study of racial stereotypes can be improved by a mutual effort on the part of political scientists and psychologists alike to better understand and apply the methods and perspectives that dominate each discipline. Our discussion focuses on three principal disciplinary contrasts. First, while psychology has typically been concerned with the processes underlying stereotypes, political science has focused on the collective sources and political consequences of stereotyping. Second, while political science could benefit from more experimentation, psychologists should implement research designs to enhance the external validity of their research. Finally, both disciplines are limited to the extent that they typically focus on the beliefs of the dominant group, and stereotyping research would benefit from a greater emphasis on the beliefs of racial minorities.

INTRODUCTION

By their very nature, the chapters in this volume share the simple premise that the disciplines of psychology and political science share a symbiotic affinity. Within political science, students of political psychology have reaped extraordinary benefits from the work produced in psychologists' laboratories, borrowing heavily from theories and research in social psychology. In particular, political scientists have, in recent years, taken advantage of the vast and ever-growing literature on stereotyping. In politics, decisions are often based on evaluations of groups (e.g., Nelson & Kinder, 1996)—groups that consist of members of a political party, a gender, a nation, a race, or an ethnicity. Stereotyping of such groups, consequently, becomes an indispensable concept. Nowhere is this truer than in studies of racial stereotyping and prejudice, one of the fastest growing areas of research in political psychology.

It is no accident, then, that the same names appear repeatedly among the citation lists of political scientists studying mass behavior—names such as Katz and Braly (1993), Allport (1958), Tajfel (1982), Devine (Devine,

Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), Hamilton (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994), Fiske (Fiske 1998; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002), and Judd (Judd, Park, Ryan, Brauer, & Kraus, 1995). In fundamentally different ways, each of these psychologists has expanded our understanding of the nature of stereotyping.

We shall argue below that stereotyping research in political science has much to offer psychology as well. Quite obviously, the political realm offers a vast applied domain for establishing the political import and "real-world" relevance of theories, concepts, and measures developed by psychologists. Our work is far more than mere applied psychology, however. Not only can political science studies extend our knowledge of stereotypes in general—particularly regarding their applicability, salience, and universality—but political research can investigate a range of questions unlikely to be explored in social psychology.

Despite the natural affinity that social psychology and political psychology have enjoyed for the past several decades, the relationship is imperfect. The most appropriate metaphor for this chapter, consequently, is that it is a conceptual, albeit biased marriage counselor. For, in reality, many of us in political science who exploit the stereotyping literature to better understand political phenomena have come to the realization that the two disciplines often think about and investigate stereotypes in quite different ways. For the relationship to improve—that is, for the two disciplines to make increasingly more profitable use of each other's work, in our partial view—there needs to be a greater appreciation of not only how the research interests of political and social psychology intertwine, but also how they tend to diverge.

One purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to inform psychologists of the peculiar needs of political scientists so that we can better exploit their work and so that they can better exploit ours. Although few psychologists appear to be aware of the burgeoning work in political science, there is much to be gained by considering research driven by different questions, perspectives, and methodologies than those typically employed by social psychologists. Accordingly, while we are strong proponents of political psychologists becoming better trained in theories and methods of psychology, we aim to show how being a good psychologist is insufficient for doing good work in political science. Because mainstream research in social psychology is limited in its ability to study the political dimensions of stereotyping, political psychologists (and hopefully, social psychologists) need to be ready to move beyond the methods and perspectives dominant in social psychology. The arguments raised, and the research reviewed, in this chapter are offered in the spirit of improved mutual understanding and, we hope, advancement in both disciplines.

Our argument below is offered in three related parts. The first is designed to underscore the differing foci of the two disciplines and takes off from the frequently offered distinction between stereotypes studied as individual-level beliefs and stereotypes studied as collective beliefs. Stripped to its essentials, our argument is that while psychologists have focused primarily on the cognitive *processes* underlying stereotypes held by individuals, political scientists are more concerned with studying the collective sources (e.g., media, political rhetoric) and political consequences (e.g., policy support and voting behavior) of such beliefs. To make our point, we offer several examples of research examining the connection between racial stereotypes and whites' support for policies such as welfare and crime control, which are ostensibly race-neutral but which have, in fact, become heavily "racialized."

The second part is more methodological in nature and focuses on the limitations of the laboratory setting—its subject pool, its isolation of variables, and its measures. Our point is that a near-exclusive reliance on a single methodology—whether it be survey research in the case of political science or laboratory experiments in psychology—limits the range of questions that can be investigated as well as the resulting knowledge base in a given field. This is particularly true in the study of racial attitudes, which requires a panoply of theoretical perspectives and methodological tools. And even a cursory reading of the literature inevitably brings one to the conclusion that not only should political scientists more often exploit the benefits of experimental manipulation and random assignment to enhance the internal validity of their findings, but psychologists should more often implement procedures to enhance the external validity of their findings, as well.

In the third and final section, we examine a problem with the study of racial stereotypes common to both disciplines—the tendency to focus on the beliefs of the dominant group—in this case, whites. In this regard, we find Judd and Park's (Chapter 9) recent focus on the different perspectives of whites and African Americans to be a welcome departure from the usual tendency to ignore the attitudes of the latter group. We attempt to extend Judd and Park's observations to the political domain by reviewing our most recent work on blacks' and whites' beliefs about the fairness of the criminal justice system.

We have focused this chapter around racial stereotypes, particularly whites' views about African Americans. We do so in full knowledge that our observations are not fully generalizable to stereotypes and attitudes (e.g., prejudice) toward other groups (including blacks' stereotypes of whites). In our defense, the study of racial stereotypes comprises the bulk of political

research on group images. The emphasis on racial images is also justified in light of the fact that, historically, racial issues have been a powerfully divisive element in American politics, affecting voting behavior, partisan alignments, and trust in government (e.g., Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Kinder & Sanders, 1996). And few would reject the proposition that racial stereotypes help to undergird and justify many white Americans' stands on a variety of racial and nonracial issues.

STEREOTYPE RESEARCH: INDIVIDUAL VERSUS COLLECTIVE FOCI

It has become commonplace (e.g., Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; Stangor & Schaller, 1996) to partition students of stereotyping into two distinct camps: those who focus primarily on stereotypes at the individual level and those whose major interest lays in stereotypes as collective belief systems. According to Stangor and Schaller (1996), "Individual approaches have not been particularly concerned about stereotype consensus, focusing instead on the meaning of the stereotype to the individual" (p. 5). Associated with the dominant social cognitive tradition in social psychology (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1991), the individual approach is primarily concerned with delineating cognitive processes that explain how individuals develop, maintain, and change stereotypic beliefs.

To label the social cognitive focus as "micro-level" is clearly not meant to belittle its extraordinary contributions to our understanding of the phenomenon. It is, however, intended to suggest that much of this work is of limited utility to those of us who analyze politics. Four characteristics of this individual approach, in particular, warrant comment. While none of these can be said to be diagnostic of all of the work on stereotyping produced by social and cognitive psychologists, their prevalence in this body of work is evident.

Inattention to Collective Consequences of Stereotypes

In the first place, the stereotyping research in social psychology has tended to focus on intrapersonal processes, such as memory, perceptions, and attributions, rather than on interpersonal interactions (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996). Moreover, psychologists tend to show little concern for the *collective* consequences of these beliefs. The primary influence of stereotypes, as studied by psychologists, is their tendency to bias information processing, with the general consequence being that stereotypes are found to perpetuate themselves and to bias judgments and treatments of groups and their members. Invariably, the types of responses of interest to psychologists are individual or interpersonal behaviors, such as helping behavior or

discrimination in choosing members of a group. And, as Dovidio et al. (1996, pp. 302–303) observe in reviewing the literature, studies that examine the relationship between racial stereotypes and behavior (i.e., discrimination) are extremely rare in psychology.

Political scientists, on the other hand, are far more interested in the collective consequences of stereotypic beliefs. How, if at all, do partisan, gender, or racial stereotypes influence our willingness to support Democratic, female, or African American candidates (e.g., Huddy & Terkildsen, 1993; Rahn, 1993; Terkildsen, 1993)? To what degree do our stereotypes of foreign nations predispose us to behave belligerently toward those nations (e.g., Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, & Ciarrochi, 1997; Hurwitz, Peffley, & Seligson, 1993)? And in what ways are public attitudes on crime, welfare, affirmative action, and other ostensibly "race neutral" policies conditioned by whites' stereotypes of African Americans (e.g., Gilens, 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997)? These are the types of questions most often raised.

It is presumptuous, of course, to expect those of one discipline to adopt the concerns of those in another discipline. As such, we cannot criticize social or cognitive psychologists for their inattention to collective consequences. At the same time, we submit that social problems are due to collective behaviors, not merely due to individual beliefs or responses. The salience and perniciousness of racial hostility in this country are not functions either of the racial stereotypes that *individuals* hold or of isolated, interpersonal acts of discrimination. Rather, they result from the heated policy debates over the distribution of scarce resources—resources that are apportioned through policies such as affirmative action, racial profiling, and poverty programs. In short, it does not matter whether an individual perceives African Americans to be lazy. It matters a great deal, however, if this stereotype translates into policy preferences that, intentionally or unintentionally, exacerbate the problems of inequality and discrimination. Our point, in short, is that the micro-theoretical work on stereotyping is useful, but political scientists often need to go beyond this work in establishing a connection between stereotypes and collective or political consequences.[1]

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[1] Consider, for instance, Allport's (1958) contact hypothesis for reducing racial prejudice and stereotyping, which holds that these beliefs are changed primarily through the acquisition of new information through direct contact with members of the target group. Unfortunately, however, contact has not been found to be sufficient for reducing prejudice and stereotyping (see, e.g., Rothbart & John, 1992); to the contrary, it has produced only minimal changes in these tenacious beliefs. By attempting to alter stereotypes, per se, rather than the discriminatory behaviors that result from such stereotypes, Allport may have drastically overestimated the importance of the beliefs, while simultaneously underestimating the importance of their consequences.

In fact, the vast majority of political studies of racial stereotyping have been, first and foremost, investigations into the *political impact* of whites' beliefs about African Americans. This work nicely illustrates the ability of the micro-level social cognition perspective to provide a loose framework for political analyses—albeit a framework that ultimately must be modified when investigating the complexities of "real-world" political consequences. On the one hand, the individual perspective common to psychological research has been invaluable in alerting political analysts to the highly conditional nature of the linkage between stereotypes and political responses—in this case, policy attitudes. On the other hand, it is often up to political scientists to identify the various conditions (outside the laboratory) that moderate the connection between stereotypes and policy attitudes.

Viewed from one perspective, the empirical relationship between racial stereotypes and political judgments is characterized by striking inconsistencies, appearing in some settings but not at all (or only weakly) in others (e.g., Bobo & Kluegel, 1993; Federico, 2004; Goren, 2003; Sniderman & Carmines, 1997; Terkildsen, 1993). One solution to this puzzle lies in the simple recognition that people are not prisoners to their prior beliefs; rather, stereotypes guide judgments only when the stereotype "fits" the judgment at hand.

When stereotypes *do* fit, they are powerfully consequential. Based on a series of survey experiments where the race and other characteristics of the target (e.g., welfare recipients and criminal suspects) were manipulated, we consistently find that whites who regard African Americans as "lazy" and lacking in the work ethic are much more negative in their assessments of welfare policy, particularly when they believe that most welfare recipients are black (Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997; see also Gilens, 1999). By the same token, we have determined that whites who perceive African Americans to be "violent," "short-tempered," and the like are more supportive of harsh and punitive anticrime policies.

There are, however, numerous "disconnects," or instances in which racial stereotypes play little role in driving individuals' attitudes toward welfare or crime policy. Even among whites who see "most blacks" as violent, for example, such stereotypes only appear to influence crime policy attitudes for black criminals described as committing violent crimes (e.g., carjacking vs. embezzlement) and only for punitive (vs. preventive) policies (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2002). When the crime, the criminal, or the policy does not comport with the African American stereotype, such beliefs have far less political impact.

Even more important for understanding the impact of stereotypes are instances when individuals are supplied with individuating or

counter-stereotypical information—that is, information about *individuals* that conflicts with the stereotypes of the larger group. And we contend that psychologists and political scientists explore the complexities of individuation in quite different, and quite revealing, ways. In our earlier work, we investigated how two groups of whites—those with negative and those with positive views of blacks—react to welfare mothers and criminal suspects where the race and work histories of the targets are randomly varied. For example, in the welfare mother experiment, respondents were asked about either a black or a white welfare mother who either had dropped out of high school or had completed high school. And, in the "welfare policy" experiment, respondents were asked whether they would favor a welfare program where the recipients are either black or white (i.e., immigrants from Europe) and were either described as "people who have trouble hanging onto a job" or "people who have shown that they want to work" (see Sniderman & Piazza, 1993, for a similar design).

For social psychologists, such a design is primarily a theoretical exercise for assessing the power of stereotypes to assimilate discrepant information according to either a top-down or a bottom-up processing strategy. Our interest in posing this question, however, was distinctly political. By describing black welfare recipients in a positive way (people who want to work) to whites who think that blacks are lazy, is it possible to inhibit the connection between their negative views of blacks and their opposition to welfare? And for whites who *reject* negative stereotypes, if we ask them about black welfare recipients who are stigmatized in some way (e.g., who failed to complete high school or have had trouble hanging onto a job), are their more positive views of blacks in the abstract mere window dressing? Will they quickly abandon such positive views when confronted with blacks who have been stigmatized as disinterested in finishing school or working hard?

In these experiments, we found that whites with positive views of blacks were, for the most part, remarkably consistent in their responses to black targets, regardless of their described work histories. Thus, they did not abandon their positive views of blacks when confronted with blacks who have been stigmatized as high school dropouts or in some other way. Whites who stereotyped blacks as lazy, however, tended to evaluate the black welfare recipient more harshly than similarly described white recipients, and they did so both in the case of the black recipient who fit their expectations (dropped out of high school, had trouble hanging onto a job) and when the recipient was mildly discrepant from their expectations (had completed high school). However, in the welfare policy experiment, when information about the target is *strongly* discrepant from the stereotype—that is, when whites

who think blacks are lazy are asked about welfare for blacks who want to work—these whites tend to "bend over backwards" in supporting welfare for African Americans who have characteristics that are clearly contrary to their stereotypes of most blacks.

One strong implication of these findings is that counter-stereotypical information may be used to short-circuit stereotypical thinking among whites. By framing policies such as welfare in terms of exemplars that are contrary to the stereotype, such as the hardworking black welfare mother, it is possible to sever the connection between negative stereotypes and policy views. Similarly, Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) found that by portraying positive images of African Americans in political ads, racial stereotypes are not activated and therefore racial thinking does not influence voting intentions after watching a televised political ad.

The conditional impact of stereotypes is also very much in evidence in studies of voting behavior. In her experimental analysis, Terkildsen (1993) asked some 350 participants (selected randomly from jury pools in Jefferson County/Louisville, Kentucky) whether they would vote for a fictitious gubernatorial candidate after reading campaign materials that included a photograph of the candidate (former Republican Senator Edward Brookes from Massachusetts) in which the candidate's skin color was varied to depict either a light-skinned or a dark-skinned black male. As expected, whites with negative stereotypes of African Americans were more likely to vote for the lighter than for the darker-complexioned candidate, but only among individuals who were low self-monitors (individuals who tend to act on their own beliefs rather than on situational cues). High self-monitors, on the other hand, due to their greater propensity to offer environmentally "appropriate" responses, disingenuously reported being more likely to vote for the dark than the light-skinned candidate (see also McDermott, 1998; Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, & Nitz, 1995).

Weaver (2005) used a similar, but more elaborate Internet-based survey experiment in which a nationally representative sample of whites ($N = 2,138$) was shown the campaign literature of two opposing candidates running for office in which the race and skin color of the candidates varied across experimental groups, using morphing software to more realistically construct candidates who varied in race and complexion but not physical attractiveness. Weaver found a general tendency to vote against darker candidates, as well as strong evidence of partisan and gender asymmetries: Republicans were much less likely to vote for a dark-skinned candidate, even when he was described as a conservative, and men were less likely to vote for a black candidate than a female. The pattern of results in these studies

helps to explain the tendency for preelection polls to overestimate the sup-port for black candidates among white voters compared with the vote totals that actually materialize on election day. Apparently, many whites express support for black candidates in surveys, but vote for someone else in the privacy of the voting booth (Clymer, 1989; but see also Hopkins, 2008).

In summary, the individual perspective in psychology has been invalu-able in alerting political scientists to the conditional effects of stereo-types: stereotypes sometimes "matter" politically and sometimes they do not. For the most part, it has been the domain of the political scientist to identify the various real-world conditions that moderate the political effects of stereotyping, isolating the conditions under which stereotypes are less influential in shaping political judgments. More specifically, much of the extant literature in political science has focused on the impor-tance of counter-stereotypical information for undercutting stereotypic thinking.

As we have argued, however, scholars from a social cognition perspec-tive shortchange themselves by viewing this research in political science merely as a branch of applied social psychology, for there is much that they could learn from this literature. Most importantly, the conditional impor-tance of stereotypes in the political sphere reveals a great deal about their ability to absorb new information in a naturalistic and sometimes politically charged environment. Surely, social psychologists—even those whose inter-ests lie entirely with matters of cognitive process rather than with matters of stereotype consequence—must have compelling interests in the degree to which the political and social context of a judgment can undercut stereotypic thinking.

Inattention to Societal Sources of Stereotypes

A second attribute of the individual-level approach is its inattention to societal sources of stereotypes. As Stangor and Shaller (1996) argue, "Whereas the individual approach has focused on how stereotypes are learned through direct interaction with others, collective approaches con-sider the ways that stereotypes are learned, transmitted, and changed through indirect sources—information gained from parents, peers, teachers, *political . . . leaders*, and the *mass media*" (pp. 10–11, emphasis added). In fact, in political science there has been a veritable explosion of research on the impact of *news coverage* and *political rhetoric* on whites' views about African Americans.

Mass Media. Several studies have explored the tendency of the contempo-rary mainstream media to activate and cultivate negative stereotypes about

minorities. Of particular importance are recent studies that examine the way news portrayals of welfare and crime tend to link such issues with African Americans. Based on content analyses of news coverage of welfare, analysts find that the news media tend to "racialize" welfare policy by disproportionately using images of African Americans to accompany negative news stories on poverty (e.g., Clawson & Trice, 2000; Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Gilens, 1999). Similarly, crime stories in local news broadcasts tend to overrepresent violent crimes where the perpetrator is black in such a manner that highly exaggerates the involvement of African Americans in criminal activities (e.g., Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000).

Judging from the available evidence, such racially biased imagery has a pernicious effect: by creating the inaccurate impression that a majority of welfare recipients are black, public support for welfare is diminished, and negative stereotypes of African Americans as the "undeserving poor" are reinforced (Avery & Peffley, 2003; Gilens, 1999). Crime attitudes are similarly affected. Experimental evidence suggests that even a brief visual image of a black male in a typical local news story on crime is powerful and sufficiently familiar to activate viewers' negative stereotypes of blacks, producing racially biased evaluations of black criminal suspects (Peffley, Shields, & Williams, 1996). In their innovative experimental studies, manipulating only the skin color of a male perpetrator in a local news broadcast, Gilliam and Iyengar and their associates (Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Gilliam, Iyengar, Simon, & Wright, 1996) convincingly demonstrated that when the perpetrator was African American, more adult subjects endorsed punitive crime policies and negative racial attitudes after watching the news broadcast. And when no perpetrator was depicted, subjects—both white and black—were much more likely to recall the perpetrator as being an African American.

Political Rhetoric. Given this backdrop, a number of studies have examined the use of racially "coded" political rhetoric by politicians who engage such issues as welfare and crime to exploit whites' racial prejudice and activate racial thinking, without ever explicitly playing the "race card" (Edsall & Edsall, 1991; Gilens, 1996; Glaser, 1996; Kinder & Sanders, 1996; Mendelberg, 1997, 2008). Perhaps, the most notorious examples of racially coded rhetoric are the infamous "Willie Horton" and "Turnstyle" television ads created by Bush supporters in 1988, which paired nonracial narratives with racial imagery to produce an "implicitly" racial message (Jamieson, 1992). Not only were the ads effective in portraying Bush's opponent as soft on crime, but news about the ads primed racial attitudes in opinions about various policies (Mendelberg, 2001). Using a creative experimental design, Valentino, Hutchings, and White (2002) were able to determine that political ads with

implicit racial messages (e.g., a nonracial narrative about government spending paired with images of undeserving blacks) were much more effective than *explicit* racial messages (e.g., the same narrative with positive images of whites alongside negative images of blacks) in priming racial attitudes and, consequently, augmenting support for George W. Bush over Al Gore. And finally, Gilliam and Iyengar (2000) and White (2007) show that racial messages from the media and political elites influence blacks' and whites' political attitudes differently, presumably because they activate different stereotypical beliefs and group identifications.

When it comes to investigating likely societal sources of racial stereotypes, therefore, political scientists have been forced to look outside the individual perspective in social psychology, often collaborating with, or borrowing from, scholars in sociology and mass communications. A number of interesting questions arise from this research that would be worthy of study by analysts of either discipline. Given that social psychologists focus primarily on direct experience with group members as a source of stereotypes, while political scientists focus on group perceptions as conveyed by the mass media, a natural question arises: Which is more powerful in shaping images of African Americans and other groups? And what happens when messages from these sources conflict? Moreover, to what extent do different antecedents create stereotypes with different properties? Do such beliefs vary systematically in terms of their strength, affect, and susceptibility to change? Are stereotypes arising from direct experience more likely to constitute prejudice than, say, images that are products of the mass media? While a few scholars have begun to investigate such questions (e.g., Gilliam, Valentino, & Beckmann, 2002), much remains to be done.

Inattention to Stereotypic Content

We have argued above that the psychological literature is often of limited utility to political scientists because of its strong emphasis on cognitive process to the neglect of collective consequences and societal sources. We extend this line of reasoning to a third issue typically ignored by psychologists: content. While their laser beam focus on process—of stereotype acquisition, perseverance, change, and structure—has been invaluable in developing a unifying theoretical perspective for the study of stereotyping, it also seems to have come at the expense of exploring what, precisely, composes these beliefs.[2]

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[2] In addition, even some psychologists have questioned whether, from a practical standpoint, increasingly greater detail about cognitive processes yields a better understanding of stereotyping (e.g., Stangor & Shaller, 1996).

On occasion, process and content overlap, such as with the work on subtyping (e.g., Devine & Baker, 1991). In this literature, scholars have investigated the dimensional structure of stereotypes, finding that they can subsume a wide variety of subtypes. Patricia Devine, for example, has found that global stereotypes of African Americans often serve as umbrellas for more specific subtypes such as "ghetto blacks," "black businessmen," and "black athletes."

More commonly, however, the content is of only secondary concern to the analyst. Once again, we bring our interest in politics to the table. And once again, we note the necessity of better understanding stereotypic content because it is this content, particularly if widely shared, that gives stereotypes their pernicious impact. Thus, while it is important to understand how stereotypes persevere in the face of conflicting information, it is even more valuable to understand of what, exactly, these stereotypes consist. For to know that a majority of whites in earlier times perceived African Americans to be genetically inferior and cognitively impaired would contribute to our understanding of segregated schools in this country. By the same token, when a series of reports in *Scientific American* concluded that these stereotypes were waning in the 1950s and 1960s, we mistakenly concluded that racial prejudice, itself, had begun to disappear. What we did not know, but should have known, was that beliefs in genetic inferiority were merely being replaced by other equally noxious racial stereotypes impugning the work ethic and other traits of African Americans (Kinder & Sanders, 1996, chapter five; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997).

More specifically, in our work, we have found that particular stereotypical traits tend to shape particular policies. As might be expected, whites' views on whether African Americans are "lazy" have a greater impact on their support for welfare, and their views on whether African Americans are "violent" have a greater impact on their support for punitive crime policies (Peffley et al., 1997). As Gilens (1999, p. 170) has argued in his study of why (white) Americans hate welfare, one implication of the fact that different stereotypes are not interchangeable is that whites' stereotypes of blacks do not simply reveal a global antipathy toward African Americans.

Instead, whites' perceptions that blacks lack commitment to the work ethic represents a specific racial judgment that cannot be reduced to a broad negative orientation toward blacks. While prejudice surely plays some part in generating negative stereotypes of blacks, these different stereotypes also reflect unique cognitive constructs that have different origins (e.g., mass media) and different consequences for white Americans' political views.

Inattention to the Pervasiveness of Stereotypes

The importance of content leads naturally to our next point, which is that stereotypes, to be malignant, must be shared and must be prevalent. It is partly a function of the experimental methodologies employed—an issue to which we will return in the next section—that psychologists have been unable to estimate the national (or regional) parameters that would provide clues as to the degree to which the stereotype has permeated the culture. It is also, however, partly a function of priority: when the concern is with process as opposed to content, charting stereotype usage necessarily takes a backseat to understanding its operation. The microlevel work, consequently, reveals little about the prevalence of stereotyping, either nationally or among various subgroups in the population.

To political scientists, the only stereotypes that mean anything are stereotypes that have a widespread impact on the treatment of various groups—treatment either by the government through public policies or by other individuals or groups in the form of acceptance or rejection and discrimination. It is, therefore, far more pernicious to find that majorities perceive African Americans to be lazy or females to be weak than to find that these beliefs are idiosyncratically and randomly distributed among only a handful of individuals.

To find that over half of all voting-age whites in the early 1990s viewed "most blacks" or "blacks in general" as "preferring to live off welfare," "lazy," and "violence prone" demonstrates that despite marked improvements in whites' racial attitudes over the last several decades, derogatory images of minorities remain commonplace (Peffley & Hurwitz, 1998; Sigelman & Tuch, 1997). Our work, based on experimental designs embedded in probability surveys (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1998; Peffley, Hurwitz, & Sniderman, 1997), has thoroughly convinced us that stereotypes that have permeated the society have a profound impact over public policy debates. There is little doubt in our minds, consequently, that when many individuals share common pejorative stereotypes of a minority group, their collective images will influence aggregated policy preferences.

Indeed, the connection between racial stereotypes and public attitudes toward policies such as welfare and crime control may be so strong that even changes in the policy itself are ineffectual in deracializing such policies in the public mind. The case of welfare is most instructive because there is no question that the policy changed dramatically in the late 1990s, when welfare reform legislation limited lifetime benefits to just 5 years and work requirements were imposed. Despite such dramatic changes, as well as a post-reform news environment that was less likely to portray welfare recipients as African Americans, Dyck and Hussey (2008) found no significant

decrease in the strong association between whites' opposition to welfare spending and their stereotypes about blacks' work ethic (see also Blinder, 2007). The authors conclude that the well-known tendency for racial stereotypes to resist change means that information challenging the association between race and welfare must be clear and pervasive, and neither condition has been met in the post-reform environment.

In addition to shaping public policy, pervasively negative stereotypes contribute to a hostile racial climate and doubtless fuel racial tensions. Indeed, Sigelman and Tuch (1997) found African Americans' "meta-stereotypes" of whites—their views of the images that whites hold of blacks—tend to be fairly accurate in gauging the extremely high percentage of whites who continue to hold negative images of blacks on a variety of dimensions.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LABORATORY: RESULTS, MEASURES, AND THEORIES

It is the need to establish national and subgroup parameters for stereotyping that practically mandates our reliance on survey research as our primary tool of analysis. Many of our reactions to the work done on stereotyping in psychology, consequently, are focused on the methodology which, until relatively recently, was a mystery for those outside of the experimental tradition. Our purpose in this section is not to criticize the experimental approach, which, in many respects, is essential for rigorously testing micro-level theories of stereotyping as well as the effects of political communication (i.e., political rhetoric and news coverage) on stereotyping. There are by now several influential works by political scientists extolling the virtues of experiments in political research (e.g., Kinder & Palfrey, 1993; Sniderman & Grob, 1996). Indeed, the development of Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) and Internet-based survey experiments (such as Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences [TESS], which enables survey researchers to imbed increasingly elaborate experimental designs into cross-sectional national surveys) has encouraged political scientists to move in an increasingly experiment-based direction. Rather, our intention is to underscore the differences between experiments and surveys and, more specifically, to note the impact which the methods have on theories, results, and measures.

By now, the characterization of experimental psychology as the study of the college sophomore has become a cliché. We do, of course, appreciate the need to exploit available subject pools and, as well, appreciate the impossibility of using probability samples and simultaneously achieving the

high degrees of internal validity characteristic of laboratory experiments. Nonetheless, we cannot help but wonder about the degree to which reliance on college students affects the results of such investigations. While this comment is anything but original, *we maintain that subject bias is perhaps more problematic in the study of social stereotyping than in many other foci of research.*

Take, for example, some recent findings suggesting a positivity bias on the part of white subjects in their perceptions and evaluations of African Americans. In their study of discourse processing, Voss, Wiley, Ciarrochi, Foltz, and Silfies (1996) found that "Black participants demonstrated a same-race bias, whereas White participants. . .provided an other-race bias" (p. 113) when judging the likely guilt of whites charged with murdering blacks (and vice versa) in hypothetical text scenarios. Additionally, Judd et al. (1995) found that "[African-American] participants manifested the expected patterns of perceived group variability and ethnocentrism, whereas [White Americans] did not" (p. 469). More specifically, they found that black subjects judged outgroup members (i.e., whites) more negatively than their own group, and, furthermore, saw whites more stereotypically (i.e., more homogeneously). Quite curiously, however, white participants demonstrated neither this negativity effect nor the outgroup homogeneity effect.

While both Voss and Judd (and their colleagues) provide quite plausible interpretations of these findings, we must raise the possibility that such surprising results (pertaining to white subjects) are at least partly the result of the subject pool. Because the great majority of these participants are liberal arts (as opposed to professional) college students, they may be assumed to be disproportionately liberal and, in the cases cited above, non-southern. Moreover, according to Sears (1988), the properties of college experimental subjects are fairly well understood. He argues, for example, that the typical 17- to 19-year-old psychology student tends to have a relatively unformulated sense of self, which often means that they "have less-crystallized social and political attitudes than do older people" (p. 325). Sears also reports a stronger need for peer approval (p. 323) among these individuals, and, not surprisingly, a tendency to be easily influenced (p. 325). And finally, he argues that "college students may be even less thoroughly tied to stable primary groups than are other late adolescents because they are more likely to have become detached from the groups of their earlier life . . . " (p. 329).

Taken together, these characteristics may yield a subject pool that is less than representative of the racial predilections in America. At the risk of exaggeration, it is reasonable to assume that the racial attitudes of younger, more affluent, and more educated college students are more positive than typically found in national probability samples. Moreover, whatever the

backgrounds of college students, not only are they quite susceptible to peer influence, but they find themselves living in one of the most liberal cultural environments in the country, where the pressures for "political correctness" can be extraordinarily strong. With the kind of self-monitoring and impression management that comes from (relatively liberal) peer influence, together with the relatively uncrystallized attitudes that students tend to hold, it would not at all be surprising to learn that even somewhat prejudiced individuals would exhibit the positivity bias reported in the literature.

In sum, we can conceive of numerous reasons why the characteristics of the subject pool would influence the results of stereotype analyses. But the impact of the subject bias may be even more pervasive, possibly influencing both the research methods and, as well, the very theories constructed to account for prejudice and stereotyping. In addition to the aforementioned characteristics, Sears (1988) also attaches the somewhat more obvious attributes to college students of being highly educated, cognitively skilled, and articulate. One of the luxuries of working with such subjects—a luxury not shared by survey research analysts—is the ability to use relatively complex and detailed textual scenarios and correspondingly complicated measures of stereotypicality, including a dot task in which subjects place stick-on dots to "indicate the relative numbers of group members who fall at each point along a dimension" (Park, Ryan, & Judd, 1992). Subjects are also asked to estimate percentages and make some detailed cognitive distinctions between members of particular groups. While such measures have been thoroughly validated, and while they yield invaluable data, we suspect that many participants from a more representative sample would have a difficult time understanding the instructions.

And we can even imagine scenarios in which the subject bias affects this work at the stage of theory development. Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio's (1986) theory of aversive racism, for instance, asserts that, while most individuals are socialized into a prejudiced culture, over time they become more egalitarian and concerned with issues of fairness and justice (also inherent in the culture). Aversive racists, cognizant of the discrimination that blacks have faced, generally prefer remedial policies such as affirmative action. However, when a situation or an event threatens to make the negative portion of the attitude salient, aversive racists are motivated to repudiate these feelings from their self-image, and they vigorously try to avoid acting wrongly on the basis of these feelings. In these situations, aversive racists may overreact and amplify their positive behavior in ways that would reaffirm their egalitarian convictions and their apparently nonracist attitudes (p. 62).

It seems quite unlikely that such a theory of human nature, based on the understanding that individuals express liberal leanings that belie their true (and substantially less egalitarian) beliefs, could have been formulated in the absence of a subject pool with predominantly liberal beliefs, given findings that, when measured unobtrusively, large numbers of Americans exhibit symptoms of racial prejudice (Kuklinski, Cobb, & Gilens, 1997).

Because of these problems, political scientists who use lab experiments often rely on relatively large and diverse nonprobability samples of (non–college student) adult participants (e.g., Gilliam & Iyengar, 2000; Iyengar, 2002; Sigelman, Sigelman, Walkosz, & Nitz, 1995; Terkildsen, 1993; Valentino et al., 2002) recruited by a variety of resourceful means (e.g., ads in local newspapers, kiosks in shopping malls, random samples of jury pools, and the Internet). While such studies are more costly in terms of time and money, the external validity they purchase is essential in the study of racial attitudes.

Political scientists have also pioneered the development of CATI technology and Internet-based surveys, which combine the external validity of surveys with the internal validity of experiments, dozens of which can be embedded throughout a survey. While there are certainly limits to the kinds of manipulations that can be performed in surveys, as compared to the laboratory, survey experiments offer one reasonable compromise between what often seems to be the mutually exclusive demands of internal and external validity (see, e.g., Piazza, Sniderman, & Tetlock, 1989). And Internet-based surveys greatly expand the richness and realism of stimulus materials that can be randomly administered to a representative cross section of the American public. In our view, then, research that makes use of a wider range of triangulating methods is likely to build a stronger foundation of knowledge about stereotyping. The use of TESS by social psychologists anxious to test their theories with representative adult samples is an extremely encouraging development.

The Consequences of the Laboratory: The Sterility of the Context. Beyond the subject pool, there is another characteristic of laboratory research on stereotyping that often reduces its utility in political analysis: in various ways, the sterility of the experimental environment, at least on occasion, fails to mimic conditions in the "real world," and, more specifically, isolates the phenomenon in question from its surrounding context. This is the issue frequently referred to as "mundane realism."

For one thing, an important assumption of the experimental method is that control variables, even if known to be significant determinants of the dependent variable, do not need to be incorporated into the statistical models because the practice of random subject assignment essentially guarantees that such control variables will be randomly distributed across the treatment

groups as well. It is, consequently, extremely rare to see discussions of socio-demographic or potentially related attitudinal variables in this literature, despite the known importance of these factors.

Quite frequently, however, these exogenous and moderating variables are relevant for purposes of understanding the phenomenon in question and ignoring them obscures some important consequences of the stereotypes. Paul Sniderman and Edward Carmines (1997), for example, have demonstrated that stereotypes do not have to be held by majorities, or even large minorities, to matter politically. Instead, they can be noteworthy if held by even small groups, provided that these groups are strategically located. Even while negative racial stereotypes are found disproportionately among Republicans in the United States, they are actually more consequential when held by a nontrivial number of Democrats. The reason, they argue, is that Republicans (and conservatives) have sufficient ideological reasons for opposing government assistance and affirmative action programs, so that negative stereotypes of minorities do not add appreciably to explaining their policy views.

However, for Democrats (and liberals)—individuals who are ideologically more comfortable with such policies—racial stereotypes have been found to play a more pivotal role in moderating levels of policy support, such that generally liberal individuals who *accept* negative racial stereotypes are far less likely to support welfare and affirmative action policies than are those who reject such negative images. The Democratic Party, as a result, has been unable and unwilling to mobilize its members to advance such policies, in large measure because of the prejudices of various groups within the party (e.g., Southern Democrats; see Carmines & Layman, 1998). We offer this as an illustration of how the practice of divorcing stereotypes from other beliefs and socio-demographic characteristics of the individual can serve to obscure their most important consequences.

It is also difficult to incorporate influences of the *social context* on racial attitudes using laboratory experiments. To be sure, analysts can incorporate characteristics of the social context, one or two elements at a time, but doing so is unlikely to mimic the natural setting where particular combinations of contextual elements are of interest (e.g., a high percentage of African Americans living in a majority-white, poor, rural setting). For this reason, many political scientists interested in racial attitudes have supplemented individual-level survey data with census data describing the social context in which individuals live, based on the assumption that racial attitudes are a product of both individual and contextual factors and the interaction between the two (e.g., Soss, Langbein, & Metelko, 2003). For example, recent work offers a variety of refinements to the "racial threat" hypothesis, which

states that white racial animosity increases with the percentage of blacks in a state, county, or metropolitan area (e.g., Blalock, 1967; Giles & Hertz, 1994; Huckfeldt & Kohfeld, 1989; Key, 1949/1984). The relationship has been shown to be more powerful in rural than metropolitan areas (Voss 1996, 2001) and to be stronger with regard to racial policy attitudes than to more global racial attitudes, such as stereotypes and prejudice (Glaser, 1994; Oliver & Mendelberg, 2001). While the aforementioned studies combine survey and census data, others have used survey experiments to manipulate perceptions of social context (Glaser, 2003). And finally, Gay's (2006) recent study shows how economic competition between racial groups can generate more hostility between groups than the relative size of the groups (as emphasized by the racial threat hypothesis). In Los Angeles, communities where Latinos were economically advantaged relative to their black neighbors, blacks were much more likely to harbor negative stereotypes about Latinos and to view black and Latino economic and political interests as incompatible.

There is, finally, the equally problematic practice of divorcing stereotypes, and stereotype holders, of their *historic* properties in the laboratory. As expressed by Judd et al. (1995):

> A frequent criticism of the social cognition approach to stereotyping and prejudice is that it tends to examine stereotyping issues within the context of the laboratory, focusing on stereotypes and groups that may have been artificially created or that are easily manipulated. Accordingly . . . . social cognition work has failed to deal with stereotyping and prejudice issues with groups that have a long history of conflict or with groups whose members feel very strongly about their group loyalties . . . . The obvious question to be asked.. .is whether the cognitive mechanisms that are studied in the laboratory do have analogs in intergroup relations for groups that have a long history of conflict and whose group loyalties are strong (p. 460).

This concern, as we note below, has led Judd and his colleagues to broaden their exploration to encompass stereotypic beliefs among members of minority, as well as majority, groups.

In sum, the requirements of political science research dictate a more diverse "grab-bag" of methods to investigate racial attitudes than laboratory experiments, the dominant method in social psychology. For psychologists to investigate similar topics, they should consider diversifying their portfolio of available methods. At a minimum, social psychologists interested in enhancing the mundane realism of their laboratory experiments should look to more applied work in political science to identify those elements of the social environment that need to be examined more closely and more realistically in the lab.

None of the above arguments should be interpreted as urging psychologists to abandon laboratory experiments. To the contrary, several political psychologists studying the effects of political communications, for example, have made the forceful argument that experiments are the best method for examining the impact of political ads and news broadcasts (e.g., Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; Valentino et al., 2002). And it would be hard to imagine implementing some of the demanding laboratory experiments examining racial bias in any mass survey (e.g., Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004). The general point, however, is that researchers in both disciplines need to be acutely aware of the costs as well as the benefits of relying on a single methodology.

THE VIEWS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS

To this point, we have underscored mainly the differences between disciplines in their approach to the study of stereotyping. One characteristic—indeed, problem—with the study of racial stereotypes *common* to both disciplines is the tendency to focus on whites' views of African Americans, with little or no attention to the views of blacks. As Sigelman and Welch (1991) noted more than a decade ago, "when we consider almost any controversial issue relating to race, we find that a great deal is known about whites' attitudes but little is known about blacks' " (p. 2; see also Bobo, 1997). In the area of stereotyping, for example, stereotype batteries typically include traits (e.g., intelligence and work ethic) that define whites' views of blacks rather than the other way around (e.g., to what extent are whites racist?). Naturally, it is next to impossible to understand interracial conflict if African Americans are conspicuously absent from studies of racial attitudes. Certainly a good deal of conflict and misunderstanding between the races arises from the different perspectives, beliefs and assumptions that each brings to the perceptual table. Although some inroads have been made in restoring balance to research on stereotyping and prejudice,[3] too little is currently known about the attitudes of African Americans.

For this reason, Judd and Park's (Chapter 9) recent focus on the different perspectives of whites and African Americans is a welcome addition to the field. In a series of studies based on nonprobability samples, the authors

[3] In political science, see, for example, Bobo and Johnson (2004), Davis and Silver (2003), Gay (2006), Gilliam and Iyengar (2000), Kinder and Sanders (1996), Sigelman and Welch (1991), Welch, Sigelman, Bledsoe, and Combs (2001), and White (2007); in social psychology, see, Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998), Steele and Aronson (1995), and the collection in Swim and Stangor (1998).

found that while younger African American participants reported more stereotypic views of both whites and blacks than did older respondents, the racial stereotypes of younger whites were weaker and less extreme. The authors suggest that these differences in stereotype strength may be tied to broader ideological perspectives used by the two groups.

> [Many younger] white Americans have largely adopted a "color-blind" ideology, advocating that issues of race and ethnicity in our society are best dealt with if one attempts to treat everyone as individuals, and that race and ethnicity should not make any difference in how people are treated . . . . Many young African-Americans are going in an ideologically very different direction, one that might be characterized as a "multicultural" ideological point of view. They are being increasingly socialized to say that ethnicity *does* matter; that people in our society are treated differently as a function of their race and ethnic background . . . (Judd & Park, Chapter 9, pp. 209–210)

Our most recent work (Hurwitz & Peffley, 2005; Peffley & Hurwitz, 2007) suggests that such different perspectives have an experiential basis and, more importantly, may have dramatic political consequences. In a national survey of approximately 600 whites and 600 African Americans, we examined the antecedents and consequences of beliefs about the *fairness of the criminal justice system.* A wide chasm was found to exist between the races in their evaluations of the justice system: whereas most African Americans believe that racial injustice and a more general lack of fairness pervades the justice system, most whites view the justice system as equitable. What gives rise to such different perspectives and how do they drive polarized responses in the justice domain? Fairness beliefs are certainly tied to racial stereotypes; for example, whites who rate blacks more negatively are much more likely to view the justice system as fair and to believe that the system treats blacks fairly. Beyond this, however, fairness judgments have an important experiential basis, particularly among African Americans; blacks who report being treated unfairly by the police are significantly more likely to rate the justice system as unfair, whether the justice system is defined in terms of the courts, the police, or the justice system in general.

Most importantly, general beliefs about the fairness of the justice system were found to be highly consequential to the way whites and African Americans interpret various scenarios designed to simulate controversies over police brutality and racial profiling. Once again, we rely on several survey experiments where we manipulate the race of the civilian target in police brutality and drug search scenarios. After describing each scenario, we ask respondents a variety of questions about their interpretations of police behavior, such as: "Are the police likely to launch a fair investigation of the brutality incident involving a (black/white) motorist?" and "Did the

police conduct a fair search of (black/white) drug suspects?" White and African American respondents reveal two distinct perceptual patterns in reacting to the scenarios. Similar to Judd and Park's studies, whites respond as if they regard the justice system as essentially "color-blind," paying little attention to the race of the civilian. The majority of African Americans who view the justice system as unfair, however, are highly suspicious of the system when the police confront African American civilians.

In short, many whites, despite an undeniable history of actual racial discrimination in the criminal justice system, appear to adhere steadfastly to a color-blind perspective in their reactions to the scenarios. At the same time, many African Americans seem quick to assume the worst motives on the part of police involved in confrontations with blacks—assumptions that, doubtless, are driven by the stereotypes they hold of the white majority in control of the criminal justice system. These reactions doubtless contribute to interracial tensions, as blacks see whites as insensitive and whites see blacks as responding to a simple ingroup favoritism bias.

CONCLUSIONS

At the beginning of this chapter, we employed the metaphor of the conceptual marriage counselor, whose job is to improve the working relationship between two disciplines—psychology and political science—that focus on a common phenomenon but with fundamentally different perspectives, interests, theories, and certainly procedures. Our intention in introducing this metaphor has been not only to underscore the nature of these differences in quite specific terms but also, where appropriate, to underscore instances where one discipline has learned (or might have learned) from the other. We have, consequently, referred frequently to work done in political science that has used, as its conceptual and theoretical underpinning, the literature from psychology.

At the risk of playing the aggrieved spouse in the troubled marriage, however, we are obliged to note that, due to the recent vintage of the work in political science, most social psychologists appear unaware of relevant scholarship in political science. We view this as unfortunate, in large measure because we believe that psychologists could profit immensely by broadening their sights to include some of this research and by expanding their attention to the collective sources and consequences of stereotyping.

One important way that psychologists could benefit from political research is to broaden their use of research methods that enhance their ability to generalize beyond the laboratory setting. As we have argued, the sterility of the laboratory and the inherent restrictions in the subject pool are problematic, particularly in tandem, for the study of racial stereotyping. Not

only should political scientists more often exploit the benefits of experimental manipulation and random assignment to enhance the internal validity of their findings, but psychologists should more often implement procedures to enhance the external validity of their findings, as well. Obviously, the near-exclusive reliance on a single methodology—whether it be survey research in the case of political science or laboratory experiments in psychology—limits the range of questions that can be investigated as well as the resulting knowledge base in a given field.

Beyond methodology, however, is the issue of the focus of stereotyping research in political science and social psychology. Compared with political scientists, who could easily be faulted for being overly eclectic in studying all sorts of issues that bear on the collective consequences of stereotypes, psychologists have focused like a laser beam on the cognitive processes underlying stereotypes, with only scant attention to important issues of stereotype content, consensus, and political and societal consequences. Much the same could be said for the study of the other end of the causal string—that is, the antecedents of stereotyping. Political scientists examine a variety of societal sources of racial stereotypes, while psychologists focus almost exclusively on direct interpersonal contact. While it may be convenient to assume that stereotypes are generated from interpersonal relations, stereotypes have multiple antecedents and the source of the stereotype must, somehow, affect its properties. Thus, while a more focused research agenda among psychologists contains important benefits—for example, a "tighter," more circumscribed theory of stereotyping—the downside may be a narrow range of applicability of these theories.

As students of stereotyping, political scientists came late to the party, thereby having the luxury of being able to draw on an immense and invaluable literature from psychology. This extant research has provided a vast storehouse of knowledge, particularly germane to the cognitive processes by which stereotypes affect the use of new information. While we do not argue that psychologists should redirect their focus of study to matters of collective consequence or the societal sources of stereotype acquisition, we do argue that their work could be made far more careful and nuanced, and ultimately richer, by becoming better informed of some of the research methods and findings in other disciplines.

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Technology and Mass Media

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CHAPTER 12

Collective Identity and the Mass Media

William A. Gamson

This chapter explores the relationship between media practices in the United States and normative conceptualizations of a healthy democracy. While a media system that discourages participation meets the normative standards of representative democracy, democratic theorizations that call for an active and engaged citizenry require a media that can develop and articulate a sense of collective identity. From this normative perspective, the chapter explores the personalization of news and the media's use of adversarial frames. Each of these media trajectories presents a double-edged sword for advocates of participation-oriented democratic theory. Personalization tends to discourage the development of a collective identity, yet it also provides the opportunity for grassroots constituencies to mobilize around particular issues. Likewise, adversarial framing encourages individuals to actively participate on behalf of one side of a conflict. At the same time, adversarial frames can create unnecessary and misleading oppositions and impede the development of cooperation and coalition formation.

INTRODUCTION: DEMOCRATIC THEORY AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Do the mass media provide the tools we need for democratic public life? The answer to this big question clearly depends on the theory of democratic politics with which one begins. More specifically, it depends on what role the model envisions for citizens and, on this question, there is a long history of controversy with little normative consensus.

In spite of this lack of consensus on what the normative criteria should be, there seems to be a surprising amount of agreement that the mass media as they currently operate are seriously inadequate. The complaints are diverse and sometimes contradictory, especially if the target includes not only elite news media but also a broader spectrum of the popular press and television. No one seems to think that the media provides what citizens need to sustain a vital democracy.

We are told[1] that most media discourse:

- Is irrational and lacks reasoned argumentation.
- Contains lies and distortions and deliberate misinformation.
- Contains ad hominem attacks, character assassination, and name-calling.
- Shows a lack of civility and mutual respect.
- Polarizes issues and discourages dialogue among those with differing opinions.
- Appeals to the emotions rather than to the brain.
- Is superficial, contains gross oversimplifications, and lacks subtlety and nuance.
- Excludes many voices and lacks openness to many perspectives, especially those held by groups with fewer resources and less cultural power.
- Encourages passivity, quiescence, and nonparticipation on the part of the citizenry.

The last of these criticisms will provide the focus for this chapter. Not all versions of democratic theory posit that active citizen participation is desirable. In Ferree, Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002, Chapter Ten), my collaborators and I reviewed four traditions of democratic theory, labeled *representative liberal, participatory liberal, discursive,* and *constructionist,* so as to unpack the normative criteria for mass media that each tradition endorses and emphasizes.

Representative Liberal Tradition

At one end of the representative liberal tradition are those who take a strongly elitist and conservative stance—the "school of democratic elitism," as Bachrach (1967) calls it. These theorists so much fear the participation of "the rabble" in democratic politics that they wish to see filters and barriers erected to diminish the citizen's role. At the other end are writers who want a strong and well-functioning public sphere, but see its role as strengthening a system of formal representation that secures the real basis of democracy. We focus particularly on theories that accept the desirability of a public

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[1] There are many critical assessments of the failure of the mass media, especially the U.S. media, to provide what citizens need. See, for example, Altheide (1976), Bennett (1996), Croteau and Hoynes (1994), Fallows (1996), Herman and Chomsky (1988), and Parenti (1993).

sphere but one in which general public participation is limited and largely indirect.[2]

This tradition shares the assumption that ultimate authority in society rests with the citizenry. Citizens need policy makers who are ultimately accountable to them but they do not need to participate in public discourse on policy issues. Not only do they not need to, but public life is actually better off if they don't. This is the "realist" school of democracy—the belief that ordinary citizens are poorly informed and have no serious interest in public affairs and are generally ill-equipped for political participation. Hence, it is both natural and desirable for citizens to be passive, quiescent, and limited in their political participation in a well-functioning, party-led democracy.

To expect citizens to be actively engaged in public life is seen by advocates of this view as at best wishful thinking, what Baker (1998) in summarizing this theory characterizes as "romantic but idle fantasy." At worst, encouraging such engagement obstructs and complicates the problems of democratic governance by politicizing and oversimplifying complex problems that require skilled leadership and technical expertise. The media retain an important role in this theory—for example, exposure of corruption and incompetence and providing decision makers with reliable information, including information about public concerns. But the media do not need to promote civic engagement or even reflection and discussion.

Participatory Liberal Tradition

The other strands of democratic theory call for a more active citizen role. The common thread in the participatory liberal tradition is the desirability of maximizing the participation of citizens in the public decisions that affect their lives. To do this, they should, to the extent feasible, be active participants in the public sphere as part of an ongoing process. With roots in Rousseau's preference for direct democracy over representative democracy, writers in this tradition often share a distrust of institutional barriers and mediating structures that make participation indirect and difficult. While Hirst (1994) refers to this as an "associative democracy," Barber (1984) calls his version "strong democracy":

> Strong democracy is defined by politics in the participatory mode: literally it is self-government by citizens rather than representative government in the

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[2] One can trace roots of representative liberal theory back to John Stuart Mill (1861) and such skeptical commentators on popular democracy and the French revolution as Edmund Burke (1790). Schumpeter's *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942) is a classic modern articulation. More contemporary exemplars include Anthony Downs' *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) and William Kornhauser's *The Politics of Mass Society* (1960).

name of citizens. Active citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are being decided and when significant power is deployed. (p. 151)

Furthermore, participation in public discourse is an ongoing process, and the participation of these grassroots actors should be continuous—not simply something that occurs periodically during election campaigns or only at the beginning of the decision-making process. Participation transforms individuals into public citizens. In this view, political interests are not given a priori by the descriptive characteristics of people, but produced in the political process. To quote Barber (1984) again:

In place of a search for a pre-political independent ground or for an immutable rational plan, strong democracy relies on participation in an evolving problem-solving community that creates public ends where there were none before by means of its own activity ... In such communities, public ends are neither extrapolated from absolutes nor 'discovered' in a preexisting "hidden consensus." They are literally forged through the act of public participation, created through common deliberation and common action and the effect that deliberation and action have on interests, which change shape and direction when subjected to these participatory processes. (p. 151)

Discursive Tradition

The line between participatory liberal and discursive theories is not easy to draw, especially regarding who should be included in the public sphere. As Cohen (1989) puts it, "The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intuitive ideal of a democratic association in which justification of the terms and conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among equal citizens" (p. 17).

Jürgen Habermas,[3] the most commanding figure in this tradition, accepts the fact that decisions on public affairs are normally made at the political center —by government agencies, parliaments, courts, and political parties. For routine decisions, it is reasonable and acceptable if these are made without extensive public discussion. But when important normative questions are at stake, it is crucial that the discussion not be limited to actors at the center of the political system. On such issues, a well-functioning public sphere should simultaneously include actors from the *periphery* as well—that is, civil society actors including especially grassroots organizations.

The civic or public journalism movement in the United States draws much of its inspiration from this discursive tradition. Lambeth (1998), in an essay discussing civic journalism as democratic practice, suggests that if it

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[3] In this section, I am primarily drawing on Habermas (1984) and (1989).

were "to require a philosophical patron saint, Habermas . . . would appear to be a logical nominee" (p. 27). Or to quote Rosen (1994), one of the major articulators of the civic journalism project, journalists should "focus on citizens as actors within rather than spectators to [the democratic process]" (p. 376). In sum, the discursive tradition shares the value of civic engagement with participatory liberalism, but unlike that tradition, views this as a means to a more deliberative public sphere rather than as an end in itself.

Constructionist Tradition

This body of theory is indebted to Michel Foucault in identifying discourse as the practices of power diffused outside formal political institutions, making use of seemingly neutral categories of knowledge and expertise to control others as well as to construct the self as a political actor. Many of the most active theorists in this tradition such as Nancy Fraser (1995, 1997), Seyla Benhabib (1992, 1996), and Iris Marion Young (1996) begin from feminist premises and develop their theories in part to explain and critique the marginality of women in politics.

They point out that the very definition of "politics" situates it as a separate "sphere" apart from and in some ways "naturally" opposed to private life. From this perspective, the sharp boundary drawn between "politics" and everything else that happens in life serves to obscure the continuities of power relations across these domains and is itself, therefore, a discursive use of power.

While the participatory liberal tradition wants grassroots actors to mobilize and speak to the media in the media's terms, the constructionist tradition wants the media to step out of its routines for dealing with the powerful and actively seek out other perspectives at the grassroots. Benhabib (1992), for example, is critical of the way participation is understood in the republican civic virtue tradition, contrasting it with:

> a conception of participation which emphasizes the determination of norms of action through the practical debate of all affected by them . . . . This modernist understanding of participation yields a novel conception of public space. Public space is not understood agonistically as a space of competition for acclaim and immortality among a political elite; it is viewed democratically as the creation of procedures whereby those affected by general social norms and collective political decisions can have a say in their formulation, stipulation, and adoption. . . . Democratization in contemporary societies can be viewed as the increase and growth of autonomous public spheres among participants. (pp. 86-87)

Constructionists challenge the desirability of a single public sphere, preferring the idea of multiple independent public spheres. Dialogue in a single

public sphere is not necessarily as desirable as autonomous and separate cultural domains, or "free spaces" in which individuals may speak together supportively and develop their identities free of the conformity pressures of the mainstream.

How the *popular inclusion* criterion applies to general audience mass media is less clear. Unlike the participatory liberal tradition, which sees public discourse as a resource for mobilizing individuals to join a separate "political" sphere, this constructionist tradition sees the political sphere as spilling across the artificial boundary between public and private. Because politics resonate throughout an individual's "private" life, a good public discourse would include individual speakers who would name and exemplify such connections for others.

In spite of their differences, the participatory liberal, discursive, and constructionist traditions share the recurrent theme that, in a democracy, the media can and should empower citizens, give them voice and agency, build community, and help citizens to act on behalf of their interests and values. The normative standard here is one of engaging citizens in the democratic process through their active participation in the public sphere.

HOW CAN THE MEDIA ENGAGE CITIZENS?

Let's accept the normative standard of engaging citizens in the democratic process, and ask *how* the media can help to engage people as citizens and how we would know, for any set of media texts, how well it was succeeding. Given the many-faceted nature of the task, we need a more specified model of the nature of citizen action that the media is expected to facilitate. The model I have in mind draws on theories of contentious politics and, more specifically, the concept of *collective action frames*.

These frames, to quote Snow and Benford (1992), are "action oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate social movement activities and campaigns." They offer ways of understanding that imply the need for and desirability of some form of action. Ryan (1991) and Gamson (1992) unpack the concept into three components: injustice, agency, and identity.

The *injustice* component refers to the moral indignation expressed in this form of political consciousness. This is not merely a cognitive or intellectual judgement about what is equitable but also what cognitive psychologists call a *hot* cognition—one that is laden with emotion (see Zajonc, 1980). An injustice frame requires an awareness of motivated human actors who carry some of the onus for bringing about harm and suffering. These adversaries supply

the other, the "they" to our "we," thereby linking injustice to the identity component.

The *agency* component refers to the consciousness that it is possible to alter conditions or policies through collective action. Collective action frames imply some sense of collective efficacy and deny the immutability of some undesirable situation. They empower people by defining them as potential agents of their own history.[4] A consciousness of collective agency is not simply a matter of believing that something can be done but that *we* can do something. It cannot happen unless there is some sense of who *we* are, thereby linking agency to the identity component.

The *identity* component refers to the process of defining this *we*, typically but not necessarily in opposition to some *they* who have different interests or values. Without an adversarial component, the potential target of collective action is likely to remain an abstraction—hunger, disease, poverty, or war, for example. Collective action requires a consciousness of human agents whose policies or practices must be changed and a *we* who will help to bring about the change.

Each component is necessary but not sufficient for producing a collective action frame. This chapter focuses on the identity component and, in particular, on ways in which the media can encourage or discourage the development of collective identities that foster civic engagement on the part of those who hold them. This is only one piece of the puzzle.

We have come some way from the big question with which we began— do the mass media provide the tools we need for democratic public life?—to a more modest and manageable question—do the mass media provide this one particular tool for encouraging civic engagement: support and encouragement of grassroots constituencies in their attempts to articulate and develop a sense of themselves as a community of action?

Political Interest Mediation

The dual role of the mass media as both sponsor of meaning and site of a meaning contest emphasizes its role in a complex system of what Rucht (1995) calls "political interest mediation." Various actors in this system— political parties, corporations, associations, and social movements—attempt to generate, aggregate, transform, and articulate the interests of some underlying constituency. The carriers of the interests of any given constituency are typically a *field* of actors of different types. Green interests in Germany, for example, are mediated by a movement/party that is simultaneously part of

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[4] Gamson (2001) explores the role of the mass media in fostering the agency component, complementing the focus of this essay on the identity component.

the political party and movement subsystems and is variously linked with associations as well.

To call this a mediation system, as Rucht (1995) reminds us, implies the linking of at least two external elements which, for a variety of reasons, cannot or do not communicate directly. They "obey conflicting logic and principles which permit no direct link" (Rucht, 1995, p. 105) or, more metaphorically, they don't speak the same language. However, the mediation system discussed here does much more than simply translate inputs and outputs into a common language. It takes on a life of its own with its own operating logic and interests and transforms and shapes what is being communicated; indeed, its processes often override the intentions of actors in the external systems being linked.

If a field of social actors is a carrier of interests in a complex mediation system, what are the external systems being linked? On the one hand, we have constituencies. One may think of these as solidarity groups or, to borrow Anderson's (1991) useful concept, "imagined communities." Examples would include women, workers, Christians, greens, conservatives, Latinos, the "left," and many others. Since people have multiple identities, they are potentially part of many constituencies.

A given imagined community may provide a *lead identity* for some people that they use on all or most issues, while for others it may be one of several that vary in salience from issue to issue. The degree of solidarity or personal identification with a particular imagined community is an empirical question, with the operation of the interest mediation system providing most of the explanation.

The other end of the mediation system is more problematic and forces us to take a closer look at what is meant by "interests." Consider, for example, that the constituency whose interests are being mediated is "farmers." The term "interests" conjures up images of crop subsidies, regulations, and other agricultural policies that will operate to the advantage or disadvantage of this group. Or perhaps of power arrangements that will increase or decrease the political influence of those who carry the political interests of farmers. In this narrow sense of policy interests, the other end of the mediation system is the system of authorities who are able to make binding decisions on policies and how they are implemented.

But farmers also have certain "interests" in the nature of public discourse, and these include both interests in promoting desired policy frames in various forums, and also more subtle ones that do not relate to any specific policy contests. As an example of the former, support for policies favoring farmers is likely to be greater if the image of farmers in public discourse emphasizes the small, independent family farm rather than the agribusiness that

is, in fact, the dominant "farmer" in the production and distribution of most crops.

In addition to this instrumental and strategic use of public discourse to further policy interests, some groups of farmers may have concerns about the degree of respect they receive in the broader culture—for example, about the disparaging depiction of white farmers in the South as "rednecks" or "hillbillies" in movies and in television entertainment forums. In short, the various constituencies whose interests are being mediated have *symbolic interests*.

For the mediation of symbolic interests, the other end of the mediation system is less clear. Authorities do not make binding decisions about language use nor does anyone else. Their decisions about usage may or may not be adopted by others and often authorities may simply follow the lead of various parts of the mediation system—especially the dominant usage in mass media discourse. Hence, *for symbolic interests, it is the outputs of the mass media system, rather than the decisions of authorities, that are being linked to constituencies through the mediation system.*

Note that authorities have an important role in this mass media system, but wearing a different hat. They are important players who bring a rich variety of resources, access, and skills to the game of influencing mass media outputs. But they still must compete with other players and, since their symbolic interests often diverge, they become multiple players rather than a single united front.

COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

As Melucci (1989, pp. 32, 34) observes, "Only if individual actors can recognize their coherence and continuity as actors will they be able to write their own script of social reality and compare expectations and outcomes." Expectations are socially constructed and outcomes can be evaluated only by actors "who are capable of defining themselves and the field of their action. The process of constructing, maintaining, and altering a collective identity provides the basis for actors to shape their expectations and calculate the costs and benefits of their action."

If the concept of collective identity sometimes seems excessively vague and difficult to operationalize, this may be in part because of the tendency to blur individual and cultural levels in some discussions of the concept. The locus of collective identity is cultural; it is manifested through the language and symbols by which it is publicly expressed. We know a collective identity through the cultural icons and artifacts displayed by those who embrace it. It is manifested in styles of dress, language, and demeanor. Collective identity

need not be treated as some mysterious intangible but can be as empirically observable as a T-shirt or a haircut. To measure it, one would ask people about the meaning of labels and other cultural symbols, not about their own personal identity.

Political psychology helps us to recognize, and not take for granted, the process of bridging individual and cultural levels. This bridging process takes place when the personal identities of some constituency increasingly include the relevant collective identity as part of their definition of self. This is a negotiated process in which the "we" involved in collective action is elaborated and given meaning—and the media can help or hinder this bridging process.

Some democratic theorists show a special awareness of this potential contribution. Hence, Mansbridge (1996, p. 57) observes that "the present reigning hostility to 'identity politics' does not recognize the value to democracy of deliberative enclaves in which the relatively like-minded can consult with each other." These informal *enclaves of resistance* foster other components of collective action frames as well but they surely encourage an internal process centered on who we are and what we stand for.

Similarly, Fraser (1997, p. 81) emphasizes the importance of *subaltern counter-publics* that "invent and circulate counter discourses." Revisionist historians of the public sphere have reexamined Habermas' (1962/1989) account in *Structural Transformation*, paying attention to alternatives to the bourgeois public sphere he emphasizes. "This history," Fraser summarizes, "records that members of subordinated social groups—women, workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians—have repeatedly found it advantageous to constitute alternative publics." In their own forums, they are able to "formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests, and needs."

These arguments imply the need for multiple public forums rather than one comprehensive public sphere. They provide an important role for alternative media but their implications for the role of general audience mass media are less clear. Assuming a total media system that allows for a vigorous alternative sector, is it necessary for the mainstream media to provide space for the development of collective identity?

Fraser (1997, p. 83) points to an answer when she observes that public spheres are not only "arenas for the formation of discursive opinion; in addition, they are arenas for the formation and enactment of social identities." Participation is not merely a matter of having an opportunity to express one's ideas but of "being able to speak 'in one's own voice,' thereby simultaneously constructing and expressing one's cultural identity through idiom and style." The mass media, as the most widely shared forum of public

discourse, is the most central and important site in which the enactment of collective identity takes place; hence, we must ask whether it encourages or discourages such expression.

The argument for this role of the media remains even if one shares the fears of some democratic theorists that this form of identity politics can lead to self-contained enclaves in which people speak only to like-minded others—a Balkanization of the public sphere in which there is no common discourse. An adequate media system for a complex democracy must meet many other criteria beyond encouraging the formation and enactment of collective identities. Certainly one of these is to provide a deliberative forum in which diverse groups can search for ways of turning their separate visions into a common dream.

If we are to avoid a pseudo-consensus, however, Baker (1998) argues that "agreement on a common good . . . can only be real if based on groups' own self-reflective commitments." If this condition is not met, dissenting groups are left with the unpalatable choice of either going along with something they do not really support or "appearing selfish in their denial of purported common goods and in their pursuit of their narrow interests." Baker concludes that a "complex democracy requires media entities that support groups' internal discursive and reflective needs for self-definition, cultural development, and value clarification."

Broadening the normative role of the media in this way also tends to broaden the type of media that one examines. The importance of these self-reflective and self-definitional activities points to the importance of a range of programming beyond news and public affairs. "Fiction, art, dance play integral roles in individuals' and groups' reflective and definitional processes," Baker argues. To understand whether the mass media are encouraging or discouraging collective identity processes, one must look beyond news coverage and commentary on state action to the full panoply of mass media products.

PERSONALIZATION IN THE U.S. MEDIA

Critics of American media often focus on the strong tendency to personalize broader social issues. As Bennett (1996) articulates the criticism:

> If there is a single most important flaw in the American news style, it is the overwhelming tendency to downplay the big social, economic, or political picture in favor of the human trials and triumphs that sit at the surface of events. In place of power and process, the media concentrate on the people engaged in political combat over the issues . . . When people are invited to "take the news personally," they can find a wide range of private, emotional meanings

in it. However, the meanings inspired by personalized news are not the shared critical and analytical meanings on which a healthy democracy thrives. Personalized news encourages people to take an egocentric rather than a socially concerned view of political problems. (p. 39)

Furthermore, this media practice of personalization is strongly reinforced by a broader set of sociocultural forces that discourage thinking about issues in collective terms. Gans (1979) describes individualism as an enduring value in the news. Individuals, acting on their own terms rather than collectively, are continually presented as "a source of economic, social, and cultural productivity" and "a means of achieving cultural variety" (p. 51).

Iyengar's (1991) distinction between episodic and thematic news frames can be read as part of this personalization critique. "The episodic news frame focuses on specific events or particular cases, while the thematic news frame places political issues and events in some general context" (1991, p. 2). The particular cases he has in mind include the personal stories discussed here. Iyengar's research blames the U.S. media for its relative emphasis on episodic rather than thematic coverage, thereby producing a public deficit in the understanding of complex issues.

"In practice," Iyengar (1991) concedes, "few news reports are exclusively episodic or thematic. Even the most detailed, close-up look at a particular poor person, for instance, invariably includes lead-in remarks by the anchorperson or reporter on the scope of poverty nationwide" (p. 14). In my own research, I have found through failed attempts to use the distinction in coding stories that it boils down to the explicitness of the larger frame. Even with no lead-in remarks or analysis of the welfare issue, the choice of a personal story (with accompanying photograph) of a black 15-year-old welfare recipient who is pregnant with a second child, is implicit with thematic messages about welfare. Gilens (1999) does an excellent job of demonstrating how the media carry misleading implicit messages in such episodic coverage that shape how Americans view welfare. But the problem is not solved by making the themes explicit, as Iyengar implies, but by choosing different stories to highlight other themes.

Not just news but also entertainment and advertising are heavily implicated in the personalization process. Merelman (1984) tells us that a "loosely bounded culture prevents Americans from controlling their political and social destinies, for the world which loose boundedness portrays is not the world of political and social structures that actually exists. It is, instead, a shadowland, which gives Americans little real purchase on the massive, hierarchical political and economic structures that dominate their lives" (p. 1). Merelman analyzes the role of television in particular in promoting a loosely

bounded culture that backs people away from politics and directs them toward a private vision of the self in the world.

Of particular relevance for collective identity, Carbaugh (1988) uses audience discussion of issues on the then popular talk show *Donahue* to analyze what he calls the "equivocal enactment of individuality and community." It is seen most clearly in discourse on the symbol of the person as an "individual." This symbol, Carbaugh (1988) writes, allows speakers to transcend the differences that are implied when people are discussed as members of social groups with some collective identity. "By defining persons as individuals, speakers can state what is common among all persons and groups" (p. 23). With this symbol, one asserts simultaneously that we are both all alike and each unique in being individuals. Through its use, "a definition of persons is constructed which enables meanings of both a common humanity and separate humanness" (p. 23).

In this discourse, persons as individuals have rights; social groups and institutions are moved to the rear. Although the term "equal rights," for example, could apply to the claims of a solidarity group as well as to those of an individual, the discourse privileges the rights of individuals and makes the articulation of collective claims problematic. The assertion of injustices based on social inequalities, for example, must contend with a culturally normative response that asserts we are all individuals and implicitly denies the relevance of social location and group differences.

By this account, U.S. media discourse actively discourages grassroots constituencies in their attempts to articulate and develop a sense of themselves as a community of action. I do not dispute the criticism but I am wary that it ignores the potential agency of interest mediators in a contingent process. It is not inevitable that personalization undermines collective identity and, under certain conditions, it can be a tool for promoting it.

It Takes a Whole Movement[5]

Bennett (1996) recognizes the contingent nature of personalization, writing "The tendency to personalize the news might be less worrisome if human interest angles were used to 'hook' audiences into more serious analysis of issues and problems" (p. 40). In Chapter 13, he takes up the challenge of specifying the contingencies since "Rather than playing up discouraging and isolating emotions, news reporting could just as systematically hit emotional buttons that link individual identifications with a sense that there is some

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[5] I am indebted to Charlotte Ryan for making me fully aware of the contingent nature of personalization and for the apt and allusive phrasing of the point.

group or collectivity with the potential to do something about a social problem." How frequently this actually happens is an empirical matter and is likely to vary from issue to issue.

That it can and sometimes does happen should lead us to ask what conditions need to be present for it to occur. Bennett (Chapter 13) suggests a number of hypotheses. For example, "*the engaged citizen* is more likely to dominate news frames on issues that have become so polarized and spread throughout the political system that the action of a particular institution or a decisive conflict between elites is unavailable as a story angle for simplifying the political status of the issue."

In Gamson (1999), I argue that particular norms and practices, which separate the language of the life-world from discourse on public policy, discourage civic engagement in a selective way. They do so by privileging certain forms of presentation over others. In particular, they favor speech that is dispassionate and disembodied. They presuppose an opposition between mind and body, reason and emotion. They favor argument over narrative, decontexualized arguments from general principles over contextualized arguments rooted in concrete circumstances, and statistical data over experiential knowledge.

The exclusionary character of these practices is especially evident on an issue such as abortion. Consider the implications of discounting experiential knowledge and storytelling—the primary currency of the life-world. The existential experience of the dilemma of an unwanted pregnancy is gender-specific. If one rules out talking about such experiences in policy discourse, the silencing falls unequally on men and women.

Personalization, in this argument, only opens discursive opportunities. Whether and how much these actually increase a sense of collective identity depends on how such stories are utilized as hooks. Telling one's personal story in the media can be part of a process of articulating a collective identity and developing a clearer sense of a group's symbolic interests. For example, it has often functioned this way on the abortion issue.

In 1962, when abortion was not yet a topic for general public discourse, Sherri Finkbine told her personal human-interest story to a friend who worked for the local newspaper where she lived.[6] Finkbine, married with four young children and pregnant with a fifth, had been taking a sleeping pill that her husband had brought back from a European trip several months earlier. The drug, it turned out, was Thalidomide—the side effects of which were only then becoming known. She had taken the strongest possible

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[6] I draw here on the account in Luker (1984, pp. 62–65).

dosage. Her physician advised her that the odds for serious fetal deformity were very high and suggested a therapeutic abortion for which she applied.

A newspaper story by her friend appeared the next day, without identifying her by name, but under the black-bordered headline: "Baby-Deforming Drug May Cost Woman Her Child Here." Within hours of the paper's appearance, the hospital cancelled her scheduled abortion, which under existing state law was legal only if the life of the mother was in danger. A few days later, her physician asked for a court order to perform the abortion, identifying the Finkbines by name in the legal request.

Wire services picked up the story, and the Finkbines were soon deluged with reporters as well as letters and phone calls from total strangers, expressing their views. Some of the callers made death threats against her and her children and the FBI was brought in to protect her. Wanting to escape the pressure and publicity, she and her husband fled to Sweden, where she applied for permission for a therapeutic abortion under a law that allowed fetal deformity as one ground for approving it. Returning home, after obtaining the abortion, she lost her job and the calls and letters continued for some time.

For Sherri Finkbine personally, having her story told in the media was hardly an empowering experience. In retrospect though, we can see it as playing a central role in a process in which a "private" matter that one did not talk about in public becomes an issue of "public concern" and, hence, a legitimate arena for public policy debate. The personalization furthered this transformation and helped an emerging abortion reform movement articulate a collective identity.

The details of the Finkbine case were important because they presented a best case scenario for the sponsors of abortion reform at that time. In 1957, Planned Parenthood had held a conference on the medical practice of abortion as it currently existed. This conference made public a "secret" that was previously known only to doctors and countless women who didn't talk about it. The secret was the fact that medically approved abortions were frequently occurring in cases of rape and incest, mental illnesses such as depression, medical complications that were not life threatening for the mother, and at times for fetal deformity as well.

This widespread practice was clearly going beyond what the laws in various states allowed. A major outgrowth of the conference was an effort, carried out by the American Law Institute (ALI), to create a model abortion law. This proposed legislation would, if adopted, bring the law more into accord with actual practice by creating legal exceptions for these grave circumstances. Media personalization of the abortion issue through the

Finkbine story helped to break the "century of silence" (Luker, 1984) on public discussion of abortion and to further, through its perfect narrative fit, the preferred frame of the emerging abortion reform movement.

In the 1970s and later, not only in the United States but in Germany and other countries as well, the "speak out" became part of the repertoire of both the abortion rights movement and the antiabortion movement. Telling one's personal story in public, and having it carried in media discourse in this context, is what one might call a form of *collective personalization*—one is adding one's story to a growing array of such stories, representing a collective witness more than merely an individual one.

Because of the existence of movements on this issue, the lesson is unlikely to be divorced from the story. There are, of course, different arrays of stories with different lessons. Antiabortion groups encourage personal stories about abortions that are later deeply regretted, while abortion rights groups encourage personal stories about how horrible it was to face an unwanted pregnancy in the days when abortion was illegal and unsafe. Each array carries its own lessons built into the narrative. Personalizing, in this movement context, encourages the articulation of collective identities and symbolic interests.

In sum, the meanings inspired by personalized news in this instance are shared and critical and support a socially concerned view of political problems. Indeed, they can be seen as a way of bridging personal and collective identities and fostering the development of constituencies as communities of action. Media reliance on personalized news is double-edged. The critics are right about its overall thrust toward discouraging collective identity but it also presents a discursive opportunity for mediators to develop and articulate a collective identity.

ADVERSARIAL FRAMES IN THE U.S. MEDIA

Collective identities are often defined as a *we* who is in opposition to some *they* who have different interests or values. In fact, the presence of such an adversarial component seems essential to collective action frames. Groups that attempt to mobilize their constituencies with an all-inclusive *we* turn the *we* into a pool of individuals, an aggregate rather than a potential collective actor. The call for action in such frames is personal—for example, to make peace, hunger, or the environment one's own personal responsibility.

There is no clear *they* in such aggregate frames. The targets are not actors but abstractions—hunger, pollution, war, poverty, disease, and so on. These abstractions do not point to an external target whose actions or policies must

be changed. If pollution is the problem and we are all polluters, then we are the target of action. *We* are the *they* and neither agent nor target is a collective actor.

The identity component of collective action frames differentiates *we* and *they* rather than conflating them. This does not mean that the *they* in such frames is always clear and unambiguous. Challenging cultural codes often means confronting a structurally elusive target, diffused through the whole of civil society. Frames with a clear *we* and an elusive *they* are quite capable of being fully collective and adversarial; unlike aggregate frames, agent and target of action are not conflated. Such frames are simply a more complicated type of adversarial frame.

To what extent does media discourse in the United States encourage or discourage such an adversarial or oppositional collective identity? I have, in other work cited earlier, examined this question systematically on five issues: abortion, troubled industry, nuclear power, affirmative action (concerning race), and Arab–Israeli conflict. The most obvious generalization is that the answer is heavily issue dependent.

Abortion is heavily framed in adversarial terms but the adversarial nature of the issue is often deplored. There is a running theme about the "shrillness" of the abortion dialogue and the domination of the discourse by "extremists" on both sides. The norm reflected in media discourse on abortion is that it is too adversarial—a "clash of absolutes" as Tribe (1990) calls it. An adversarial identity is encouraged only in the sense that the issue is framed as a contest or battle between designated antagonists, but the reader is addressed as part of "the rest of us" who need to be heard. Such third-party frames, although they depict adversaries, discourage rather than encourage an oppositional collective identity.

Media discourse on *troubled industry*, in contrast, is remarkably free of adversarial frames. The most prominent frame, Partnership, presents us as all in the same leaky lifeboat with everybody needing to row and bail to keep us afloat. Collective categories such as business, labor, and government are part of the analysis, but the central issue is cooperation among them. Adversarial relations are presented as hangovers from the past and part of the problem that needs to be overcome.

The major competitor, Free Enterprise, challenges the cooperation idea without introducing an adversarial component. It emphasizes the self-correcting character of the market system in which the weak and inefficient lose out to the strong and efficient. Some versions of this frame have a strong antilabor component, but they are not really adversarial. They depict powerful unions as working against the real interests of working people by making American products no longer competitive.

Media discourse on **affirmative action** again emphasizes the adversarial nature of the issue. Visually, it begins as a story about a conflict between black and white workers. In the early years, white construction workers in hard hats symbolize the opposition to the demand of black workers for inclusion. By 1984, at the time of the Memphis firefighters Supreme Court decision, hard hats were replaced by fire hats and police caps, but the visual message remains the same. Columnists and newsmagazine coverage frequently quote white union leaders or rank-and-file workers in opposition to black civil rights leaders. Even frames opposing affirmative action accept the adversarial nature of the issue, placing the blame on affirmative action programs themselves for promoting or exacerbating a group conflict situation.

There are elements of adversarial class frames in media discourse on *nuclear power* with pro and antinuclear sponsors competing directly for the loyalties of working people. Class enters the picture in the pro-nuclear Progress frame through linking nuclear power to economic growth and development. Technological progress, which nuclear power symbolizes, is presented as the engine of economic growth; growth promises jobs and a higher standard of living for poor and working people. The adversarial element enters when opponents of nuclear power are depicted in class terms—as indulged children of the affluent who have everything they need. These "coercive utopians" (McCracken, 1977) are intent on imposing their antigrowth vision on others at the expense of the real interests of working people.

One antinuclear frame, Public Accountability, offers a competing class discourse on nuclear power. "If Exxon owned the sun, would we have solar energy?" it asks. The root of the problem is the organization of nuclear production by profit-making corporations, which minimizes accountability and control by the public. In the hands of a movement organization, there is a clear adversarial framing here although it seems more populist than production based. As it appears in the media, however, even this populist form becomes watered down. As a case of "the people versus the interests," no specific identity as working people is engaged. Class identity is blurred by clustering working people and middle-class professionals into an amorphous "public."

There is, then, a pinch of adversarial class framing in media discourse on nuclear power, but it does not provide the dominant flavor. The message for working people is mixed and confusing since a pro-nuclear Progress frame suggests that nuclear power is in the interest of working people, and a rival Public Accountability frame suggests that it is in the interest of powerful elites. Furthermore, although both of these frames are continually visible in

media discourse, Runaway, the most prominent media frame since 1979, has no adversarial component at all.

The only collective identity invoked by U.S. media discourse on *Arab–Israeli conflict* is a national identity as Americans. The ethnic angle is framed in interest group rather than adversarial terms. Arab and Jewish Americans are recognized as having partisan identifications and a special interest in the conflict; they are observers who root for one side or the other but are not significant players. Any adversarial relationship between these ethnic groups is very low in salience and, in any event, they represent a small minority of the population. No domestic cleavages of class or race are treated as relevant in media discourse.

Judging from these five issues, the U.S. media fluctuates dramatically by issue in the prominence of adversarial frames in the discourse. Adversarial framing is strongest on the two issues on which there is arguably the greatest ambivalence in most people's attitudes—abortion and affirmative action. On troubled industry, where adversarial class frames are culturally available and articulated by challengers who sponsor them, they are virtually invisible in mainstream media. For movements attempting to develop an oppositional collective identity, the lesson would seem to be not to expect the mass media to provide a resource for constructing an appropriate adversarial frame. Build on the life experiences of your constituents instead.

CONCLUSION

American media discourse permits but discourages grassroots constituencies in their attempts to articulate and develop a sense of themselves as a community of action. The media practice of personalization does not in itself encourage it. But it provides a discursive opportunity for a mobilizing field of actors to transform a personal sorrow or triumph into a public cause. Movements and media have a common interest in personalization.

For an active citizen model of democracy, journalistic norms should demand that personalization be hooked to a more serious analysis of issues and problems. This analysis should illuminate Merelman's shadowland and lift the veil on the broader political and economic forces that affect individual lives—using the personal narrative for illustration. In this way, media discourse becomes a useful tool for bridging the language of the life-world and policy discourse. When there is more than one plausible narrative, as there usually is, let the media be a site for competing narratives.

With respect to the development of an oppositional identity that fosters challenges to existing power arrangements or cultural codes, media norms

and practices simultaneously foster and discourage adversarial frames, favoring certain societal cleavages over others. On the one hand, conflict provides drama, color, and spectacle. War metaphors and sports metaphors are the tired clichés of news reporting. Many events lend themselves to a story line in which two determined sides are confronting each other in a contest of wills. The audience is implicitly encouraged to have a rooting interest and possibly even to participate actively on behalf of one or the other side. Certainly many who watched peaceful marchers for civil rights being attacked by local police or segregationist mobs were mobilized by such depictions.

On the other hand, the adversarial framing can and often does provide misleading and unnecessary oppositions; or both sides in the conflict are depicted as deserving contempt. In the latter case, the citizenry is encouraged to feel a plague on both sides and to withdraw from possible engagement. In the case of misleading oppositions, such media adversarial frames can make it more difficult for challengers to form coalitions among those affected in similar ways by power arrangements or cultural codes. Finally, the media's adversarial framing is much more likely to depict racial conflict than class conflict. After almost a century of discourse on American exceptionalism, it really should not surprise anyone that there is so little adversarial class discourse in the U.S. media even on an issue such as troubled industry.

Can we reasonably expect more from the media in a country in which discourse on the person as an individual, regardless of their social location, is simply "talking American" (Carbaugh, 1988)? It seems little enough to ask for a media that recognizes the reality of social location in determining one's life chances. When a group attempts to articulate and pursue injustice claims based on the shared social location of its members, such efforts should not be disparaged as "special interests." A complex democracy needs a media system that provides space for group-based claims as well as individual rights.

A media system that permits but discourages civic engagement is good enough for a representative liberal model of democracy. But for any democratic theory that calls for a more active and participant citizenry, we need a media that permits and encourages constituencies—particularly those with less cultural power—to develop and articulate a collective identity. Alternative media may provide the main space for such reflection and articulation, but it helps when the mainstream media also provide space for enacting who *we* are in our own distinctive voices, idioms, and cultural styles.

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Social Identity and Representations of Society and Politics in the News

W. Lance Bennett

This chapter argues that a model of communication based on demographic-targeted marketing and strategic political communication has become a dominant force in the United States, and that this development has profound consequences for the patterns of social identification in late modern society. In particular, over the past 20 years, television news content has trended toward fewer displays of collective representations, fewer positive portrayals of government, and fewer stories about policy issues. The move toward a more personalized and consumer-oriented news format, charged with negative emotional images, has numerous political implications. In particular, the chapter argues that changes in the media engender a sense of isolation, failing to connect citizens who might share a collective sense of concern and need for action. The implications of this dynamic are explored, as well as the potential for Internet communication to correct for the shortcomings of mainstream news.

In what ways can communication practices encourage people to form positive identifications with others and help them to see their fortunes entwined in civil society? Can media content in general, and the news in particular, help people construct imagined communities that counteract the divisive forces of social and economic change, as manifested in recent years in the fragmentation of social institutions and declining group membership? These are important questions for political psychology in an era of global changes in civil societies. Many democratic nations are undergoing profound social transformations stemming from the refiguring of domestic economies as production moves south and the economies and careers of northern societies shift to service, information technology, branding, marketing, and distribution.

The economic restructuring associated with globalization in the past several decades has translated in many forms through society, from new and more stressful patterns of work and careers to the challenges of managing family responsibilities within far more diverse family models. The growth of two-working-parent and single-parent households have made the once standard two-parent, wife-at-home model a dying social type. Individuals report

greater stress, more emotional disturbance, and a higher sense of risk, even as they celebrate new lifestyle freedoms and unprecedented levels of personal consumer choice (Beck, 1999; Bennett, 1998). In addition, individuals today probably have greater personal responsibility for choosing and managing their own identities than at any point in modern history (Giddens, 1991). Although freedom, choice, and consumption are celebrated in politics and popular culture, Robert Lane (2000) argues that the increases in social isolation and materialism associated with greater exposure to market forces have undermined the sense of personal happiness over this period.

Accompanying these profound societal and personal changes are important political changes that vary from nation to nation. In the United States, and to varying degrees in some European nations, these changes include citizen withdrawal, voting decline, mistrust of government, weaker party identifications, anger at politicians and fellow citizens, and overheated conflicts born of deep moral differences in society (Gitlin, 1995; Hunter, 1991; Inglehart, 1997; Putnam, 1995, 2000; Rahn & Transue, 1998).

At the same time, the labor parties of Europe and the Democrats in America have re-branded themselves in the image of middle-class, lifestyle, and consumer values. Most politicians and nearly all the business interests who support them have become free traders and celebrants of individual choice. As broad ideological appeals to large social blocs are replaced by more personalized and narrowly targeted political messages, politicians must spend ever-greater sums of money designing and implementing communication strategies to get through to ever harder to reach citizen-consumers.

COMMUNICATION AND LIFESTYLE IDENTITIES

Strategic political communication, along with product advertising and market-driven entertainment forms, may actively reinforce the fragmented and isolated social identification patterns of late modern society. Many communication scholars regard the demographic marketing of program content, from sitcoms to the news, as actively contributing to the fragmentation of social identifications. For example, Turow (1997) argues that the evolution of scientific marketing technologies enables the targeting of images and messages to widely scattered demographic niches. In this view, ever smaller and more numerous publics are constructed through the delivery of strategic advertising, political advocacy messages, entertainment content, and the news.

The logic of media content for a fragmented society provides audiences with opportunities to identify more with their own lifestyles than with the old mass society membership symbols of common groups, broad social classes, the nation, or public values and obligations (Bennett, 1998). The obvious exception to this trend involves instances of common threats to all individuals such as natural disasters or attacks such as the one that occurred on September 11, 2001.

This chapter explores some of the political implications of the triumph of a communication model based on marketing-driven content and consumer lifestyle-based information processing. This communication model has become dominant in both political and entertainment communication, and the resulting social identifications and images of society are reinforced by the emergence of *infotainment* as the defining characteristic of contemporary news (Bennett, 2007). These communication formats both create and reflect a society that is increasingly organized in terms of fluid "image tribes" or identity networks that sustain the loyalties of members not through social memberships and rituals of the old group-based society that were reinforced through mass communication, but through the construction and continuous reinforcement of images based in exclusive consumer and lifestyle communication fantasies.

In this view, lifestyles are becoming the new belief organizers and public narratives of our time, and they often create new kinds of social tensions and antagonisms in a post-ideological age. A common element of lifestyle meaning systems is that they are often celebrated by branding others in society as losers or as offensive, strange, threatening, or simply invisible (Turow, 1997). In advertising, images of being cool are often established with reference to others who lack money, sex appeal, thin hard bodies, or designer products. In the news, overt choices of stories tend to represent a society of middle-class white families struggling to make the right lifestyle choices (from eating and traveling, to worrying about health care and choosing the right schools), while surrounded with stories of bad government, social predators, and criminal elements who are overwhelmingly black, Latino, or of other suspect racial profiles (Entman & Rojecki, 2000). Such overt news content choices offer symbolic resources for the public imagination. At the same time, the underlying marketing and consumer formulas simply omit other social content from public view. The news (and more generally, most political communication content emanating from government and interest organizations) contains few positive images or policy agendas for those who are too poor or otherwise lacking in desirable lifestyles to merit attention. This brand-oriented "consumers want exclusivity" communication logic is zero sum. Producing program content or political appeals for people who

are actively being excluded from preferred society would only cost advertisers or political figures popular support in more desirable public opinion markets.

THE NEWS IN LIFESTYLE FORMATS

This chapter explores one central aspect of this mediated civic identity processes: the transformation of news content in the United States over the past 20 years, with a focus on the decline of collective representations, fewer positive portrayals of government, and sharp decreases in coverage of local, national, and international policy issues. In place of these traditional topics that might be described as "the news for citizens," the news industry has substituted a personalized, consumer-oriented, emotional mix of human interest and celebrity features, bad government (waste of tax dollars, political venality, and scandal), social predators, and a parade of everyday personal risks and deceptions. This emotion-packed and often sensational human interest news runs the generic gamut from mayhem and violent crime (the "if it bleeds it leads" and "scare them and they will watch" genres), to more bad news than good about government (waste, corruption, and personal scandal genres), to expanded coverage of health, fashion, food, sports, weather, consumer rip-offs, and other "news you can use" lifestyle genres (Bennett, 2007; Patterson, 2000; Sabato, Stencel, & Lichter, 2000).

The key questions to be explored here are *what are the origins* and *what are the democratic implications* of this dramatic shift in news content toward what may be termed "a private or isolated window" on the world? In particular, are market forces based on the transformation of society and the corresponding changes in social identity processes really driving the demand for such content or are these identity factors simply easy to exploit by media organizations looking to draw audiences with cheap to produce, and therefore, more profitable content? In addition, this analysis takes up the important question of whether late modern identity formations based on fluid social networks and lifestyles are open to media imagery of a more inclusive and commonly purposed society and politics.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND POLITICAL IDENTITY

The fragmentation of group and institutional life defines late modem society through numerous effects on social relations, individual identity, and politics. (Giddens, 1991). As noted above, the declining importance of group and institutional memberships shows up in individual tendencies to identify less

with distant symbols of nation, party, national groups, and common authority and to perceive less common cause with others in society. In place of traditional social memberships and the belief systems that guided meaningful public behavior, the denizens of late modem societies increasingly organize identities around personally assembled and managed meaning systems involving consumption, networked communities (both local and global), and lifestyles (Bennett, 1998, 2007; Inglehart, 1997).

Developing in parallel with the fragmenting civil society noted at the beginning of this chapter are signs of a profound transformation in the social and symbolic resources of identity formation. These changes present new challenges for individuals in maintaining coherent, stable emotional attachments between self and others in society. A revival of grand theory in the social sciences highlights these connections between structural changes in society and new problems for individual identity formation (Turner, 1996; Wagner, 1996). Giddens offers a summary of recent thinking on the subject: "The self in modem society is frail, brittle, fractured, fragmented—such a conception is probably the preeminent outlook in current discussions of the self and modernity" (1991, p. 169). Wagner describes the commonly felt antagonisms and identity crises of the age as symptomatic of a loss of coherence in society: "Coherence, in this sense, means that there is a collectivity of human beings, forming a 'society' by virtue that they share common understandings about what is important in their lives (identities), that they mostly interact with each other inside this collectivity (practices), and that they have ways to determine how they regulate their lives in common (rules of the polity)" (Wagner, 1996, p. 4).

It may be true that welcome gains in personal choices have become available for majorities of citizens in the advanced market democracies, including remarkable degrees of choice over identity itself. However, the expansion of choice is accompanied and balanced by a greater sense of isolation and risk. Epidemics of stress, personal insecurity, and vague anxiety are now managed routinely with popular prescriptions for designer tranquilizers and mood toners. But there is a darker side to the Prozac Generation. For many, the psychological distress is more severe, as registered in an alarming rise of clinical depression and other severe psychiatric disorders throughout the industrial world (Lane, 2000). For example, Americans born after 1945 suffer depression at 10 times the rate of those born 50 years before, and nearly half the population is likely to suffer some kind of mental illness during their lives (Lane, 1994, p. 3). Lane concludes from his review of world mental health studies that "While the United States is not the most depressed country in the world, it may be on its way to that infelicitous rank" (Lane, 1996, p. 5). The primary sources of these trends for Lane (1991, 2000) are the effects of

increasingly market-defined societies on the erosion of community and common identifications, along with the absence of mechanisms for individuals to control or transcend those market forces.

MEDIA AND IDENTITY IN CHANGING SOCIETIES

A confessional culture that has spawned talk shows and the burgeoning self-help sections in book stores suggests that few people remain untouched by common personal troubles that include alcoholism, drug abuse, eating disorders, and various difficulties forming satisfying personal relationships. Easy media formulas for this age run the gamut from talk show confessions to TV news magazine scare stories about ordinary situations that can go badly wrong. Such media content has some obvious basis in the worst fears about living in a highly interdependent and complex global risk society (Beck, 1999).

The important question, of course, is whether people would welcome an escape from worst fear TV and respond to more creative and socially functional media formulas if media corporations would invest the money and resources to develop them. We shall return at the end of this discussion to look for ways in which media content, particularly the news, might help bridge rather than reinforce the fears and social divisions of fragmenting societies. For now the main point is that media representations of society and public life offer resources and cues for individuals to think and act more or less creatively and more or less collectively regarding their civic involvements, their satisfaction with the direction of society and government, and their perceptions of public problems (Edelman, 1964, 1988).

At present, news images often fail to bridge diversity and stimulate thoughtful public deliberation. For example, Entman and Rojecki (2000) describe important differences in the portrayals of blacks and whites in various American media, including advertising, the news, and movies. They conclude that these symbolic representations establish the public legitimizing context in which race relations play out by providing the public vocabularies for discussions of policies on racially sensitive subjects such as affirmative action, crime and punishment, welfare, and drug enforcement. To cite another example, studies of reality TV crime programs in different nations show that media production values (which are strongly affected by the presence or absence of public regulation) affect how audiences engage with those programs and how the audience–program interactions shape perceptions of crime and personal safety in society (Fishman & Cavender, 1998).

IMAGINED MEDIA COMMUNITIES

Since the rise of the nation-state that has defined polities in the recent era, all modern societies have been, to use Benedict Anderson's (1991) phrase, *imagined communities.* In Anderson's analysis, large-scale societies and geographically dispersed nations simply could not exist if they depended on face-to-face networks in which people get along because they know each other personally. In his view, societies exist because humans have the capacity to relate to each other as strangers by developing symbolic identifications with and against distant others. Imagining themselves in societies enables people to exchange various kinds of recognition. In this view, a necessary condition for a secure sense of self is emotional and intellectual investment in commonly recognized symbols. The more commonly recognized the symbols, the more secure is the sense of self that comes from identifying with them. Through this basic human process, we experience distant others most completely by investing emotion and meaning in the common symbols (and related ritual practices) that define a society. Communication media from newspapers and civics books to maps and movies stimulate these social imaginations.

A simple model of civic identity within an imagined community is a process described by Lasswell (1952, 1965) whereby private emotions gain conscious political definition through displacement onto public symbols, from leaders, to flags, to core motivating concepts such as freedom, equality, or enemy groups such as communists, infidels, or immigrants. To the extent that others identify with or against the same objects and ideas, individuals create a political order that confers recognition and can be authorized to act in the name of those recognized.

Theorists from Lasswell (1952, 1965) to Fromm (1941, 1960) to Edelman (1964) cautioned that the process of constructing such symbolic orders is fraught with perils from public deception to varieties of fanaticism. For example, the rise of fascistic and totalitarian movements in the early- to mid-twentieth century led theorists to worry about loss of autonomous individual identity as mass symbols consumed private emotion. In these accounts, strong emotional bonds with public symbolism resulted in the abdication of power and personal control to political regimes that inflicted considerable harm on others. Such cautions about the politically overidentified self point to one kind of symbolic disorder: the loss of personal autonomy through emotional merger with public symbols. The signal identity disorder of this past era was what Fromm described as *authoritarian conformity:* "The individual ceases to be himself; he adopts entirely the kind of personality offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes exactly as all others are and as they expect him to be" (1960, p. 160).

Such concerns are scarcely heard in the cautionary social science of today—although they may still be appropriate in cases of political cults such as neo-Nazis, nationalist splinter parties, the Taliban, or in the populist swings of newly emerging democratic systems with weak civic traditions. What seems most striking about earlier theories of public identity disorders that threaten democracy is how poorly they fit the contemporary civic realities of declining trust, social capital, and disinterested citizens. The dilemma facing mature democracies today is more the opposite one of weak political identifications. Even where strong political identifications do exist, as in various brands of identity politics and moral crusades, the social distribution of those political identities tends to be fragmented, marginalized, and contested.

The weakness of shared symbols in contemporary society may help explain the paradox of high levels of public discontent that coexist with impressive levels of individual freedom and expressive license. Reinforcing this imbalance between the public and private aspects of the self is a commercialized communication order that actively encourages the construction of self-centered and often divisive symbolic exchanges in society, while limiting the publicity of collective identifications. The shifting patterns of social identifications within nations mean that once familiar mass society and nationalistic imagined political communities are being disrupted. Citizens are thrown into communication environments that target them with appeals for votes, causes, and political loyalties much as consumers are bombarded with advertising messages aimed at reinforcing or upsetting their brand loyalties.

It is important to understand whether more creative and still commercially viable mediated images of society and citizenship can challenge people to find new ways of connecting with others. Put differently, it is important to critically assess the degree to which the marketing of media content, combined with the lifestyle motives of citizens, inevitably reinforce the trends toward individual isolation and fragmentation of meaning that represent the democratic downside of late modern society and identity. It is helpful to begin this assessment with a look at how news content has changed during this recent period of global, social, and personal change.

NEWS IMAGES AND THE PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION

Why are so many people at odds with themselves and with their own societies and governments? Part of the explanation offered above is that

there appears to be something of an epidemic identity crisis going on in post-industrial democratic societies. An interesting aspect of the public preoccupation with private identity is the broad engagement with mediated communication that at once offers many people symbolic resources for positive identification with the lifestyle-confessional television culture of soul-baring talk shows and reality TV programs, while providing relatively little news and public affairs content that motivates broader civic engagement.

This is not to suggest that the news always fails to engage and inform. As discussed later, and as explained in Chapter 12 by William Gamson, there are notable differences in the symbolic qualities of different issues in the news. While useful news models exist, their application is limited. The main task ahead is to show how more engaging news representations of politics can be produced more often, for more citizens—particularly for younger generations, who are disconnecting from public life in alarming numbers. However, it is helpful to first assess the symbolic transformation in news content during the recent 20-year period of pronounced global social and psychological change.

The content changes in the news over the last 20 years are stunning. As noted below, these changes reflect a time of dramatic media market deregulation and increased competition among media companies for profitable audience niches. In this business-driven news environment, coverage of politics and government are down, and pathos, bathos, and human interest are up. Even within the shrinking space given to politics and government, much of the coverage is about scandal, waste, and the games and personal fights between parties or politicians. What passes for coverage of public problems puts the focus on mayhem and disorder, with topics such as crime often covered with little connection to their actual incidence in the society in which news audiences live. According to a national study reported by Patterson (2000, p. 6), those audiences continue to regard the news as informative (84 percent), but they generally find it depressing (84 percent), sensational (58 percent), not enjoyable (52 percent), and negative (77 percent).

What are some of the news content changes that elicit these reactions? A national study of local news by the Center for Media and Public Affairs found that crime dominated most programs and that after removing the combination of crime, weather, accidents, disasters, other "soft" news, and sports, only 5 minutes and 40 seconds remained out of the 24 minutes and 20 seconds of noncommercial news time for coverage of government, health, foreign affairs, education, science, and the environment (Grossman, 1998). In short, "hard" news gets less time than commercials. Similar trends developed on the national networks. Network TV newscasts between 1990 and

1998 more than doubled the time devoted to entertainment, disasters, accidents, and crime, while reducing the coverage of environment, government activities, and international affairs to make the room (Center for Media and Public Affairs).

Since crime and violence over this period were among the leading growth areas in news content, let us examine the counter hypothesis that these trends simply reflect reality. It turns out that the trends in increased violent crime news cannot be explained as reflections of actual rates of crime in society. To the contrary, the trends in crime news have been going up as actual crime rate has declined. Nor are these profitable news formulas just limited to local programs. In the period from 1990 through 1998, for example, the number of crime stories broadcast annually on the NBC, CBS, and ABC evening news programs rose from 542 to 1,392, during a time in which the actual levels of most violent crimes dropped significantly in society (Brill's Content, 1999). If we look just at the news about murder on the national networks, the number of murder stories increased by 700 percent between 1993 and 1996, a period in which the murder rate in society actually declined by 20 percent (Morin, 1997).

The general pattern is that low quality news drives out the high quality reporting. Consider the area of international news: On national network TV, world news stories declined from 45 percent of stories in the 1970s to 13.5 percent of stories in 1995 (Hoge, 1997). Newspapers reduced international news coverage from over 10 percent of non-advertising space in the early 1970s to 6 percent in the early 1980s to less than 3 percent in the 1990s (Hoge, 1997). Among the national news weeklies, between 1985 and 1995, international news declined from 24 to 14 percent in *Time,* from 22 to 12 percent in *Newsweek,* and from 20 to 14 percent in *U.S. News and World Report* (Hickey, 1998). In 1987, *Time* ran 11 covers that put the focus on international news. Only one cover in 1997 was about an international story (Hickey, 1998).

Entertainment, celebrity stories, recreation, lifestyle, and sports filled up the politically vacant editorial space. Overall, the network news, the cover stories of news magazines, and the front pages of major newspapers witnessed an increase from 15 to 43 percent between 1977 and 1997 in celebrity, scandal, gossip, and other human interest stories (Hickey, 1998).

Patterson's (2000) national sample of over 5,000 news stories (from 2 TV networks, 2 weekly magazines, 3 leading newspapers, and 26 local daily papers) offers a good general summary of these trends. Between 1980 and 1999, he found that stories with no public policy content (soft news) comprised 35 percent of all stories in 1980 and nearly 50 percent in 1999. Over the same time, sensationalism increased from 25 to 40 percent of all news, and human interest stories increased from 11 to 26 percent of news content. The

journalistic tone of the news during this 20-year span became more negative and cynical, with journalists introducing their own voices more into stories, often at the expense of direct quotes from the political sources they cover. In broadcast coverage of the 2000 U.S. election, for example, journalists spoke 6 minutes for each 1 minute allocated to the candidates (Patterson, 2000).

DO NEWS REPRESENTATIONS OF SOCIETY MATTER?

A more complete discussion of the above trends can be found in Bennett (2007). The main point for now is that news images of American society and public problems have changed notably during the past 20 years. But does any of this media content substitution really matter? It turns out that it does. First, news content matters in the sense that people begin thinking about the society around them through media exposure (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). According to a national survey, nearly two-thirds of people get most of their views about crime from television, compared to just 20 percent from newspapers, 7 percent from radio, and less than 10 percent from friends, neighbors, coworkers, or personal experience (Morin, 1997).

Next, we can say that the content of what people follow on the media matters in other ways, from their attitudes about politics and society to their feelings of personal security. For example, people who watch more news, and more "reality programs" in general (i.e., programs like *America's Most Wanted* and *Cops*), are significantly more likely to misjudge the seriousness of the crime problem and to misjudge their own chances of being victims. These trends are less pronounced in nations that still attempt to regulate the content of such programs to better reflect social realities (Fishman & Cavendar, 1998). Moreover, as Entman and Rojecki (2000) suggest, the racial framing of much crime news tends to distort ways in which both citizens and policy makers think about crime problems and their policy solutions. Perhaps as a result of the runaway crime wave in the media (both reality TV and the news), fewer people in the United States felt safe in their neighborhoods (29 percent) in the late 1990s than in the early 1980s (44 percent), even though objective crime conditions warranted just the opposite feelings (Morin, 1997).

Crime is just one example of many issues for which media images matter. Evidence from other policy areas also suggests that the framing and the emotional tone of news accounts affect both specific (Entman & Rojecki, 2000; Iyengar, 1991) and general responses to politics (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1994). The symbolic transformation of the news from a public-regarding to a personal lifestyle value system affects what people regard as important and what they indentify with and against

in society. What, for example, should people think about the importance of poverty in society, or the plight of the poor, when only 35 stories in a 3-year national sample of 25,000 local TV news stories addressed aspects of poverty in local communities (Rosenstiel, Gottlieb, & Brady, 2000)?

We also know that framing stories in personal and situation-specific terms—what Iyengar (1991) calls episodic framing—limits audience grasp of larger problems and perspectives for dealing with them. What sort of grasp of public problems are news audiences likely to form when the number of stories with no public policy component rose from 35 percent to nearly 50 percent of all news (based on trends from 1980 to 1998 in a national sample of diverse news media reported by Patterson, 2000, p. 3)? What kind of imagined communities are people likely to construct from the news that has sharply decreased the use of collective references (e.g., groups, institutions, and countries) and sharply increased the use of self references such as I, me, mine, and myself (Patterson, 2000, p. 5)? As noted earlier, the key question is whether these content trends that erode positive common identifications with politics and society are driven by audience demand or whether they are more the products of profit and marketing equations of media companies.

HOW AUDIENCE-DRIVEN IS THIS EMOTIONALIZED MEDIA WORLD?

Many media executives argue that the sensational and emotionally turbulent news world of recent times simply reflects changing lifestyle values and resulting audience demands for images of society that are more consistent with their newfound preoccupations with personal lives. In this "demand-driven" account, the news is simply giving people what they want. Indeed, this account seems to be supported by ample marketing research—often done by media organizations and their advertising sponsors—indicating that individual lifestyles rather than group and institutional memberships increasingly form the core of public and private meaning systems (Putnam, 2000; Turow, 1997). In terms of democratic implications, this news-by-popular-demand account offers a pessimistic confirmation of democracy imperiled by self-absorption, lack of inclination to transcend self-interest, and resistance to government regulations forcing people to behave according to some external sense of the public good. Tocqueville (1945) might have predicted this late modern version of public life as consistent with his observation that liberal democracy is most threatened by individual freedom that is unrestrained by community obligations or other public-regarding mechanisms.

One common rebuttal to the audience-driven news argument is a fairly straightforward normative one: that the news has become increasingly shaped by profit pressures from ever larger and more distant corporate owners who see little obligation to citizens and who are not conversant with traditional journalistic values to give citizens what they need to know even if that is inconsistent with what they may want to know (Kalb, 1998). Kalb's account of the "new news" is shared by many journalists and academic critics. However, this view is typically brushed aside by media executives, who disarm the criticism by affirming that their obligation is not to citizens, but to their investors. If there is to be some public service obligation for the media, let government, not business corporations, decide what that is.

This is, of course, an empty response in an era of government deregulation and cozy political relations between media giants and government regulators (McChesney, 1999). During the 20-year period from 1980 to 2000, the media markets in the United States experienced an unprecedented historical explosion of mergers and corporate growth. This economic revolution has reduced government regulation and lowered the public service obligations of media organizations as the swing toward a free market ideology has predictably created a media oligopoly. True, there is fierce competition for audiences among the proliferating media outlets within these empires. However, the profit pressures driving this competition require many media products (from the news to entertainment formulas) to be cheapened and standardized (Bagdikian, 1997; McChesney, 1999). As a result, this grand period of merger and deregulation is also one in which the editorial content of newspapers, television, and magazines has been transformed strikingly in the direction of the dramatized, entertainment-oriented, and personality-centered images of society and politics described earlier. The bottom line in this analysis is that open media markets and the accompanying relaxation of corporate social responsibility norms promote business decisions above public service and public interest information considerations. This account is far better supported by data than is the ideological proposition that free markets perfectly reflect and respond to consumer demands.

It may be true that public service values are undermined by contemporary media markets, but it is equally true that any return to more socially responsible and politically engaging news is discouraged by the strong common sense perception outlined above that content trends strongly reflect consumer demands stemming from changing audience lifestyle values. If it can be shown that typical mass media news is not as satisfying to its audiences as spokespeople for the news business say it is, then we have a case for arguing that sensationalized, lifestyle news may actively drive citizens away from the important public media sphere that is necessary for nurturing

common purpose and popular sovereignty in democracy (Habermas, 1989).

A national study of market share among high and low quality local television news programs in the United States found that the highest quality (hard news, policy-oriented) programs competed successfully with the lowest quality (soft news, human interest, mayhem) formats. In fact, the highest quality newscasts were more likely to move up in audience share (64 percent upward ratings movement) than the lowest quality news, which showed the next best market performance at 50 percent upward movement. Unfortunately, top quality newscasts amounted to just 10 percent of the national sample studied in the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism (Rosenstiel, Gottlieb, & Brady, 2000).

This research supports the obvious inference that low-quality soft news and lifestyle programs far outnumber high quality citizen-oriented ones not because they are more popular but because they are simply far more profitable to produce. An important point here is that parent corporations are not losing money on high quality news, they are simply not making as much as they do when they lower their product standards. In this view, *bad news is not the choice of the people; it is the choice offered to the people.*

There is another important body of data supporting the claim that the shift toward lifestyle identity values in society does not adequately explain the deterioration of news content: large numbers of people are actively fleeing the news due to an inability to identify with its emotionally draining imagery. Audiences commonly criticize the news as negative, depressing, and too focused on scandal and mayhem. Large majorities in one national survey reported that they preferred hard news (coverage of government, major events, and policy issues) to soft news (with no policy content) by a 63 percent majority (Patterson, 2000, p. 7). The conventional caution against taking these responses at face value is that they may be distorted by survey "response bias" in which people report what they imagine to be the socially appropriate responses, rather than reporting how they actually act or feel.

Despite the assurances of media executives that people actually follow bad news even as they condemn it, there is one empirical trend that warrants taking the criticisms of audiences seriously: audiences are tuning out in alarming numbers. The news audience in the United States has declined dramatically in the period from 1990 to 2000, and this decline holds for local TV news, nightly network news, newspapers, and magazines (Patterson, 2000, p. 2). Even the cable market is fragmenting and battling over shrinking audiences who surf through programs and have less interest in staying with a particular news lineup. The predictable response of programmers is the superstitious one of running more scary and emotionally grabbing fare in efforts to snag fickle viewers and readers.

The best measure of the failure of increasingly sensationalistic, infotainment, and lifestyle-oriented news formats to engage audience identifications comes from surveys of people who have stopped following the news or seriously reduced their attention. A News Lab study of less frequent viewers found that they cited reasons such as too much crime (32 percent), repetitive story formulas (25 percent), too much fluff (25 percent), lack of positive subjects (24 percent), and excess negativity (23 percent) as the leading reasons for tuning out (Potter & Gantz, 2000). Also confirming the poor fit between what audiences want and what they get is a finding from Patterson's national survey of news interest levels. Ninety-three percent of those who follow the news less than they once did say it is too negative, compared to 77 percent of the general population (Patterson, 2000, p. 11).

Even simple adjustments to news formulas such as positive or negative tone can make big differences in audience responses. The length of stories also matters. Media executives often say stories must be kept short to fit the short attention spans of audiences. This is not necessarily so. In the 2000 Project for Excellence in Journalism ratings of local TV news, stations with rising ratings had by far the highest percentage of stories over 1 minute in length, at 40 percent of all stories, compared to 28 percent longer stories on stations with flat ratings, and 25 percent on stations with falling ratings. Thus, even a simple (but more costly) change such as increasing story length allows journalists to present more engaging information to audiences (Rosenstiel, Gottlieb, & Brady, 2000, p. 87).

Consider a cross-national study showing that media content does not need to be driven to the soft side by the identity formations and lifestyle values of audiences. Holtz-Bacha and Norris (2001) found that public knowledge and political engagement levels are significantly higher in nations that have strong commitments to public service television and among the citizens who watch those channels. An interesting finding of the Holtz-Bacha and Norris study is that variations in national preferences for public versus commercial television are not directly explained by levels of commercial competition, suggesting complex interactions among social structures, media cultures, and political identities. This offers hope that there are ways in which media organizations in competitive market situations can produce satisfying (and still profitable) political representations for citizens as well as for consumers.

This comparative research makes it clear that not all societies or individuals experience the changing processes of globalization and domestic restructuring in the same ways. Mediating the direct impact of social change on personal identity are important intermediate sets of institutions (e.g., party and press systems) and symbolic resources (e.g., media and popular culture) that offer people creative options to think about their places in

society and define their relations to others. Among the most important symbolic resources that can affect how individuals in different societies react to social and economic change are the symbolic representations of self, society, and others in the media.

Taken together, the above research raises doubts about the frequent claim by media executives that scandal, drama, and *news-you-can-use* are mainly what the public wants. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that not only is this not what people want, but that news audiences are shrinking because people are actively offended by negative content and unsatisfying portrayals of society. There are, in short, various reasons to think that content trends do not simply reflect market demand. *There is a more realistic explanation for the transformation of media formats and public consumption habits: low-budget emotion-centered, dramatized news is not so much the result of popular demand as it is the most profitable product to produce. Other information formats turn out to be popular, but not so profitable* (Bennett, 2007).

Perhaps the most important lesson about the new news is that slapping cheap emotionalism on top of audience demographics and lifestyles does not produce meaningful communication. Does that mean that audiences want deep analytical reporting, or *New York Times* levels of detail? No. The lesson to be learned from this divergence of news content and audience identifications is that news representations simply need to engage the interests of audiences *and* offer more encouraging personal examples of ordinary people making a difference in society.

The poor fit between lifestyle-based identity formations and sensationalized social and political news images offers hope that people in changing civil societies may still have the interest and capacity to engage politically with public problems. The key to activating this capacity for engagement is to represent public issues in less alarming, less discouraging, and more affirmative citizen political action frames (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Gamson, 1992). The chapter concludes with an examination of an important question raised by William Gamson in Chapter 12: Under what circumstances and in what ways can more engaging personalized and emotional media representations actually help individuals engage positively with others to address common social problems?

IS PERSONALIZING THE NEWS NECESSARILY BAD?

Gamson notes that some news stories contain a symbolic vocabulary that appeals to individuals *and* that connects personal emotional imagery (hot cognitions) to motivating images of collective action. While these stories are

not typical of most political news, their existence suggests that journalists can learn something about how to tell the news about politics and government in more effective and engaging ways. The lesson in fact seems to be a simple one: rather than playing up discouraging or isolating emotions, news reporting could just as systematically hit emotional buttons that link individual identifications with a sense that there is some group or collectivity with the potential to do something about a social problem.

The incidence of this sort of individual-to-public narrative progression that connects individual emotions to *collective action frames* (Snow & Bensford, 1992) is uneven at best. For example, such narratives seem to occur in coverage of some moral and social justice issues that affect individuals personally. Abortion is the example that Gamson cites as containing consistently high levels of images of ordinary people who are both affected at a deep personal level by an issue and who are engaging in politics together. However, many other areas of public policy seem to be reported with key elements of the personal-to-collective action framework missing. For example, when economic conditions throw people out of work, or when people are adversely affected by environmental pollution, the tendency is more to portray individuals as statistics or as hapless victims rather than as political agents with the capacity to take some responsive action. Affirmative action had early periods of reporting that showed individuals acting effectively to promote or reverse policies, but there have been more recent long stretches in which reporting has centered on abstracted policy struggles and coded racial discourse (Gamson, 2001).

As Gamson notes, the quality of individual-to-collective identifiers in the news varies widely across issues and periods of time. One possible explanation is that a more encouraging brand of emotionalism in the news is attached to enduring issues that are surrounded by strong social movements. One suspects that coverage also becomes more positive when the social composition of those social movements matches the demographics of news audiences. I also hypothesize that *engaged citizens* are more likely to dominate news frames on issues that have become so polarized and spread throughout the political system that conflicts within institutions and between elites open the news gates to broader social viewpoints on the issue. In short, the voices of engaged citizens in the news tend to follow the divisions inside government itself (Bennett, 1990). In some cases, issues become so divisive, important, or enduring that they spill outside of government and into the streets, or onto movie screens. Under these conditions (abortion, terrorism, and human rights abuses come to mind), journalists are given license to look even more deeply into the human experiences surrounding public issues, and the resulting news narratives may inspire the sociological imagination.

CONCLUSION: LIFESTYLE POLITICS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CITIZEN INFORMATION

The above analysis suggests that the core problem with the news, as citizens experience it, is not the presence of emotional images, but rather with the kinds of emotional imagery typically inserted into stories. Work by Marcus, Neuman, and McKuen (2001) shows that emotions must first be engaged for attention, interest, and information processing to occur. Thus, the question is not whether emotional content in the news is a good thing, but what kind of emotional content should be introduced into political reporting. The trouble with the news as it has evolved is the tendency for emotional references to be negative, isolating, and often devoid of connections between individuals and others in society who might share their sense of concern and need for action.

The important question is why journalists and news organizations do not begin to see the advantage of finding news formulas that include more positive portrayals of individual agency that might be more appealing to the audiences currently fleeing negativity and discouragement. The problem seems to be one of convincing news organizations that they could stem audience flight with modest investments in increased narrative length, more diverse news sourcing, and more images of active citizens. The failure to adapt news formats to the aspects of lifestyle values that engage people may signal the end of an era in which the news was regarded as the primary citizen resource. Indeed, there are signs that people are receiving information in other ways, from political advertising in elections to issue-specific Web channels.

Along with the indicators that news formats must represent issues and society differently in order to engage citizens, the changes in society and identity discussed earlier also make it difficult for people to be mobilized politically in the same ways or to the same degree as they were in the past. In place of the two-step flow of communication in which elites sent messages to group leaders who filtered and translated them to memberships (Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955), we now have more of a *one-step flow of communication* in which politicians, cause groups, and other communicators market their messages more directly to individuals (Bennett & Manheim, 2006). The uses of emotional hot buttons and fearful imagery may reinforce a sense of isolation and discouragement in society (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). The news often echoes these isolating images in ways that individuals prefer to tune out.

The main point is that it is also clear that there are ways of appealing to more inward-looking individuals in ways that help connect their private identities with action scripts that include others. Indeed, even as

national political identifications appear to be declining in the United States and in Europe (Rahn & Rudolph, 2001), new forms of politics and identity are emerging in areas such as environmentalism, debt relief, human rights, genetic modification of organisms, global labor standards, and consumer politics that connect citizens in global networks and, potentially, in global social movements (Bennett, 2004). Many of these citizen activist networks have invented their own information services on the Internet. These activist networks depend little on the mainstream media for news of their activities.

The greater involvement of younger generations in an emerging global politics is a hopeful sign of political renewal. There may be hope for the renewal of the news in the fact that the preferred communication medium of younger generation citizens is the Internet and various other digital platforms and not traditional print or electronic media (Graber, 2001). However, it is unfortunate that so little creativity on the part of the major media organizations is going into the development of the Internet as an innovative information source for the younger demographics who are abandoning the news in alarming numbers. The policies of the big media corporations seem to be aimed at capturing new generations as entertainment audiences, while allowing news divisions to wither or to shift to infotainment formats as the news audience continues to shrink.

The danger of issue-driven Internet news niches is that the absence of common mass communication experiences may further diminish the public sphere of democracy. If some citizen connection to a public sphere is essential for developing common images of society and politics, then abandoning the news as a common experience has some considerable consequence. If there are information formats through which commercial news organizations can serve their business interests and the public interest at the same time, and the above analysis suggests that there are, then this is surely the democratic moment in which to develop them.

Perhaps, commercial media will figure out what it takes to get young people involved and networked in large numbers by simply following the lead of young citizens as they do IT (Information Technology) for themselves. It seems clear that engaging young citizens requires involving them in the production of the information content they consume. This does not necessarily mean turning everyone into reporters, although digital media technologies are increasingly doing just that. At the very least, regenerating the audience for the news means recognizing what makes reality TV and other popular media formats so compelling (and so unlike the nightly news): they involve audiences in the creation of program content in the most meaningful ways, from blogging and fan sites, to voting characters on and off the programs. It is perhaps no coincidence that in the 2008 presidential race

part of Barack Obama's popularity with young voters involved the number of videos of speeches and fan testimonials that circulated virally through sites such as *YouTube* and *Facebook*. At the time of this writing, the *Obama Girl* video had been viewed over 12.5 million times on *YouTube* and other online sites, and the *Yes We Can* video had received more than 24 million views (viralvideo.com). Even Obama's lengthy (37-minute) speech on race received nearly 4 million complete views within the first 2 weeks on the Obama *YouTube* campaign site, and hundreds of thousands more watched shorter clips loaded by individuals. This made the *YouTube* audience for the speech larger than the combined cable TV audience (Melber, 2008).

These new forms of digital news production involve not just watching, but rating, commenting, linking, sending to friends, and even creating mashups that add personal content elements as they circulate across social networks. If a lengthy political speech can circulate more widely through viral distribution across digital social networks than through conventional television channels, the lesson may well be that the news network of the future is us.

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Commentaries

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Experimental Social Psychology, Broader Contexts, and the Politics of Multiculturalism

David O. Sears

This chapter contends that experimental social psychology—particularly that dealing with intergroup relations—is shaped by multicultural political sensibilities. Multiculturalism is based on the expectation of intergroup conflict and as such is incompatible with individual-centered social psychological theories that emphasize individualism, integration, and assimilation. Given that political psychology uses experimental investigations based largely on college student samples, the field is not well situated to assess the external validity of multicultural- and individual-centered approaches. As an example, the chapter presents evidence indicating it is problematic to make universal claims of an "incompatibility" between ethnic and national identities, instead suggesting that the relationship between these identities is highly nuanced and contextualized. In conclusion, the chapter suggests that cross talk between psychology and political science may be helpful in overcoming these difficulties, providing a healthy, generative stimulus for the development of the field as a whole.

The primary ambition of political psychology is usually thought to be to apply the basic principles of psychological science to the complex phenomena of political behavior in the real world. That framing seems straightforward enough. Most academic psychologists comfortably make the distinction between "basic research" and "applied psychology." There is a long tradition of applied psychologists helping soldiers with emotional responses to combat, firms to become more productive, or children who are struggling with school or family conflicts. In each case, the predominant flow of knowledge is from basic psychological principles to the messy and multiply determined behaviors of real life or what Gamson (Chapter 12) calls "the lifeworld." Framed in this way, political psychology is presumably the bridge between the general principles of psychology and the particular details of the situations to which they are applied, the various contexts of the political world.

This volume aims to do just that for citizenship issues, to use psychology to understand and improve the behaviors associated with democratic

citizenship. Those behaviors range from tolerance of outgroups to voting choices and political participation. The predominant focus is on mass publics. True, sometimes the focus seems to be on elites and how they affect the mass public's ability to enact good democratic citizenship. Even in such cases, though, the *psychology* at hand is that of the mass public. For example, Bennett's concern (Chapter 13) is with personalization in the media, but he analyzes the presumptive effects of media personalization on the audience's collective identity and capacity for mobilization rather than the psychological dynamics of media elites.

But experimental social psychology and political science are very different enterprises. As Peffley and Hurwitz (Chapter 11) point out, psychologists usually are content to understand individual behavior in and of itself. But political scientists believe that the most useful applications of psychology come when helping to understand consequential political outcomes in real-world contexts. Social problems, they argue, come from the *collective* consequences of individual behavior. For example, social psychology may focus on the impact of stereotypes in biasing individual information processing. Political scientists, in contrast, want to understand their impact on election outcomes or support for particular public policies, such as driving a nation to war, preventing black candidates from winning in majority-white constituencies, or promoting the enactment of racialized policies toward crime and the construction of vast prison systems to warehouse young black men.

Related to this is the fact that experimental social psychology has a particularly narrow paradigmatic approach to research, based primarily on experiments in artificial situations involving college student subjects. Because of this limited database, the field is ill-suited to assess the external validity of many politically relevant psychological theories. At the very least, as argued elsewhere (Sears, 1986), the picture painted by experimental social psychology often may not fit the real world very well, once broader kinds of evidence are consulted. In this respect, the "group identity" theme of the current volume is close enough to my own current work that I hope I have something fresh to add to the dialogue about the political psychology of democratic citizenship.

My general thesis is roughly this. Experimental social psychology in the United States is strongly skewed to the political left, especially in domains focused on intergroup relations. The version of left-politics most relevant to intergroup relations is the ideology of multiculturalism. Multiculturalism is based on the familiar assumptions of theories centered on intergroup conflict that have emerged from the work of American experimental social psychologists. These theories emphasize consensual and stable ethnic group boundaries, strong ethnic identities, the politicization of group identities and group

interests, and so the expectation of intergroup conflict. This has yielded what I will call the social–psychological "substrate" of multiculturalism. It is not so compatible with more individual-centered social psychological theories that emphasize individualism, integration, and assimilation—or the "color-blind" view that Martin Luther King, Jr., captured with his phrase, "the content of their character rather than the color of their skin."

I would argue that the field's largely lab-based methods—and a set of political priors that align with the research results produced by those methods—have led it to develop a view of race and ethnicity in America compatible with the intergroup conflict rather than the individual-centered cluster of theories. (I make no distinction here between "race" and "ethnicity," a longer discussion than suitable in this brief chapter.) That view is what I will call the "political subtext" of experimental social psychology, an approach that is described more generally in the next section.

THE CENTRAL PARADIGM OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Experimental social psychology is almost entirely dependent on a peculiarly narrow form of data collection: Experimentation in artificial laboratory settings (or their equivalents) using college student participants, usually predominantly middle-class white Americans. The ostensible goal of experimental social psychology is to develop abstract general principles about psychological processes. But to understand the collective consequences of individual behavior requires knowledge of the historical, political, social, and economic context in which it is enacted, variables largely excluded from the social psychological laboratory. As a result, studying human behavior in an artificial context may or may not yield general principles that are helpful in real contexts. So, simple and obvious as the applied-psychology metaphor may be, it may not be the appropriate way to frame political psychological analysis.

Most social psychology studies are based on experiments in situations that are artificial in three senses (Sears, 1986). First, they almost always are physically conducted in an artificial location—usually a laboratory or a classroom on a college campus. Their materials generally resemble educational materials, such as paper and pencil questionnaires or computer screens. They frequently invent artificial stimuli for the purpose, such as in the "dot estimator" task or the "minimal intergroup situation" mentioned elsewhere in this volume, rather than allowing the chaos of the natural world to flood the analysis with error variance and confounding variables. For these

reasons, Peffley and Hurwitz (Chapter 11) criticize the laboratory as "sterile." Its usual minimal mundane realism is likely to diminish still further in the future as experimental social psychology becomes more technologically sophisticated and Institutional Review Boards more cautious.

Second, the almost exclusive reliance of experimental social psychology on college student participants may also yield misleading results (Henry, 2008; Sears, 1986). Peffley and Hurwitz present several examples from the study of stereotypes. College students are usually thought to express more favorable racial attitudes than the general population. Why? We can hope that the college experience has opened their eyes to the unhappy realities of racial inequality. On the other hand, as young people with presumably relatively uncrystallized attitudes living in a usually liberal environment, they may simply be vulnerable to transient liberal influences. Or they merely may be complying overtly to campus social desirability pressures. I think the evidence on this point is still somewhat fragmentary and difficult to interpret.

Third, human behavior is always enacted in some specific context. There is no such thing as a general, abstract context. Experimental social psychology usually ignores the specific contexts of the worlds from which its participants come, such as their racial history, cultural diversity, or affluence, on the assumption that random assignment adequately protects its findings. It sets the values of its parameters at arbitrary levels, insensitive to historical, cultural, and demographic variables that may often essentially be constants in laboratories but in the real world may well be crucial moderators. The experiment may tell us about the artificial context created in the lab, but it may or may not tell us much about real people in their quite different but more real political contexts.

The larger context may simply produce main effects that are beyond social psychology's legitimate disciplinary turf and presumably may be safely ignored. But real-world conditions may moderate and interact with psychological processes. Peffley and Hurwitz hint at such interactions, by suggesting that political scientists can broaden social psychology's perspective by supplying the larger context within which social psychological processes operate. The flow of information between the two disciplines becomes a two-way street, not the borrowing of information by one from the other.

Peffley and Hurwitz give several well-chosen examples concerning stereotypes. For example, stereotypes may have a significant impact only when the target "fits" the content of conventional stereotypes. Indeed, in their field experiments (also see Mendelberg, 2001), exposure to violent crime committed by blacks is a prime condition for promoting white

public support for punitive crime policy, as well as for racially conservative candidates. The contrasting tradition in social psychology is to focus on stereotyping at a generic level, irrespective of stereotype content. Similarly, *consensual* stereotypes are likely to be more potent than artificial or generic stereotypes. For example, laboratory research on stereotype threat has demonstrated the power of consensual stereotypes, but has rarely examined consensus in its own right. Our understanding of the momentous change in white Americans' consensual racial stereotypes and prejudices from inherited deficiencies to cultural deficiencies come from general population probability samples, and not from laboratories (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000). Examining the systematic sources of stereotypes is also critical, whether in the news media, where the link between blacks and welfare became established after the civil rights movement (Gilens, 1999), or the political arena, which racialized sexual assaults in the 1988 Bush campaign (Mendelberg, 2001). Implicitly racial messages seem to be more politically powerful in political campaigns today than explicitly racist ones, perhaps an effect specific to this point in American history. The laboratory experiment is poorly equipped to assess historical sources of variation or of changes in the implicated psychological processes.

How can the limitations of experimental social psychology—the nearly exclusive reliance on college students studied in an artificial laboratory, and the minimal ability to test real-world contexts as moderators—be overcome, or even assessed? One solution would be to do formal scientific analyses of the effects of these constraints. For example, Judd and Park (Chapter 9) compare a probability sample and laboratory studies of students and find surprising differences in their racial ideologies. Field experiments in natural situations, perhaps with probability samples, can overcome the laboratory's lack of mundane realism in the laboratory while retaining an experiment's confident causal interpretation (Green & Wong, Chapter 10). A field experiment can also assess the power of parameters set at natural rather than artificial levels: Is the kind and amount of intergroup contact that occurs in the natural environment sufficiently powerful to reduce prejudice?

The possible shortcomings of college student participants might be assessed through direct comparisons with adults. Judd and Park (Chapter 9) report an interesting age–race interaction in the strength of stereotyping from a field survey, with older whites and younger blacks having the strongest stereotypes. This outcome could not be discovered in laboratory experiments on young students. Other examples will be given later. On the other hand, such comparisons may sometimes not yield large differences. In one study, the level of symbolic racism turned out to be rather similar in several standard subject pool and general population samples (Henry & Sears, 2002). In

another, party identification and symbolic racism were as crystallized among college seniors as in the general population (Sears & Henry, 2008).

A formal approach to assessing the role of context might be found in Egon Brunswik's (1956) idea of a "representative design." Behavioral scientists are familiar with the need for representative samples of persons responding to a particular standardized situation. Brunswik argued also for representative sampling of natural situations, and even, in the extreme case, the study of a relatively few people in a wide variety of situations. Later the term "ecological validity" was used to describe the fit of empirical findings with natural situations.

Of course, while potentially insightful, such systematic comparisons would be expensive. Later on, I will discuss an alternative that is likely to be more feasible, namely, a stronger emphasis on cross talk across disciplines. Before doing so, I provide an illustration of the problems created by experimental social psychology's narrow participant base. For this purpose, I turn to the contributions from this volume that are closest to my own area of interest: the three chapters on "group identity."

THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL SUBSTRATE OF MULTICULTURALISM

The otherwise excellent chapters on group identity in this volume seem to me to represent well the conventional social psychological view of American intergroup relations. Chick Judd and Bernadette Park develop a "multicultural" approach to prejudice reduction. The experimental social psychologist Marilynn Brewer develops her theory of optimally distinctive identities. The political scientist Pam Conover actually presents a similar view, joining the abstract concepts of political theory to the empirical findings of experimental social psychology to develop the psychological underpinnings of a "politics of recognition." As I will argue, all three chapters interpret the conventional wisdom of today's experimental social psychology as promoting a multicultural political ideology. Here there is little "cross-talk" of empirical evidence about the realities of the political world. Without it, experimental social psychology is a bit like "one hand clapping," as J. D. Salinger once said. I will try to supply some cross talk, particularly based on more open-ended responses not so constrained by experimental treatments and, more important, on general population samples.

Beginning in the 1960s with the civil rights movement and the many subsequent civil rights reforms since, race has become far more salient in American society. The burgeoning waves of immigration since then have

contributed further to heightened salience of cultural diversity. Together they led to an organized multicultural movement asserting group rights, not just traditional individual rights, a movement sometimes also described as "identity politics." The multicultural movement led to group-based demands on behalf of disadvantaged ethnic groups, such as for group acknowledgement, respect, and recognition; for group-based resource allocation; and descriptive representation. The multicultural movement was naturally suspicious of individual-based goals such as assimilation and racial integration, even sometimes seeing them as racist (for some original sources, see Glazer, 1997; Ingram, 2000; Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994).

The psychological assumptions behind multiculturalism converge with the core of the experimental social–psychological approach to American racial and ethnic group relations reflected in this volume's three chapters on group identity. It centers on such processes as swift, automatic social categorization into groups, especially ingroups and outgroups; the stability of consensual racial group boundaries; strong and stable ethnic identities; the politicization of group interests; and ingroup favoritism and outgroup antagonism. Just as "you are what you eat," so our findings "are" dictated by the constructs and independent variables we start with. Still, I want to emphasize that here I am describing what I see as the general subtext of American experimental social psychology's treatment of race and ethnicity, not any specific theory.

The central distinction is between ingroups and outgroups. The notion of ingroups and outgroups implies a fixity of group identities that seems to me artificially imposed on a world in which some group boundaries are indeed quite stable over time, and others are quite fluid. But it does seem to be a staple of American experimental social psychology as applied to race and ethnicity. Indeed Judd and Park (Chapter 9) argue that any effort to reduce prejudice by eliminating racial category distinctions is "infeasible and undesirable." This argument proceeds from two assumptions: (1) that cultural and ethnic boundaries are not going to disappear and that our society needs to develop more harmonious intergroup relations while explicitly acknowledging them rather than pretending they do not exist, and (2) that can only happen if we all better appreciate our diversity as a nation and accept and value that diversity, accepting each group's positive and negative qualities.

Similarly, Conover argues that minority groups must have presence and voice in shaping their preferences and identities. Otherwise their interests will be misunderstood and their identities will become inauthentic. "Constitutive preferences" that join their ethnic interests to their ethnic identities transform minority individuals so that political issues become relevant to the self, producing a vested interest that is less individualistic and more

group-centered. The political necessity is a "politics of recognition." Groups must speak for themselves, perhaps through a system of descriptive representation. The assumption of stable group boundaries is so secure that it requires an abandonment of the traditional liberal individualism in favor of group rights. To Conover, "constitutive preferences" induce a desirable increase in the intensity of minorities' information processing, yielding more stable attitudes and more contentious politics. The subtext of the politics of recognition, then, as the less sympathetic journalist Gregory Rodriguez said recently, becomes that "American society is a federation of opposing, static and permanently aggrieved identities" (Rodriguez, 2008). Other social psychologists such as Sidanius and Pratto (1999), Bobo (1999), and Bonilla-Silva and Glover (2004) similarly describe bounded pan-ethnic groups of stark clarity and stability, but arrayed in a durable racial hierarchy. Even while paying tribute to the notion that race and ethnicity are socially constructed, social psychological theorizing seems to see America's pan-ethnic categories as so stamped in stone that it is functionally an almost essentialist perspective (see also Miller & Prentice, 1999).

Thus, the subtext of the ingroup–outgroup distinction in American experimental social psychology is that group boundaries are not only highly stable, but consensual. The traditional panethnic categories such as "white," "black," "Latino," and "Asian American" should capture the ethnic identities of almost all Americans. In this respect, the dominant treatment of intergroup relations in American experimental social psychology coincides with the psychological underpinnings of the political ideology of multiculturalism. However, I would argue that, convenient as that classification is for social psychologists, it may be a poor fit to the ethnic identities of ordinary people. For example, in a survey of 2,080 UCLA freshmen in 1996, we asked, "Which ethnic/racial group do you most identify with?" We required 131 coding categories, not just four, to classify all the responses (Sears, Fu, Henry, & Bui, 2003; Sears, Fu, Henry, & Bui, 2008). Black and white respondents typically used the conventional pan-ethnic categories, but Asian and Latino respondents more frequently used a wide variety of nationality categories.

There is a puzzle here. Why does American social psychology so strongly assume stable boundaries between ethnic ingroups and outgroups? The influential but less American social identity theory does not assume that. For example, Oakes (2002) argues that the self-categorization variant of social identity theory views group membership not as fixed but as an emergent, context-specific outcome of the interaction of the perceiver and the immediate situation. As indicated above, I believe there is a political component, as well as an historical and cultural component, in American social psychology's assumption.

BLACK EXCEPTIONALISM

The treatments of intergroup relations in all these chapters take for granted stable ethnic and racial group boundaries. Is that assumption credible outside of the college laboratory? The assumption of presumed fixity seems to me oddly pervasive when placed in the context of the American historical experience. The "melting pot" metaphor is in part a romantic myth, of course. But who could deny that this "nation of immigrants" has greatly homogenized the vast cultural heterogeneity of new arrivals over the past couple of centuries? The considerable immigration of French Huguenots 300 years ago, or of Germans a century and a half ago, have left some traces, but most would not use the social-psychological language of intergroup conflict to describe their lives in today's America.

As such, it is important to ask where the assumption of stable, rigid boundaries might come from. However poorly it may describe the experience of many groups, the fixity assumption *does* square well with nearly four centuries of African American experience, the premier case of dysfunctional intergroup relations in the United States. The historical level of oppression of African Americans has been so severe that it has long prompted vociferous calls for redress and even reparations. The process of categorizing African Americans has always been unique and particularly interesting. They have historically been corralled into a group whose boundaries are marked by a largely impermeable color line. "One drop" of African blood—if it is known—categorizes an individual inescapably and irrevocably as "black" or "African American." And that categorization is enduring and nearly inescapable. A man with a white mother from Kansas and an African father is inescapably "black," even when the exactly 50–50 nature of that mix is known to virtually every man, woman, and child in America. The color line is extraordinarily different to cross.

This suggests to me that American social psychology's unstated presumption is that African Americans are the prototypical racial and ethnic minority group. If we use that model, ethnic group boundaries in general should indeed be likely to be perceived as highly stable over time and relatively impermeable. But that is not the experience of the descendents of most groups that have come to America. No one should be surprised if social psychology is strongly influenced by the times in which it is written. But in the aftermath of the civil rights revolution and the continuing frustrations of blacks in attaining full equality, which are especially salient on college campuses, does the *specific* African American context weigh too heavily in social psychology's *general* theories of intergroup relations?

I would argue that this stability of ingroup–outgroup boundaries is largely unique to African Americans among America's racial and ethnic groups. It is inescapedly linked to a specific and unique historical and social context that is not captured in experimental social psychology, but that is generalized to other groups in it. The uniqueness of African Americans can be seen in three major ways.

First, African Americans continue to show unusually low levels of integration and assimilation into the broader society. The rate of intermarriage between blacks and whites is far lower than that between any other ethnic or racial minority group and whites (Lichter & Qian, 2005). The residential segregation levels, and so the school segregation levels, of African Americans are far higher than those of any other group. Blacks remain substantially more disadvantaged than any other major native-born ethnic group by almost all criteria—ranging from infant mortality to longevity, educational level, income and wealth, employment, illegitimate births, divorce, crime (both commission and victimization), and imprisonment rates (Sears, Hetts, Sidanius, & Bobo, 2000; Stoll, 2005).

Second, African Americans attract unusually high levels of prejudice. Our own research indicates that whites harbor more negative affect toward blacks than toward any other ethnic or racial minority group (Sears, Citrin, Cheleden, & Van Laar, 1999). The volume of research about whites' antiblack prejudice is another, if imperfect, index of that, ranging from Allport's (1954) original work to its recent update (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2006). The heat of the post-civil rights debate about the persistence of whites' racial prejudice against blacks is perhaps another indicator (D'Souza, 1995; Sears et al., 2000; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997).

Third, African Americans, cooped up behind a color line they have little prospect of ever crossing in some major respects, show higher levels of ethnic and racial group consciousness, as reflected in their racial identity, sense of common fate, and perceived discrimination, than does any other major ethnic or racial group, whether whites, Asian Americans, or native-born Latinos (Bobo & Johnson, 2001; Sears & Savalei, 2006). Their group consciousness is more powerful in determining their preferences on policy issues involving their group's interests than is the case for any other ethnic group (Sears & Savalei, 2006). In that sense, blacks are the premier exemplars of developing Conover's "constitutive preferences," and they, at least, do map well onto the political subtext of experimental social psychology.

Thus, the color line drives politics among blacks to an extraordinary extent, both as agents and as targets. But what about minority groups not descended from Africa? The sociological evidence is overwhelming that the waves of heavily Eastern and Southern European immigrants who

arrived about a century ago have gradually assimilated into the previously Anglo-Saxon-dominated culture by virtually any standard one can imagine (Alba, 1990; Alba & Nee, 2003). Those ethnic groups were once so separate that the Italians and Germans and Irish were thought to constitute different races. But today, their original languages are spoken by only handfuls of their descendants; the number of ethnically specific institutions has dwindled; intermarriage rates are very high; few neighborhoods any longer are dominated by a single European ethnic group; educational and income differences across groups are sharply reduced; both ethnic discrimination and ethnic loyalty in politics is much reduced, and so on. For example, the proportion of the once-stigmatized Jews who serve in the U.S. Senate and the House far outstrips their small population proportion, while black congressional candidates rarely win outside majority-black constituencies. Except for African Americans, the pattern has been one of permeable group lines over time.

There is evidence that today's new immigrant groups may be following the same route and perhaps far more swiftly. The intermarriage rate is a good indicator. For example, in the 2000 Census, 58 percent of the married young native-born Asian American women and 45 percent of their male counterparts had married a non-Asian. Add to that some proportion of the 24 percent of the young women who had married a U.S.-born Asian who married an Asian man not of their own nationality group, and the intermarriage rate becomes astonishingly high, even for a group dominated by relatively recent immigrants (Lichter & Qian, 2005). A reasonable question, but one I have no answer for, is what ethnic group the children of those young women will identify with or be categorized in by others?

The prediction from experimental social psychology, for example, as reflected in Brewer's chapter, is that minorities should have stronger ethnic identities than majorities. Again the historical context probably should condition that abstract generalization. Voluntary immigrants such as the waves of European immigrants of a century ago today have markedly reduced ethnic identifications (Alba, 1990; Alba & Nee, 2003). Even more advanced generations of contemporary immigrant groups have significantly weaker ethnic identities. Yes, both blacks and Latinos have stronger ethnic identities than do whites. But generations of Asians and Latinos whose grandparents and parents were born in the United States have markedly weaker ethnic identities than do those who have immigrated more recently (Citrin & Sears, 2009, chapter 3; Sears & Savalei, 2006).

This weakened ethnic identity among the U.S.-born is also reflected in a question asking respondents to choose between American and ethnic identity (Citrin & Sears, 2009, chapter 4). An item used in several surveys read,

"When you think of social and political issues, do you think of yourself mainly as a member of a particular ethnic, racial, or nationality group, or do you think of yourself mainly as just an American?" We find that only 16 percent of U.S.-born Latinos opted for ethnic identity, compared to 28 percent of the naturalized citizens. When given the option of a hyphenated identity, 25 percent of the United States born, as against only 10 percent of the naturalized Latinos, rejected even that ethnic label in preference for pure American identity. Interestingly enough, generation in the United States has much less effect on the strength of nonblack minority college students' ethnic identities (Sears et al., 2003). This foreshadows a number of similar examples of the failure of student samples to reflect general population findings, as will be seen in the next section.

Finally, to make the point that boundary permeability is strongly contingent on context, I turn to the Arab world. The ancient antagonisms of Sunnis and Shiites do suggest some lack of fluid movement between the two groups. By contrast, Americans appear to change religious denominations at dizzying speed. According to a recent Pew Research report, 44 percent claim to have switched denominations during their lifetimes.

In short, the assumption of largely unchanging and impermeable group boundaries implied by the terms "ingroup" and "outgroup" should be regarded as largely contingent on context. The implied stability of these "ingroup" and "outgroup" boundaries of American ethnic and racial groups seems to me rooted in the important and salient exception of the African American experience. Without taking into account the broader historical context that has led to the uniquely strong color line constraining the lives of African Americans, one cannot fully understand the political psychology of race and ethnicity in America. As such, the problem of black exceptionalism provides a paradigmatic example of how experimental social psychology's perspective on crucial issues facing democratic societies could be enriched by cross talk with those whose specialty is context—namely, political scientists, sociologists, and historians.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MAJORITY AND MINORITY GROUPS

Another illustration of the problems posed by experimental social psychology's analytic base can be found in research on differences in group identification in majority and minority groups. For example, in Chapter 7, Brewer develops the idea that majorities and minorities have very different group identities. To her, social structure does matter; being a minority

group is, per se, different. The superordinate identity (e.g., American iden-
tity) is essentially "owned" by the dominant majority group and is more
salient to its members than its own ethnic identity (e.g., "white"). Subordi-
nate minorities, on the other hand, are more likely to feel somewhat alienated
from the superordinate identity that is the property of the dominant major-
ity, and their own ethnic identities (e.g., being "black") are more likely to be
salient. So ethnic identity often competes successfully with the superordinate
identity. Majorities and minorities should therefore show very different pat-
terns of group identity: "for majority group members, identification at the
subgroup and superordinate group levels are essentially interchangeable,"
in contrast to the "incompatibility and conflict" between ethnic and national
identification among minorities.

The political implication is important. The social-psychological analysis
yields a dark portrait of American society in which dominant whites have
co-opted the symbols of the nation as a whole as objects of affection, while
oppressed minorities settle for identification with their subgroup and feel
alienated from the nation as a whole. As Brewer says, "this asymmetry in the
compatibility between national identification and subgroup identification
among majorities and minorities provides the social psychological backdrop
for the politics of recognition," a core ingredient in a multicultural ideology.

Concretely, this predicts American national identity should be stronger
among the dominant whites, and ethnic identities stronger among subor-
dinate ethnic minorities. It also predicts that national and ethnic identity
should be strongly positively correlated among whites, but negatively cor-
related among minorities. This is a recipe for ethnic conflict in which the
dominant majority has a great deal of power, and subordinate minorities are
left with feelings of alienation and resentment. It is a meta-view of our soci-
ety that, if accurate, would point toward conflictual identity politics as the
likely product and multicultural policies as the preferred, or even required,
ameliorative solution, respectively.

In support of these asymmetry hypotheses, Brewer cites three studies by
Sidanius and his colleagues, based on both college student and general pop-
ulation samples, as showing that national attachment is stronger among the
dominant white majority than among minorities, and that national attach-
ment is positively correlated with ethnic attachment in the majority group
but either negatively or uncorrelated among ethnic minorities. I was curi-
ous about that brief synopsis of the relevant research, as well as wondering
about the student versus general population comparison, so I did a more
systematic review, which I discuss below. It turns out that those data seem to
support only a piece of the original hypothesis and the less interesting piece
of it at that. The basic findings come from Sidanius, Feshbach, Levin, and

Pratto (1997), Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin, (1998), and Sidanius and Petrocik (2001). All three present student data and all but Sinclair et al. (1998) present general population data.

Strength of National Attachment

The first prediction discussed in Brewer's chapter focuses on ethnic differences in the strength of national attachment. It does prove important to treat student and general population samples separately. Two samples of white American students do show, as predicted, stronger national attachment than do students from any of the conventional pan-ethnic minority groups (e.g., blacks, Asian Americans, and Latinos). Three general-population American samples all show that whites have, as predicted, stronger national attachment than do African Americans. But all three also show that Asians' and Latinos' levels of attachment to the nation are just as strong as whites'. Blacks fit the harsh pattern of ingroup–outgroup conflict emphasized in much of experimental social psychology, but other minority groups do not. Indeed in the one study making the comparison, blacks were no more identified with the nation than were resident aliens (Sidanius & Petrocik, 2001). But mere majority or minority status does not explain the data except among college students.

   I would make three points. First, college students proved to be unreliable guides to the general population. Second, the underlying story for minorities—resentment of their subordinate status and so some alienation from the nation—does seem to characterize African Americans, at least relative to whites. For other minority groups, however, only those who have not even been formally incorporated into the nation—resident aliens—show significantly lower national attachment than does the dominant white majority, consistent with the notion of "black exceptionalism." Third, contrary to the political subtext of minority alienation from the white-dominated nation, all minorities—even blacks—show high levels of attachment to the superordinate national group in absolute terms, according to Sidanius and Petrocik (2001).

Does Ethnic Identity Facilitate or Compromise National Attachment?

A second prediction reviewed by Brewer is that the dominant white majority will show a positive association of national and ethnic identities. Again, American student samples support the prediction. Summarizing across all three studies, whites' national attachment is positively correlated with ethnic attachment in seven of eight tests (five significant), and with whites' ethnocentrism (the difference between white and minority thermometer scores)

positively in all five tests (all significant). Turning to general population surveys of whites, the 1992 NES shows the predicted significant positive association of patriotism with own-group ethnic attachment or ethnocentrism in five out of six tests. The Los Angeles County Social Survey (LACSS) yields one significantly negative association between patriotism and ethnocentrism, and two null associations. A crude count for the general population surveys shows five significantly positive, and one significantly negative, association out of eight tested—supportive but somewhat less consistently so than among the students.

The third prediction highlighted in Brewer's chapter—and arguably the most interesting one—is that minorities' national and ethnic identities should conflict and compete, yielding negative associations between them. The two surveys of minority students at UCLA provide consistent support for the predicted negative associations. In one case, 15 of the 18 associations were negative, nine significantly so (Sinclair et al., 1998). The single student survey analyzed in both other papers yielded five significantly negative, and two nonsignificantly positive, associations. By contrast, the general population samples show only chance associations. The predicted negative associations of patriotism with ethnocentrism were statistically significant among blacks in the 1992 NES and Latinos in the LACSS. However, patriotism was not significantly related to ethnic attachment in the NES among blacks, nor to ethnocentrism among Latinos and Asians in the NES or among blacks or Asians in the LACSS. Patriotism and ethnic attachment were actually significantly positively linked among Latinos in the NES. The total count is two significantly negative, one significantly positive, and five null, which sounds like chance.

What happens if we go not only off the American college campus, but overseas as well? Staerkle, Sidanius, Green, & Molina (2005) took advantage of parallel general population surveys conducted in 23 countries by the International Social Survey Program in 1995, though for various reasons, the analyses parallel to those just described above were only conducted on respondents from eight non-U.S. nations. In this case, again the correlations of national and ethnic identity were all positive among majority groups, all but one significantly so. Among minorities, however, more than half the coefficients were positive, two significantly positive, and only one significantly negative. Again the language of "incompatibility and conflict" between ethnic and national identifications hardly seems appropriate to serve as the foundation of a *general* theory of intergroup relations—whatever it fits with some specific contexts.

College student samples, then, seem to be unreliable guides to the general population in terms of the link between patriotism and ethnic

identification in these studies. The student samples quite consistently show the predicted patterns among both majority and minority groups. General population samples show less support for a positive link among whites and no evidence at all of a *general* negative association among minorities, whether in the USA or elsewhere. Thus, when the analysis is taken out of the usual social-psychological research context and into the real world, the notion that strong minority identities come at the expense of attachment to the nation seems not to be confirmed.

In fairness, the authors interpret the critical test as being a significant difference between the associations among majority whites and those among ethnic minorities, which is generally sustained. My focus, however, is on the underlying view of ethnic minorities' perspectives common in experimental social psychology, of minorities not just as different from whites, but as disenchanted and estranged from a nation dominated by whites. It is a strikingly different subtext about cultural diversity than the one based on the traditional expectation that minorities will mostly assimilate over time from being alien foreigners to ordinary Americans, if not super-Americans. A negative correlation between the two identities reflecting alienated minority groups, especially among those with the strongest subgroup attachment, is its most interesting prediction. Yet that prediction fails empirically except among college students. America's ethnic and racial minority groups seem not to fit social psychology's portrait of them very well.

To reinforce this latter point further, when given a free choice, even blacks prefer to think of themselves as "just an American" rather than simply as a black in response to the item cited earlier. In a national sample, 66 percent of blacks chose "just an American," as did 72 percent of blacks in a Los Angeles sample. When given the additional option of "both an American and (ethnicity)," an identity as a hyphenated American became the most popular choice, with 56 percent of the blacks in Los Angeles selecting "African American." But of the remainder, more (33 percent) favored the national identity than the purely racial identity (12 percent; Citrin & Sears, 2009, chapter 4). Even for African Americans, the political subtext of estrangement from American national identity in favor of their racial identity is not a good fit. They prefer to blend the two if possible.

CONCLUSION

My goal in the previous section was not to single out Brewer's contribution in this volume for special criticism. To the contrary, I was trying to illustrate a more general point about how the narrowness of experimental social

psychology's participant and contextual base may lead to conclusions with very different political implications not only for how to approach problems of intergroup relations, but also for the nature of democratic life itself. Without the benefit of interdisciplinary cross talk between researchers from different disciplines focused on the broader social and political context of intergroup relations in specific democratic societies, there would be a tendency for experimental social psychology to overstate the fit of empirical reality to the underlying psychological assumptions of multicultural ideology.

More generally, cross talk between the different intellectual traditions that contribute to political psychology, as highlighted by various chapters included in this volume, has significant implications for refining and advancing the interdisciplinary agenda of political psychology. It might seem obvious that cross talk would be most valuable as a check on political scientists' tendencies to get mired in the peculiarities and causal ambiguities of the natural political situations they study *in vivo*. More important, I think, cross talk could be a crucial check on the narrowness of experimental social psychology. Perhaps political scientists can detect collisions between the sometimes simple abstractions of social psychology with the hard realities and complexities of the political world, to illuminate anomalies, exceptions, theoretical omissions, and so on.

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Political Psychology: The Promise of (and Impediments to) Synergistic Interdisciplinary Scholarship

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The field of political psychology is currently flourishing, owing by and large to the strength it draws from its interdisciplinary nature. Current interdisciplinary connections can generally be characterized as *exportation*–borrowing a principle from the other discipline while remaining steadfastly within one's own disciplinary paradigm. While exportation has yielded numerous important findings, political psychology stands to benefit the most from *synergistic* interdisciplinary connections. This chapter explores why genuine synergy has been so rare, and provides guidance for developing a synergistic interdisciplinary research agenda.

These are good times for political psychology. The International Society for Political Psychology is thriving, with a bustling annual conference and a journal with a worldwide readership and a rapidly increasing impact factor. Political psychology scholarship is also routinely appearing in the pages of its parent fields' premiere journals and in the top journals of other disciplines as well. Graduate and undergraduate courses on political psychology have proliferated, and a new crop of doctoral programs in political psychology has begun to spring up.

For those working in this area, the strong state of the field comes as no surprise. Political psychology, as a truly interdisciplinary field of inquiry, offers unparalleled promise for expanding our understanding in the social sciences in ways that more traditional fields cannot. Situated at the intersection of psychology and political science, political psychology draws as well on a broad array of other disciplines including mass communications, sociology, anthropology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience, among others. Because of this rich theoretical and empirical foundation, political psychology offers a unique opportunity to identify and explore meaningful links between micro-level processes and macro-level phenomena, between intrapsychic processes within individuals and aspects of the political reality within which those individuals operate.

As social psychologists, we have found the flourishing of political psychology wonderfully gratifying to observe. For the field of social psychology, political psychology represents something of a homecoming. From the beginning, social psychology has been guided by an enduring desire to understand and rectify contemporary social problems. The topics that have captivated the field at various points in time have, in large measure, reflected the social and historical crises of the day. World War II sparked a flood of research on persuasion and propaganda, the Holocaust motivated research on obedience to authority, the Cuban missile crisis inspired an exploration of the pathologies of group decision making, racial tensions in the United States have sparked countless lines of research seeking to shed new light on the problem of prejudice and discrimination, and the current crisis of terror will doubtless have its research legacy. As we know to our collective horror, real-world issues and events routinely challenge our assumptions about human nature and about the social context, inspiring new programs of research and requiring more sophisticated social psychological theories.

But social psychologists have tended—especially in the post-cognitive-revolution days, and especially in the United States— to take these real-world issues and break them down into tractable questions that can be wrestled with in the lab. As an afterthought somewhere in the discussion section of a paper, we might wave our hands at the original, rich, complex real-world problem that prompted the study. Nevertheless, the field is moving toward more meaningful, fuller connections with real-world problems, not just in political psychology but in other domains as well—health psychology, psychology and the law, consumer psychology, psychology of aging, and so on. Contributions to the current volume provide some excellent examples of social psychology tackling real-world political problems (see, e.g., Chapters 4, 6, and 10 by Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, Snyder, Omoto, & Smith, Green & Wong).

Further, by juxtaposing chapters tackling issues from different disciplinary perspectives, this volume contributes to a lively cross talk among scholars taking different theoretical and empirical approaches to the study of democracy and citizenship. For example, these chapters illuminate how micro-level processes such automatic impression formation influence macro-level phenomena such as electoral outcomes (Hall, Goren, Chaiken, & Todorov, Chapter 4), and how macro-level phenomena such as elite-level political rhetoric can impact micro-level psychological processes such as individual decision making (Jerit, Kuklinski, & Quirk, Chapter 5). Chapters organized around civic knowledge clarify how models of knowledge grounded in psychological processes and individual experience (Johnson, Chapter 3) may be combined with models grounded more overtly in political

theory in order to understand how (and how well) individuals navigate civic life (Delli Carpini, Chapter 2). Chapters organized around intergroup relations and group identity elucidate how psychological processes such as stereotyping as well as individual experience and identity (Brewer, Chapter 7) produce societal-level phenomena of intolerance and hate (Judd & Park, Chapter 9), as well as how political phenomena such as societal recognition can influence individual-level cognitive and affective processes (Conover, Chapter 8). Finally, these chapters highlight the contribution of the media to these processes, by acting as an intermediary connecting individual members of groups or by bringing news of society and institutions back to individuals (see Gamson, Chapter 12, and Bennett, Chapter 13). Together, these chapters say much about democratic citizenship by illustrating how micro-level psychological processes interact with and are influenced by macro-level structural and political phenomena.

Lest we celebrate too much, however, we still have work to do. In fact, in our view the real promise of political psychology—the development of synergistic links that draw on and genuinely feed back into basic theory and findings in its parent disciplines—has gone largely unrealized. In this commentary, we consider the philosophical and methodological tensions inherent in the conduct of political psychology that stand in the way of developing these kinds of genuinely reciprocal interdisciplinary links. Our aim in doing so is not to minimize or detract from the excellent scholarship currently being done in this area, but to challenge political psychologists to capitalize on the rich opportunities for synergy.

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY: EXPORTATION VERSUS SYNERGY

As the diversity of entries in the current volume illustrates, the bounds of political psychology are broad. Underlying this diversity of topic areas and approaches, however, is a fairly simple distinction between scholarship involving what might be referred to as *exportation* and that which involves *synergism*.

Exportation is a form of political psychology that is well known to all of us. Indeed, exportation accounts for the lion's share of contemporary research in political psychology. It involves borrowing theories and hypotheses from another discipline while remaining steadfastly within one's own disciplinary paradigm. Particularly common has been the exportation of psychological principles in the service of understanding political judgment, political behavior, and political communication, as well as other

political processes and outcomes. For example, psychological processes such as motivated skepticism, confirmation bias, and heuristic use have been used fruitfully to explain political judgments, especially in low-information contexts (e.g., Redlawsk, 2002; Taber & Lodge, 2006). Distinctions between memory-based and on-line judgmental processes have been applied to the case of candidate evaluations, clarifying the process by which citizens make vote choices (e.g., Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen, & Brau, 1995). Similarly, psychological research on the accessibility and importance of attitudes has shaped research on how the mass media may set the public agenda, prime particular bases of judgment, and frame public issues in ways that emphasize some considerations over others (e.g., Althaus & Kim, 2006; Domke, Shah, & Wackman, 1998; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987; McCombs, 2005; Miller & Krosnick, 2000; Scheufele, 1999; Shah, Watts, Domke, Fan, & Fibison, 1999). Finally, the psychological literature on attribution has served as a foundation for investigations of citizens' explanations for and preferred solutions to social and political problems (e.g., Iyengar, 1990). As these important lines of research illustrate, this approach has benefited both disciplines tremendously and it will undoubtedly continue to do so.

Our contention, however, is that the real promise of political psychology lies in its capacity to identify and explore *synergistic* connections across disciplines and levels of analysis. Such synergy might involve using basic, micro-level principles to elucidate macro-level phenomena, and by doing so, refining our appreciation of the basic underlying principles by identifying structural constraints or emergent, molar properties that cannot be appreciated in the decontextualized experimental laboratory. Or it may involve decomposing macro-level processes or outcomes into their constituent micro-level components, yielding new insights into the operation of both micro- and macro-level processes and phenomena. True synergy requires taking equally seriously the relevant psychological constructs and processes and the structural constraints and affordances presented by a specific social, political, and communicative context, rather than treating one component as focal and the other as a peripheral add-on. Such synthesis yields new knowledge in all contributing disciplines, knowledge that had been obscured by strictly disciplinary-bound scholarship.

This call for synergy is not an entirely new one. In recent years, scholars have pleaded for a political psychology that both is informed by and advances its various parent fields (Krosnick, 2002; Krosnick & McGraw, 2002). Ideally, research of this sort would make basic contributions to multiple disciplines, rather than merely applying the basic theoretical and empirical insights of one field to issues another. Yet this plea has been answered with a trickle rather than a flood of new research.

WHY IS SYNERGY SO RARE?

Generating examples of important and innovative exportation within political psychology is a relatively easy task. Indeed, a wealth of such scholarship has accumulated in recent decades, of which political psychologists can be very proud. It is considerably more difficult to generate examples of true synergy. Excellent examples do exist, but they are rare. Even in this volume, examples of synergy are present, but not common. Though the cross talk between disciplines exemplified in this book enables synergistic communications among researchers from different fields, even here researchers struggle to reach the synergistic potential of political psychology. A number of barriers help account for this scarcity.

Philosophical and Methodological Barriers

Philosophical and methodological tensions among the multiple parent fields of political psychology contribute to difficulties in achieving synergy in political psychological scholarship. The fields of psychology, political science, and mass communication cover fairly different terrain within the social and behavioral sciences, so perhaps it is inevitable that different priorities would emerge within each contributing discipline. These differences pose a serious impediment to synergistic political psychology.

For example, psychologists tend to prioritize the discovery of general and perhaps even universal principles that are broadly applicable across a range of specific instances. In contrast to psychologists' tendency to generalize across circumstances, political scientists and communication scholars tend to particularize with respect to circumstance. The priority in the latter two disciplines is to fully delineate the confluence of distinct features of a particular event or structure with little concern for extrapolating to other events and structures. So, whereas psychologists might ask how attitudes influence behavior, political scientists are more likely to ask how a particular attitude (e.g., toward legalized abortion) influences a specific form of behavior (e.g., campaign contributions to a pro-choice political candidate) at a particular point in time and under particular political and historical circumstances (e.g., during George W. Bush's second term, when the Democrats held a slim majority in the Senate). To provide another contrast, while psychologists might focus on a general social influence process operating in many diverse contexts, researchers in mass communication are more likely to focus on how particular media influence the transmission of political cues in historically specific contexts.

A related difference between psychologists and scholars from some other social-science disciplines involves the differing trade-offs that they make regarding internal versus external validity. Psychologists tend to prioritize

the documentation of causal processes. Toward that end, psychologists rely heavily on tightly controlled laboratory experiments that enable them to isolate independent variables and trace with a great deal of precision their impact on one or more dependent variables. Because of the logistic constraints of a controlled experiment, the typical participant in these experiments is of course the infamous college sophomore. Although the potential dangers of relying on this narrow subject population have been forcefully articulated (Sears, 1986; Sears, Chapter 14), the use of these samples of convenience is rarely cause for concern within the discipline. After all, the processes of interest to psychologist are presumed to be fundamental, rendering less important the issue of with whom these processes are documented.

If psychologists seek to document causal processes that can be isolated in closed systems, political scientists and communication scholars tend to be more interested in examining the processes that actually do unfold within the vast and complex "open system" that is the real world. This leads them to prize external validity, and to a willingness to cede experimental control in favor of naturalistic contexts and paradigms, and samples of research participants that are representative of the population to whom findings are to be generalized. Often, this means that in place of laboratory experiments, these scholars rely on national surveys and content analyses of real political communications to investigate the phenomenon of interest.

Causality Versus Generalizability?

The different emphases and approaches of psychology, political science, and mass communication are often framed in terms of competing goals of causality versus generalizability, and indeed we have adopted this frame as well. It is worth noting, though, that this is ultimately a false dichotomy. All of political psychology's constituent disciplines value and strive to obtain generalizability, though they take very different approaches. For example, while political science has traditionally emphasized the importance of being able to generalize findings from a sample of research participants to the population from which they were drawn, psychologists have traditionally emphasized the identification of basic processes that can be generalized beyond the particulars of a given study experiment—that is, to other individuals and across any number of superficially dissimilar situations. Similarly, all three disciplines ultimately seek to identify causal relations. Here, too, the fields tend to take different approaches. Whereas psychologists and some communication scholars rely experimental methods, political scientists tend to rely on sophisticated statistical procedures for fitting causal models to correlational data. Of course, each of these approaches is rooted in a set of assumptions that go largely untested. For example, psychologists assume

that the processes they isolate in the lab with their student samples operate in similar ways in other contexts and with other sorts of individuals, but only very rarely do they formally test these assumptions. Conversely, political scientists assume that the associations that they observe do in fact reflect the causal processes that they have attempted to model, but only rarely are these inferences corroborated with experimental evidence.

Perhaps not surprisingly, researchers from one discipline are often acutely sensitive to the limitations of other fields' approaches but are less troubled by the blind spots inherent in their own field's approach. This is a shame, because it is often the case that important new insights emerge when scholars from one field adopt for a time the perspective, priorities, and methodologies of the other field. Judd and Park (Chapter 9) offer a compelling illustration of this point. Through an impressive program of research rooted primarily in laboratory experimentation, Judd and Park have contributed significantly to our understanding of stereotyping processes. But as they detail in their chapter, venturing beyond the laboratory to explore stereotype processes using more representative samples and examining socially significant ingroups and outgroups led to surprising new findings. These findings, in conjunction with experimental work from their own labs and the labs of other scholars, set the stage for important breakthroughs in the stereotyping domain.

Opportunities for Synergism

We have suggested that instances of synergism are relatively rare, and we have identified some of the obstacles that stand in the way. These challenges notwithstanding, opportunities for synergism abound. Perhaps, the most obviously fertile grounds for synergy involve research questions that researchers from multiple disciplines have been independently investigating or that several political psychologists have been investigating from different perspectives. Indeed, the current volume is a testament to the richness of these opportunities. As interesting and provocative as the chapters are in their own right, each is enlivened and enriched by their juxtaposition with accompanying chapters. True to the editors' aims, the current volume is indeed a case where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Similar opportunities exist in other topic areas. Often, the work of different researchers (across and sometimes within disciplines) yields empirical support for very different theories regarding the same research question or real-world problem. This is particularly common when investigators from different disciplines seek to understand the same phenomenon, because each tends to rely on the paradigms and tools predominant in the home discipline, and to focus on the set of variables that operate at the field's traditional

level of analysis. Yet these divergent (or at least, incommensurate) theories and empirical regularities provide important opportunities for integration, promising a more complete understanding of the phenomenon in question.

The potential for integration is sometimes overlooked because of a tendency to see theories and sometimes disciplines as competing with one another, rather than cooperating. But of course, real-world phenomena often have more than one cause, and when there is a debate about which variable is at work or which theory best accounts for the phenomenon, the resolution often involves specification of the conditions under which each perspective holds. This point is nicely articulated by Delli Carpini (Chapter 2) in his discussion of integrating the traditional, heuristic, affective, and operative models of information processing into an integrated model of civic processing. Although much work remains to be done in this area, the integration of these theories promises to dramatically advance our understanding of civic learning and democratic citizenship.

In addition to *theoretical* integration, equally important advances can also be made through *methodological* synergy. In general, researchers in political psychology have tended to utilize either the lab-based techniques prominent in psychology or the survey-based techniques prominent in political science. To our credit, researchers do not invariably utilize the methods of the field in which they were trained. Nonetheless, we do show a troubling tendency to choose one or the other, rather than integrating both into a single program of research. We are delighted to note that methodological synergies of this sort are becoming more common. Although still the exception, investigators are more often pairing laboratory experiments with survey findings, triangulating across these divergent approaches in their investigations. In addition, investigators are conducting hybrid studies with greater frequency, simultaneously capitalizing on the strengths of multiple methodologies. For example, field experiments such as the Outward Bound contact research of Green and Wong (Chapter 10) explore the impact of interracial contact outside the confines of the artificially simplified laboratory environment while still providing solid grounds for causal inferences. Similarly, any number of key studies in political communication have demonstrated the value of merging the power of experimental control with the realism of simulated media content (e.g., Domke et al., 1998; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987). Because of their ability to capture real-world situations while simultaneously investigating causal relations, hybrid techniques are likely to be instrumental to a richer understanding in political psychology.

There are many such opportunities to conduct ecologically valid research while still addressing questions of causality (see Kinder & Palfrey, 1993). One set of opportunities involves taking advantage of naturally occurring

experiments. When college freshmen are randomly assigned to roommates in dorms, for example, we can capitalize on the fact that the local environments into which these students are suddenly thrust will vary in a number of ways. For example, some will find themselves surrounded by people who share their social and political attitudes, whereas others will be embedded in attitudinally diverse environments (Levitan & Visser, 2005). Similarly, some will be assigned to live with roommates of the same race, whereas others will be assigned roommates of another race (Deutsch & Collins, 1951). These situations provide rich opportunities to examine the impact of these social contextual factors on politically relevant thought and behavior.

Another set of opportunities involves the conduct of population-based experiments by embedding experimental manipulations into surveys of nationally representative samples. Although such manipulations have long been used to test methodological questions (e.g., about the impact of particular question wording choices), scholars have begun to take advantage of this approach to answer substantive questions with increased frequency (e.g., Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999; Sniderman, Piazza, Tetlock, & Kendrick; 1991; Stenner, 2005). To a large degree, the growing prevalence of this approach is attributable to omnibus survey platforms that capitalize on economies of scale to make this mode of data collection available to greater numbers of scholars (e.g., Time-Sharing Experiments for the Social Sciences).

These and other forms of methodological synergy are valuable not only for the new insights they yield, but also for the new audiences that they permit political psychologists to reach. By combining the strengths of different fields' gold standard methods, this form of synergy legitimizes political psychology in the eyes of all contributing fields. As a result, disciplinary scholars in a particular field are less prone to dismiss advances in political psychology because they do not achieve some standard of methodology that is prevalent in that field. In short, methodological synergy guarantees political psychology the widest possible audience.

AN ILLUSTRATION

In an effort to illustrate the approach that we have advocated, we close by describing one recent line of research that set out to elucidate the reciprocal, multidirectional influence between psychological processes and structural and political factors. We draw our example from the domain of stereotypes (and from the lab of one of the current authors).

Because social psychologists are primarily interested in understanding general principles that hold across instances (rather than understanding the

particulars of a given instance), little attention has been paid to content of the cultural stereotypes about different groups. Instead, scholars have tended to focus on basic processes of stereotyping, which have been presumed to generalize across various groups. Recently, however, Fiske and her colleagues (e.g., Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) have demonstrated that just as the processes of stereotyping operate systematically, so too do basic aspects of stereotype content. In particular, these scholars demonstrated that the apparently idiosyncratic stereotypes of a wide assortment of social groups were in fact organized around two fundamental dimensions: warmth and competence. The content of the cultural stereotypes about a group depends to a large degree on the group's standing on these basic dimensions. And importantly, Fiske and her colleagues have demonstrated (using both correlational and experimental approaches) that groups' perceived standings on the dimensions of warmth and competence are driven by social structural factors.

Specifically, Fiske's Stereotype Content Model (SCM) suggests outgroups are perceived as competent to the extent that they occupy positions of power and status within a society, and they are seen as relatively warm to the extent that are not in direct competition with others for scarce resources. A large and diverse body of evidence suggests that on the basis of these structural factors, there is substantial consensus within a given society about where various groups fall within the two-dimensional space of warmth and competence. Some groups are perceived to be high in both competence and warmth, whereas other groups are perceived to be low on both dimensions. Perhaps more interesting are groups for whom the cultural stereotype is mixed. Some groups are perceived as high in warmth but low in competence, whereas other groups are seen as highly competent but not at all warm.

In addition to differences in the content of these stereotypes, Fiske and her colleagues have documented systematic differences in the primary emotion that groups in each of these quadrants tend to elicit. Groups that are high in both competence and warmth tend to evoke admiration, whereas groups that are low on both dimensions tend to evoke contempt. Groups that are perceived as competent but not warm tend to evoke envy, whereas groups that are perceived as warm but not competent tend to evoke pity.

This work, therefore, identifies a set of general principles that link social structural variables with the perceptions of members of various social groups and with the discrete emotional reactions that members of these groups elicit. It offers a systematic account of stereotype content that extends across particular outgroups and even across cultures (e.g., Cuddy et al., in press). In so doing, this work contributes new insights to not just to social psychology, but to other disciplines as well. In particular, the SCM sheds new

light on the processes guiding the particular content of outgroup stereotypes, breaking new ground in social psychology by documenting the general principles that govern the ascription of attributes to social groups. However, it contributes as well to political science and sociology by illuminating the implications of social structural variables for group and individual-level outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS

Let us end where we began, with a celebration of the rich success of political psychology. These are indeed good times for political psychology. As a field, we are in a position of extraordinary potential. Scholars working in this area have the opportunity to draw upon and integrate the rich theoretical and methodological traditions of several well-established parent fields, bringing the arsenal of each to bear on problems of common interest. We must take care, however, to ensure that political psychology brings together the best of these multiple fields and achieves its deserved status as a golden child, rather than falling prey to the faults of each and ultimately becoming an embarrassment to the family.

To be sure, much work remains to be done, and many phenomena have yet to be fully explored. As is reflected in these chapters, many ideas in our field are still taking shape and await further testing and development with the best tools and minds that the two fields have to offer. Some of these efforts will (and by all means should) involve the exportation of ideas from one field to the other. Ideas that are considered passé in one parent field may be dusted off and reexamined in the light of the other. And of course, as each parent discipline marches forward, new advances in one can and should be assessed for relevance in the other.

But exportation does not represent the full realization of a truly integrated, interdisciplinary research enterprise. We cannot stop at exportation and consider it a job well done. As a field, we must continue to move beyond these first tentative steps of integrative research. Significant advances in our understanding of the complex questions that captivate us require a fully integrated and synergistic political psychology.

In our continuing endeavors to understand and explain, we can also look beyond the proud traditions of political science, mass communication, and psychology and draw upon other fields that grapple with the same issues, from yet other perspectives. Scholars in sociology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience, to name just a few, all seek to better understand the intricacies of human thought and behavior in complex social environments. Looking

forward, each of these perspectives seems likely to yield new insights into the enduring questions about democracy and citizenship that attracted us to the field of political psychology to begin with.

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What Has Political Psychology to Offer Regarding Democratic Citizenship?

George E. Marcus

A large body of psychological research on citizen competence has resoundingly suggested that citizens are ill-equipped to meet the demands of sound democratic decision making. This chapter challenges this view, arguing that democratic politics presents a wide array of challenges, each demanding different civic skills. In particular, the chapter contends that it is necessary to embrace a more agonistic view of democratic politics–one that places citizens at the center of conflict over power and resources. Drawing broadly on interdisciplinary evidence, the chapter argues that citizens are actually quite adept at meeting the challenges of self-governance in the democratic polity.

The relationship between political psychology and democratic citizenship is a reoccurring theme both in this volume and elsewhere (Elkin & Soltan, 1999; Marcus & Hanson, 1993), and it is reasonable to predict that this new collection of research contributions is not the last word. What prompts such continued interest? One principal reason involves the shortcoming of the public. Both individually and collectively the public typically fails to match the standards set by academics and other learned individuals that requires citizens to be well-informed and attentive, formulating political judgments through thoughtful consideration of the relevant facts and the relevant policy principles and prescriptions they are expected to hold and rely upon (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960, 1966; Converse, 1970; Converse & Markus, 1979; Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Mueller, 1992; Schumpeter, 1943). The consequences of using empirical investigations to explore citizen competence have largely resulted in conclusions that the electorate is better characterized as incompetent, though there are dissenters who argue that, despite individual limitations, the public performs "well enough" in the aggregate (Page & Shapiro, 1992) or that the relatively thoughtless reliance on "heuristics"—largely prior broad allegiances to party or ideological labels—provides for adequate democratic citizenship (Mueller, 1992; Popkin, 1991). Only rarely have social scientists offered a more full-throated defense of the electorate's abilities (Key & Cummings, 1966; Krouse & Marcus, 1984; Marcus, 2002).

But, notwithstanding that focus, there is a second and more telling impulse motivating these searching reflections on modern citizenship, that is, the failure of the enlightenment expectations of an emergent populace freed from the tyrannies of tradition and passion to become ruled by tranquil reason and to flourish in a world of cosmopolitan peace (Marcus, 2007). This diagnosis of failure, largely owing to the horrors of World War II, has led to a search for whom and what to blame. While malevolent leaders are culpable in not living up to these ideals, so too are modern publics culpable—given their proclaimed gullibility (Kornhauser, 1959; Zaller, 1992).

My commentary focuses on the following issues rising from the seemingly well-established diagnosis of electorate pathologies meant to cast doubt on the viability of democratic governance. While enduring controversies regarding the best regime seemingly turns on the question of citizen competence, there remains some question as to whether this diagnosis is sound. I use this observation to elaborate a framework for assessing the challenges of democratic citizenship. Using this analytic lens, I assess the evidence and theoretical formulations in the present volume, detailing how they advance our insight into the condition of democratic citizenship.

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, REGIME TYPE, AND THE CHALLENGES OF DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP

What are the issues and concerns that engage political psychology with respect to the choice of regime? Setting aside the Madisonian and Aristotelian recommendations for mixed regimes, political philosophers have historically settled on three basic "types." The first is rule by one, or monarchy—a regime dependent on the abilities of the Leviathan (Hobbes, 1968). The failure of monarchs to meet the standard of virtuous rule (either inability to perceive or enact the public interest either through malfeasance or misfeasance) leads to the corrupted version of rule by one, tyranny. The second choice is rule by the few, or aristocracy—a choice largely defended then and now by those more powerful and learned. Its virtue depends upon the validity of the claim of ennobled intentions and capacity for rule. When these claims fail to be realized, the result yields an oligarchy, wherein the powerful rule out of self-interest instead of enlightened virtuous leadership in the public interest. The third choice is democracy, a choice that, in its republican form, depends on the abilities both of citizens and of those chosen to lead, to fabricate, and enact the public interest. Failure here leads to corruptions of many names, such as "mob rule" and "tyranny of the majority."

In many respects, the arguments as to the virtues and vices associated with these choices remain contiguous with those that engaged the ancient Greeks. In the *Republic* (1974), Plato argued the claims of rule by the few, while Aristotle's *Politics* (1992) advanced the superiority of the mixed regime with a dependence on collective judgment as superior to reliance on the wisdom of some singular individual or class.

From the Greeks forward, scholars have sought the political and social arrangements that would best elicit optimal performances from citizens and leaders alike.[1] The research reviewed in this volume, examining stereotyping, tolerance, identity, information gathering, and the decision-making related issues of persuasion and judgment, is motivated by similar concerns. Ultimately, the study of citizen competence seeks to assess the extent to which the citizenry has demonstrated they are "up to the task" of democratic governance. Yet in this collection, as in the larger literature, we have precious few systematic explorations of elite performance (apart from case studies), despite considerable evidence that elites are not especially well suited to meeting their responsibilities (Janis, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977; Tetlock, 2005). Given the relatively recent emergence of democratic regimes in civilization, perhaps it is not surprising that the public's capacities would be given greater scrutiny than that of leaders. At the same time, however, the history of nondemocratic regimes would suggest that leaders' capacities, in spite of Plato's gloss on the superiority of reliance on "philosopher kings," seem largely a history of folly, wars (foreign and civil), and intolerance. Thus, it is somewhat paradoxical that the primary literatures in political psychology have largely followed the script of conservative critique of democratic rule and public incompetence while ignoring the issue of elite performance (Herzog, 1998; Sartori, 1987).

Two literatures assess the competence of publics in their role as rulers and followers as the principal targets of investigations. The first and older debate involves defenders of aristocratic rule railing against democratic excess and defenders of democracy attacking elite rule as corrupt oligarchy. The second and more recent debate is the post-enlightenment expectation that democratic rule would be pregnant with possibilities for peace and commonwealth as autocratic rule and hierarchical traditions gave way to systematic knowledge generation through broad public education and the institutions of science and technology. Secularization and economic desires, in this view, would supplant passions rooted in tradition and devotions to

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[1] Setting aside direct, or participatory, variants of democratic rule as unlikely to find much purchase in large and heterogenous societies that have popular forms of governance (Mansbridge, 1980; Pateman, 1970).

faith with reasoned self-interest (Condorcet, 1795, 1847; Hume, 1984; Smith, 1986). The failure of these benefits to emerge "naturally" as science flourished, technology, and the expanded role for the public in the determination of public affairs, has largely lead to blaming the public—hence the inquiry into citizen competence.[2]

Let me begin this commentary with a brief account to raise the appropriate context to assess the contributions herein. Hobbes (1968) famously contended that no basis for collective rule was legitimate other than that based on popular sovereignty—though he hoped that the public would cede their authority to the Leviathan. So, for good or ill, since his then radical assertion that monarchial rule depended on popular support, popular sovereignty has been the bedrock of even the most dictatorial governments—at least to the extent of securing the veneer of public endorsement (referendum—uncontested elections, intimidation, etc.).

In order for this expanded citizen involvement to be meaningful, it must ultimately embrace conflict in the public realm. That is the case because public conflict in a democratic regime serves a number of fundamental purposes. First, conflict enables the public to have an array of choices as to what policies to attend to and what policy positions to support or oppose. Second, conflict ensures that the public will have choices as to which individuals or teams will be elevated to formal positions of leadership and authority. Third, and perhaps the most important, conflict ensures that accounts—why we should do this, or that; who is responsible for success or failure; and so forth—presented in public will be examined by friends and by foes in the crucible of contentious public deliberation (Coser, 1956; Dewey, 1938; Dewey & Bentley, 1949; Schattschneider, 1960; Sundquist, 1973).[3] All of this is to preface a claim I will explore more thoroughly below: the search for harmony as a characteristic of democratic citizenship must be matched by the search for the willingness and capacity of all democratic citizens to engage in political conflict.

The rebalancing of considerations—to weigh civility and harmony less and eagerness for and ability to engage in political conflict more—may seem strange in light of the historic concern about an unruly public (Herzog, 1998; Le Bon, 1986; Plato, 1974). The worry that giving the public greater

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[2] Elite performance has not gone without notice (Barber, 1985; Janis, 1982; Tetlock, 2005) and often been found to be wanting.

[3] The special role of the media in this process should be noted. And, in light of recent events in the United States, the actual ability of the media to serve as a public watchdog and as critical and even caustic participants as servants of the public's right to know can be easily manipulated by a variety of forces.

authority to more fully participate in governance has largely been based on claims of intemperate ineptitude, even though these assertions are principally advanced by those who have claims on that same authority and have little wish to see their influence diminished (Herzog, 1998). So, we might well be suspicious of the claim that the public's competence is the most crucial issue that confronts us, especially when most definitions of citizen competence begin with requirements of forbearance.[4] Most considerations of citizen competence begin with high standards for tolerance, social and political, as well as a demand for Herculean levels of political knowledge. In broad brush, before citizens can wear the mantle of citizenship, they should show that they can act responsibly and knowledgably. Rarely is the citizen, when competence is discussed, held to a standard of eagerness to engage in political battle (though see Rosenblum, 1999 and Young, 1990, 2000).The concern for harmony and civility, while not unimportant, pales in comparison to what is most absent in the politics of advanced democratic republics—that all of its citizens have fears and cynicism about political participation abated in order to act in pursuit of claims of justice and equality. This commentary thus argues that focusing on the fear of democratic politics and the role that citizens ought to play therein is the more critical issue in light of the unwillingness of so many of the public to engage in democratic politics (Doppelt & Shearer, 1999; Fromm, 1965; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Mansbridge, 1980). According to that literature, too many in the public are prevented from active political participation by their own fears, alienation, and cynicism.[5]

The theoretical approaches used to gain purchase on these questions often meet two significant limitations. First, political psychology is rather blind to the role of institutions and history on human behavior. Certainly since Durkheim (1951) but even earlier with Burke (1973), de Tocqueville (1978), and Oakeshott (1975), we have known how potent institutional practices are in guiding, often in unobtrusive ways, political behavior. Similarly, the Founding Fathers were well aware of the role of history in

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[4] Historically, the principal argument advanced against democratic rule has been the assertion of claim that democratic rule is too turbulent, that it allows an unfettered majority to cast aside claims of justice or the rights of the minority to satisfy whatever immediate impulse has arisen among the many. Hence, the ability of the majority to be mindful of the rights of all—the claims of justice—has been thought to be a pivotal quality that, if absent, would undermine the claims of democratic rule to be a rule of justice and able to advance the public, not just the majority's, enduring interests.

[5] Some of which is a rational response to the circumstances they confront—hostility by a variety of systems of authority in which people find themselves, a paucity of democratic institutions able and willing to endorse and support activist efforts, and more.

shaping mass behavior—Alexander Hamilton (2003), for example, expected that the passage of time would add legitimacy to the Constitution. While some psychological studies have explored the role of context—for example, Stewart McCann's work on threat and its impact on leadership criteria (McCann, 1997)—on the balance, the primary approach has been experimental research. This approach typically relies on well-designed experiments with random assignment and variations of some selected factors, though, given its relatively decontextualized nature, it would do well to remind ourselves that while very widespread in political psychology, it is not the only approach to explanation. And, while it is not impossible to gain purchase on context in experiments—an excellent exemplar can be found on the series of experiments exploring Terror Management Theory (Landau et al., 2004)—it is relatively rare.

Second, most of these accounts are also deeply committed to cognitive explanations. That is to say, these accounts explain behavior as a function of beliefs, schemas, and other forms of semantic-based memory on the one hand, and semantic contemporary communications, for example, persuasive messages, on the other.[6] This is sensible if cognitive accounts can provide an exhaustive and comprehensive explanation for human behavior. However, for at least 20 years now psychologists have identified independent roles for affective and cognitive processes (Zajonc, 1980). With the work done in that vein over the past two decades, especially that in political science (Neuman, Marcus, Crigler, & MacKuen, 2007; Redlawsk, 2006), it is clear that affective processes may directly influence behavior (in conjunction with but also apart from cognitive processes) and can also shape cognition itself (Marcus, 2002).

The often decontextualized and cognitive-centric approach to political participation misses the larger problem, that is, the American public is ill-prepared and finds unattractive the particular demands of citizenship in a political context that is highly conflict-laden. Among these are the willingness to join together with others in pursuit of some political aim, the willingness to confront others devoted to contrary aims, the willingness to support the rights of all to act in public while being challenged by unpopular groups and positions, and the willingness to act in the defense of others who need aid even as your own interests are not impacted. As examples, consider the large array of people who joined the civil rights movement in the 1960s who were not themselves subject to public and private acts of racial discrimination, or those who joined the antiwar movement in the 1960s and 1970s who were not themselves subject to the draft. The willingness to speak

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[6] There is a wealth of work on affect in psychology though it largely focuses on the role of affect in prejudice and habit (Haidt, 2001; Sears, 2000).

up, to join in, to fight for a cause, and to defend the rights of all (even the most odious) to do so make up the principal tenets of democratic citizenship. Yet, few of the contributions in this volume, and political psychology more broadly, has much to say on these matters, despite the fact that these matters have long been known to be problematic features of democratic politics in the United States (Gibson & Bingham, 1985; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002; Mansbridge, 1980; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982).

More important than most typical markers of citizen competence is the ability to judge a situation and place oneself in the tripartite taxonomy of foes, friends, and bystanders (Schattschneider, 1960). It is that initial assessment, joined with the courage to act, that shapes the course of political action. Consider, for example, the civic skills necessary for effective engagement in a political movement (among historical examples, the antiwar movement in the Vietnam period or the pro-life movement following the *Roe v. Wade* decision). Ultimately, the skills necessary for political action in these examples are fundamentally different from those incumbent upon a voter confronting a referendum initiative to fund a state program in support of stem cell research. The differences between these examples extend far beyond differences in topical areas. The more important difference is that when engaged in a movement or cause, citizens need to know that their cause is just, that those with whom they have allied are equally steadfast, that their opponents will do what they can to delay or fray the movement, and so on.

When confronting something new or novel, citizens thus have a different type of challenge. In such circumstances, old established convictions—what they have learned even to the point of embedding these lessons in "automatic" heuristics such as ideological and partisan affiliations to guide recurring decisions—must be cast aside. Old knowledge must be discarded and replaced with contemporaneously acquired knowledge specific to the immediate challenge. What people must know depends on the circumstances in which they find themselves. Ignoring the context and setting forth an arbitrary array of things that all citizens should know is to set forth a test that citizens will fail.

The failure to understand that knowledge absent some political purpose is not useful leads to inattention to dynamics. Democratic politics presents a variety of situations, each demanding different types of civic skills. When the conflict is well established with clear combatants and clear stakes, the use of information is most often of value in its ability to motivate and to help defend against opposition efforts to undermine and deflect purpose. In this situation, information has value in its ability to help defend a cause and secure solidarity. In such circumstances, people will rely on decision strategies

that sound like "group think," though in such circumstances solidarity and certainty are not pathological but essential and strategically appropriate.

However, when circumstances are marked by change and uncertainty, the need for information is quite different. Here, when circumstances are not as they have been, and when established strategies can no longer be expected to yield familiar results, what is needed is information that can address the novelty and unknown character of the moment. And in such circumstances, citizens elicit a decision strategy that is explicit and formal (generally classified as deliberation). Different circumstances require difference competencies, articulated in an appropriate manner. The dual-citizenship roles of both partisan and deliberative judge should be made manifest in every citizen, but only within the appropriate political context—the former in familiar conflicts and the latter in novel circumstances (Marcus, 2002).

ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTIONS: THE "POLITICS AS CONFLICT" VIEW

The above theorization, arguing that context-specific civic skills are necessary for effective citizenship, suggests a lens through which to offer constructive commentary on how the research presented in this volume informs our understanding of democratic governance. Research on hate crimes, tolerance, diversity, and stereotyping sheds light on the dark impulses that stand in the way of realizing the ideals of cosmopolitan affection and shared experience in pursuit of a beneficent commonwealth. As Judd and Park argue, harmonious relationships offer a path to realizing those ideals. But while individuation and harmony are important, democratic politics also requires conflict, and that requires partisan divisions and partisan loyalty.

Reflecting of Judd and Park's principal argument, early political science research on tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982) suggests a degree of caution in securing tolerance solely through correcting stereotypical information. First, Sullivan et al. (1982) conclude that the causal factors bringing about social and political tolerance are quite different. Comprehension of and commitment to the norms and principles of democracy plays an influential role in encouraging political tolerance, but no role at all (in the same population) in enhancing social tolerance. Moreover, in a study of a middle school curriculum based on that work, researchers found that exposing students to groups they disliked, while also learning about the norms of democracy (the principles of free speech and universal access of all citizens to execute political acts), had the desired effect of enhancing political tolerance (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammer, 1992). However, that same research also

found that while enhancing political tolerance in the students, their initial dislike, animus, against their disliked groups became even stronger. Thus, the approach proposed by Judd and Park is likely to be more consequential for social than for political tolerance. Moreover, as I have argued above, conflict is the devise that Madison and others endorsed to serve as the catalytic device to ensure that political claims were put to epistemological challenges, insofar as the nature of public interest is one that is fabricated by political processes (rather than anchored in tradition, devotion, or piety, or given to some learned authority). And, of course, conflict provides for clear political alternatives so that those with political authority will and can be held accountable. So, a focus on greater harmony can, if to the exclusion of other considerations, have the pernicious consequence of undermining the most crucial aspect of democracy—the fulsome agonistic engagement between contending groups over who is to hold authority for the next period of rule and which among contending policies to endorse.

Green and Wong follow a similar approach. While I am persuaded that heterogeneous contact can induce more tolerance, it is important to question, "which kind of tolerance?" The items used in their research are largely apolitical and are thus good benchmarks to draw conclusions about social tolerance, but are not likely to be applicable to political tolerance. And, while heterogeneous contact seems to help social tolerance, this path is likely to be less fruitful than it might seem. The demographic experience of late suggests that there is less and less contact as communities become more homogeneous, segmented by race, age, and class, and as more and as more people live solitary rather than collective lives. As a result, in the future, individuals will, given current trends, have declining numbers of interactions, homogeneous or heterogeneous (Cacioppo & Hawkley, 2005). While interracial and other forms of heterogeneous group contact might increase, it is not a given that it will be widespread or reach those who are most disinclined to engage in a more diverse and cosmopolitan culture.

Peffley and Hurwitz make the pertinent point that social psychologists offer their contributions to political psychology largely ignorant of the political science literature. I endorse that conclusion but would add another: they don't know or understand much about politics. It has long been a major claim in the political science literature that heuristics are potent facets of political judgment, noting in particular the important role of partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1944). And, in a diverse, large, and heterogeneous society, some collective identities, be they based on partisan identification with national or local parties, or groups based on racial or class or ideological convictions, are unavoidable. As such they are an essential element if democratic governance is to be based on the

challenges of conflicts to see which partisan group has the greater support and the better claims. But, as has been established by research in the political science literature, reliance on stereotypes is not constant. Reliance on stereotypes is robust when conditions are familiar but that same reliance is largely inhibited and hence set aside when conditions are uncertain (Brader, 2005, 2006; MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000). Hence, reliance on stereotypes is not only functional but also dynamically strengthened and abandoned depending on the political context.

It would be hard to identify a topic more central to democratic citizenship than research on how citizens make decisions and how they engage in politics, as elaborated by the contributors in "Persuasion and Interventions." The section begins with a contribution by Hall, Goren, Chaiken, and Todorov showing how preconscious appraisals of faces can shape political judgments. This is an important contribution since it is often thought that democratic citizens ought be able to formulate deliberate and explicit judgments so that their reasoning can be accurately shared with friends and foes. Finding that their judgments have implicit and even inaccessible foundations challenges that common account.

This contribution relies on the work in social psychology that has come to be characterized as "dual-process models" of decision making. The research supports their claim that "first" or "gut" impressions derived form initial visual assessments of candidates can be a potent influence on voter decision making, and they are right in considering how other factors like partisan identification would have "real-world" influence given dual-process mechanisms. But work already available in political science (Brader, 2005, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000) not only documents the influence of contemporary information (such as issue considerations and candidate qualities) and historical convictions (notably partisan affiliation and ideological congruence) but also shows that the relative weight given to "shallow" and "deep" cues is dynamic across circumstances rather than constant. Hall and colleagues place their work with the "dual-process model" approach. At about the same time as dual-process models were introduced into psychology (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), at least one other was being independently developed in political science (Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993).[7] And, while the psychological literature contributed the useful observation that peripheral (or automatic) and central (or self-aware deliberative) are both available to most people (Chaiken & Trope, 1999) as well as considering

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[7] The explicit application of the terminology of "dual process" in what became the theory of affective intelligence was not done until the later work (Marcus, 2002; Marcus et al., 2000).

various explanations for why these two modes of decision making coexist (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), the political science stream was developing a similar insight by providing an account of when and why people engage in effortful consideration and why, at other times, they are complacently reliant on extant heuristics (Neuman et al., 2007). This theoretic dichotomy ultimately has consequences on Hall et al.'s interpretive perspective. Specifically, while Hall and colleagues treat the dual modes of decision making as a spatial matter ("shallow" or "deep"), the theory of affective intelligence treats the dual modes of decision making as a temporal matter (with affective processes being fast in "automatic" and deliberative processes being slow and articulated only in novel circumstances). Thus, while the research reported here advances a useful point, much like that advanced by Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989), it is rather undernourished—largely because social psychologists have not, in the main, engaged that parallel literature.

Jerit, Kuklinski, and Quirk link political environment, emotion, and voter decision making in an imaginative program to embed people as they are, in real contexts, seeking to form judgments that address the conditions in which they find themselves. In this project, there is much to laud, including the core distinction between anxiety and anger and as well resurrecting perhaps the oldest theme in politics that is the role of political rhetoric in engaging the public (Aristotle, 1954). The capacity to move people by appealing to their emotions is a justly vital topic and worth the attention they give to the topic. To develop a more fully elaborated model would require devoting still more attention to the differences between conditions that induce anger and how anger shapes judgment and action as opposed to the conditions that induce anxiety and how anxiety quite differently shapes judgment (Marcus, 2002). Finally, much is made of the unaligned and "those who want to make the best and most objective choices," as if the first are of much consequence and as if the latter is possible. Each of these claims is suspect. The role of "independents" is often, as here, overestimated first because, at least in the United States, they are a very small slice of the general electorate, and second because their contribution to electoral results is overwhelmed by partisan defections, as for example, Reagan Democrats in 1980 and 1984 or Clinton Republicans in 1996 (MacKuen et al., 2007). And, as to the prospect for securing an objective and "best" choice, the conditions for "objectivity" flow from first and foremost an assessment of the political environment—what is "best" depends first on a judgment of the strategic political environment. And, as I have noted above, conditions of familiarity lead to different decision approaches than do conditions of uncertainty. And, it is emotions that, through swift preconscious appraisals, identify precisely what the immediate strategic consequence is. For example, enthusiasm, the core positive

emotion, works by identifying familiar and rewarding conditions, engaging and articulating reliance on extant convictions. As Aristotle (see above) and research since demonstrate, politicians, having gained the attention of their audience, must express their confidence in a fashion that will mobilize the enthusiasm of the public they hope to lead (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000).

Similarly, Snyder, Omoto, and Smith are writing largely inattentive to politics. In particular, little distinction is made between involvement in partisan and social movements (Gusfield, 1986) as opposed to deliberative moments (Fishkin, 1991). Moreover, the authors are inattentive to political science literature on campaign and political involvement (Conway, 1990; Milbrath & Goel, 1977; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Rudolph, Gangl, & Stevens, 2000; Teske, 1997; Verba & Nie, 1972) so that it's hard to see where and how this contribution advances our understanding of political involvement (not to mention the vast literature on media effects in the communication subfield). Finally, "volunteerism" is not a particularly fundamental aspect of citizenship (Schudson, 1998). Civics is nice but nice is not the core of politics. Politics is a fight, often dirty and intense, over vital issues and vital stakes. The central agenda for research ought to focus on what enables and motivates citizens to act when the need for courage is great, when the promise of success is modest at best, and when costs are high. For unless citizens are willing to commit themselves in such situations they, and we, will be marginal in our capacity to rule (Schattschneider, 1960).

Snyder, Omoto, and Smith's project could be improved by taking as its starting point the debate in political science regarding the respective place and value of deliberative politics (Fishkin, 1991; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996) and of agonistic politics (Sanders, 1997; Shapiro, 1999). There are multiple forms of citizenship, both deliberative and partisan, and each has its apt role. In the debate between those who espouse deliberation and those who espouse steadiness of purpose, the authors would have found that persuasion in politics has various purposes: on the one hand, to sustain solidarity and purpose; or, on the other hand, to set aside extant convictions for thoughtful consideration of all options to those challenges now before us. Persuasion tactics are useful but their usefulness depends on the political strategy.

The part on group identity begins with a claim similar to that advanced in the Green and Wong contribution in Part I. Brewer argues that more complex identities better prepare people for the demands of citizenship in plural and diverse societies. Perhaps, but pieties about a willingness to be accepting to one and all through social identities that are tolerant and groups that are heterogeneous seem to leave people unprepared for politics and conflict therein. The principal problem of modern pluralistic advanced democratic

societies such as the United States is not the lack of harmony, but rather getting people to engage each other in repeated conflictual situations (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1995, 2002; Mutz, 2002, 2006). Even in familiar and recurring contexts, such as the New England town meeting, many find themselves going with trepidation intimidated by the challenge of confrontation and the demands of public speaking (Mansbridge, 1980). We need more of the contentious citizen able and willing to speak up (Rosenblum, 1999) and not the pieties encouraging civic docility and harmony. Of course, it would be useful to acknowledge that too much conflict can overwhelm a society and thrust it into civil disorder and war (the U.S. Civil War comes readily to mind as would any number of other historical examples). Hence, calling for more conflict can be misunderstood as an unhinged and thoughtless call for ever more conflict. To clarify, then, suffice it to say that a polity that does not prepare its citizens to master the challenges of political conflict is likely to find too many of its citizens fleeing from the distastefulness of even the milder forms of confrontation and that democratic politics must find plentiful if it is to have any vibrant purpose.[8]

Conover also endorses a path to citizenship by adopting a cosmopolitan definition of citizenship. And, while harmonious relations might well replace divisive and multicultural disputes, that eliminates the role of politics rather than enriching it. There is an alternative route to restraining disputes that would breach norms of acceptable conflict, and that is to encourage not just mutual recognition but also, and perhaps more forcefully, to teach the norms of democracy, the principles of free expression and free association, and so on. That is to say, instead of a focus on the shared identity of mutual recognition, I recommend that we advance a renewed commitment to democratic norms (cf. tolerance literature I previously cited), all of which is to suggest that there are rules and obligations that apply to all citizens irrespective of their identity.

Part V on technology and mass media offers important insights into the current practices of news presentation in the United States. Gamson's contribution is a useful examination of framing and media coverage. Gamson shows how the evolved practice of news coverage imposes certain established narrative schemes on recurring topics. But more importantly, he argues that the specific narratives largely disempower citizens from effective collective understanding and action. Bennett explores how the decline in public policy influence on the coverage of the news and the concomitant

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[8] And, it that recognition that has fueled the research into the study of political efficacy, or more precisely its lack (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982; Craig & Niemi, 1988; Rudolph et al., 2000) and alienation (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Doppelt & Shearer, 1999).

rise in commercial criteria has degraded the quality and quantity of news coverage critical for an informed and mobilized citizenry. This degradation is seen as the inevitable consequence of the demand for securing increased profit and treating news divisions as profit centers (thereby replacing journalist considerations for economic) has fostered stories that avoid conflict rather than political agency. There are other telling concerns—the decrease of budgets for the news; the advancement of profit over journalist criteria; the decline of searching inquiry into truth; the unwillingness to reveal who's lying; and the numerous examples of the press' unwillingness to pursue and investigate. What then are the institutional and psychological basis for resuscitating the journalistic enterprise? The decline of the norm of journalist as investigator, willing to stand against the rich and powerful, and instead the rise of journalist as pundit and adherent to the interests of the powerful to secure a public position of celebrity is an additional concern. This critical review of the news-generating and -disseminating institutions, what we normally mean by the "media" (in a less visual world, the "press"), bolsters my earlier point: the focus on elite performance is an important corrective to the more popular concern with the purported shortcomings of the public.

The final section reconsiders political information and its relationship to democratic citizenship. I begin with the question: "What role is information to play in democratic governance?" The standard accounts argue that citizens ought minimally understand the "who" and the "what" of political representation. For example, citizens ought to know who their congressional representative is, and what the length of tenure for Supreme Court justices is. This civic test approach to information is longstanding and is the primary evidence in support of the claim of citizen ignorance (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993, 1996). Let me set aside the obvious point that in the past, poll taxes and literacy tests were largely utilized to disenfranchise those too poor or too "ignorant" (in the United States, these were largely meant to target former slaves newly enfranchised and thus a threat to the established white and agrarian order).

Is the model of civic knowledge what is really needed? As I argued earlier, I think this model fails to mesh with appropriate standards for citizen competence. Rather, we should prepare people to recognize and then participate in structured conflicts—both extant and those looming unseen over the horizon. And, even more than gathering knowledge, individuals should have the knowledge that enables them to join in a political conflict and to pick a side. Republicans and Democrats stand for an array of divergent policy positions, and these positions reflect deep differences regarding how societies best function (Lakoff, 2002). And, while these positions do shift over

time (Carmines & Stimson, 1989), at any given time the positions of the two major parties are fairly stable and determinative of the interests and forces at play. Indeed, one of the critiques advanced by Converse is that the public is largely unaware of the political universe as defined by the dominant national parties (Converse, 1964). That a democracy will battle in an enduring fashion the compelling but competing claims of equality (equal treatment realized by a robust government) and liberty (security of one's autonomy of action) requires that if the public is to shape the outcome of the sundry battles between these compelling values it must have the playbill well in hand at the outset of the conflict. Moreover, that playbill should focus less on who one's congressional representative is, and more on which interests are cloaking their efforts in the language of liberty, and on which interests are cloaking their efforts in the language of equality.

Johnson offers an additional answer to what information is most worthwhile. His attention to political engagement as a task rather than as an intention is important and welcome because, as he notes, much of our behavior is driven not by knowledge and a top–down scheme of purpose learning but by embedded procedures largely absorbed through mimicry. This squares nicely with recent work in psychology and neuroscience that most knowledge is non-semantic. This research argues that what we think and explicitly know is both limited and rather more commentary than executive (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Gigerenzer, Todd, & ABC Research Group, 1999). People do not have the ability to convert all they know into comprehensible semantic accounts. And, especially with respect to preferences, perhaps the most important of political variables, extensive research has shown that asking people to account for their preferences often leads to erroneous confabulations (Wilson, 2002; Wilson & Dunn, 1986; Wilson, Dunn, Kraft, & Lisle, 1989; Wilson, Hodges, & LaFleur, 1995). Hence, using implicit testing procedures may be a better way to gain access to "automated" preferences (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004; Egloff & Schmukle, 2002; Phelps et al., 2000). Moreover, knowledge (semantic and non-semantic) is useful to the extent it supports functions— the "civic" function, to know about the general operations of democratic political procedures and who holds office, is only one task and of modest value at that. Consider, for example, that moral action seems to be less a top–down application of Kantian principles than an instantaneous application of embedded norms (Haidt, 2001; Monroe, 1996) as is most action (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). And, in politics, the moments that compel action arise not so often out of self-initiation but in response to the actions of others seeking our involvement, to which we can either respond or turn away (Schattschneider, 1960).

Monroe's study of heroic action by some to save Jews from Nazi persecution (Monroe, 1996) found that those who acted did so without any apparent reliance on knowledge or reliance on prior habits. Indeed, it was only on repeated questioning by themselves and by others that they crafted a retrospective account. The citizen's understanding of "civic" behavior may ultimately tell us, and the citizen, relatively little about when to actually join a cause or to "act up." Knowledge is more likely to flow from action rather than to lead to action. Specifically, group actions that express some vital motivation—to redress injustice or to achieve some joint purpose—seek to spurs us to join them and to take action. And the response to these moments on the part of spectators is likely to be based not so much on civic knowledge as on more pragmatic and critical judgments; for example, can we trust the leaders who promise much and direct strategically?

I've tried in this commentary to advance a more agonistic view of citizenship than is expressed in most accounts of democratic citizenship. I do so because in a full-throated democracy, democratic citizens have important responsibilities that can only be realized in public conflict. This consideration is important because of the fragility of good intentions (they often lead to consequences not only unintended but often pernicious) and because democracies will most often confront not a choice between the good and the bad but a variety of worthy claims. Unfortunately for the many devotees of philosophic models of deliberation (Fishkin, 1991; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Kant, 1970a, 1970b; Rawls, 1971, 1997), real democratic politics will look less like a deliberative forum with an attentive public sorting out the opinions of experts and look more like a battle wherein intensity is limited by rules that give each person a vote rather than a spear to cast. How to prepare citizens for the real world of politics is a challenge the academy has not as yet engaged.

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Index